Abstract: This factsheet looks into Jewish education in the UK and the rest of Europe, highlighting parents’ different motives when choosing a Jewish or non-Jewish school for their children. The paper draws data from three sources: previous JPR research on school registration numbers, a 2018 pan-European study sponsored by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), conducted by a joint JPR-Ipsos team, and JPR’s spring 2023 survey of Jews in the UK.
Some of the key findings in this factsheet:
The number of Jewish children attending Jewish schools has increased significantly over time and is expected to reach about 40,000 by the mid-2020s;
In the UK, the number of children attending Haredi schools outnumbers the number of Jewish children in mainstream Jewish schools by about three to two.
Parents in the UK, France and across Europe are most likely to point to a desire for their child to develop a strong Jewish identity as a motive for registering their children to a Jewish school;
Jewish identity is followed in most places by a desire for their children to have friends with similar values, with the exception of France, where concern about antisemitism in non-Jewish schools is a more common motive;
In the UK and France, the most common motive for parents to send their children to a non-Jewish school is actively preferring a non-Jewish (integrated) environment, cited by about two-thirds of all such parents in both countries;
Convenience also commonly features as a reason not to send children to a Jewish school, coming second on the list in the UK and France, and topping it elsewhere in Europe.
Academic standards and availability are also marked highly as reasons parents prefer a non-Jewish school for their children, particularly in the UK.
Abstract: На протяжении почти 30 лет, прошедших после распада СССР в 1991 году, численность еврейского населения Беларуси постоянно сокращалась вследствие ассимиляции, естественной убыли (депопуляции) и особенно ‑ эмиграции из страны. Еврейские общинные организации оценивают численность еврейского населения республики на сегодняшний момент либо 9-15, либо 30-40 тысяч человек. Тем не менее, в стране действует разветвленная сеть городских, религиозных, культурных и других еврейских организаций, объединенных в три, иногда соперничающие друг с другом «зонтичные» структуры. Лоббистские возможности еврейских организаций, которые в Беларуси, в отличие от иных постсоветских республик, не находятся под опекой крупного частного бизнеса или межрегиональных еврейских объединений, ограничены и потому фактически зависят от личных связей отдельных общинных лидеров с представителями власти. Интерес широкой публики к еврейской истории и культуре; желание властей превратить еврейскую историю Беларуси в дипломатический и политический бренд и продвижение, в рамках политики развития туризма в стране, идеи международного еврейского паломничества к «сакральным иудейским объектам», по аналогии с паломничеством иудеев на Украину в период осенних праздников ‑ перспективы общинной жизни Беларуси в ближайшие годы.
Abstract: Идущий в России очередной виток дискуссии о ликвидации ряда «дотационных» национальных автономий путем их слияния с более состоятельными в хозяйственном и бюджетном смысле соседними регионами страны, напрямую касается и возможного изменения статуса основанной в мае 1934 года Еврейской автономной области. Хотя мотивы данного шага преимущественно финансово-экономические, лишение ЕАО, единственного оставшегося в мире примера, пусть на декларативном уровне, реализации «территориалистской» модели национального самоопределения еврейского народа, нанесет немалый символический и содержательный ущерб российской еврейской общине и стране в целом. Особенно, если принять во внимание идущий в последние десятилетия в области процесс возрождения еврейской культурной жизни и то, что сама по себе ЕАО, как бренд, может в долгосрочной перспективе оказаться экономически эффективен.
Abstract: В конце прошлого, 2018го и начале этого 2019 года были опубликованы очередные доклады израильских, российских и украинских организаций, вовлеченных в процесс мониторинга появлений антисемитизма и ксенофобии на просторах бывшего СССР, и прежде всего – в России и Украине. Факты и выводы этих документов стали богатым информационным поводом и предметом оживленной дискуссии представителей политических кругов этих стран и различных фракций постсоветских еврейских элит. Основные разногласия связаны с темой классификации тех или иных событий в качестве антисемитских проявлений. Точкой соприкосновения сторонников разных подходов является стремление уделять особое внимание не только прямым физическими преступлениями или вандализма на почве ненависти к евреям, но и таким сюжетам как подстрекательство, попытки диффамации евреев и Израиля, отрицание Катастрофы, и антисемитизм, замаскированный под «антисионизм».
В конце прошлого, 2018-го и начале этого 2019 года вниманию общественности были представлены очередные доклады организаций, вовлеченных в процесс мониторинга появлений антисемитизма и ксенофобии на просторах бывшего СССР, и прежде всего – в России и Украине. Где тема отношения властей и общества к евреям стала заметным элементом психологической, дипломатической и информационной активности, сопровождающей уже более чем четырехлетний тяжелый конфликт между двумя странами. Не случайно, что факты и выводы документов, представленных в нынешней – как и прошлогодней серии докладов, стали богатым информационным поводом и предметом оживленной дискуссии представителей политических кругов этих стран и различных фракций постсоветских еврейских элит
Abstract: Катастрофа европейского еврейства привела к почти полному исчезновению еврейской общины Германии. Чудо случилось в 1990-х годах, когда русскоязычные евреи стали тысячами прибывать в эту страну. Для местных евреев неожиданная иммиграция казалась удачным шансом, выпавшим еврейским сообществам и обществу в целом. Однако первое поколение русско-еврейских иммигрантов столкнулось с большим числом социальных проблем и трудностей интеграции на рынок труда. К этому следует добавить культурное отчуждение от немецкого общества и серьезные различия в культуре, ментальности и идентичности с местными еврейскими общинами. А также конфликты между старожилами и новоприбывшими относительно желаемых моделей организации еврейской жизни – в силу чего и через тридцать лет после начала иммиграции русские евреи все еще мало представлены в общенациональном еврейском руководстве. И все же, впервые после окончания Второй мировой войны у еврейских общин Германии появился шанс построить плюралистическую модель религиозных, культурных, образовательных и политических проектов. Второе поколение русских евреев Германии не сталкивается с проблемами интеграции, подобные проблемам родителей, и большинство из этого поколения вольется в немецкий средний класс и профессиональную элиту страны – или уже находятся там. Но при этом совершенно непонятно пока, до какой степени второе поколение русских евреев будет искать собственные корни, интересоваться еврейским наследием и участвовать в жизни еврейских общин.
Abstract: Концепция «двойной лояльности» в еврейском случае подразумевает, что еврей стоит на стороне Израиля вне зависимости от страны своего проживания, а принцип Талмуда, известный как «Закон государства обязателен для исполнения евреями» (Дина де-мальхута дина) часто рассматривается как требование к еврею придерживаться лояльности тому государству, где он живет. Попытка многих советских евреев, на разных этапах послевоенной истории этой страны, совмещать патриотизм в отношении страны проживания и преданность Израилю, воспринимался властями СССР как вызов и повод для репрессивных кампаний. Нынешняя ситуация в постсоветских странах в целом иная, и ближе к подходу современных демократических государств, признающих феномен «поли-лояльности» и двойного гражданства, закрепленного межправительственными соглашениями и программами о развитии культурных, научных, деловых и других связей.
Abstract: After 1989, post-communist countries such as Poland and Moldova have been faced with the challenge of
reinventing their national identity and rewriting their master narratives, shifting from a communist one to an
ethnic-patriotic one. In this context, the fate of local Jews and the actions of Poles and Moldovans during the
Holocaust have repeatedly proven difficult or even impossible to incorporate into the new national narrative. As
a result, Holocaust denial in various forms initially gained ground in post-communist countries, since denying
the Holocaust, or blaming it on someone else, even on the Jews themselves, was the easiest way to strengthen
national identities. In later years, however, Polish and Moldovan paths towards re-definition of self have taken
different paths. At least in part, this can be explained as a product of Poland's incorporation in the European
unification project, while Moldova remains in limbo, both in terms of identity and politics – between the Soviet
Union and Europe, between the past and the future.
Abstract: This article studies eight European countries, investigating how the level of antisemitism as
registered in national populations relates to the perception of antisemitism by the Jewish
population in the same country. Furthermore, the article empirically identifies distinct aspects
of antisemitism, deconstructing the concept of antisemitism and breaking it up into three
kinds of empirically differently based and composed antisemitisms (Note the plural!): classic
antisemitism, Israel-derived antisemitism and Enlightenment-based antisemitism. The article
also elaborates on some more general implications for the understanding of the character of
antisemitism in contemporary Europe, and based on that, presents some perspectives on the
development of the three distinct antisemitisms in contemporary Europe.
The countries included in the article are Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Latvia, Sweden and the United Kingdom, but a special focus is placed on Sweden because
the situation in Sweden concerning antisemitism and the Jewish population’s reactions to
perceived antisemitism is particularly illustrative of some of the main points we can make
based on our investigations.
Abstract: Recent negative economic, political, and anti-Semitic developments in Europe, question the future thriving of Jewish life on the old continent.
According to a large-scale survey on Jewish people’s experiences and perceptions of anti-Semitism commissioned by the EU's Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), in three of the nine states surveyed (namely Belgium, France and Hungary), between 40-50% of respondents said they had considered emigrating from their country of residence because they did not feel safe there. Moreover, some 200-300 Jewish families of French origin have recently immigrated to Montreal, and at least 120 families to London.
Beyond the Aliyah of 50,000 French Jews since 1990 (10% of French Jewry), new-immigrant associations claim there are some 20-30,000 additional French Jews who live part of the year in Israel but for convenience – and in order to avoid Israeli bureaucracy – prefer not to take Israeli citizenship.
Despite the trends outlined above, benefiting from relatively high social, professional, and economic personal status, most European Jews will in all likelihood remain in Europe.
Abstract: Demographic research by the Jewish social organization JMW shows that three-quarters of the Dutch Jewish community, which numbers about 30,000, is not organized in one of the three religious organizations-the Ashkenazi, Progressive, and Portuguese. Among other things, this means they do not send their children to a Jewish school and, if they are ill, do not go to the Jewish hospital. Close to half of the Jews live in Amsterdam and the adjacent southern suburb of Amstelveen.
The immigration of Muslims and the rise of Islam in the Netherlands have created problems for the Jewish community and will continue to do so. There are about one million Muslims in the Netherlands. Their influence on the political system is increasing. This cannot be positive for the Jews. The more power the Muslim community gains, the more it will weaken the Jewish community’s relations with a number of ministries.
The Jewish community faces increasing anti-Semitism. This has led to enhanced security measures. It also threatens to intensify attitudes based on fear.
An important element in Dutch Jewish history over the past decade was the restitution negotiations. As a result, the Dutch government made a payment of 400 million guilders (180 million Euros) to the Dutch community. Banks, insurance companies, and the stock exchange made additional payments that totaled 340 million guilders (155 million Euros).
Abstract: During wars, Jewish communities often become scapegoats and victims of the combatants. In the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s, the opposite happened. The Jewish community in the country’s capital Sarajevo extended humanitarian services indiscriminately to people of all religions and was respected by the three warring parties, Muslims, Orthodox Serbs, and Roman Catholic Croats.
Support from the American Joint Distribution Committee and other foreign groups enabled the Jewish community to provide free food, medicine, as well as radio and mail services.
During the battle for Sarajevo the Jewish community evacuated a thousand Jews and two thousand non-Jews in eleven convoys and planes.
At present, six Jewish communities remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a total of a thousand members. Of these seven hundred are in Sarajevo and the remainder in Mostar, Zenica, Tuzla, Banja Luka, and Doboj.
Abstract: At least twenty thousand Jews live in Poland. The two leading organizations, the Union of Jewish Communities and the Cultural and Social Association of Jews, each have about two thousand members.
The subject of Jews and Poland involves three interrelated matters. The first concerns what is currently happening to the Jews living in Poland. The second is Poland’s Jewish heritage, including its physical remnants: cemeteries, synagogues, communal and private property. The third has to do with the nature of Polish- Jewish relations.
Poland is still in a major state of flux. Since 1989, official Poland has wanted to reexamine its relations with the Jews. The main reasons for this are the teachings of Pope John Paul II, Poland’s admiration for the United States, and the rejection among the younger generation of everything their parents and grandparents stood for.
Although the main government force, the Law and Justice Party, is not anti- Semitic, the coalition now contains an anti-Semitic party, the Polish Families League, whose leader, Roman Giertych, is deputy prime minister and minister of education. This poses many dilemmas for the Jewish community, and Israel is boycotting Giertych.
Abstract: Key Points:
General:
• Faith communities tend to be heterogeneous rather than homogenous and the diversity of all faith communities must be recognised.
• Public policymakers need to be aware of cultural sensitivities in devel-oping policies that promote cohesion and integration. This can only be achieved through promoting shared values whilst acknowledging the positive contribution that the diverse minority make to Britain.
• Government must be sensitive, astute and acknowledge that integra-tion takes time. The Home Office has acknowledged in the past, one size does not fit all and a tailor-made approach to cohesion is needed. Inequality and poverty need to be tackled to achieve social cohesion.
• The Government has provided welcomed support for voluntary sector initiatives and worked in partnership with them in building cohesion through a variety of programmes. However, the public sector needs to encourage the sustainability of these projects and good practice by fo-cussing on both a long term strategic framework and longer term fund-ing cycles for these projects.
• There is a need to understand the complexity of religious belief and faith communities and their different needs. In addition, there needs to be an acknowledgement by policymakers that communities have a wide range of views on many issues.
• There are many instances where ethnic and faith minority communi-ties work together on issues where we are all affected. However, while sometimes communities and individuals within them agree on issues, sometimes they disagree. The essential thing is to build a framework for open and respectful dialogue where good relationships are main-tained through better communication.
• It is evident that British citizens increasingly have multi-dimensional identities. In particular more work needs to be done to explore the rela-tionship between faith and ethnicity.
Specific:
• The Jewish community is diverse.
• The Jewish community sees itself as simultaneously a people, faith and ethnic group. It is not useful to compartmentalise these identities.
• British Jewry has developed over several centuries a notion of ‘inte-gration without assimilation’.
• Jewish experience of immigration shows that integration can happen but takes time, in particular in terms of institutional development.
• The Jewish community promotes inter and intra communal initiatives on a number of levels in the areas of social cohesion, education, community development, interfaith relations, social action and welfare. Strategic national, regional and grassroots projects exist that are sup-ported by the public, private and voluntary sectors
• Rising numbers of antisemitic attacks is a concern that needs to be tackled.
• The Jewish community is keen to promote good community relations.
• Jewish schools can be agents of social cohesion and promoters of ac-tive citizenship.
