Abstract: Our point of departure being that free speech by all sides must be protected and that pro-Palestinian speech is not antisemitic by definition, this chapter examines the extent to which Greek political parties’ critique of Israeli policies diachronically might implicitly or explicitly contribute to the dissemination of antisemitic mythopoesis. Moving beyond the conventional focus on far-right rhetoric, this analysis explores how antisemitic tropes are reproduced within the discourses of mainstream political actors, including the conservative party New Democracy and the socialist PASOK. Particular emphasis is placed on the Greek left, a heterogeneous political formation encompassing a broad spectrum of ideologies that ostensibly uphold human rights and progressive values. The presence of discriminatory discourse within such frameworks reveals the deep entrenchment of antisemitic attitudes in Greek society, where they function as a form of ideological common sense. By examining periods such as the Greek debt crisis and the War in Gaza starting in 2023, we argue that this latent antisemitism tends to resurface during periods of socio-political crisis and permeates the entire political spectrum, challenging assumptions about its marginality or exclusivity to far right politics and rhetoric. At this point, and in light of the turbulent historical moment we are witnessing—marked by an ongoing humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, the endless suffering of the Palestinean people and the widespread instability throughout the Middle East—we deem it necessary to clarify that it is not our intention to intervene in the broader debate surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In contrast, our objective is to examine the phenomenon of antisemitism through a historical, cultural, and political lens, with a specific focus on how public opinion is shaped with regard to Greek Jewish citizens—and Jews more broadly—within the discourse articulated by Greek political actors. We would like to explicitly state that antisemitism, in this context, is not to be understood solely as a contemporary political manifestation, but as a multidimensional and diachronic phenomenon. With reference to the events of October 7th and their aftermath, we align ourselves with the position articulated by Gabor Maté, who, discussing the trauma and Palestinian suffering, emphatically stated that: “Any colonial power does precisely what Israel is doing and has been doing. (…) So, there is nothing specifically ‘Jewish’ about this. It also goes along with the colonial trajectory
Abstract: Wir untersuchen Manifestationen von Online-Antisemitismus im deutschen Sprachraum anhand von Tweets über Jüdinnen, Juden und Israel aus den Jahren 2019–2022. Die manuell annotierten Zufallsstichproben von insgesamt mehr als 8000 Tweets geben Aufschluss darüber, wie in sozialen Medien im deutschen Sprachraum vor dem 7. Oktober 2023 über jüdisches Leben und Israel gesprochen wurde.
Auch wenn nur ein kleiner Teil der Kommentare, mit 312 Nachrichten etwa vier Prozent, antisemitisch laut der IHRA-Definition von Antisemitismus waren, zeigen sie eine große Bandbreite an Formen von Antisemitismus auf. So wird sichtbar, dass viele der nach dem 7. Oktober 2023 gemachten Anschuldigungen gegen Israel auch schon vorher vorhanden waren.
Aber auch die als nicht antisemitisch gelabelten Posts bilden viele unterschiedliche Aspekte und Perspektiven ab, mit denen in Deutschland über jüdisches Leben und Antisemitismus gesprochen wird. Ein Thema war die Shoah. Dabei wurden zum Teil fragwürdige Vergleiche gezogen, etwa zwischen der Verfolgung von Jüdinnen und Juden während des Nationalsozialismus und zeitgenössischen Themen. Beispiele dafür sind die öffentliche Kritik an Personen, die sich gegen Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung der COVID-19-Pandemie stellen, das Diskriminierungsempfinden von Muslim_innen oder AfD-Sympathisant_innen sowie das Leid der Palästinenser_innen. Ein weiters Thema war Antisemitismus und die Verurteilung dessen, meist allgemein, gelegentlich aber auch konkret in Bezug auf eine bestimmte Äußerung oder Handlung. Eine zentrale Erkenntnis der Untersuchung ist, dass sich die meisten Online-Diskurse, in denen die Begriffe „Juden“ oder „Israel“ verwendet wurden, in irgendeiner Form mit Antisemitismus in Vergangenheit oder Gegenwart befassten – der Alltag von Jüdinnen, Juden und Israelis spielte dagegen eine untergeordnete Rolle.
Abstract: With the now-established visibility and electoral success of the contemporary populist radical right (PRR) in Western Europe, existing literature has examined these parties’ refutation of antisemitism in parallel to their continued allusion to antisemitic tropes, to greater and lesser extents. This PhD thesis brings these two strands of literature together in a three-country, three-party, and two-platform analysis of the Facebook and X posts of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), the National Rally (RN) in France, and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) between 2017 and early 2023. First, this thesis applies elements of discourse-historical analysis and of populist “style” to social media data in a novel way to contribute a framework of when Jewish inclusion and exclusion are acceptable to the parties. It demonstrates that the parties construct their ingroups as “victims”, and that Jews are included when this is strategically conducive or when Jewish victimhood does not threaten that of the non-Jewish majority. Second, while existing literature on the PRR’s framing of Jews, Israel, and antisemitism has predominantly focused on party output, this thesis uses mixed methods, Natural Language Processing (NLP) tools and inductive qualitative analysis, to analyse the comments by users who engage with the parties’ posts. It contributes a novel framework of user victimhood, showing that users are not able to form a common identity with Jews when they see Jews as an Other (rejective), see Jewish victimhood as competing with their own (competitive), and perceive Jewish victimhood as an accusation of antisemitism (defensive). Despite this, a third contribution of this research is an examination of user responses to antisemitic code words, such as “globalists”, and a conclusion that only rarely are these overtly understood and escalated by users. The thesis thus provides both empirical and methodological contributions to scholarship on the PRR: combining influences from psychology, political science, and history, and applying mixed methods in an original way to deepen and widen understanding of both the parties and users, and examining how the strategy of (anti-)antisemitism fits into broader processes of PRR mainstreaming.
Abstract: While public antisemitism after 7 October prominently features references to Israel, forms of Holocaust denial and distortion remain very relevant and are deeply intertwined with other forms of antisemitism.
Acts and manifestations of Holocaust denial and distortion appear in various forms and are adopted by different milieus and groups to serve their own political or religious agenda, regardless of societal and country-specific context.
Our publication „Holocaust Distortion in Europe“ examines the alarming prevalence of Holocaust denial and distortion in Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, and Poland; demonstrating how antisemitic narratives adapt to societal crises, are exploited for political gain, often evade legal accountability, erode historical truth—with harmful consequences for Jewish communities, Holocaust survivors, and their descendants—and highlights the urgent need for coordinated action.
Abstract: Dal 1991 la Fondazione CDEC produce un rapporto annuale sull’antisemitismo in Italia. L’ultimo, che analizza i dati raccolti nel corso del 2025, evidenzia un quadro particolarmente allarmante: le manifestazioni di odio antiebraico in Italia continuano a crescere. Anche in termini qualitativi la situazione è nettamente peggiorata, poiché gli atti più gravi hanno conosciuto un aumento maggiore.
Nel corso dell’anno si sono registrati 963 episodi di antisemitismo, a fronte di 1492 segnalazioni ricevute. Questo dato rappresenta una crescita di circa il 10% rispetto allo scorso anno, del 100% rispetto al 2023 e di ben il 400% rispetto al 2022. Si tratta, dunque, di un trend in continua crescita.
Nel corso del 2025 la matrice principale delle manifestazioni di odio è stata legata a Israele. Antichi pregiudizi — come l’accusa del sangue, il mito dell’elezione e l’odio verso il genere umano — sono stati trasferiti sul sionismo e sullo Stato di Israele.
Sebbene le diffamazioni rappresentino la maggior parte degli episodi, seguite dalle minacce, gli incrementi maggiori rispetto allo scorso anno hanno riguardato le discriminazioni (+100%) e le aggressioni fisiche (+225%). In altri termini, gli atti più gravi sono cresciuti maggiormente.
Le manifestazioni di palese antisemitismo online rappresentano oltre il 66% dei casi. Particolarmente diffuso è l’uso di emoji o numeri apparentemente innocui (come il gufo, il polpo, 109, 14/88, le triple parentesi (((cognome))), il triangolo rosso) per veicolare messaggi d’odio nelle subculture digitali.
I mesi estivi, e in particolare giugno e luglio, hanno mostrato picchi particolarmente elevati. Anche le Olimpiadi di Milano-Cortina, all’inizio del 2026, hanno evidenziato vari episodi di antisemitismo. In termini geografici, gli episodi di antisemitismo fisico da noi osservati si sono concentrati in Lombardia e Lazio, seguiti da Toscana, Emilia-Romagna, Piemonte e Veneto.
Forse il dato più inquietante è che il 14% degli italiani concorda con l’ipotesi di espellere gli ebrei dall’Italia. Manifestare la propria identità (ad esempio parlare in ebraico o indossare la kippah) comporta oggi rischi particolarmente elevati di aggressione e marginalizzazione.
Il Rapporto si basa sulla definizione operativa di antisemitismo dell’International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), largamente in uso internazionalmente e analizzata nel contributo scientifico del prof. Sergio Della Pergola.
Abstract: Since 7th October 2023, when Hamas perpetrated the worst single massacre against Jews since the Holocaust, there has been a surge in antisemitism in UK universities. Some of this has tipped over into outright anti-Jewish discrimination and harassment. Jewish students and staff have reported feeling unable to fully participate in university life, for fear of being abused, harassed, or attacked. This report offers a summary of research by the IntraCommunal Professorial Group (ICPG) aimed at understanding free speech on university campuses especially with regard to the approaches to speech concerning Jews, Israel, Zionism, and the Middle East conflict.
This report sets out the key issues, and a series of recommendations based on the research and grouped together under the subheadings of our three key findings. Those key findings are as follows:
1. UK universities have (a) a general legal duty, to protect freedom of expression on campus; (b) a duty to prevent discrimination and harassment based on protected characteristics; (c) a university-specific institutional duty to protect the academic freedoms of research and study. Currently UK universities are meeting neither (b) nor (c) in their response to the menace to Jewish students and academic staff posed by antisemitism, particularly antiIsrael antisemitism. That is, they are neither preventing discrimination and harassment, nor protecting freedom of research or freedom to study.
2. Anti-Israel protests and encampments on campuses, including in online spaces, have exacerbated what was already considered a hostile environment by many Jewish students and staff. Some university departments, trade unions, and student political milieus – inperson and online – have directly and indirectly discriminated against, abused, harassed and/or excluded Jewish students.
3. Traditional antisemitic concepts and tropes are being used by pro-Palestinian and/or antiIsrael staff and students. Israel and Zionism are regularly demonised and delegitimised, often using blood libels or other anti-Jewish hatred, and students or academics labelled as Zionists are routinely viewed as legitimate targets for discrimination, harassment, abuse, and/or attack.
Abstract: This report finds that the decision to ban away supporters from the fixture was reached through a flawed risk assessment process.
We argue that the prohibition was not justified by the risks as assessed, and it represented an unnecessary departure from ordinary policing practice, which we believe would likely have been sufficient to secure the match.
The Parliamentary Select Committee similarly concludes that the decision-making process was flawed. However, it maintains that the prohibition was proportionate to the level of risk, even if that risk had been more rigorously assessed.
Our analysis considers a further, key point. A central weakness in the decision-making process was the failure clearly to specify the nature and source of the risk.
If the primary risk came from away supporters themselves, then exclusion may have been justified. But if the principal risk derived from anti-Israel protestors, boycott activists, and antizionist actors seeking to disrupt or attack the match, then banning the away supporters risked punishing those who were being threatened and who did not themselves constitute a significant threat.
In such circumstances, the appropriate response would have required consideration beyond technical policing calculations. If there was a significant antisemitic threat, a policy priority might have been to mobilise sufficient police resources to defend the match, the visiting team, and their supporters rather than excluding them.
The decision-making process appears to have overestimated the risk posed by Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters, in part through a misreading of the Amsterdam precedent and perhaps through reliance on politically committed sources of advice. It may have given insufficient weight to risks arising from boycott activism and to the risk of antisemitic violence of the kind that occurred in Amsterdam.
The process did not engage in a serious way with institutions or individuals from the Jewish community either locally or nationally, or with HM Independent Advisor on Antisemitism. Doing so would have given it a better chance of avoiding the mistakes that it made in understanding the precedent, possible alternatives and the predictable impact of the away fans ban on Jewish communities.
If there was a significant antisemitic dimension to the threat environment, the risk assessment process did not identify or articulate it clearly.
Abstract: Nach dem Angriff der klerikal-faschistsichen Hamas auf Israel im Oktober 2023 kam es sehr schnell zu einer Mobilisierung für die Ziele der Terrororganisation. Diese waren von Anfang an getragen von antisemitischen Tropen und gingen einher mit einem rasanten Anstieg der antisemitisch motivierten Straft- und Gewalttaten. Relevante Trägergruppen dieses Antisemitismus sind dem eigenen Selbstverständnis nach im linken politischen Spektrum positioniert. Zeigt diese Mobilisierung eine bisher übersehene Verbreitung antisemitischer Ressentiments auch in der politischen Linken an? Und was sind mögliche Ursachen für das Vorkommen des Antisemitismus in Gruppen, für die Gerechtigkeitsnormen zum erklärten Selbstverständnis gehören? Auf Grundlage der Daten der Leipziger Autoritarismus Studie 2024 können wir zeigen, dass der Antisemitismus auch innerhalb der Linken verbreitet ist, wenn auch die Rationalisierung des Ressentiments teilweise anders ausfällt. Auffällig ist, dass innerhalb jüngerer Befragter der Antisemitismus häufiger anzutreffen ist, als bei älteren – mit Ausnahme des Schuldabwehrantisemitismus. Wir diskutieren diese Befunde auf auf kritisch-theoretischer Basis.Nach dem Angriff der klerikal-faschistsichen Hamas auf Israel im Oktober 2023 kam es sehr schnell zu einer Mobilisierung für die Ziele der Terrororganisation. Diese waren von Anfang an getragen von antisemitischen Tropen und gingen einher mit einem rasanten Anstieg der antisemitisch motivierten Straft- und Gewalttaten. Relevante Trägergruppen dieses Antisemitismus sind dem eigenen Selbstverständnis nach im linken politischen Spektrum positioniert. Zeigt diese Mobilisierung eine bisher übersehene Verbreitung antisemitischer Ressentiments auch in der politischen Linken an? Und was sind mögliche Ursachen für das Vorkommen des Antisemitismus in Gruppen, für die Gerechtigkeitsnormen zum erklärten Selbstverständnis gehören? Auf Grundlage der Daten der Leipziger Autoritarismus Studie 2024 können wir zeigen, dass der Antisemitismus auch innerhalb der Linken verbreitet ist, wenn auch die Rationalisierung des Ressentiments teilweise anders ausfällt. Auffällig ist, dass innerhalb jüngerer Befragter der Antisemitismus häufiger anzutreffen ist, als bei älteren – mit Ausnahme des Schuldabwehrantisemitismus. Wir diskutieren diese Befunde auf auf kritisch-theoretischer Basis.
Abstract: This article examines how normative logic embedded in reparations law continues to shape contemporary German criminal law, taking the Luxembourg Agreement of 1952 between the Federal Republic of Germany, the State of Israel and the Jewish Conference on Material Claims against Germany (JCC) as its very conceptual point of departure. Against the backdrop of rising antisemitic criminal offenses in Germany, the article focuses on the amendment of Section 46 (2) of the German Criminal Code (StGB; Strafgesetzbuch), which explicitly includes antisemitic motives among the circumstances relevant for sentencing. While this amendment has been criticized as merely declaratory or even ‘symbolic’, this article argues that such criticism overlooks the deeper legal genealogy of state responsibility that ultimately originates in the Luxembourg Agreement. Antisemitic motives intensify culpability and wrongfulness because they engage the foundational commitments of the post-war legal order that emerged in response to antisemitic state-driven violence. Explicitly naming such motives in sentencing law therefore constitutes a crucial institutional function by shaping investigative practices, judicial reasoning, and normative expectations within the criminal justice system. From a criminal legal perspective, the article develops an account of motives as normative indicators that affect both culpability and wrongfulness. Antisemitic motives, it argues, intensify the Unrechtsgehalt of an offense because they negate the equal moral status of the victim and symbolically attack the legal order that emerged in response to antisemitic state violence. The article concludes that the explicit inclusion of antisemitic motives in Section 46 (2) StGB reflects a coherent and legally grounded response to historically specific injustice and underscores the role of criminal law in stabilizing responsibility within the German legal order.
Abstract: For this report, the Union of Jewish Students has collated dozens of testimonies from students who have
experienced antisemitism on campus.
The UJS also commissioned polling of 1,000 students, across all faiths and none, to assess the
impact of campus protests and the rise of antisemitism. The findings reveal alarming levels of campus
antisemitism, significant disruption caused by protests, and perceptions of Jewish students marred by
hostility and intolerance.
Key Findings:
1.Antisemitism has become normalised on our campuses.
- One in four students (23%) have seen behaviour that targets Jewish students for their religion/ethnicity.
- One in five (20%) students would be reluctant to, or would never, houseshare with a Jewish student.
- Jewish students have told us they have faced physical and verbal abuse, social ostracisation and
widespread antisemitic attitudes.
2.Glorification of terrorism is prevalent and unpunished.
- Our research has found that student groups have explicitly called for violence against Jews, even justifying the terrorist attack at Bondi Beach in December 2025.
- 49% of students have heard slogans or chants glorifying Hamas, Hezbollah or other proscribed groups on campus.
- 47% have witnessed justification of the October 7th attacks, rising to 77% among those who encounter Israel-Palestine protests regularly.
3. Protests disrupt all students, and universities have a clear mandate from students to take firmer action.
-Protests have disrupted learning for 65% of students, and 40% have altered their journey on campus to avoid disruption.
- Universities where protests are more frequent have seen higher levels of antisemitism, and four in ten (39%) of students who witness regular Israel-Palestine protests have seen Jewish students harassed often.
- 69% of students disapprove of protests blocking access to learning, and 82% deem calls to 'globalise the intifada' to be antisemitic.
Abstract: I 2024 har AKVAH registreret det højeste antal antisemitiske hændelser nogensinde med i alt 207 antisemitiske hændelser. 1 Det er en stigning på 71 % fra 2023, hvor AKVAH registrerede 121 antisemitiske hændelser.
Terrorangrebet i Israel d. 7. oktober 2023, den efterfølgende krig i Gaza og den bredere konflikt i Mellemøsten dannede bagtæppe for størstedelen af de antisemitiske hændelser i 2024. I 125 (60 %) af de 207 antisemitiske hændelser var indholdet eller konteksten for hændelserne relateret til Israel, krigen i Gaza eller andre udviklinger og begivenheder i Mellemøsten.
Brandattentatet mod en jødisk kvindes hjem i maj 2024 var en ekstrem og personfarlig antisemitisme af en karakter, som AKVAH ikke har registreret siden terrorangrebet mod synagogen i 2015, hvor den frivillige vagt Dan Uzan
blev dræbt. AKVAH registrerede i 2024 hele 9 tilfælde af vold, overfald og anden fysisk chikane mod jøder, heriblandt et knivoverfald mod en jødisk dreng i Slagelse.
I 5 hændelser i 2024 modtog jødiske borgere konkrete og eksplicitte dødstrusler. I yderligere 20 hændelser blev der opfordret til drab på jøder generelt eller udtrykt ønske om jøders død.
Over halvdelen (63 %) af de antisemitiske hændelser i 2024 var rettet mod personer eller institutioner, der tydeligt kunne identificeres som jøder eller jødiske.
Denne tendens var hyppig både offline (49 % af alle hændelserne offline) og i særdeleshed online (90 % af alle hændelserne online).3 AKVAH vurderer på den baggrund, at personer eller institutioner, der er synligt jødiske i det offentlige eller online rum, er i betydeligt forhøjet risiko for at blive udsat for antisemitiske hændelser.
I 2024 var der en udbredt tendens til, at jødiske borgere, institutioner eller organisationer i Danmark blev holdt kollektivt ansvarlige for Israels handlinger (71 hændelser). Denne tendens forekom både offline (56 % af de 71 tilfælde) og online (44 % af de 71 tilfælde).
Antisemitiske hændelser, der involverede børn og unge, var en udtalt og alvorlig problematik i 2024 (26 hændelser). Ligesom i 2023 var størstedelen af de antisemitiske tilfælde af overfald, trusler, chikane og mobning mod jødiske børn og unge i 2024 relateret til begivenheder i Israel, Gaza eller bredere udviklinger i konflikten i Mellemøsten (17 hændelser).
Referencer til Holocaust, 2. verdenskrig eller Hitler, eller eksplicit nazistisk symbolik, retorik og gestik indgik i 97 (47 %) af de antisemitiske hændelser for 2024. Dette forekom både med eksplicit afsæt i den ekstreme højrefløj, men
optrådte også hyppigt med relation til Israel, krigen i Gaza og begivenheder i Mellemøsten. Det vidner om en udbredt tendens til, at både nazismen som ideologi og Holocaust som historisk begivenhed benyttes som midler til
antisemitisk chikane med afsæt i forskellige ideologier, politiske overbevisninger og samfundsmæssige agendaer.
Antisemitiske hændelser offline udgjorde en større andel (66 %) af de registrerede hændelser i 2024 end i 2023 (47 %). Antallet af onlinebaserede antisemitiske hændelser var højere i 2024 (71) end i 2023 (64).
Antisemitiske konspirationsteorier optrådte i 28 % af de antisemitiske hændelser online.
Abstract: Antisemitische Stereotype sind heute in allen politischen und gesellschaftlichen Kreisen virulent, sie sind in hohem Maße integrativer Bestandteil rechtsextremer Ideologie, finden sich im globalisierungskritischen und im linken Umfeld und sind auch in der Mitte der Gesellschaft längst kein Tabu mehr. Seit Beginn der Zweiten Intifada im Herbst 2000, als sich erneut zeigte, welchen Mobilisierungseffekt die Radikalisierung des Nahostkonflikts auf antisemitische Einstellungen und Aktionen hat, zeigt sich, dass antisemitische Stereotype und Propaganda in verschiedenen europäischen Ländern auch unter Migranten und deren Nachkommen virulent sind, die aus der arabischen Welt, aus Nordafrika oder der Türkei stammen. Wobei diese antisemitischen Vorurteilsstrukturen kaum Anknüpfungspunkte an etwaige Traditionen im Islam aufweisen, sondern vielmehr Ergebnis einer von europäischen Vordenkern des Antisemitismus in die muslimische Welt getragenen Topoi sind, die dort inzwischen einen zentralen Stellenwert einnehmen und sich insbesondere in einer antizionistischen Variante gegen Israel, aber ebenso gegen Juden überhaupt richten (vgl. zum Antisemitismus in der arabischen Welt Tibi 2003). Entgegen verbreiteter Vorstellungen – nach denen Araber als Semiten keine antisemitischen Vorurteile hegen könnten – schließt der Begriff „Antisemitismus“ auch Judenfeindschaft von Arabern ein. Der Begriff Antisemitismus, der gegen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts entstand, meint ausschließlich die Feindschaft gegen Juden und ist ein Konstrukt der Agitatoren seiner Entstehungszeit.
Abstract: Bis zum 7. Oktober 2023 bedeutete Zivilisationsbruch Shoah oder Holocaust. Mit dem 7. Oktober entstand ein zweiter historischer Einschnitt, der alles bisher Geschehene übertraf. Israel mit seiner besonderen Bedeutung für Juden:Jüdinnen weltweit, in der Diaspora, und in Israel selbst, war plötzlich verletzlich geworden, kein sicherer Ort mehr, der vor Vernichtung schützt. Die psychischen Folgen für Familien, die von Überlebenden der Shoah gegründet oder die sonst der Verfolgung entronnen waren, werden aus psychoanalytischer Sicht in diesem Aufsatz untersucht. Die nach dem Holocaust geborenen Generationen stehen vor einem neuerlichen Schrecken, der ihr Leben nachhaltig verändern sollte, egal in welchem Teil der Welt sie sich bewegten.
Abstract: Today, in the age of the internet, during recent epidemics such as H1N1, Ebola and Covid-19, it is striking to see how old accusatory scripts are circulated and perpetuated via social media, which serve as new channels for discrimination and blame directed at traditional figures who have been scapegoated at different moments in the history of European epidemics. The article shows how the laundering of information into a cliquey network takes empirical shape during a health crisis. We do so by focusing on VKontakte, a Russian social network similar to Facebook and the 15th largest website in the world in terms of traffic. Using an ethnographic approach to social media, we show how borderline information from an open and easily accessible website is reappropriated, made explicit, and transformed into legally prohibited hate content. It also documents the ability of conspiracy theorists to use the full range of discourse production channels in a country-in this case France-that has very strict laws on hate speech, including that published on social networks. These laws are circumvented by anti-Semitic communities that spread false information in marginal, open and legal networks, thus avoiding legal proceedings.
Abstract: The study examines antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes in Sweden, analyzing their links to prejudicial attitudes, conspiracy beliefs, and institutional trust. Based on a representative survey of 3,507 individuals, the findings reveal that antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes are related, but differ in important ways. Antisemitism is associated with anti-immigrant and sexist attitudes and greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs, but is unrelated to institutional trust. By contrast, anti-Israel attitudes are unrelated to anti-immigrant attitudes and are positively associated with governemnt trust and media confidence. Cluster analyses have identified three profiles: Neutral Moderates (low antisemitism and low anti-Israel attitudes), Critical Engagers (low antisemitism but moderate anti-Israel attitudes), and Distrustful Sceptics (heightened levels of both). These profiles differ in socio-demographic characteristics, prejudicial attitudes, and conspiracy beliefs, with higher institutional trust increasing the likelihood of belonging to Critical Engagers. The findings suggest that institutional trust may channel individuals toward stronger anti-Israel attitudes, particularly in Sweden.
Abstract: Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach, welches Empathieverständnis sich für eine wirksame Antisemitismusprävention in öffentlichen Institutionen eignet, wenn die Rolle von Emotionen und affektiven Deutungsmustern im Antisemitismus ernst genommen und Empathie als wichtige Ressource professionellen Handelns verstanden wird. Dabei wird die professionelle Haltung von Staatsbediensteten in ihrem rollenspezifischen institutionellen Kontext in den Blick genommen, deren Verständnis im Beitrag auf der Grundlage eines reflexiven Professions- und Haltungsverständnisses entfaltet wird. Auf Basis aktueller empirischer Befunde zu antisemitischen Erfahrungen in Institutionen und zum Phänomen eines zunehmend tolerierten Antisemitismus wird gezeigt, dass kognitives Faktenwissen zwar eine notwendige Grundlage bildet, allein jedoch nicht ausreicht, um Betroffene zu schützen und verantwortliches Handeln im öffentlichen Dienst zu fördern.
Im Zentrum steht ein an Carl Rogers orientiertes Empathieverständnis, das Empathie als Teil einer Haltung konzipiert, die Selbstwahrnehmung, emotional anschlussfähiges Verstehen und kognitive Differenziertheit verbindet, ohne in eine Identifikation mit der anderen Person zu münden. Darauf aufbauend werden die personellen und prozessualen Bedingungen und Wirkfaktoren eines solchen Empathieverständnisses herausgearbeitet. Auf dieser Grundlage wird ein Modell empathisch-selbstreflexiver Professionalität weiterentwickelt und dargelegt, das die Verschränkung von Wissensbeständen, berufsethischen Anforderungen und emotionsreflexiven Lernprozessen beschreibt. Praxisorientierte Zugänge wie Focusing dienen dabei als Beispiel für Herangehensweisen, die emotionale Resonanzen bewusst machen und in Reflexionsprozesse über antisemitismuskritische Fragestellungen integrieren.
Es wird argumentiert, dass eine empathisch-selbstreflexive Professionalität Staatsbedienstete darin unterstützt, Ambivalenzen auszuhalten, für jüdisches Leben und Betroffenenperspektiven zu sensibilisieren und zugleich handlungs- und urteilsfähig zu bleiben. Damit wird ein konzeptioneller Rahmen für antisemitismuskritische Bildungsarbeit im öffentlichen Dienst skizziert, der fachliches Wissen mit einer auf kommunikativer Rationalität beruhenden Haltung verbindet.
