Abstract: The paper sets out how a small religion-based sub-population based in a UK city, Liverpool Jewry, underpinned its planning for the future in the light of its reducing size and the consequent strain on the community’s infrastructure and resources. This was achieved by carrying out a voluntary census to provide information on the community’s current size (about 1800 individuals living in 900 households) and its age profile, household types and other characteristics. The census questions were designed to provide data that allowed future population projections to be developed. The low number of births in the community necessitated the devising of a novel approach to the fertility assessment, though mortality rates were derived in a traditional way. In particular, the various elements of migration were investigated via historical information and stated preference responses. The analysis facilitated the estimation of levels of future demand for educational, youth, cultural, religious, welfare and burial services, and the community’s ability to continue to provide those services. Whilst the subject of this paper is the Jewish community in the city of Liverpool, the approach set out here could be adopted by other minority groups, whether shrinking, growing or stable, in other localities and in other countries.
Abstract: This book addresses the issues of memory (a more suitable word would be Marianne Hirsh’s term of postmemory) of the Holocaust among young Poles, the attitudes towards Jews and the Holocaust in the comparative context of educational developments in other countries. The term “Jews” is, as rightly noted Joanna Tokarska-Bakir (2010) a decontextualized term used here in the meaning of Antoni Sułek (2010) as a collective “symbolic” entity. The focus was on education (transmitting values), attitudinal changes and actions undertaken to preserve (or counteract) the memory of Jews and their culture in contemporary Poland. The study to which the book primarly refers was conducted in 2008 and was a second study on a national representative sample of Polish adolescents after the first one undertaken in 1998. The data may seem remote from the current political situation of stepping back from the tendency to increase education about the Holocaust which dominated after 1989 and especially between 2000 and 2005, nonetheless they present trends and outcomes of specific educational interventions which are universal and may set examples for various geopolitical contexts.
The focus of this research was not primarily on the politics of remembrance, which often takes a national approach, although state initiatives are also brought to the attention of the reader, but rather on grassroots action, often initiated by local civil society organizations (NGOs) or individual teachers and/or students. This study has attempted to discover the place that Jews have (or do not have) in the culture of memory in Poland, where there lived the largest Jewish community in pre-war Europe, more than 90% of which was murdered during the Holocaust. The challenge was to show the diversity of phenomena aimed at integrating Jewish history and culture into national culture, including areas of extracurricular education, often against mainstream educational policy, bearing in mind that the Jews currently living in Poland are also, in many cases, active partners in various public initiatives. It is rare to find in-depth empirical research investigating the ensemble of areas of memory construction and the attitudes of youth as an ensemble, including the evaluation of actions (programmes of non-governmental organisations and school projects) in the field of education, particularly with reference to the long-term effects of educational programmes. The assumption prior to this project was that the asking of questions appearing during this research would stimulate further studies.
The book is divided into three parts: Memory, Attitudes and Actions. All three parts of the book, although aimed at analysing an ongoing process of reconstructing and deconstructing memory of the Holocaust in post-2000 Poland, including the dynamics of the attitudes of Polish youth toward Jews, the Shoah and memory of the Shoah, are grounded in different theories and were inspired by various concepts. The assumption prior to the study was that this complex process of attitudinal change cannot be interpreted and explained within the framework on one single academic discipline or one theory. Education and the cultural studies definitely played a significant role in exploring initiatives undertaken to research, study and commemorate the Holocaust and the remnants of the rich Jewish culture in Poland, but the sociology, anthropology and psychology also played a part in helping to see this process from various angles.
Abstract: In this report:
This landmark report looks at how the October 7 attacks on Israel and the war in Gaza have impacted the British Jewish community one year on. The report demonstrates the profound impact the events of the last year have had on Jews in the UK by analysing the responses of over 4,500 adult British Jews to the JPR Jewish Current Affairs Survey in July 2024 – the largest survey of British Jews since October 7, 2023.
Among other things, the report explores how the original Hamas attack and the subsequent war have affected how British Jews view Israel politically, how the public reaction to the conflict has affected Jews’ sense of security and trust in critical organisations in the UK, and how the conflict has impacted the Jewish lives of British Jews – their connections to Israel and the Jewish community. The findings also form the basis for the second series of the JPR/JW3 “Jews Do Count” podcast, available on the JPR website and all major platforms.
Some of the key findings in this report:
British Jews express far more concern today about the state of Israel’s democracy than they did fifteen or so years ago. Nevertheless, more still believe it to be alive and well today than do not, by 52% to 38%.
British Jews are more likely to agree than to disagree that the IDF is acting morally and according to international law, though we see much division in the responses. 50% of British Jews feel that the IDF military action against Hamas since October 7 has been unsuccessful
For all the division and criticism, British Jews are still more likely to have felt proud of Israel than ashamed since October 7.
Just 54% of Jews in the UK agree that a two-state solution is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours, compared to 77% who did so in 2010. Only about one in four (26%) British Jews think that most Palestinians want peace with Israel, compared to nearly half (47%) in 2010.
Nearly four in five British Jews say that they often feel that they are being held responsible by non-Jews for the actions of Israel’s government, with 43% ‘strongly agreeing’ with this statement.
Nearly half of British Jews (46%) say that antisemitism is ‘a very big problem’ in the UK today, compared to 28% in 2018 and only 11% in 2012. In total, 83% of British define antisemitism as a problem in Britain, the highest proportion found since records began over a decade ago.
Nearly three in four respondents say they feel less safe as a Jewish person living in the UK, and almost two in three adult British Jews said they feel less confident displaying their Jewishness since the October 7 attacks.
Although most British Jews report no overall change in this regard, substantial proportions of British Jews say that they feel closer to their Jewish friends since October 7 (39%) and less close to their non-Jewish friends (24%). The findings also suggest a notable increase in levels of attachment to their local Jewish community.
Attachment levels of British Jews to Israel were steady before October 7 but have risen significantly since then, with half of British Jews saying they are ‘very’ attached to Israel today (up from 40% in 2022).
About two in three British Jews (65%) identify as Zionist, up slightly compared to before October 7. 10% identify as anti-Zionist, also up slightly.
Levels of anxiety among British Jews are higher than they were before October 7 and are notably higher than they are among the general population of Britain.
There is no evidence to indicate Jews are leaving the UK in elevated numbers in the past year – on the contrary, emigration levels are generally low and stable and have been for several decades. At the same time, a slight change in sentiment around this issue has occurred over the past year, with many moving up one notch from wherever they were on it before October 7.
Abstract: The report looks into what Jews in the UK think of key Israeli political leaders and the country’s future, drawing on data from the responses of over 4,500 adult British Jews, members of the JPR Research Panel, to the JPR Jewish Current Affairs Survey, held in June-July 2024. The report reveals that levels of pessimism about Israel’s current situation have increased significantly among British Jews when compared to data gathered before the October 7 attacks on Israel and the war in Gaza.
Some of the main findings in this report:
Three-quarters (74%) of Jews in the UK describe Israel’s situation as “bad” (37%) or “very bad” (37%), increasing from 57% measured in Apr/May 2023. Overall, Jews in the UK characterise Israel’s current state more negatively than Israelis.
95% of adult British Jews have an opinion on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the most widely known leader among those examined. Four in five Jews hold an unfavourable opinion of him, with 65% saying they “strongly disapprove” and 15% saying they “somewhat” disapprove of him.
Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich (-78%), Minister of Security Itamar Ben-Gvir (-77%) and Netanyahu (-68%) are the Israeli leaders British Jews least approve of when looking at their net approval ratings. Former Prime Minister Yair Lapid (+12%) and former Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister Benny Gantz (+10%) are the only two leaders showing positive net ratings among those examined.
Lapid is the only leader examined showing an increase in net approval rate compared to data from before October 7.
Politically ‘right-leaning’ Jews were much more likely to approve of Netanyahu than those who are ‘left-leaning’.
Abstract: This report draws on data collected in June and July 2024, eight months after the October 7 attacks on Israel and in the context of the war in Gaza, to explore Jewish parents' understanding of whether their children have experienced antisemitism either at school, in the vicinity of school, and travelling to and from school. The research goes further to investigate whether parents would make different choices about where to educate their Jewish children in light of the events of October 7, the war in Gaza and the rise in antisemitism in the UK.
This is part of a growing body of evidence demonstrating how antisemitism can drive Jews away from participation in wider society, and that should be of concern to anyone who cares about building a more cohesive and understanding society. The findings raise critical questions for mainstream school administrators about how to manage the issue of antisemitism in their schools and, indeed, for government leaders about social cohesion.
Some of the key findings in this report:
A little under a quarter (23%) of British Jewish parents surveyed reported that their child or children had experienced antisemitism at school (12%), in the vicinity of school (6%) or travelling to or from school (9%).
Parents of children at a Jewish school are more likely to report that their children experienced antisemitism while travelling to or from school (13%) than at school (3%).
In comparison, those with children at mainstream schools are more likely to report their children experienced antisemitism at school (21%) than travelling to/from it (2%).
Three-quarters (73%) of Jewish parents with children in mainstream schools said that the October 7 attacks and the war in Gaza would not affect their choice about where to educate the children, but one in five (20%) said they would now be more likely to send their children to a Jewish school.
This proportion doubles (40%) for parents whose children have experienced antisemitism in, around or travelling to or from their mainstream school.
Just over half of Jewish parents with children in Jewish schools (52%) said that the attacks on Israel and the war in Gaza would not affect their school choice, with most of the remainder (46%) saying they would be even more likely to opt for Jewish schooling now.
Abstract: Immersion (tevillah) in a special pool of water (mikvah) is an ancient Jewish ritual act of purification. Rumors of personal healing through mikvah immersion are often presented as Jewish folklore or urban legends. Yet, my research shows that a surprising percentage of immersing respondents –both Orthodox and non-orthodox— have experienced mikvah immersion as either spiritually, emotionally, psychologically, or physically healing. My study investigates what it means to experience mikvah as healing; and whether these experiences correlate with other attitudes and personal practices that signal patterns in how Jews think about Self, purity, wellbeing, and healing. I conducted a survey (N=283) and 34 in-depth interviews in the United States, and an additional survey (N=239) in the United Kingdom –to determine how relevant the U.S. findings could be for the aspiring mikvah organization, Wellspring UK, that plans to incorporate mikvah as a central modality of care in a center for wellbeing in London. I interpret these findings through a ritual ecological analysis –integrating embodiment, ritual studies, history, and religious studies— that centers participants’ sensory-emotional descriptions of their immersion as centering and affirming, in the midst of personal suffering. I then seek to understand how immersers interpret these sensory experiences by framing their mikvah stories in the historical context of new conceptual constructs about body, self, wellbeing, healing, and purity that emerged from multiple Jewish engagements with the American Great Awakening (1960-1990). That sensory experiences of centering and affirmation are identified as healing reflects a holistic self-concept, observed among the majority of participants –immersers and non-immersers alike. Specifically, the contemporary Jewish self is a holistic body-self, integrating physical, spiritual, emotional, psychological, and relational aspects. Such holism means that upset in one aspect of the self produces difficulties in one or more of the other aspects. Thus, maintaining one’s sense of wellbeing requires continual balancing and rebalancing, a self-making project that dovetails with respondents’ high value for an emergent ideal of spiritual purity, defined as the alignment of one’s inner values with one’s outer speech and actions. Together, wellbeing and spiritual purity constitute an ideal state of radical shalom, as experienced during healing mikvah immersions.
Abstract: “More than Jews have kept Shabbat, Shabbat has kept the Jews”, said A’had Ha’am, encapsulating the significance of the day of rest to many Jews everywhere over the centuries. While its origins are biblical, and the requirement to observe it appears in the Ten Commandments, in contemporary times, Shabbat is observed in many ways by different types of Jews.
This factsheet uses data from JPR’s recent study of Jewish identity in the UK today to explore the social and religious significance of Shabbat to British Jews and how it manifests in their behaviour. The study is based on the responses of nearly 5,000 British Jews, members of the JPR Research Panel, to its UK National Jewish Identity Survey, held in November – December 2022
Some of the key findings in this factsheet:
Just over one in three Jews (34%) say Shabbat is ‘very important’ to their Jewish identity, a substantially lower proportion than those who say the same about ‘remembering the holocaust’ (71%), ‘strong moral and ethical behaviour’ (69%) or ‘feeling part of the Jewish People’ (65%).
While 88% of Orthodox Jews say Shabbat is ‘very important’ to their Jewish identity, this is only the case for 36% of Traditional Jews and just 28% of Reform/Progressive Jews.
About six in ten (61%) British Jews attend Friday night meals most weeks, while 58% regularly make time for family and friends, and 50% take a break from work on Shabbat.
80% of British Jews light candles on Friday night at least occasionally, and about the same proportion report buying Challah (plaited bread) at least occasionally. Observance of Shabbat peaks between the ages 40-49.
27% of respondents attend synagogue most Shabbats or more often. 23% abstain from driving during Shabbat, and 20% say they do not switch on electric lights on Shabbat.
Abstract: The Sixth Survey of European Jewish Community Leaders and Professionals, 2024, presents the results of an online survey offered in 10 languages and administered to 879 respondents in 31 countries. Conducted every three years using the same format, the survey seeks to identify trends and their evolution over time.
The 2024 survey came during a historically fraught moment for the Jewish people globally. The impact of the horrific October 7th attacks and the subsequent war in Israel cannot be understated. How is this affecting Jewish leadership and Jewish communal life? Therefore, in addition to the regular topics covered by the survey (community priorities, threats, security concerns, attitudes towards Europe and Israel), this edition included a special section designed to understand the impact of October 7th on Jewish life in Europe.
That October 7th has profoundly affected Jewish Europe is evident across multiple sections throughout the survey. Concern about antisemitism and the threat of physical attack has intensified. A large majority of 78% feel less safe living as Jews in their cities than they did before the Hamas attack, and respondents are more cautious about how they identify themselves as Jews. They are also more distant from their wider environments, with 38% reporting they have become more distant from non-Jewish friends.
The respondents were comprised of presidents and chairpersons of nationwide “umbrella organizations” or Federations; presidents and executive directors of private Jewish foundations, charities, and other privately funded initiatives; presidents and main representatives of Jewish communities that are organized at a city level; executive directors and programme coordinators, as well as current and former board members of Jewish organizations; among others
Abstract: FRA’s third survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU reveals their experiences and perceptions of antisemitism, and shows the obstacles they face in living an openly Jewish life.
The survey pre-dates the Hamas attacks on 7 October 2023 and Israel’s military response in Gaza. But the report includes information about antisemitism collected from 12 Jewish community organisations more recently. Jewish people have experienced more antisemitic incidents since October 2023, with some organisations reporting an increase of more than 400%.
The survey results point to:
Rising antisemitism: 80% of respondents feel that antisemitism has grown in their country in the five years before the survey.
High levels of antisemitism online: 90% of respondents encountered antisemitism online in the year before the survey.
Antisemitism in the public sphere: in the year before the survey, 56% of respondents encountered offline antisemitism from people they know and 51% in the media.
Harassment: 37% say they were harassed because they are Jewish in the year before the survey. Most of them experienced harassment multiple times. Antisemitic harassment and violence mostly take place in streets, parks, or shops.
Safety and security concerns: Most respondents continue to worry for their own (53%) and their family’s (60%) safety and security. Over the years, FRA research has shown that antisemitism tends to increase in times of tension in the Middle East. In this survey, 75% feel that people hold them responsible for the Israeli government’s actions because they are Jewish.
Hidden lives: 76% hide their Jewish identity at least occasionally and 34% avoid Jewish events or sites because they do not feel safe. As a reaction to online antisemitism, 24% avoid posting content that would identify them as Jewish, 23% say that they limited their participation in online discussions, and 16% reduced their use of certain platforms, websites or services.
The EU and its Member States have put in place measures against antisemitism, which have led to some progress. These include the EU’s first ever strategy on combating antisemitism and action plans in some EU countries. The report suggests concrete ways for building on that progress:
Monitoring and adequately funding antisemitism strategies and action plans: This includes adopting plans in those EU countries which do not have them and developing indicators to monitor progress.
Securing the safety and security of Jewish communities: Countries need to invest more in protecting Jewish people, working closely with the affected communities.
Tackling antisemitism online: Online platforms need to address and remove antisemitic content online, to adhere tothe EU’s Digital Services Act. They also need to better investigate and prosecute illegal antisemitic content online.
Encouraging reporting and improving recording of antisemitism: National authorities should step up efforts to raise rights awareness among Jews, encourage them to report antisemitic incidents and improve the recording of such incidents. Greater use of third-party and anonymous reporting could help.
The survey covers Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden where around 96% of the EU’s estimated Jewish population live. Almost 8,000 Jews aged 16 or over took part in the online survey from January to June 2023. This is the third survey of its kind, following those of 2013 and 2018.
Abstract: Rising antisemitism in the twenty-first century has alarmed Jewish communities and the general public, but antisemitic hate crime victimization remains understudied outside the US context. This study primarily relies on a comprehensive survey of 16,400 Jews across twelve European countries, supplemented with data from additional sources, to assess individual and country-level predictors of Jews’ experiences and fears of antisemitic harassment and violence. Multilevel models indicate that young age, perceived discrimination, identity visibility, and identification with Israel are pronounced individual risk factors for victimization. On the country level, negative opinion of Israel and Muslim population share predict victimization, highlighting the role of a “new” or Israel-derived antisemitism in the twenty-first century. The factors most strongly associated with fear are young age, previous victimization, perceptions of an ambient antisemitic threat, and recent occurrence of fatal antisemitic violence. Overall, the findings underscore the importance of integrating general theory on hate crime and victimization with context-specific factors when seeking to understand the experiences of targeted groups.
Abstract: On the eve of the 2024 UK General Election, national polls show the Labour Party ahead of the
Conservative Party by 20 percentage points. An average of polls at the time of publication has Labour
at 41.9% and Conservatives at 22.2%, with Reform UK at 15.0%, well ahead of the Liberal Democrats,
Greens, Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru and other parties. These polls do not, however,
show the voting intention of Jewish people in the UK. The JPR Research Panel provides the research
infrastructure to gather nationally representative data about Jewish people’s behaviours and attitudes
on a wide range of social and political issues. This paper presents initial data on voting intentions for
4 July 2024, based on 2,717 UK-based Jewish adults who responded to a survey between 14-20 June
Abstract: La ricerca rientra nel progetto PCTO sull’antisemitismo a cui hanno aderito 84 studenti di tre scuole superiori della Regione Lazio, due licei e un istituto d’istruzione superiore, insieme a Progetto Memoria e alla Fondazione CDEC per l’anno scolastico 2022-2023.
Studenti e studentesse delle classi terze e quarte, insieme ai docenti referenti hanno coinvolto Progetto Memoria quale tutor esterno (Sandra Terracina) e due dipartimenti della Fondazione CDEC (Betti Guetta, Stefano Gatti e Murilo Cambruzzi per l’Osservatorio antisemitismo; Patrizia Baldi per la Didattica) per sviluppare il progetto, ricevere formazione, essere coadiuvati nell’analisi e nella riflessione su stereotipi e pregiudizi, in particolare sugli ebrei. Tra gli obiettivi del progetto, la promozione di un processo conoscitivo sulle cause e sulle dinamiche dell’antisemitismo, indirizzato a far emergere comportamenti e atteggiamenti diffusi nella società, al fine di orientare ai valori di una collettività democratica e inclusiva, partendo dalla fotografia realizzata dall’indagine delle Fondazione CDEC. L’apprendimento di carattere storico, sociologico, psicosociale e statistico ha permesso agli studenti di sviluppare le attività a loro affidate. Sono stati stimolati a confrontarsi con figure esterne al mondo della scuola e a gestire, nelle varie fasi del progetto, dinamiche tra pari. Il lavoro di formazione e di tutoraggio si è tenuto in modalità ibrida.
Gli studenti coinvolti nel progetto di formazione hanno compilato un questionario (già utilizzato nell’anno scolastico precedente) finalizzato a valutare il grado di conoscenza degli ebrei e la presenza di pregiudizi e stereotipi nei loro confronti.
Il questionario è composto da 13 domande chiuse ed è stato somministrato tramite Google Forms, tra l’aprile e il maggio 2023, dagli studenti dei tre istituti che hanno partecipato alla seconda edizione del PCTO “Progetto sull’antisemitismo”.
La scelta metodologica è stata quella di coinvolgere nell’indagine i ragazzi del primo anno delle superiori e quelli dell’ultimo anno per cercare di valutare se il percorso scolastico (lungo 5 anni) possa avere un effetto sulla conoscenza degli ebrei e la condivisione di pregiudizi antisemiti.
In totale sono stati compilati 673 questionari 481 al liceo A (71.5%) e 29 al liceo B (4.3%), e 163 all’istituto d’istruzione superiore (24.2%). Il 73% degli studenti è iscritto al percorso scientifico e il 24% al tecnico, gli altri 3% si dividono tra il linguistico e il classico. Il 46 % degli studenti frequenta il primo anno e il 54 % il quinto. Il 45% ha dichiarato di appartenere al genere femminile e il 51% al maschile, il 4% rimanente non ha voluto indicarlo o ha indicato altro.
Abstract: Der Beitrag untersucht, inwiefern sich der „Nahostkonflikt“ auf das Sicherheitsgefühl von in Deutschland lebenden Jüdinnen und Juden auswirkt. Ausgehend vom Theorieansatz der „politisch-kulturellen Gelegenheitsstrukturen“ untersuchen wir, ob das „Nahostkonflikt“ bezogene Sicherheitsgefühl davon abhängt, wie offen oder geschlossen diese Strukturen von den (potenziell) Betroffenen wahrgenommen werden. Unsere Befunde zeigen, dass je günstiger die Gelegenheiten für antisemitische Mobilisierung erscheinen, desto negativer wirkt sich der „Nahostkonflikt“ auf die hiesige jüdische Gemeinschaft aus, weil in der Wahrnehmung der Betroffenen antisemitische Übergriffe nicht angemessen thematisiert und juristisch verfolgt werden. Mittels Daten einer Online-Befragung von in Deutschland lebenden Jüdinnen und Juden (n = 295) weisen wir nach, dass vor allem die Befürchtung, die Bevölkerungsmeinung gegenüber Jüdinnen und Juden in Deutschland hinge mit dem sogenannten „Nahostkonflikt“ eng zusammen, zu einem stärkeren „Nahostkonflikt“ bezogenen Bedrohungsgefühl beiträgt. Misstrauen in die Fähigkeit von Gerichten und Medien, auf Antisemitismus angemessen zu reagieren, sind weitere statistisch signifikante Korrelate.
Abstract: Basierend auf Daten des Jahres 2018 der Fundamental Rights Agency der Europäischen Union ermittelt der vorliegende Beitrag Ausmaß und Faktoren antisemitischer Vorurteilskriminalität in Deutschland. Zum einen werden die Erfahrungen von in Deutschland lebenden Jüdinnen und Juden mit persönlichen Belästigungen und Beleidigungen, Vandalismus und körperlicher Gewalt innerhalb eines Zeitraumes von fünf Jahren vor dem Erhebungszeitpunkt beleuchtet. Zum anderen beschäftigen wir uns mit der geäußerten Furcht, zukünftig Opfer antisemitischer Übergriffe zu werden. Erfahrungen mit Gewalt und Vandalismus berichten 7 % der 1225 Befragten, und 44 % wurden in den letzten fünf Jahren belästigt, weil sie jüdisch sind. Vor allem Personen, die aufgrund des Tragens von Symbolen als Juden erkennbar sind, waren betroffen und vermeiden gelegentlich oder öfter Plätze in der lokalen Umgebung, weil sie sich dort unsicher fühlen. Wenn die Befragten hingegen in einer mehrheitlich jüdischen Nachbarschaft lebten, sank die Wahrscheinlichkeit Opfer von Belästigungen und Gewalttaten zu werden. Belästigt und beleidigt wurden zudem besonders religiöse Menschen und Personen, die die Unterstützung von Israel als sehr wichtig für ihre jüdische Identität erachten. Diese Personen fühlen sich, ebenso wie jene, die dem Erinnern an den Holocaust eine hohe Bedeutung beimessen, zudem stärker bedroht – eine Bestätigung der Vermutung, dass sekundärer und israelbezogener Antisemitismus ein großes Bedrohungspotential in der aktuellen gesellschaftlichen Situation darstellen. Als Reaktion auf die empfundene Bedrohung verzichten die Befragten zwar laut der vorliegenden Befragung nicht auf das Tragen von jüdischen Symbolen, aber stärkere Bedrohungswahrnehmungen korrelieren mit dem Vermeiden von als gefährlich eingeschätzten Plätzen sowie von jüdischen Veranstaltungen.
Abstract: Les différentes réalités de l’antisémitisme sont enfin objectivées.
L’Institut Jonathas présente les résultats du premier sondage réalisé en Belgique sur la perception des Juifs, de l’antisémitisme, des autres minorités et de la guerre en cours à Gaza et en Israël.
Créé en mars 2024, l’Institut Jonathas est un centre d’études et d’action contre l’antisémitisme et contre tout ce qui le favorise en Belgique. Il a demandé à IPSOS d’objectiver et de mesurer, à la veille des élections du 9 juin, les opinions des Belges sur des sujets qui sont au cœur de sa raison d’être.
IPSOS a interrogé, du 8 au 12 mai, un échantillon de 1.000 personnes, représentatif de la population belge de 18 ans et plus, avec le même panel et la même méthodologie que pour les sondages politiques.
En l’absence de sondages pouvant tenir lieu de points de comparaison en Belgique, plusieurs questions ont été reprises de sondages récents menés en France par IPSOS ou par IFOP. Les résultats français sont indiqués ci-après, lorsque la comparaison avec les résultats belges est pertinente.
Le sondage réalisé par IPSOS pour l’Institut Jonathas met en lumière et objective les différentes facettes de l’image des Juifs et de l’antisémitisme dans la société belge :
Une image très moyenne des Juifs, 80 ans après la Shoah.
Des marqueurs d’antisémitisme primaire prégnants dans toutes les composantes de la société belge et sur-représentés à l’extrême-gauche, à l’extrême-droite et chez les musulmans
En plus de ces préjugés « traditionnels » (argent, pouvoir, religion…), des marqueurs d’antisémitisme dit « secondaire », aboutissant à banaliser la Shoah et à nazifier Israël
Une méconnaissance générale des Juifs, du judaïsme et de la réalité de l’antisémitisme en Belgique
Trois premières sources d’antisémitisme en Belgique, selon les Belges : l’hostilité à Israël, l’islamisme radical et les préjugés sur les Juifs
Un écho limité chez les Belges des sujets relatifs à Israël, à la Palestine et à la guerre, à l’exception d’une minorité dont certains éléments souhaitent la destruction de l’Etat d’Israël
Distance ou indifférence d’environ 50% des Belges vis-à-vis de la guerre entre Israël et le Hamas, mais aussi polarisation sur ce conflit de segments précis de la population belge.
La guerre, source d’inquiétude pour les Juifs en Belgique selon la majorité des Belges, mais aussi matière à hostilité contre les Juifs en Belgique pour une minorité de Belges
Un antisémitisme s’inscrivant dans une société belge plutôt tendue et inquiète concernant ses relations avec les différents groupes minoritaires et, en particulier, les musulmans et les Maghrébins.
Abstract: Antisemitismiä on esiintynyt eri muodoissa useimmissa yhteiskunnissa vuosisatojen ajan. Viime vuosina
juutalaisvähemmistöt ovat eri puolilla maailmalla raportoineet lisääntyneistä antisemitistisistä kokemuksista etenkin sen jälkeen, kun äärijärjestö Hamas hyökkäsi Israeliin 7. lokakuuta 2023.
Tämä selvitys keskittyy itsensä juutalaiseksi identifioivien henkilöiden näkemyksiin ja kokemuksiin
antisemitismistä ja syrjinnästä. Se perustuu määrälliseen ja laadulliseen aineistoon. Tutkimus kohdennettiin 16 vuotta täyttäneille henkilöille, jotka pitävät itseään juutalaisina joko uskonnon, kulttuurin,
kasvatuksen, etnisyyden, sukulaisuussuhteen tai muun syyn perusteella, ja jotka tutkimuksen tekohetkellä asuivat Suomessa.
Selvityksen tiedonkeruu toteutettiin kahdessa vaiheessa. Ensin suoritettiin kyselytutkimus (4.10.–
4.11.2023), jossa vastaajat kertoivat mielipiteitään muun muassa antisemitismistä, kohtaamistaan
antisemitistisistä tapauksista joko internetissä tai sen ulkopuolella, huolistaan antisemitistisen hyökkäyksen uhriksi joutumisesta sekä syrjintäkokemuksistaan Suomessa. Kyselyyn vastasi 334 henkilöä, mikä
laskentatavasta riippuen vastaa noin 17–22 prosenttia Suomessa asuvista juutalaisista. Tutkimuksen
toisessa vaiheessa järjestettiin kaksi fokusryhmähaastattelua, joihin osallistui henkilöitä kuudesta eri
juutalaisjärjestöstä. Heiltä kysyttiin antisemitismin vaikutuksista järjestöjen toimintaan ja jäsenistön elämään. Molemmat fokusryhmähaastattelut toteutettiin 15. marraskuuta 2023.
Vastaajista suurin osa ilmoitti, että antisemitismi on lisääntynyt Suomessa viiden viime vuoden aikana. Vastaajat arvioivat, että suurin ongelma on internetissä ja sosiaalisessa mediassa ilmenevä antisemitismi, ja seuraavaksi suurinta ongelma on mediassa ja poliittisessa elämässä.
Kyselyn tuloksien ja fokusryhmähaastattelujen pohjalta laadittiin suosituksia antisemitismin torjumiseksi, juutalaisvähemmistön turvallisuuden edistämiseksi ja juutalaisen kulttuurin suojaamiseksi myös
moninkertaisten vähemmistöjen näkökulmasta. Suosituksia annettiin myös koulutukseen, juutalaisiin
kohdistuvan väkivallan, syrjinnän ja viharikosten ehkäisyyn, juutalaisen elämän ja kulttuurin turvaamiseen sekä juutalaisuuden tutkimukseen.
Abstract: Seventy years have passed since the Holocaust, but this cataclysmic event continues to reverberate in the present. In this research, we examine attributions about the causes of the Holocaust and the influence of such attributions on intergroup relations. Three representative surveys were conducted among Germans, Poles, and Israeli Jews to examine inter- and intragroup variations in attributions for the Holocaust and how these attributions influence intergroup attitudes. Results indicated that Germans made more external than internal attributions and were especially low in attributing an evil essence to their ancestors. Israelis and Poles mainly endorsed the obedient essence attribution and were lowest on attribution to coercion. These attributions, however, were related to attitudes towards contemporary Germany primarily among Israeli Jews. The more they endorsed situationist explanations, and the less they endorsed the evil essence explanation, the more positive their attitude to Germany. Among Germans, attributions were related to a higher motivation for historical closure, except for the obedience attribution that was related to low desire for closure. Israelis exhibited a low desire for historical closure especially when attribution for evil essence was high. These findings suggest that lay perceptions of history are essential to understanding contemporary intergroup processes.
Abstract: This landmark study provides a detailed and updated profile of how British Jews understand and live their Jewish lives. It is based on JPR’s National Jewish Identity Survey, conducted in November-December 2022 among nearly 5,000 members of the JPR research panel. It is the largest survey of its kind and the most comprehensive study of Jewish identity to date.
The report, written by Dr David Graham and Dr Jonathan Boyd, covers a variety of key themes in contemporary Jewish life, including religious belief and affiliation, Jewish education and cultural consumption, Jewish ethnicity, Zionism and attachment to Israel, antisemitism, charitable giving and volunteering, and the relationship between community engagement and happiness.
Some of the key findings in this report:
Just 34% of British Jews believe in God ‘as described in the Bible’. However, over half of British Jewish adults belong to a synagogue and many more practice aspects of Jewish religious culture.
94% of Jews in the UK say that moral and ethical behaviour is an important part of their Jewish identities. Nearly 9 out of 10 British Jews reported making at least one charitable donation yearly.
88% of British Jews have been to Israel at least once, and 73% say that they feel very or somewhat attached to the country. However, the proportion identifying as ‘Zionists’ has fallen from 72% to 63% over the past decade.
Close to a third of all British Jewish adults personally experienced some kind of antisemitic incident in the year before the survey, a much higher number than that recorded in police or community incident counts.
Abstract: This cross-sectional study follows Open Science principles in estimating relationships between antisemitism, i.e. anti-Jewish bigotry, and conspiracy belief, i.e. endorsement of conspiracy theories, through analysis of data collected from a representative sample of UK adults (n=1722). Antisemitism was measured using the Generalized Antisemitism scale, and conspiracy belief was measured using the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale. Positive relationships were found to exist between all forms of antisemitism and all types of conspiracy belief, and an average across all items of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale was found to predict Generalized Antisemitism at least as well as any individual type of conspiracy belief. On a more detailed level, antisemitic attitudes relating to British Jews were found to be most strongly associated with belief in conspiracies relating to personal well-being, while antisemitic attitudes relating to the State of Israel and its supporters were found to be most strongly associated with belief in conspiracies relating to government malfeasance. Generalized Antisemitism itself was found to be most strongly associated with belief in malevolent global conspiracies. Exploratory analysis additionally examined the effect of standard demographic variables that had been introduced into the main analysis as controls. Through this means, it was found that antisemitic attitudes relating both to Jews qua Jews and to Israel and its supporters are more prevalent among less highly educated people and members of other-than-white ethnic groups, while antisemitic attitudes relating to Israel and its supporters are more common among younger people. In addition, it was found that female gender is associated with reduced antisemitic attitudes relating to Jews qua Jews and also with increased antisemitic attitudes relating to Israel and its supporters. However, the addition of demographic controls did not explain any additional variance in Generalized Antisemitism beyond that which was already explained by conspiracy belief – perhaps suggesting that demographic characteristics are more strongly associated with the inclination towards particular expressions of antisemitism than with antisemitism itself.
Abstract: In den Jahren 1985 und 1986 wurde die Öffentlichkeit durch eine Häu fung antisemitischer Vorfälle in der Bundesrepublik und in Österreich aufgeschreckt. Besonders die heftige Auseinandersetzung um die Präsi dentschaftswahl in Österreich machte in Polemiken und Leserbriefen sichtbar, daß antijüdische Ressentiments vorhanden und mobilisierbar sind. Da die Größe dieses Potentials unbekannt war, entsprechende Umfragen lagen mehr als ein Jahrzehnt zurück, nahm die Anti-Defa mation League (ADL), New York, mit österreichischen und deutschen Forschungseinrichtungen Kontakt auf, um Antworten auf diese Frage zu erhalten. Die ADL-Direktoren Abraham H. Foxman und Theodore Freedman traten 1986 mit der Bitte an Professor Dr. Herbert A. Strauss, den Lei ter des Zentrums für Antisemitismusforschung der Technischen Uni versität Berlin, heran, die wissenschaftliche Konzeption für eine Re präsentativbefragung zum gegenwärtigen Antisemitismus in der Bun desrepublik Deutschland auszuarbeiten. Ohne die Initiative und die Finanzierung der ADL, für die wir hiermit danken, wäre es dem Zen trum für Antisemitismusforschung nicht möglich gewesen, ein derartig umfangreiches und teures Forschungsprojekt in Angriff zu nehmen. Das Recht, die Daten der Umfrage einer eigenen Auswertung zu unter ziehen, verschaffte dem Zentrum die empirische Basis, seine Forschun gen zum Antisemitismus erstmals auch auf die Gegenwart auszudeh nen.
Abstract: Im Jahr 2021 wurden in Deutschland 3.028 antisemitische Straftaten erfasst. Dies ist der höchste jemals gemessene Wert seit Beginn der Erfassung in der polizeilichen Kriminalstatistik im Jahr 2001. Allerdings handelt es sich bei dieser Zahl nur um einen Ausschnitt, da sich das Problem des Antisemitismus in der deutschen Gesellschaft nicht allein auf Straftaten reduzieren lässt. So wichtig es natürlich ist, dass jede antisemitische Straftat entschlossen und mit allen rechtsstaatlichen Möglichkeiten verfolgt wird, muss der Kampf gegen Judenhass in einem breiten Kontext verstanden und adressiert werden. Denn die antisemitischen Vorfälle sind Ausdruck und Ergebnis eines gesamtgesellschaftlichen Klimas, in welchem antisemitische Stereotype und Ressentiments weit verbreitet und akzeptiert sind. Neben den Straftaten kommt eine große Zahl antisemitischer Vorfälle unterhalb der Strafbarkeitsgrenze hinzu, wie sie der Bundesverband der Recherche- und Informationsstelle Antisemitismus (RIAS) jährlich in seinem Bericht dokumentiert. Zudem gilt es zu bedenken, dass sowohl die Straftaten als auch die von RIAS dokumentierten Vorfälle nur jene sind, die zur Anzeige gebracht beziehungsweise gemeldet wurden. Die European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) kam im Jahr 2018 im Rahmen einer Befragung von Jüdinnen und Juden in zwölf europäischen Ländern zu dem Ergebnis, dass überhaupt nur 20 Prozent der Betroffenen antisemitische Straftaten zur Anzeige bringen oder anderweitig melden. Es ist also davon auszugehen, dass die Dunkelziffer nochmals erheblich höher ist.
Aufgrund dieser Erkenntnisse hat das American Jewish Committee (AJC) das Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach (IFD) mit der vorliegenden repräsentativen Umfrage beauftragt.
Und die Ergebnisse sind erneut ein Grund zur Sorge. Zwar zeigen die Daten nicht, dass antisemitische Einstellungen in der Bevölkerung stark zugenommen haben, dennoch bestätigen sie, dass ein beachtlicher Teil der deutschen Bevölkerung antisemitische Stereotype und Ressentiments teilen, wie es seit Jahren konstant in anderen Umfragen nachgewiesen wurde. Dabei haben wir auch untersuchen lassen, wie verbreitet diese Einstellungen unter den Wählerinnen und Wählern der sechs im Bundestag vertretenen Parteien sind. Die Ergebnisse verdeutlichen abermals, dass Antisemitismus nicht allein ein Problem der politischen Ränder ist, sondern in der Mitte der Gesellschaft tief verankert ist. Hier sind deshalb ausnahmslos alle demokratischen Parteien gefordert, diese Realität anzuerkennen und entsprechend zu handeln. Auch deswegen können wir nur davor warnen, dass das Thema Antisemitismus als Gegenstand parteipolitischer Auseinandersetzungen genutzt wird. Die demokratischen Parteien sollten es vielmehr als ihre Aufgabe begreifen, über sonstige politische Differenzen hinaus zusammenzustehen und Antisemitismus gemeinsam entschlossen zu bekämpfen.
Im Gegensatz zu vielen bisherigen Studien haben wir im Rahmen dieser Untersuchung auch die Einstellungen von Musliminnen und Muslimen in Deutschland abgefragt. Ausschlaggebend waren hierbei nicht zuletzt die antisemitischen Ausschreitungen hierzulande im Mai 2021 während der israelischen Selbstverteidigungsmaßnahmen gegen den Raketenbeschuss der islamistischen Terrororganisation Hamas. Wenngleich es in der Vergangenheit immer wieder zu antisemitischen Ausschreitungen vor dem Hintergrund derartiger Auseinandersetzungen gekommen ist, so waren jene im vergangenen Jahr nicht nur erheblich gewalttätiger, sondern es zogen zum ersten Mal anti-israelische Demonstrationen in verschiedenen Städten gezielt vor Synagogen. Nur das Eingreifen der Polizei, wenn auch zum Teil verspätet, konnte Schlimmeres verhindern. Im Zuge dieser Proteste kam es zu zahlreichen antisemitischen Vorfällen, Bedrohungen und körperlichen Angriffen. Allerdings hat sich die quantitative Sozialforschung, zumindest in Deutschland, diesem Phänomen bisher nur unzureichend gewidmet. Dies ist umso überraschender, da in der bereits erwähnten Studie der FRA befragte Jüdinnen und Juden in Deutschland auf die Frage, welchem Spektrum sie den schlimmsten antisemitischen Vorfall, der ihnen in den letzten 5 Jahren widerfahren ist, zuordnen, mit 41 Prozent die Täterinnen und Täter als „Someone with a Muslim extremist view“ angaben. Unter den zwölf befragten Ländern war dies der höchste Wert in dieser Kategorie. Und die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Umfrage bestätigen, dass antisemitische Stereotype und Ressentiments in dieser Bevölkerungsgruppe durchgängig deutlich stärker vertreten sind als im Bevölkerungsdurchschnitt. Wie die Umfrage aber auch belegt, bedeutet dies selbstredend nicht, dass Antisemitismus allein ein Problem der muslimischen Community ist. Allerdings kann dieses immense Problem auch nicht ausgeblendet werden, wenn der Kampf gegen Antisemitismus erfolgreich sein soll.
Abstract: Campaigning organisation Avaaz commissioned ICM Unlimited to conduct a nationally representative poll to look into attitudes of the British public towards Jews and Muslims.
Some of the key findings include:
Overall, just under half of British adults say that they have a positive view of Jews (47%), while 7% say that they have a negative view. When it comes to Muslims, the British public’s attitudes are more unfavourable. A quarter say that they have a negative view of Muslims (26%), while a third say that they have a positive view (32%).
2017 Conservative voters are more likely than those who voted Labour to have a negative view of Muslims. Just under four in ten of those who voted Conservative in 2017 say that they have a negative view of Muslims (37%), more than double the proportion of those who voted Labour who have a negative view (16%).
A greater proportion of people agree than disagree for four of the five statements about Muslims/Islam that Avaaz tested. That is, more people agree than disagree that: Islam threatens the British way of life (45% agree vs. 31% disagree), Islamophobia in Britain is a response to the everyday behaviour of Muslims (36% vs. 34%), parts of the UK are under Sharia law (33% vs. 28%), and that there should be a reduction in the number of Muslims entering Britain (41% vs. 25%). The only statement with which more people disagree than agree is: ‘Islamic terrorism reflects the views of the Muslim community in Britain’ (26% agree vs. 49% disagree).
Six in ten 2017 Conservative voters agree that ‘Islam threatens the British way of life’ (62%), compared to 35% of 2017 Labour voters.
When it comes to attitudes towards Jews, just over one in seven of people agree that ‘Jews have disproportionate influence in politics’ (15%). Among 2017 Labour voters, this figure rises to one in five (20%), compared to one in seven 2017 Conservative voters (14%).
Abstract: Od dłuższego czasu próbuję dowieść tezy, że obecnie w Polsce postawy antysemickie, a więc postawy wrogości i niechęci do Żydów, nie występują jako odrębne, niezależne od innych. Jeśli mamy do czynienia z aktywnymi postawami antysemickimi, takimi, które nakazują rozejrzeć się wokół, czy nie ma obok jakiegoś Żyda – a więc także osoby żydowskiego pochodzenia, która udaje nie-Żyda – najczęściej nie występują one w Polsce samodzielnie. Stanowią na ogół część ogólniejszego obrazu świata, zideologizowanego światopoglądu, w którego centrum znajduje się kwestia narodu, jego powołania, jego cech i katolickiego charakteru oraz, rzecz jasna, jego wrogów i przeciwników.
Abstract: Racism and racial prejudice, considered a relic of obsolete and outdated social systems, is emerging in the depths of ultra-modern Western societies with different characteristics from the past but with a surprising and worrying virulence. These waves of prejudice and racism testify to the many fears that fill the horizons of advanced societies, undermining not only their internal reliability, but also just their democratic settings. This paper presents a critical review of Islamophobia as a racial prejudice, showing that two main definitions are at work: Islamophobia as xeno-racism or linked to the so-called clash of civilizations. Then, it presents the outcomes coming from a Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) survey led among a representative sample of the Italian population (n = 1,523) on Antisemitic and Islamophobic attitudes. The cogency and structure of anti-Muslim public discourse and connected mass attitudes, revealed by our investigation, confirm the emergency of these two relevant dimensions of Islamophobia, which claim for a more accurate definition of Islamophobia. Moreover, the distribution of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic attitudes illustrate an interesting overlapping of Islamophobia and Antisemitism which claims that racism is multi-targeted and that there is not so much options between Antisemitism and Islamophobia. Finally, we use three main variables—anomie, ethnocentrism, and authoritarianism—as predictors of Islamophobia and Antisemitism. We tested the strength of these three predictors with the aid of path technique based on multiple regression analysis, which helps to determine the direct and indirect impacts of certain independent variables on dependent variables in a hypothetical causal system.
Abstract: The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (Claims Conference), commissioned Schoen Cooperman Research to conduct a comprehensive national study of Holocaust Knowledge and Awareness in the United Kingdom
(England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland). Schoen Cooperman Research conducted 2,000 interviews in the United Kingdom with adults aged 18 and over between September 29 – October 17, 2021. The margin of error is two percent.
The United Kingdom study finds that 89 percent say they have definitely heard about the Holocaust, and three quarters (75 percent) know that the Holocaust refers to the extermination of Jewish people. That being said, there are significant gaps in Holocaust Knowledge and Awareness in the United Kingdom.
The majority of UK respondents surveyed (52 percent) do not know that six million Jews were killed in the Holocaust. Further, a majority of UK citizens (57 percent) believe that fewer people seem to care about the Holocaust today than they used to, and 56 percent believe that something like the Holocaust could happen again today.
