Abstract: A new national study has revealed that, while Portugal maintains high levels of religious tolerance and broadly positive perceptions of the Jewish community, a profound lack of knowledge, persistent stereotypes, and growing international polarisation may create conditions conducive to the future rise of antisemitism if not addressed through education and public awareness.
The study, “Social Distance and Tolerance in Portugal: the place of the Jewish Community – conceptual literacy, antisemitism, religious tolerance and comparison with other social groups in Portugal”, was conducted by Pitagórica at the request of the Jewish Community of Lisbon (Comunidade Israelita de Lisboa, CIL). It surveyed a representative sample of 1,200 residents in mainland Portugal and the Autonomous Regions, aged 18 and over.
The research shows that Portuguese society remains broadly open and tolerant:
68% of respondents feel comfortable living with people of different cultures or religions.
92% support cultural and religious diversity, provided fundamental national values are respected.
94% defend freedom of religious practice for all faiths in compliance with Portuguese law.
The Jewish community is among the most positively perceived groups in the study. Nearly half of respondents consider its contribution to Portugal to be positive, and only 4% identify Jews as one of the most discriminated communities in the country.
However, the study highlights a striking paradox: strong acceptance coexists with very limited knowledge. Only 3% of respondents say they know the Jewish community well, while 75% admit to knowing little or nothing about it.
The findings point to significant gaps in conceptual and historical literacy:
19% have never heard of the term antisemitism, and only 40% correctly define it.
40% are unfamiliar with the term Zionism.
55% believe Holocaust education in schools is insufficient.
The study also identifies the persistence of stereotypes, with around 40% agreeing with statements suggesting that Jews have “too much economic power” or “excessive influence in politics and international media”.
While 59% of respondents say it is important to distinguish between Jews in Portugal and the State of Israel, almost half (49%) believe that events in Israel negatively affect the image of Jews more broadly. At the same time, 80% reject the idea that Jews outside Israel should be held responsible for the actions of the Israeli government.
The digital sphere emerges as a key area of concern:
52% believe the Jewish community is targeted by online hate speech.
37% report perceptions of vandalism against property.
30% mention physical attacks.
The study also finds that 52% of respondents consider online hate speech against the Jewish community likely to increase, while 34% anticipate further vandalism and 31% foresee potential physical attacks in the future. The main drivers identified are hate speech on social media (46%) and religious extremism (35%).
A further significant finding is that 67% of respondents are unaware that Lisbon’s synagogue currently requires permanent police protection.
Awareness of institutional frameworks is extremely limited:
90% are unaware of the European Strategy to Combat Antisemitism and Foster Jewish Life.
99% do not know the national coordinator of the strategy.
75% are unaware of which government ministry is responsible for the file.
According to the authors, the data suggest that Portugal does not exhibit signs of structural rejection of the Jewish community. On the contrary, attitudes are generally positive and levels of declared tolerance remain high.
However, this positive baseline is accompanied by three interlinked vulnerabilities: widespread ignorance about Jewish life in Portugal, the influence of international conflicts on perceptions of Jews, and the persistence of stereotypes in digital spaces.
As a result, perception tends to be shaped less by direct social contact and more by abstract associations and online narratives.
According to David Joffe Botelho, President of the Board of Directors of the Jewish
Community of Lisbon, “the objective of this independent study was to produce a robust and
comparable diagnosis of the place of the Jewish community in Portuguese society,
identifying protective factors, vulnerabilities and trends relevant to the development of
education, communication and prejudice prevention strategies,” since, adds the leader,
“Portuguese political leaders have not given due attention to this issue, and the urgent
adoption of a national strategy, aligned with the European strategy, is necessary to combat
antisemitism and promote Jewish life.”
Additionally, he also states, “our goal was to have a comparative portrait with other social
and religious realities, so the study, beyond the specific dimension related to antisemitism,
can be used by those in government to design and implement public policies based on
concrete and measurable data and not on mere perceptions.”
The study concludes that the principal challenge in Portugal is not widespread rejection of the Jewish community, but rather the combination of low levels of knowledge, limited direct contact, and exposure to polarised global narratives.
In a context where 72% of respondents believe tensions between social and cultural groups have increased in recent years, the report warns that these conditions, if left unaddressed, may gradually create an environment more susceptible to antisemitic attitudes.
It therefore calls for strengthened educational initiatives, improved Holocaust and religious literacy in schools, and closer alignment with European strategies aimed at combating antisemitism and promoting Jewish life.
Source : European Jewish congress
Abstract: Der 7. Oktober 2023, der brutale Terrorangriff der Hamas auf Israel mit rund 1200 Ermordeten und hunderten Verschleppten und der anschließende Krieg in Gaza markieren auch hierzulande eine Zäsur. Unmittelbar nach Bekanntwerden des Terrorangriffs der Hamas auf Israel am 7. Oktober und des kurz darauf beginnenden
und zum Veröffentlichungszeitpunkt dieser Publikation noch laufenden Krieges in Gaza, erreichte die Bildungsstätte Anne Frank eine Flut an Anfragen. Insbesondere Lehrkräfte und andere an Schule beschäftigte Fachkräfte meldeten sich mit der Bitte nach Beratung und Fortbildung zum Umgang mit Terror, Krieg und den sich daran entzündenden Folgen hierzulande.
Unser Team reagierte schnell mit einer Vielzahl ad hoc durchgeführter digitaler Gesprächsangebote, mit Fortbildungen vor Ort, mit Veranstaltungen, Publikationen und Materialien. Den ersten Jahrestag des
7. Oktobers 2023 nahmen wir zum Anlass, die aktuellen Bedarfe an Schulen systematisch zu erfassen – eine Lücke, die wir mit einer Online-Umfrage unter Lehrkräften schließen. Ziel war es zu erfassen, ob und in welcher Weise der 7. Oktober 2023 und der Gaza-Krieg ein Jahr später noch Thema in den Schulen sind, wie die Lehrkräfte damit umgehen und welche Unterstützung sie sich dabei wünschen.
Zwischen dem 09.09.24 und 23.09.24 haben sich 159 Lehrkräfte aller Schulformen, vor allem aus Gymnasien, Berufs- und Gesamtschulen und mit 98 Prozent überwiegend aus Hessen, an der Umfrage beteiligt. Ihnen und ihren aussagekräftigen Antworten, die wir auf den folgenden Seiten präsentieren, gilt unser ausdrücklicher
Dank. Ihre Antworten zeigen, dass dem Thema große Wichtigkeit beigemessen wird und einzelne Lehrkräfte im Rahmen ihrer Möglichkeiten versuchen, den sogenannten Nahostkonflikt zu thematisieren – dass strukturelle Zwänge, insbesondere mangelnde zeitliche Kapazitäten, einen angemessenen Umgang mit der Thematik
aber erschweren.
Die Umfrage bestätigt uns in unserer Forderung nach einer Bildungsoffensive, die Schulen in all ihrer Heterogenität dazu befähigt und sie mit den entsprechenden zeitlichen und materiellen Ressourcen ausstattet, den Nahostkonflikt und andere komplexe globale Konflikte unserer Zeit, deren Geschichte und gesellschaftspolitische Dimensionen besser verstehen und einordnen zu können.
Ziel muss es sein, dass Lehrkräfte sprechfähig sind zu den Themen, die ihre Schüler*innen und uns als Gesellschaft bewegen – und entsprechend der vielfältigen Identitäten und Positionen im Raum Schule sind Perspektivwechsel dafür unumgänglich. Insbesondere müssen dabei auch der digitale Raum und dessen besondere Dynamiken1
mit adressiert werden – die Umfrageergebnisse zeigen überdeutlich, dass es an Strategien des Umgangs mit den Sozialen Medien mangelt, hier bedarf es einer konsequenten Verzahnung medienpädagogischer Angebote mit Inhalten der politischen Bildung.
Abstract: Pearn Kandola’s Antisemitism and Islamophobia at Work report (2024) is a comprehensive study in which over 1000 Muslim and Jewish employees participated, either through in-depth focus groups or our survey, to shine a light on their experiences of antisemitism and Islamophobia in the workplace since October 7th 2023.
Late last year, we published our groundbreaking Religion At Work (2023) report, the largest of its kind. It explored the experiences of people of faith in the workplace, highlighting the difficulty for employees of any religion to express their faith at work.
Released in November 2023, a question we were increasingly faced with as time went on was the impact on Muslim and Jewish employees, in particular, since October 7th. However, the data for this momentous report was gathered and analysed before the current Israel-Gaza conflict, which could tell us little to answer this question.
As a result, we carried out a new piece of research, designed to look at the:
Extent to which Jewish employees experience antisemitism in the workplace;
Extent to which Muslim employees experience Islamophobia in the workplace;
Impact of the Israel-Gaza conflict on them
Actions that organisations can take to ensure people feel safe and included in workplaces
The research was in two parts:
Firstly, a survey was carried out in June 2024 in which 500 Jewish and 500 Muslim employees participated, followed by in-depth interviews with 20 people, 10 of each faith.
The report closes with key recommendations for employers to better support Muslim and Jewish employees by research author Professor Binna Kandola OBE.
Abstract: Evaluative research in Jewish education often adopts a “silver bullet” approach, attributing identity outcomes to single programs or interventions. This article advances an ecosystem framework that situates Jewish schooling, family upbringing, and peer networks within their wider communal and societal contexts. Drawing on hierarchical regression analyses of large-scale survey data (n = 21,260) from four Jewish diaspora communities, we find that the impact of Jewish education depends on its interaction with family background, social capital, and national setting. Jewish identity thus emerges as a cumulative and relational process rather than the product of discrete experiences. These findings underscore the limitations of single-country studies, which often generalize about Jewish identity formation without considering the structural and contextual differences that shape communal life in different national settings. The findings also extend sociological theories of social capital, cultural capital, and the life course, offering new insight into how educational, familial, and communal forces together sustain Jewish identity in diaspora.
Abstract: The chapter addresses the key problem of Polish collective memory of Auschwitz, that is, how Poles perceive the former camp, in a wider context of Polish memory of World War II, Nazi camps, and the Holocaust. It presents and discusses results of surveys representative of Poland’s population, particularly two designed by the authors and conducted in 2020. The surveys show that the war is the major theme of Polish collective memory, and Nazi camps in general and Auschwitz in particular belong to top Polish lieux de mémoire. Auschwitz evokes in Poles mostly general and universalist associations with destruction, murder, crematoria, gas chambers, and death. The Holocaust is spontaneously associated with Auschwitz only rarely. On the other hand, the camp is the most frequently associated site of the destruction of Jews. The Polish collective memory of Auschwitz hinges upon a poor awareness of the number, nationality, and countries of origin of the camp’s victims. However, Poles are aware of the major historical functions of the camp and share different symbolic meanings of it. Some survey results suggest that a cosmopolitan Holocaust memory focusing on Auschwitz developed among Poles while others indicate that the Polish memory of Auschwitz has nationalist characteristics.
Abstract: Nach dem Angriff der klerikal-faschistsichen Hamas auf Israel im Oktober 2023 kam es sehr schnell zu einer Mobilisierung für die Ziele der Terrororganisation. Diese waren von Anfang an getragen von antisemitischen Tropen und gingen einher mit einem rasanten Anstieg der antisemitisch motivierten Straft- und Gewalttaten. Relevante Trägergruppen dieses Antisemitismus sind dem eigenen Selbstverständnis nach im linken politischen Spektrum positioniert. Zeigt diese Mobilisierung eine bisher übersehene Verbreitung antisemitischer Ressentiments auch in der politischen Linken an? Und was sind mögliche Ursachen für das Vorkommen des Antisemitismus in Gruppen, für die Gerechtigkeitsnormen zum erklärten Selbstverständnis gehören? Auf Grundlage der Daten der Leipziger Autoritarismus Studie 2024 können wir zeigen, dass der Antisemitismus auch innerhalb der Linken verbreitet ist, wenn auch die Rationalisierung des Ressentiments teilweise anders ausfällt. Auffällig ist, dass innerhalb jüngerer Befragter der Antisemitismus häufiger anzutreffen ist, als bei älteren – mit Ausnahme des Schuldabwehrantisemitismus. Wir diskutieren diese Befunde auf auf kritisch-theoretischer Basis.Nach dem Angriff der klerikal-faschistsichen Hamas auf Israel im Oktober 2023 kam es sehr schnell zu einer Mobilisierung für die Ziele der Terrororganisation. Diese waren von Anfang an getragen von antisemitischen Tropen und gingen einher mit einem rasanten Anstieg der antisemitisch motivierten Straft- und Gewalttaten. Relevante Trägergruppen dieses Antisemitismus sind dem eigenen Selbstverständnis nach im linken politischen Spektrum positioniert. Zeigt diese Mobilisierung eine bisher übersehene Verbreitung antisemitischer Ressentiments auch in der politischen Linken an? Und was sind mögliche Ursachen für das Vorkommen des Antisemitismus in Gruppen, für die Gerechtigkeitsnormen zum erklärten Selbstverständnis gehören? Auf Grundlage der Daten der Leipziger Autoritarismus Studie 2024 können wir zeigen, dass der Antisemitismus auch innerhalb der Linken verbreitet ist, wenn auch die Rationalisierung des Ressentiments teilweise anders ausfällt. Auffällig ist, dass innerhalb jüngerer Befragter der Antisemitismus häufiger anzutreffen ist, als bei älteren – mit Ausnahme des Schuldabwehrantisemitismus. Wir diskutieren diese Befunde auf auf kritisch-theoretischer Basis.
Abstract: For this report, the Union of Jewish Students has collated dozens of testimonies from students who have
experienced antisemitism on campus.
The UJS also commissioned polling of 1,000 students, across all faiths and none, to assess the
impact of campus protests and the rise of antisemitism. The findings reveal alarming levels of campus
antisemitism, significant disruption caused by protests, and perceptions of Jewish students marred by
hostility and intolerance.
Key Findings:
1.Antisemitism has become normalised on our campuses.
- One in four students (23%) have seen behaviour that targets Jewish students for their religion/ethnicity.
- One in five (20%) students would be reluctant to, or would never, houseshare with a Jewish student.
- Jewish students have told us they have faced physical and verbal abuse, social ostracisation and
widespread antisemitic attitudes.
2.Glorification of terrorism is prevalent and unpunished.
- Our research has found that student groups have explicitly called for violence against Jews, even justifying the terrorist attack at Bondi Beach in December 2025.
- 49% of students have heard slogans or chants glorifying Hamas, Hezbollah or other proscribed groups on campus.
- 47% have witnessed justification of the October 7th attacks, rising to 77% among those who encounter Israel-Palestine protests regularly.
3. Protests disrupt all students, and universities have a clear mandate from students to take firmer action.
-Protests have disrupted learning for 65% of students, and 40% have altered their journey on campus to avoid disruption.
- Universities where protests are more frequent have seen higher levels of antisemitism, and four in ten (39%) of students who witness regular Israel-Palestine protests have seen Jewish students harassed often.
- 69% of students disapprove of protests blocking access to learning, and 82% deem calls to 'globalise the intifada' to be antisemitic.
Abstract: In June 2025, Hadassah UK partnered with the Hadassah Medical Organization in Jerusalem to undertake important mental health research in the community. Developed by leading Israeli trauma experts, a UK-wide survey was presented to the community to understand how British Jews were coping with the psychological and social impact of October 7th, the ongoing conflict, and rising antisemitism.
This research involved 511 participants from diverse backgrounds within the UK Jewish community, representing various denominational affiliations, geographic locations, and demographic characteristics. The completed study provided robust statistical power for examining complex relationships between trauma exposure, psychological symptoms, and protective factors.Our comprehensive statistical analysis reveals critical insights into the psychological impact of exposure to the October 7th events and subsequent antisemitism on the UK Jewish community.
Participants were recruited through multiple channels including synagogues, Jewish community organisations, and social networks to ensure broad representation, as well as help to capture the full spectrum of experiences within the UK Jewish community.
From our study, we can see that the psychological impact of October 7th and subsequent events created significant mental health challenges within the UK Jewish community. A key finding showed that over one-third of participants exhibited clinically significant PTSD symptoms, including intrusive memories of attack imagery, avoidance of trauma reminders, and heightened reactive responses.
Abstract: Feindselige Einstellungen gegenüber religiösen und ethnischen Minoritäten sind weit verbreitet. Ziel dieser Studie ist es, Einstellungsmuster in der Schweizer Bevölkerung empirisch zu identifizieren und zu prüfen, wie diese mit Kontakthäufigkeit zu Minoritäten zusammenhängen. Grundlage ist ein repräsentativer Survey, der im Jahr 2022 durchgeführt wurde (N = 2 701). Dazu wurden Fragen zu feindseligen Einstellungen gegenüber Jüdinnen und Juden, Musliminnen und Muslimen sowie Schwarzen Menschen gestellt. Befragte mit vergleichbaren Einstellungen wurden mit einer Reihe latenter Klassenanalysen gruppiert. Mittels Bayesian Information Criterion wurde das am besten zu den Daten passende Modell identifiziert. Es fanden sich sechs distinkte Einstellungsgruppen: keine Feindseligkeit, nicht antisemitisch geprägte Kulturangst, antisemitische Feindseligkeit, Fremdenfeindlichkeit, antisemitisch geprägte Kulturangst und unspezifische Feindseligkeit. Mittels multinomialer logistischer Regression konnte gezeigt werden, dass die Kontakthäufigkeit mit der Gruppe nicht antisemitisch geprägte Kulturangst zusammenhängt. Personen mit feindseligen Einstellungen stellen keine homogene Gruppe dar. Antisemitismus und Kulturangst sind bei der Unterscheidung der Gruppen zentral, wobei Antisemitismus ein eigenständiges Phänomen ist.
Abstract: Die Problematik des politisch-islamischen Antisemitismus (PIA) hat in den letzten Jahren zunehmend Aufmerksamkeit erfahren. In diesem Kapitel gehen wir der oftmals wenig berücksichtigten Frage nach, wie Jüdinnen:Juden die aktuelle Bedrohungslage erleben und ausdeuten. Dies untersuchen wir aus Perspektive einer phänomenologisch orientierten Wissenssoziologie mittels eines Mixed-Methods-Ansatzes. Unsere Studie umfasst die Analyse von 21 problemzentrierten Interviews mit Jüdinnen:Juden sowie die Auswertung eines Online-Surveys mit 295 jüdischen Befragten. Die Interviewanalyse ergab, dass das Erleben von PIA strukturidentisch zu anderen Antisemitismusformen verläuft. Die alltägliche Konfrontation führt zum Erleben dreier Begrenzungen: Im Vorfeld der möglichen Konfrontation ist es problematisch, dass diese nicht immer vollumfänglich antizipiert werden kann. Kommt es zur Konfrontation, sind selbstgewählte Alltagsrelevanzen eingegrenzt. Im weiteren Konfrontationsverlauf kann sich zudem die eigene Handlungsfähigkeit als begrenzt erweisen. Die Auswertung der quantitativen Daten kann hieran anknüpfend zeigen, dass viele Befragte von Begegnungen mit PIA berichten, den sie vor allem durch Aussagen, Sprache und Kontext der Täter:innen identifizieren. 29 % der Befragten gaben an, in den letzten zehn Jahren PIA in Form von Beleidigung, Vandalismus oder physischer Gewalt erlebt zu haben. Bezüglich der Bedrohungs- und Problemwahrnehmung unterscheiden sie deutlich zwischen „Muslimen“ und „radikalen Muslimen“ und sehen PIA als großes gesellschaftliches Problem an, das ihre Sicherheit und alltägliche Lebenswelt beeinflusst.
Abstract: The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (Claims Conference) commissioned Schoen Cooperman Research to conduct a comprehensive national study of Holocaust Knowledge and Awareness in the Netherlands.
Schoen Cooperman Research conducted 2,000 interviews across the Netherlands. The margin of error for the study is 2 percent. This memo presents our key research findings and compares these findings with prior Claims Conference studies, which were conducted in five other countries.
Our latest study finds significant gaps in Holocaust knowledge and awareness in the Netherlands, as well as widespread concern that Holocaust denial and Holocaust distortion are problems in the Netherlands today.
We found that 23 percent of Dutch Millennials and Gen Z respondents believe the Holocaust is a myth, or that it occurred but the number of Jews who died has been greatly exaggerated – the highest percentage among Millennials and Gen Z respondents in all six countries the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against
Germany has previously studied.
Further, 29 percent of Dutch respondents, including 37 percent of Dutch Millennials and Gen Z respondents believe that two million or fewer Jews were killed during the Holocaust. Moreover, despite the fact that more than 70 percent of the Netherlands’ Jewish population perished during the Holocaust, a majority of Dutch respondents (53
percent), including 60 percent of Dutch Millennials and Gen Z, do not cite the Netherlands as a country where the Holocaust took place. Finally, 53 percent of Dutch respondents believe that something like the Holocaust
could happen again today.
Abstract: To cope with the covid-19 pandemic, people not only relied on state measures and scientific knowledge, but also drew on the resources of religion. They may also have embraced conspiracy theories that sometimes led them to engage in protest behavior. Against this background, we address the following research question: “How are people's religiosity and spirituality related to their belief in covid-19 conspiracy theories in Germany?” We answer this question by conducting a theory-led empirical analysis. We apply quantitative methods based on primary data from a (non-representative) online survey that we carried out with 2,373 respondents in Germany between July 2020 and January 2021. The results show that belief in covid-19 conspiracy theories is positively correlated with the image of a punitive God, with exclusivist beliefs, and with private prayer—and negatively correlated with attendance at religious services. Moreover, Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, and Jews have a lower affinity for conspiracy theories than not religiously affiliated people, while the opposite is true for Evangelicals.
Abstract: The report shares, for the first time, data on observing Succot in the UK, based on the responses of over 4,800 adult British Jews to the JPR 2025 Jews in Uncertain Times Survey. The report compares Succot observance with other Jewish New Year holidays and festivals, and explores who is more likely to celebrate Succot.
Some of the key findings in this report:
50% of Jews in the UK said they celebrate Succot in some way (e.g. attending synagogue, spending some time in a 'Succah', etc.)."
Compared with its neighbouring High Holidays, Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur, and with other Jewish festivals and practices, Succot is somewhat less commonly observed.
The larger the household size, the more likely it is that Succot is observed. Households with school-aged children at home are much more likely to celebrate Succot, especially if they are in Jewish schools.
74% of British Jews observe Rosh Hashanah rituals at home. 63% of British Jews fast on Yom Kippur most or all years.
Abstract: Significance
Commemoration initiatives seek to increase the public visibility of past atrocities and the fates of victims. This is counter to the objectives of revisionist actors to downplay or deny atrocities. Memorials for victims might complicate such attempts and reduce support for revisionist actors. The current research examines whether, on the level of local neighborhoods, exposure to memorials for victims of NS persecution can reduce support for a far-right, revisionist party. We find that, in Berlin, Germany, the placement of small, local “stumbling stones” commemorating victims and survivors of NS persecution, is associated with a substantial decrease in the local far-right vote share in the following election. Our study suggests that local, victim-focused memorials can reduce far-right support.
Abstract
Does public remembrance of past atrocities lead to decreased support for far-right parties today? Initiatives commemorating past atrocities aim to make visible the victims and crimes committed against them. This runs counter to revisionist actors who attempt to downplay or deny atrocities and victims. Memorials for victims might complicate such attempts and reduce support for revisionist actors. Yet, little empirical evidence exists on whether that happens. In this study, we examine whether exposure to local memorials that commemorate victims of atrocities reduces support for a revisionist far-right party. Our empirical case is the Stolpersteine (“stumbling stones”) memorial in Berlin, Germany. It commemorates victims and survivors of Nazi persecution in front of their last freely chosen place of residence. We employ time-series cross-sectional analyses and a discontinuity design using a panel dataset that matches the location and date of placement of new Stolpersteine with the election results from seven elections (2013 to 2021) at the level of polling station areas. We find that, on average, the presence of Stolpersteine is associated with a 0.96%-point decrease in the far-right vote share in the following election. Our study suggests that local memorials that make past atrocities visible have implications for political behavior in the present.
Abstract: In this report:
As the 80th Session of the United Nations General Assembly approaches, and with key statesmen and leaders, including British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, announcing that their countries may recognise a Palestinian state at the summit, this report finds levels of agreement with the contention that “a two-state solution is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours in the Middle East” have fallen to below 50% among British Jews for the first time since records began.
The report is based on over 4,800 responses from members of the JPR Research Panel to the 2025 Jews in Uncertain Times Survey, conducted in June/July 2025.
Some of the key findings in this report:
49% of respondents agree with the two-state solution contention, compared with 54% a year ago, and 78% in 2010.
Despite the reported drop, support for the two-state solution remains the majority opinion among British Jews, as 41% disagree with it and 10% are not sure.
Younger Jews are found to be less likely to believe in the two-state solution than their elders, with over 40% of 16-29-year-olds showing a degree of support for a shared bi-national state.
Attitudes to support for the two-state solution correlate with Jews’ Jewish denominational positions, political allegiances and attitudes to Zionism.
Anti-Zionist Jews, who constitute a small minority of British Jews as a whole, are particularly likely to favour bi-nationalism over the two-state solution. The much larger, mainstream and orthodox communities overwhelmingly reject this position, but show considerable scepticism for the two-state solution, most likely on security grounds.
British Jews overwhelmingly reject the idea that ‘Israel should take over full control of Gaza.’
Abstract: Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Israel sind einzigartig. Geprägt von der Erinnerung an die Shoah und getragen von dem Anspruch, daraus praktische Konsequenzen für heute zu ziehen, gelten sie als „besonders“. Doch was bedeutet diese Besonderheit im Jahr 2025? Haben der Terrorangriff der Hamas auf Israel am 7. Oktober 2023 und der nachfolgende Krieg Israels gegen die Hamas im Gazastreifen Spuren im bilateralen Verhältnis hinterlassen? Wie blicken Deutsche und Israelis heute aufeinander, welche Erwartungen und Bilder prägen das gegenseitige Verhältnis, und welche Verantwortung resultiert daraus in einer Zeit wachsender geopolitischer Spannungen und gesellschaftlicher Polarisierung? Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Fragen gibt die vorliegende Kompaktauswertung einen ersten Einblick in die Ergebnisse unserer aktuellen Studie zur gegenseitigen Wahrnehmung von Israelis und Deutschen. Auf Basis einer repräsentativen Doppelbefragung in beiden Ländern gibt sie Aufschluss über das politische Selbstverständnis in beiden Gesellschaften, die Rolle der Geschichte für die Gegenwart, die Erwartungen an die deutsche Nahostpolitik sowie die Wahrnehmung von Antisemitismus und internationaler Verantwortung. Die Ergebnisse zeichnen ein ambivalentes Bild, geprägt von Nähe und Distanz, Zustimmung und Kritik, Hoffnung und Skepsis. In dieser Auswertung legen wir einen besonderen Fokus auf die Erhebung in Deutschland und ziehen die israelischen Befunde vergleichend heran. Eine umfangreiche Darstellung aller Ergebnisse ist in Vorbereitung. Mit dieser Studie setzt die Bertelsmann Stiftung ihre langjährige Reihe empirischer Analysen zur Entwicklung der deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen fort. Die Studie erscheint in einem Jahr, in dem sich die Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen zwischen beiden Staaten zum sechzigsten Mal jährt. Ein Anlass, nicht nur auf das Erreichte zurückzublicken, sondern auch für eine kritische Selbstbefragung: Wie können wir, Deutsche und Israelis, unsere Beziehung in Zukunft verantwortungsvoll gestalten?
Abstract: Since the end of the USSR, post-Soviet Jewry has evolved into an ethnically and culturally diverse Russian speaking community. This process is taking place against the gradual inflation of a collective identity among Russian-speaking Jews that survived the first post-Soviet decade. The infrastructure for this new entity is provided by new local (or ethno-civic) groups of East European Ashkenazi Jewry with specific communal, subcultural, and ethno-political identities (“Ukrainian,” “Moldavian,” or “Russian” Jews, e.g.). These communities demonstrate a changing balance of identification between their countries of residence and the “transnational Russian-Jewish community”, and they absorb a significant number of persons of non-Jewish and ethnically heterogeneous origins as well.
This book discusses identity, community modes, migration dynamics, socioeconomic status, attitudes toward Israel, social and political environments, and other parameters framing these trends using the results of a comprehensive sociological study of the extended Jewish population conducted in 2019–2020 by this author in the five former-Soviet Union countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Kazakhstan).
Abstract: For many people, the coronavirus pandemic meant an enormous and existential loss of control. At the same time, an increase in right-wing extremist attitudes like xenophobia could be observed in Germany. In this study, we hypothesize that the loss of control caused by the pandemic has contributed to the rise in xenophobic and anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany. We propose that this occurs through an attempt to restore control via elements of a revised authoritarian syndrome understood as both the classic authoritarian dynamic of aggression, submission and conventionalism on the one hand, and a general belief in conspiracy theories on the other. In a representative, probability-based study, N = 2522 participants were surveyed on locus of control, right-wing authoritarianism, conspiracy mentality, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. It was found that right-wing authoritarianism and conspiracy mentality mediated the relationship between external locus of control and xenophobia (partial mediation) and anti-Semitism (full mediation). Surprisingly, internal control beliefs had a direct effect on right-wing authoritarianism—an effect that also leads to increased resentment. We conclude that social crises make people particularly vulnerable to regaining control via conspiracy theories and authoritarianism, which harbors dangers such as right-wing extremism as a consequence. Limitations are discussed.
Topics: Antisemitism: Education against, Schools: Primary / Elementary, Schools: Seconday / High Schools, Schools: Non-Jewish, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Teachers, Surveys, Teaching and Pedagogy, Jewish Students, Interviews, Antisemitism: Jewish Perceptions and Experiences
