Abstract: Expressions of antisemitic hate abound on social media today, reinvigorating ancient stereotypes around Jewish people and their history. The current user-centered study examined the shapes and the extent of antisemitic stereotypes from the point of view of emerging adults and their daily social media consumption. Emerging adults (N = 47) between 18 and 30 years of age were asked to keep guided media diaries of their social media activity over a period of 21 days (February to May 2022), zooming in on Jewish people, Jewish life, the Middle East conflict, and other topics associated with Jewry. A sample of N = 1,024 threads from a variety of social media channels was collected, encompassing textual and visual material. Qualitative content analysis was used to determine the presence of antisemitism, how explicit/implicit it was, and the types of argumentation used to support antisemitic claims. Frequency analysis and Chi-Square tests yielded beyond-chance patterns in the data. Findings reveal a high prevalence of explicit Israel-related antisemitic discourse encountered by emerging adults on social media, as well as highly ambiguous and implicit content that eludes easy detection by emerging adult users. Findings also point to the highly interactive nature in which antisemitism is co-constructed online.
Abstract: Der Anschlag von Hanau, die Mbembe-Debatte wie auch die immer wiederkehrenden, meist hitzigen Diskussionen um den Nahost-Konflikt machen eines klar: Wir brauchen dringend eine fundierte Auseinandersetzung mit den Zusammenhängen zwischen Antisemitismus und (anti-muslimischem) Rassismus. In der Öffentlichkeit ist die Frage, ob und wie diese beiden Phänomene miteinander verglichen werden dürfen, enorm umstritten, was eine sachliche und wissenschaftliche Beschäftigung lange erschwert hat.
Sabine Schiffer und Constantin Wagner schaffen durch ihre Forschungsergebnisse eine Grundlage für eine neue, aufgeschlossene Diskussion und zeigen an aktuellen wie auch historischen Beispielen, dass Antisemitismus und Islamophobie über entscheidende Gemeinsamkeiten verfügen, die zu erkennen die Voraussetzung für ihre Bekämpfung ist. Ein wichtiges Debattenbuch, das offen und mutig eine der drängendsten Fragen unserer Zeit in den Blick nimmt und aufzeigt, wie wir mit diesen Erkenntnissen den gesellschaftlichen Konflikten vor allem im Sinne der unmittelbar Betroffenen besser begegnen können.
Abstract: Public concern about antisemitism has increased globally in the twenty-first century, sparking renewed interest from social scientists. However, the crucial question of why trajectories of antisemitic hostility differ between countries remains unanswered due to a lack of studies designed to track temporal and cross-national variation. Addressing this gap, I evaluate the explanatory power of two main lines of argument that divide the literature: generalist and particularist. While generalists see antisemitism as a manifestation of general outgroup hostility common to various forms of prejudice, particularists stress the contextual specificity of antisemitism and posit that its twenty-first-century expressions are distinctively linked to anti-Zionist sentiment (enmity toward Israel and its supporters). I derive observable implications from these positions and conduct a comparative, longitudinal case study of antisemitic hostility in Germany, Sweden, and Russia (1990–2020), using a mixed-methods approach to integrate incident counts, victimization surveys, media analysis, and expert interviews. Findings match predictions from the particularist position, with flare-ups in the Israel–Palestine conflict generating or catalyzing antisemitic hostility depending on the strength of local anti-Zionist sentiment, thus demonstrating the centrality of the “Israel factor” in contemporary antisemitism.
Abstract: Our point of departure being that free speech by all sides must be protected and that pro-Palestinian speech is not antisemitic by definition, this chapter examines the extent to which Greek political parties’ critique of Israeli policies diachronically might implicitly or explicitly contribute to the dissemination of antisemitic mythopoesis. Moving beyond the conventional focus on far-right rhetoric, this analysis explores how antisemitic tropes are reproduced within the discourses of mainstream political actors, including the conservative party New Democracy and the socialist PASOK. Particular emphasis is placed on the Greek left, a heterogeneous political formation encompassing a broad spectrum of ideologies that ostensibly uphold human rights and progressive values. The presence of discriminatory discourse within such frameworks reveals the deep entrenchment of antisemitic attitudes in Greek society, where they function as a form of ideological common sense. By examining periods such as the Greek debt crisis and the War in Gaza starting in 2023, we argue that this latent antisemitism tends to resurface during periods of socio-political crisis and permeates the entire political spectrum, challenging assumptions about its marginality or exclusivity to far right politics and rhetoric. At this point, and in light of the turbulent historical moment we are witnessing—marked by an ongoing humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, the endless suffering of the Palestinean people and the widespread instability throughout the Middle East—we deem it necessary to clarify that it is not our intention to intervene in the broader debate surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In contrast, our objective is to examine the phenomenon of antisemitism through a historical, cultural, and political lens, with a specific focus on how public opinion is shaped with regard to Greek Jewish citizens—and Jews more broadly—within the discourse articulated by Greek political actors. We would like to explicitly state that antisemitism, in this context, is not to be understood solely as a contemporary political manifestation, but as a multidimensional and diachronic phenomenon. With reference to the events of October 7th and their aftermath, we align ourselves with the position articulated by Gabor Maté, who, discussing the trauma and Palestinian suffering, emphatically stated that: “Any colonial power does precisely what Israel is doing and has been doing. (…) So, there is nothing specifically ‘Jewish’ about this. It also goes along with the colonial trajectory
Abstract: Wir untersuchen Manifestationen von Online-Antisemitismus im deutschen Sprachraum anhand von Tweets über Jüdinnen, Juden und Israel aus den Jahren 2019–2022. Die manuell annotierten Zufallsstichproben von insgesamt mehr als 8000 Tweets geben Aufschluss darüber, wie in sozialen Medien im deutschen Sprachraum vor dem 7. Oktober 2023 über jüdisches Leben und Israel gesprochen wurde.
Auch wenn nur ein kleiner Teil der Kommentare, mit 312 Nachrichten etwa vier Prozent, antisemitisch laut der IHRA-Definition von Antisemitismus waren, zeigen sie eine große Bandbreite an Formen von Antisemitismus auf. So wird sichtbar, dass viele der nach dem 7. Oktober 2023 gemachten Anschuldigungen gegen Israel auch schon vorher vorhanden waren.
Aber auch die als nicht antisemitisch gelabelten Posts bilden viele unterschiedliche Aspekte und Perspektiven ab, mit denen in Deutschland über jüdisches Leben und Antisemitismus gesprochen wird. Ein Thema war die Shoah. Dabei wurden zum Teil fragwürdige Vergleiche gezogen, etwa zwischen der Verfolgung von Jüdinnen und Juden während des Nationalsozialismus und zeitgenössischen Themen. Beispiele dafür sind die öffentliche Kritik an Personen, die sich gegen Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung der COVID-19-Pandemie stellen, das Diskriminierungsempfinden von Muslim_innen oder AfD-Sympathisant_innen sowie das Leid der Palästinenser_innen. Ein weiters Thema war Antisemitismus und die Verurteilung dessen, meist allgemein, gelegentlich aber auch konkret in Bezug auf eine bestimmte Äußerung oder Handlung. Eine zentrale Erkenntnis der Untersuchung ist, dass sich die meisten Online-Diskurse, in denen die Begriffe „Juden“ oder „Israel“ verwendet wurden, in irgendeiner Form mit Antisemitismus in Vergangenheit oder Gegenwart befassten – der Alltag von Jüdinnen, Juden und Israelis spielte dagegen eine untergeordnete Rolle.
Abstract: With the now-established visibility and electoral success of the contemporary populist radical right (PRR) in Western Europe, existing literature has examined these parties’ refutation of antisemitism in parallel to their continued allusion to antisemitic tropes, to greater and lesser extents. This PhD thesis brings these two strands of literature together in a three-country, three-party, and two-platform analysis of the Facebook and X posts of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), the National Rally (RN) in France, and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) between 2017 and early 2023. First, this thesis applies elements of discourse-historical analysis and of populist “style” to social media data in a novel way to contribute a framework of when Jewish inclusion and exclusion are acceptable to the parties. It demonstrates that the parties construct their ingroups as “victims”, and that Jews are included when this is strategically conducive or when Jewish victimhood does not threaten that of the non-Jewish majority. Second, while existing literature on the PRR’s framing of Jews, Israel, and antisemitism has predominantly focused on party output, this thesis uses mixed methods, Natural Language Processing (NLP) tools and inductive qualitative analysis, to analyse the comments by users who engage with the parties’ posts. It contributes a novel framework of user victimhood, showing that users are not able to form a common identity with Jews when they see Jews as an Other (rejective), see Jewish victimhood as competing with their own (competitive), and perceive Jewish victimhood as an accusation of antisemitism (defensive). Despite this, a third contribution of this research is an examination of user responses to antisemitic code words, such as “globalists”, and a conclusion that only rarely are these overtly understood and escalated by users. The thesis thus provides both empirical and methodological contributions to scholarship on the PRR: combining influences from psychology, political science, and history, and applying mixed methods in an original way to deepen and widen understanding of both the parties and users, and examining how the strategy of (anti-)antisemitism fits into broader processes of PRR mainstreaming.
Abstract: While public antisemitism after 7 October prominently features references to Israel, forms of Holocaust denial and distortion remain very relevant and are deeply intertwined with other forms of antisemitism.
Acts and manifestations of Holocaust denial and distortion appear in various forms and are adopted by different milieus and groups to serve their own political or religious agenda, regardless of societal and country-specific context.
Our publication „Holocaust Distortion in Europe“ examines the alarming prevalence of Holocaust denial and distortion in Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, and Poland; demonstrating how antisemitic narratives adapt to societal crises, are exploited for political gain, often evade legal accountability, erode historical truth—with harmful consequences for Jewish communities, Holocaust survivors, and their descendants—and highlights the urgent need for coordinated action.
Abstract: Dal 1991 la Fondazione CDEC produce un rapporto annuale sull’antisemitismo in Italia. L’ultimo, che analizza i dati raccolti nel corso del 2025, evidenzia un quadro particolarmente allarmante: le manifestazioni di odio antiebraico in Italia continuano a crescere. Anche in termini qualitativi la situazione è nettamente peggiorata, poiché gli atti più gravi hanno conosciuto un aumento maggiore.
Nel corso dell’anno si sono registrati 963 episodi di antisemitismo, a fronte di 1492 segnalazioni ricevute. Questo dato rappresenta una crescita di circa il 10% rispetto allo scorso anno, del 100% rispetto al 2023 e di ben il 400% rispetto al 2022. Si tratta, dunque, di un trend in continua crescita.
Nel corso del 2025 la matrice principale delle manifestazioni di odio è stata legata a Israele. Antichi pregiudizi — come l’accusa del sangue, il mito dell’elezione e l’odio verso il genere umano — sono stati trasferiti sul sionismo e sullo Stato di Israele.
Sebbene le diffamazioni rappresentino la maggior parte degli episodi, seguite dalle minacce, gli incrementi maggiori rispetto allo scorso anno hanno riguardato le discriminazioni (+100%) e le aggressioni fisiche (+225%). In altri termini, gli atti più gravi sono cresciuti maggiormente.
Le manifestazioni di palese antisemitismo online rappresentano oltre il 66% dei casi. Particolarmente diffuso è l’uso di emoji o numeri apparentemente innocui (come il gufo, il polpo, 109, 14/88, le triple parentesi (((cognome))), il triangolo rosso) per veicolare messaggi d’odio nelle subculture digitali.
I mesi estivi, e in particolare giugno e luglio, hanno mostrato picchi particolarmente elevati. Anche le Olimpiadi di Milano-Cortina, all’inizio del 2026, hanno evidenziato vari episodi di antisemitismo. In termini geografici, gli episodi di antisemitismo fisico da noi osservati si sono concentrati in Lombardia e Lazio, seguiti da Toscana, Emilia-Romagna, Piemonte e Veneto.
Forse il dato più inquietante è che il 14% degli italiani concorda con l’ipotesi di espellere gli ebrei dall’Italia. Manifestare la propria identità (ad esempio parlare in ebraico o indossare la kippah) comporta oggi rischi particolarmente elevati di aggressione e marginalizzazione.
Il Rapporto si basa sulla definizione operativa di antisemitismo dell’International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), largamente in uso internazionalmente e analizzata nel contributo scientifico del prof. Sergio Della Pergola.
Abstract: Since 7th October 2023, when Hamas perpetrated the worst single massacre against Jews since the Holocaust, there has been a surge in antisemitism in UK universities. Some of this has tipped over into outright anti-Jewish discrimination and harassment. Jewish students and staff have reported feeling unable to fully participate in university life, for fear of being abused, harassed, or attacked. This report offers a summary of research by the IntraCommunal Professorial Group (ICPG) aimed at understanding free speech on university campuses especially with regard to the approaches to speech concerning Jews, Israel, Zionism, and the Middle East conflict.
This report sets out the key issues, and a series of recommendations based on the research and grouped together under the subheadings of our three key findings. Those key findings are as follows:
1. UK universities have (a) a general legal duty, to protect freedom of expression on campus; (b) a duty to prevent discrimination and harassment based on protected characteristics; (c) a university-specific institutional duty to protect the academic freedoms of research and study. Currently UK universities are meeting neither (b) nor (c) in their response to the menace to Jewish students and academic staff posed by antisemitism, particularly antiIsrael antisemitism. That is, they are neither preventing discrimination and harassment, nor protecting freedom of research or freedom to study.
2. Anti-Israel protests and encampments on campuses, including in online spaces, have exacerbated what was already considered a hostile environment by many Jewish students and staff. Some university departments, trade unions, and student political milieus – inperson and online – have directly and indirectly discriminated against, abused, harassed and/or excluded Jewish students.
3. Traditional antisemitic concepts and tropes are being used by pro-Palestinian and/or antiIsrael staff and students. Israel and Zionism are regularly demonised and delegitimised, often using blood libels or other anti-Jewish hatred, and students or academics labelled as Zionists are routinely viewed as legitimate targets for discrimination, harassment, abuse, and/or attack.
Abstract: This report finds that the decision to ban away supporters from the fixture was reached through a flawed risk assessment process.
We argue that the prohibition was not justified by the risks as assessed, and it represented an unnecessary departure from ordinary policing practice, which we believe would likely have been sufficient to secure the match.
The Parliamentary Select Committee similarly concludes that the decision-making process was flawed. However, it maintains that the prohibition was proportionate to the level of risk, even if that risk had been more rigorously assessed.
Our analysis considers a further, key point. A central weakness in the decision-making process was the failure clearly to specify the nature and source of the risk.
If the primary risk came from away supporters themselves, then exclusion may have been justified. But if the principal risk derived from anti-Israel protestors, boycott activists, and antizionist actors seeking to disrupt or attack the match, then banning the away supporters risked punishing those who were being threatened and who did not themselves constitute a significant threat.
In such circumstances, the appropriate response would have required consideration beyond technical policing calculations. If there was a significant antisemitic threat, a policy priority might have been to mobilise sufficient police resources to defend the match, the visiting team, and their supporters rather than excluding them.
The decision-making process appears to have overestimated the risk posed by Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters, in part through a misreading of the Amsterdam precedent and perhaps through reliance on politically committed sources of advice. It may have given insufficient weight to risks arising from boycott activism and to the risk of antisemitic violence of the kind that occurred in Amsterdam.
The process did not engage in a serious way with institutions or individuals from the Jewish community either locally or nationally, or with HM Independent Advisor on Antisemitism. Doing so would have given it a better chance of avoiding the mistakes that it made in understanding the precedent, possible alternatives and the predictable impact of the away fans ban on Jewish communities.
If there was a significant antisemitic dimension to the threat environment, the risk assessment process did not identify or articulate it clearly.
Abstract: Nach dem Angriff der klerikal-faschistsichen Hamas auf Israel im Oktober 2023 kam es sehr schnell zu einer Mobilisierung für die Ziele der Terrororganisation. Diese waren von Anfang an getragen von antisemitischen Tropen und gingen einher mit einem rasanten Anstieg der antisemitisch motivierten Straft- und Gewalttaten. Relevante Trägergruppen dieses Antisemitismus sind dem eigenen Selbstverständnis nach im linken politischen Spektrum positioniert. Zeigt diese Mobilisierung eine bisher übersehene Verbreitung antisemitischer Ressentiments auch in der politischen Linken an? Und was sind mögliche Ursachen für das Vorkommen des Antisemitismus in Gruppen, für die Gerechtigkeitsnormen zum erklärten Selbstverständnis gehören? Auf Grundlage der Daten der Leipziger Autoritarismus Studie 2024 können wir zeigen, dass der Antisemitismus auch innerhalb der Linken verbreitet ist, wenn auch die Rationalisierung des Ressentiments teilweise anders ausfällt. Auffällig ist, dass innerhalb jüngerer Befragter der Antisemitismus häufiger anzutreffen ist, als bei älteren – mit Ausnahme des Schuldabwehrantisemitismus. Wir diskutieren diese Befunde auf auf kritisch-theoretischer Basis.Nach dem Angriff der klerikal-faschistsichen Hamas auf Israel im Oktober 2023 kam es sehr schnell zu einer Mobilisierung für die Ziele der Terrororganisation. Diese waren von Anfang an getragen von antisemitischen Tropen und gingen einher mit einem rasanten Anstieg der antisemitisch motivierten Straft- und Gewalttaten. Relevante Trägergruppen dieses Antisemitismus sind dem eigenen Selbstverständnis nach im linken politischen Spektrum positioniert. Zeigt diese Mobilisierung eine bisher übersehene Verbreitung antisemitischer Ressentiments auch in der politischen Linken an? Und was sind mögliche Ursachen für das Vorkommen des Antisemitismus in Gruppen, für die Gerechtigkeitsnormen zum erklärten Selbstverständnis gehören? Auf Grundlage der Daten der Leipziger Autoritarismus Studie 2024 können wir zeigen, dass der Antisemitismus auch innerhalb der Linken verbreitet ist, wenn auch die Rationalisierung des Ressentiments teilweise anders ausfällt. Auffällig ist, dass innerhalb jüngerer Befragter der Antisemitismus häufiger anzutreffen ist, als bei älteren – mit Ausnahme des Schuldabwehrantisemitismus. Wir diskutieren diese Befunde auf auf kritisch-theoretischer Basis.
