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Date: 2024
Abstract: The findings of this report demonstrate a concerning rise in antisemitism and anti-Zionism in Europe since October 7, 2023, drawing on extensive data analysis of incidents, trends, online sentiments, and influential figures utilizing Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) methodologies.

Dramatic Increase in Sentiment: There has been a significant and consistent surge in both antisemitic and anti-Zionist sentiments across Europe, among both far-right and far-left groups. This more than 400% increase in hateful content is primarily linked to heightened anti-Israel sentiments following the country s response to the October 7
attacks.

Traditional Antisemitism: While the surge in sentiment correlates with growing anti-Israel sentiment, it has increasingly become intertwined with long-standing antisemitic stereotypes. Narratives suggesting that Jews exert disproportionate control, equating Jews with Nazis, or accusing them of genocidal intentions have
become more prevalent.

Geographical Concentration: The most concerning developments have been observed in the UK, France, and Germany—countries with substantial Jewish populations. This trend underscores the heightened risks faced by these communities, both online and in physical spaces.

Influencers and Content Generators: The primary drivers of antisemitic and anti-Zionist content have been pro-Palestinian advocates (both politicians, groups, and influencers) who o en employ antisemitic rhetoric to advance an anti-Israel agenda. This rhetoric seeks to delegitimize the state of Israel and its right to self-defense in the aftermath of the October 7 attacks.

This report serves as a critical resource for understanding the contemporary landscape of antisemitism and anti-Zionism in Europe, highlighting the urgent need for awareness and action in combating these dangerous trends.
Date: 2024
Abstract: Seit den Anschlägen vom 7. Oktober 2023 und im Gefolge des anschließenden Gaza-Krieges erfährt Antisemitismus in Deutschland wieder erheblich gesteigerte Aufmerksamkeit. Ein besonders sensibles Thema ist dabei Antisemitismus unter in Deutschland lebenden Muslim:innen. Auf Basis der Daten aus drei repräsentativen, bundesweiten Befragungen untersucht der vorliegende Beitrag Trends der Verbreitung antisemitischer Einstellungen seit 2021. Analysen erfolgen sowohl in Bezug auf die erwachsene Bevölkerung insgesamt als auch kontrastierend für verschiedene gesellschaftliche Subgruppen. Im Ergebnis finden sich für die erwachsene Gesamtbevölkerung keine signifikanten Anstiege von Formen tradierter antisemitischer Einstellungen zwischen 2021 und 2023. Es sind jedoch deutliche Binnendifferenzen zu erkennen. Insbesondere sind bei Muslim:innen nicht nur erheblich erhöhte Raten antisemitischer Einstellungen zu registrieren, sondern auch statistisch signifikante Zuwächse zwischen 2021 und 2023, die sich bei anderen Gruppen so nicht finden. Auch nach multivariaten Kontrollen soziodemografischer Merkmale und weiterer aus der Forschung bekannter sozialer Einflussgrößen sind bei ihnen weiterhin signifikant erhöhte Ausprägungen antisemitischer Einstellungen nachweisbar. Ferner erweisen sich Neigungen zur Akzeptanz von Verschwörungsnarrativen für alle Gruppen als ein stabiler, signifikanter Prädiktor. Bei Christ:innen wie Muslim:innen finden sich daneben keine Zusammenhänge der persönlichen Gläubigkeit oder der Zentralität der Religion mit Antisemitismus. Es zeigen sich aber Zusammenhänge der Ausprägung eines fundamentalistischen Religionsverständnisses mit erhöhten antisemitischen Ressentiments bei beiden Gruppen. Nur bei Muslim:innen ist darüber hinaus die Intensität der kollektiven Religionspraxis, gemessen über die Häufigkeit des Besuchs von Moscheen, nach multivariaten Kontrollen der Intensität der individuellen Gläubigkeit sowie sozialer Kontrollvariablen, mit einer Erhöhung antisemitischer Vorurteile verbunden. Politische Implikationen dieser Ergebnisse für die Prävention von Antisemitismus in der modernen deutschen Migrationsgesellschaft werden daran anknüpfend diskutiert.
Date: 2024
Abstract: W ramach półrocznego badania podjęliśmy działania mające na celu sprawdzenie, czy i kiedy nienawistne treści o charakterze antysemickim są usuwane przez międzynarodowe i polskie serwisy IT po otrzymaniu zgłoszenia od użytkowniczek i użytkowników o konieczności ich usunięcia. Chcieliśmy także sprawdzić, czy istnieje różnica w usuwaniu nienawistnych treści zgłaszanych przez zwykłych użytkowników a tzw. zaufane podmioty sygnalizujące.

W tym celu przeprowadziliśmy Badanie usuwania treści nielegalnych w internecie (zwane także MRE — Monitoring and Reporting Exercise), testując międzynarodowe platformy internetowe: Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, platforma X (dawniej Twitter) oraz dostawców polskich usług pośrednich: Agora, wp.pl, onet.pl, natemat.pl, dorzeczy.pl i wykop.pl pod kątem stosowania krajowych i unijnych przepisów nakazujących usunięcie lub uniemożliwienie dostępu do treści nielegalnych, w tym mowy nienawiści. Badanie zostało przeprowadzone w momencie wchodzenia w życie nowej unijnej regulacji dotyczącej poprawy bezpieczeństwa w przestrzeni cyfrowej, znanej jako Rozporządzenie 2022/2065 lub Akt o usługach cyfrowych.

Spis treści:

Wstęp
Słowniczek
Ramy prawne
Metodologia
Etapy MRE
Kluczowe dane
Wskaźniki usuwalności zgłoszeń
Wnioski i rekomendacje
Publikacja powstała w ramach projektu Zabezpieczenie naszej społeczności, ochrona naszej demokracji: zwalczanie antysemityzmu poprzez zintegrowane podejście do rzecznictwa i bezpieczeństwa (projekt PROTEUS), współfinansowanego przez Unię Europejską.
Date: 2015
Abstract: Current approach to tackling antisemitism not working, our report with the Birkbeck Institute for the Study of Antisemitism shows.

‍Antisemitism is deeply embedded into our common culture; it exists as a reservoir of racist stereotypes and narratives about Jewish people, which are normalised and widespread. Antisemitic incidents have spiked over the last year, particularly in response to the events of October 7th 2023 and the ongoing violence in Gaza. Yet, discussions around antisemitism have become highly politicised in ways that have been detrimental to Jewish communities’ safety and wellbeing.

‍Particularly damaging is the fact that these politicised discussions have inhibited the possibility of forging anti-racist solidarities with other communities that have been subject to the rise in far-right violence, and to the mainstreaming of racist rhetoric and policies.

‍Facing antisemitism highlights that:

Antisemitism is hardwired into UK society;
Current methods of defining, measuring and reacting to it are deeply contested and politicised;
The arguments that anti-Zionism always equates to antisemitism prevents meaningful and productive action to eradicate antisemitism in the UK;
Like other forms of racism, antisemitism in the UK consists of hateful attitudes and individual incidents but also institutional and structural racism;
The UK must move beyond framing and discussing antisemitism in ways that pit communities against one another, prohibit solidarity and encourage division;
Combating antisemitism must be undertaken as part of wider anti-racist initiatives, including building alliances with other racialised minorities.

The Runnymede Trust urgently calls for a different approach to combating antisemitism, including from the government and wider anti-racist organisations.
Date: 2024
Abstract: This article adopts a historical perspective to explore Jewish women’s experiences of anti­ semitism in Sweden. The empirical foundation of the study comprises interviews with approximately thirty women born in the 1950s, 1970s or 1990s, all of whom self­ identify as Jewish. Employing a dialogical epistemology rooted in intersectionality and shared authority, the study emphasises both the content of the women’s life ­stories and the ways they interpret and articulate their experiences. A key finding of this study is that the fear of antisemitism is a persistent presence in the lives of most participants. A notable continuity over time is the school, which emerges as a recurring site where Jewish women have experienced a sense of being different. However, there is a generational shift in how these experiences are interpreted. Women born in the 1990s are more likely to identify such experiences explicitly as antisemitism, compared to those born in the 1950s or 1970s. Another significant conclusion is that understanding Jewish women’s stories about antisemitism requires these accounts to be situated within broader relational contexts, encompassing both their own and others’ experiences as well as both contemporary and historical processes. Past experiences are often reactivated by current events, such as the attack of 7 October 2023. There is also a before and after 7 October. After 7 October, the fear of antisemitism increased, and some women describe the fear as constant or existential.

A general conclusion in the article is that the fear of antisemitism is present in most of the women's lives. A continuity over time is that the school is a place where Jewish women have experienced that they are different. Women born in the 1990s interpret these experiences to a greater extent, than the women born in the 1950’s and the 19970’s, as an experience of antisemitism. In this respect, our results differ from previous international research showing that older people in particular experience and regard society as antisemitic, while younger people do not do so to the same extent.

A further conclusion is that to understand women's narratives about experiences of antisemitism, these should also be understood in relation to the experiences of others both in the present and in the past, since these form layer upon layer of experiences that are actualized by current events such as October 7. There is also a before and after October 7. After 7 October, the feeling of insecurity has increased, and some women describe the fear as constant or existential.
Date: 2024
Date: 2024
Abstract: Wie haben sich rechtsextreme und autoritäre Einstellungen in Deutschland im Jahr 2024 verändert? Nehmen Vorurteile und Ressentiments in unsicheren Zeiten wieder zu? Und wie stehen die Deutschen aktuell zur Demokratie? Die Leipziger Autoritarismus Studie 2024 kann als repräsentative Langzeiterhebung die Entwicklungen der Einstellungen im Zeitverlauf aufzeigen und Erklärungen bieten.

Seit 2002 analysieren Wissenschaftler und Wissenschaftlerinnen der Universität Leipzig die Entwicklung autoritärer und rechtsextremer Einstellungen in Deutschland zuerst als Mitte-Studie und seit 2018 als Autoritarismus-Studie. Die Autoritarismus-Studie 2024 analysiert insbesondere Antisemitismus, Sexismus und Antifeminismus, Demokratieverdrossenheit und die sozialen Bedinungen der Ressentiments.

Zentrale Ergebnisse:
Die Zufriedenheit mit der Demokratie in Deutschland nimmt ab. In den ostdeutschen Bundesländern ist die Zufriedenheit mit der Demokratie so gering wie zuletzt 2006.
Verdrossenheit mit den Parteien und Politiker:innen und fehlende Möglichkeiten der Partizipation wurden am häufigsten genannt.
Im Westen Deutschlands hat die Zustimmung zu ausländerfeindlichen Aussagen deutlich zugenommen und nähert sich den Einstellungen im Osten an. Ausländerfeindlichkeit hat sich damit zu einem bundesweit geteilten Ressentiment entwickelt.
Antiamerikanismus, Antikapitalismus und Trans*feindlichkeit wurden neu untersucht. Vor allem letztere ist weit verbreitet.
Erstmals wurden postkolonialer und antizionistischer Antisemitismus untersucht: 13,2 Prozent stimmen voll und ganz zu, dass es besser wäre, „wenn die Juden den Nahen Osten verlassen würden“.
Date: 2022
Abstract: The dissertation explores anti-Jewish racism as a structural phenomenon inherent to Swedish society. While research often has separated the study of anti-Jewish racism/antisemitism from other racisms, this dissertation is located within the field of critical race studies to explore anti-Jewish racism as part of larger social and racialised structures.
The study is theoretically framed by a feminist and antiracist gaze that locates Sweden and constructions of “Swedishness” at the core of the analysis, enabling a perspective on anti-Jewish racism as a relational and dynamic social phenomenon. Methodologically the study is inspired by a qualitative tradition, situated at the crossroads of in-depth interviews with self-identified Jews on experiences of anti-Jewish racism and Jewish identity, discourse analysis of media debates, film analysis, and participant observations.
The dissertation explores the entanglements of anti-Jewish racism with notions of “Swedish exceptionalism”, “Swedish gender equality”, the categories of Protestantism and secularism, and racism against other “Others” within what is referred to as the Swedish racial regime. By doing so, the thesis expands the field of critical race studies in Sweden to incorporate an analysis of anti-Jewish racism as a social phenomenon, but also develops a critical analysis of the Swedish racial regime through a specific focus of anti-Jewish racism.
The study illuminates that migration from the Global South is often portrayed within hegemonic discourses as a racist threat against Jews, obscuring Swedish anti-Jewish racism. At the same time, the important demographical shifts that have occurred in Sweden due to this migration have rendered Jews “whiter” in relative terms, and the pressure to adapt to Protestant-secular norms of Swedish “sameness” has decreased, opening up for demands of recognition and Jewish visibility. However, Protestant-secular norms regulating Swedish society confer the category of Jews to a position of conditional “Swedishness”, with public display of Jewishness creating instances of Swedish white discomfort. Thus, the category of Jews embodies a position of ambivalence in the Swedish racial regime, subjected to processes of racialisation but also relative racial privilege. Moreover, this ambiguity occurs in a context of a dynamic of “care” towards the Jewish “Other”, shaped through the perceived threat of the Muslim “Other”, partly reducing the category of Jews to a position of victimhood, while producing an image of Sweden as a progressive and “tolerant” nation, disavowing the ongoing exclusion of those categorised as “different” from Swedish Protestant secularism.
The dissertation suggests that challenging the demands for Swedish “sameness” and the dismantling of hegemonic and racist notions of “Swedishness” would open up for greater possibilities of lives beyond racism.
Date: 2024
Date: 2024
Abstract: While concern about antisemitism is growing, especially online, agreement about what exactly constitutes antisemitism is declining, especially when it appears in contexts other than those associated with Nazism.
Based on four empirical case studies and combining various qualitative analyses of digital content and semi-structured interviews, this thesis explores expressions of antisemitic hate speech and how the discursive boundaries of what can and cannot be said about Jews are perceived, dealt with, and experienced by different actors in the Norwegian digital public sphere. These include key political actors on the far right and the left, as well as members of the small and historically vulnerable Jewish minority. Theoretically, the thesis combines sociological boundary theory with perspectives from media studies, antisemitism studies and multidisciplinary research on online hate.

The thesis shows how the neo-Nazi organisation Nordic Resistance Movement and online debaters in various comment sections push boundaries by producing and promoting antisemitic content in both explicit and implicit ways. It also shows how “anti-Islamic” far-right alternative media and left-wing political organisations draw boundaries through comment moderation on their digital platforms. A key finding is that antisemitic hate speech is a diverse and complex phenomenon that can be difficult to identify. Finally, the thesis also sheds light on the experiences of antisemitic hate speech among Norwegian “public Jews”.

Beyond the empirical findings, the thesis contributes to media studies by proposing an analytical framework for how the concepts of boundaries and boundary-making can be used to understand different key dimensions and dynamics of the digital public sphere, in particular, how hateful content is communicated and countered, and the consequences for those targeted.
Date: 2024
Date: 2024
Author(s): Boyd, Jonathan
Date: 2024
Abstract: In this report:
This landmark report looks at how the October 7 attacks on Israel and the war in Gaza have impacted the British Jewish community one year on. The report demonstrates the profound impact the events of the last year have had on Jews in the UK by analysing the responses of over 4,500 adult British Jews to the JPR Jewish Current Affairs Survey in July 2024 – the largest survey of British Jews since October 7, 2023.

Among other things, the report explores how the original Hamas attack and the subsequent war have affected how British Jews view Israel politically, how the public reaction to the conflict has affected Jews’ sense of security and trust in critical organisations in the UK, and how the conflict has impacted the Jewish lives of British Jews – their connections to Israel and the Jewish community. The findings also form the basis for the second series of the JPR/JW3 “Jews Do Count” podcast, available on the JPR website and all major platforms.

Some of the key findings in this report:
British Jews express far more concern today about the state of Israel’s democracy than they did fifteen or so years ago. Nevertheless, more still believe it to be alive and well today than do not, by 52% to 38%.
British Jews are more likely to agree than to disagree that the IDF is acting morally and according to international law, though we see much division in the responses. 50% of British Jews feel that the IDF military action against Hamas since October 7 has been unsuccessful
For all the division and criticism, British Jews are still more likely to have felt proud of Israel than ashamed since October 7.
Just 54% of Jews in the UK agree that a two-state solution is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours, compared to 77% who did so in 2010. Only about one in four (26%) British Jews think that most Palestinians want peace with Israel, compared to nearly half (47%) in 2010.
Nearly four in five British Jews say that they often feel that they are being held responsible by non-Jews for the actions of Israel’s government, with 43% ‘strongly agreeing’ with this statement.
Nearly half of British Jews (46%) say that antisemitism is ‘a very big problem’ in the UK today, compared to 28% in 2018 and only 11% in 2012. In total, 83% of British define antisemitism as a problem in Britain, the highest proportion found since records began over a decade ago.
Nearly three in four respondents say they feel less safe as a Jewish person living in the UK, and almost two in three adult British Jews said they feel less confident displaying their Jewishness since the October 7 attacks.
Although most British Jews report no overall change in this regard, substantial proportions of British Jews say that they feel closer to their Jewish friends since October 7 (39%) and less close to their non-Jewish friends (24%). The findings also suggest a notable increase in levels of attachment to their local Jewish community.
Attachment levels of British Jews to Israel were steady before October 7 but have risen significantly since then, with half of British Jews saying they are ‘very’ attached to Israel today (up from 40% in 2022).
About two in three British Jews (65%) identify as Zionist, up slightly compared to before October 7. 10% identify as anti-Zionist, also up slightly.
Levels of anxiety among British Jews are higher than they were before October 7 and are notably higher than they are among the general population of Britain.
There is no evidence to indicate Jews are leaving the UK in elevated numbers in the past year – on the contrary, emigration levels are generally low and stable and have been for several decades. At the same time, a slight change in sentiment around this issue has occurred over the past year, with many moving up one notch from wherever they were on it before October 7.
Author(s): Boyd, Jonathan
Date: 2024
Abstract: In this policy paper:
How have levels of antisemitism in the UK and across Europe changed since the October 7 attack on Israel and the war in Gaza? Using the most recent survey data from July 2024, this policy paper demonstrates how the antisemitic incident reporting figures most commonly quoted significantly underestimate the number of incidents happening in reality. The paper also introduces the concept of ‘ambient antisemitism’ – Jews experiencing antisemitism that isn’t personally directed at them –looking at how the context in which Jews are living today affects their perceptions of antisemitism. It also explores the general population’s attitudes to Jews and Israel before and after October 7, 2023.

The paper concludes that better research methods are required to accurately assess the general population’s attitudes to Jews and Israel and Jewish people’s perceptions and experiences of antisemitism. It points to a critical gap in research compared with the EU and calls on the UK Government and philanthropic community to plug it as a matter of urgency.

Some of the key findings in this policy paper:
Reports of antisemitic incidents increased dramatically in the months following the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7 in multiple European countries.
Survey data demonstrate that the number of antisemitic incidents being recorded by the police and community monitoring agencies vastly underestimates the amount of antisemitism taking place.
An evident rise in antisemitism since October 7 has had a significant impact on Jewish people’s feelings of safety and security in the UK and across Europe.
The degree to which the Hamas attacks on October 7 were marked by open celebration and affirmation of violence reveals a level of antisemitic hate that exists within parts of Western Europe that poses a severe threat to Jews living on the continent.
A culture of ‘ambient antisemitism’ has emerged in the post-October 7 period, marked by incidents such as defacing or tearing down posters of Israeli hostages, that, whether strictly antisemitic or not, create a broader milieu that feels threatening and hostile to many Jewish people.
Inaccurate and irresponsible media reporting can lead directly to an increase in antisemitism, although more research is required to understand how and when this occurs.
There has been a significant increase in sympathy for the Palestinians among young people and those on the political left since October 7; levels of sympathy for Israel are much lower, even in the very immediate aftermath of the Hamas attacks.
The lack of sympathy for Israel is likely to lead to many Jews feeling a greater sense of alienation from the societies in which they live over time.
Given the apparent levels of concern among Jews today, much more needs to be done to invest in a robust and systematic approach to measuring antisemitism in society and its effects on Jews as part of a serious strategy to combat it going forward. This is particularly the case in the UK, which has fallen far behind the EU since leaving the European Union in this respect.
Author(s): Lessof, Carli
Date: 2024
Abstract: This report draws on data collected in June and July 2024, eight months after the October 7 attacks on Israel and in the context of the war in Gaza, to explore Jewish parents' understanding of whether their children have experienced antisemitism either at school, in the vicinity of school, and travelling to and from school. The research goes further to investigate whether parents would make different choices about where to educate their Jewish children in light of the events of October 7, the war in Gaza and the rise in antisemitism in the UK.

This is part of a growing body of evidence demonstrating how antisemitism can drive Jews away from participation in wider society, and that should be of concern to anyone who cares about building a more cohesive and understanding society. The findings raise critical questions for mainstream school administrators about how to manage the issue of antisemitism in their schools and, indeed, for government leaders about social cohesion.

Some of the key findings in this report:
A little under a quarter (23%) of British Jewish parents surveyed reported that their child or children had experienced antisemitism at school (12%), in the vicinity of school (6%) or travelling to or from school (9%).
Parents of children at a Jewish school are more likely to report that their children experienced antisemitism while travelling to or from school (13%) than at school (3%).
In comparison, those with children at mainstream schools are more likely to report their children experienced antisemitism at school (21%) than travelling to/from it (2%).
Three-quarters (73%) of Jewish parents with children in mainstream schools said that the October 7 attacks and the war in Gaza would not affect their choice about where to educate the children, but one in five (20%) said they would now be more likely to send their children to a Jewish school.
This proportion doubles (40%) for parents whose children have experienced antisemitism in, around or travelling to or from their mainstream school.
Just over half of Jewish parents with children in Jewish schools (52%) said that the attacks on Israel and the war in Gaza would not affect their school choice, with most of the remainder (46%) saying they would be even more likely to opt for Jewish schooling now.
Date: 2024
Date: 2024
Abstract: Federace židovských obcí v České republice (dále jen FŽO) zaznamenala v roce 2023 celkem 4 328 antisemitských incidentů. Ve srovnání s rokem 2022, kdy bylo registrováno 2 277 incidentů, tak došlo k nárůstu o 90 %. Rok 2023 tedy znovu potvrdil konstantní trend dramatického nárůstu antisemitismu.

Shromážděná data nejsou úplným statistickým přehledem všech antisemitských incidentů za rok 2023. FŽO čerpá informace výlučně z otevřených zdrojů, které zahrnují pouze malý výsek popisované reality. Počet registrovaných incidentů závisí rovněž na ochotě a možnostech obětí i svědků projevy antisemitismu hlásit. V České republice, stejně jako v jiných zemích, přetrvává nedostatečná míra nahlašování nenávistných činů, často kvůli stigmatizaci, nedůvěře v instituce nebo obavám o osobní bezpečnost. Statistiky FŽO neumí odpovědět na otázku, jaká část české populace smýšlí či jedná antisemitsky, vypovídají však o trendech v jeho vnímání a o společenském klimatu ve vztahu k protižidovské předsudečné nenávisti. K antisemitsky motivovanému fyzickému násilí dochází v České republice pouze výjimečně. V posledních pěti letech byly FŽO nahlášeny dva násilné útoky (2020, 2021). V roce 2023 nebylo evidováno žádné napadení. Z hlediska fyzické bezpečnosti zůstala v roce 2023 Česká republika pro židovskou komunitu bezpečnou zemí.

Témata, motivy a rychlost šíření antisemitismu ovlivňovala řada domácích a zahraničních událostí. Až do samého konce roku 2023 se objevovaly antisemitské narativy spojené s ruskou vojenskou agresí proti Ukrajině i s doznívající pandemií nemoci covid-19. Jednoznačným zlomem se stal 7. říjen 2023, kdy palestinské teroristické organizace pod vedením Hamásu zaútočily z Pásma Gazy proti civilním a vojenským cílům v jižním Izraeli. Bezprecedentní útok zahájil válku mezi Izraelem a Hamásem. Bezprostředně po 7. říjnu následovala celosvětová explozivní vlna antisemitismu, která silně zasáhla i Českou republiku.

Měsíční statistiky zcela jednoznačně dokládají masivní nárůst antisemitismu v posledním čtvrtletí roku 2023. Za období leden–září bylo registrováno 2 528 incidentů, tj. 58,41 % celkového počtu, za období říjen–prosinec pak dalších 1 800 incidentů, které představují 41,59 % celkového počtu. Pro období leden–září 2023 platí, že průměrný měsíční nárůst v porovnání s rokem 2022 činil 50,03 %. V období říjen–prosinec byl průměrný nárůst 254,32 %.

Z hlediska šíření antisemitismu došlo v posledních pěti letech k aktivizaci všech hlavních ideologických proudů. Do roku 2019 představoval největší hrozbu pro židovskou komunitu pravicový extremismus. V letech 2020–2023 v souvislosti s pandemií nemoci covid-19 a s ruskou agresí proti Ukrajině významně posílil vliv dezinformačních platforem. Po teroristickém útoku 7. října akcelerovaly aktivity krajní levice a islamismu. Protižidovská nenávist zejména v podobě démonizace a delegitimizace Státu Izrael v roce 2023 masivně vstoupila do veřejného prostoru a stala se společensky přijatelným postojem. Stoupala agresivita antisemitských incidentů, které byly čím dál častěji adresovány konkrétním osobám či institucím. Protižidovské postoje přejímalo a šířilo stále více jednotlivců, kteří jinak neprojevovali žádné sympatie k politickému či ideologickému extremismu. Závěr roku 2023 tak přinesl zcela nový trend normalizace antisemitismu.
Date: 2024
Abstract: The Sixth Survey of European Jewish Community Leaders and Professionals, 2024, presents the results of an online survey offered in 10 languages and administered to 879 respondents in 31 countries. Conducted every three years using the same format, the survey seeks to identify trends and their evolution over time.

The 2024 survey came during a historically fraught moment for the Jewish people globally. The impact of the horrific October 7th attacks and the subsequent war in Israel cannot be understated. How is this affecting Jewish leadership and Jewish communal life? Therefore, in addition to the regular topics covered by the survey (community priorities, threats, security concerns, attitudes towards Europe and Israel), this edition included a special section designed to understand the impact of October 7th on Jewish life in Europe.

That October 7th has profoundly affected Jewish Europe is evident across multiple sections throughout the survey. Concern about antisemitism and the threat of physical attack has intensified. A large majority of 78% feel less safe living as Jews in their cities than they did before the Hamas attack, and respondents are more cautious about how they identify themselves as Jews. They are also more distant from their wider environments, with 38% reporting they have become more distant from non-Jewish friends.

The respondents were comprised of presidents and chairpersons of nationwide “umbrella organizations” or Federations; presidents and executive directors of private Jewish foundations, charities, and other privately funded initiatives; presidents and main representatives of Jewish communities that are organized at a city level; executive directors and programme coordinators, as well as current and former board members of Jewish organizations; among others