Abstract: Cette recherche envisage la tension entre une conception englobante de la religion portée par les juifs orthodoxes et une conception privatisée et plurielle en vigueur dans la société française, une société laïque et sécularisée, des années 1980 à nos jours. Cette tension est explorée depuis ces deux points de vue. D’une part, elle interroge comment les juifs orthodoxes s’organisent pour ménager l’espace jugé nécessaire à leur pratique religieuse. Pour ce faire, elle explore leurs besoins, leurs demandes, ainsi que les stratégies qu’ils mettent en œuvre pour les porter. D’autre part, elle soulève la question de la gouvernance publique du religieux. Pour ce faire, elle étudie la manière dont l’État laïc appréhende une minorité religieuse, qui semble aller à contre-courant du mouvement de fond de la sécularisation. A partir d’un protocole de recherche mixte, et en mobilisant la sociologie électorale, la sociologie de l’action collective, l’analyse des politiques publiques, et des outils de sociologie de la religion, elle teste la consistance de l’intégralisme des juifs orthodoxes dans la société française. Elle réfléchit ainsi à la gouvernance de minorités religieuses intégralistes, à partir d’un autre cas que l’islam, et distingue ce qui relève d’une religion en particulier ou de l’orthodoxie. Elle montre une érosion de l’intégralisme religieux, du fait de réponses défavorables des institutions publiques et de la sécularisation qu’il ne parvient pas à enrayer.
Abstract: How attached do European Jews feel to the countries in which they live? Or to the European Union? And are their loyalties ‘divided’ in some way – between their home country and Israel? Answering these types of questions helps us to see how integrated European Jews feel today, and brings some empiricism to the antisemitic claim that Jews don’t fully ‘belong.’
This mini-report, based on JPR's groundbreaking report ‘The Jewish identities of European Jews’, explores European Jews’ levels of attachment to the countries in which they live, to Israel, and to the European Union, and compares them with those of wider society and other minority groups across Europe. Some of the key findings in this study written by Professor Sergio DellaPergola and Dr Daniel Staetsky of JPR’s European Jewish Demography Unit include:
European Jews tend to feel somewhat less strongly attached to the countries in which they live than the general population of those countries, but more strongly attached than other minority groups and people of no religion.
That said, levels of strong attachment to country vary significantly from one country to another, both among Jews and others.
European Jews tend to feel somewhat more strongly attached to the European Union than the general populations of their countries, although in many cases, the distinctions are small.
Some European Jewish populations feel more strongly attached to Israel than to the countries in which they live, and some do not. The Jewish populations that tend to feel more attached to Israel than the countries in which they live often have high proportions of recent Jewish immigrants.
Having a strong attachment to Israel has no bearing on Jewish people's attachments to the EU or the countries in which they live, and vice versa: one attachment does not come at the expense of another. They are neither competitive nor complementary; they are rather completely unrelated.
Jews of different denominations show very similar levels of attachment to the countries in which they live, but rather different levels of attachment to Israel and the EU.
Abstract: Migration, displacement, and flight are major worldwide phenomena and typically pose challenges to mental health. Therefore, migrants’ mental health, and the factors which may predict it, have become an important research subject. The present population-based cross-national comparison study explores symptoms of depression, anxiety, and somatization, as well as quality-of-life in samples of ex-Soviet Jewish migrants settling in three new countries: Germany, Austria and Israel, as well as in a sample of non-migrant ex-Soviet Jews in their country of origin, Russia. In the current study, we investigate the relationship of perceived xenophobiа and antisemitism, acculturation attitudes, ethnic and national identity, as well as affiliation with Jewish religion and culture to the psychological well-being of these migrants. Furthermore, we consider xenophobic and antisemitic attitudes as well as the acculturation orientation of the new countries’ societies, assessed in the native control samples. Our data suggest that attitudes of the new country’s society matter for the mental health of this migrant group. We conclude that the level of distress among ex-Soviet Jewish migrants seems to depend, among other factors, on the characteristics of the new country and/or specific interactions of the migrant population with the society they are settling in.
Abstract: Das Working Paper setzt sich mit Verschränkungen von Migrationserfahrung, Antisemitismus und antislawischem Rassismus auseinander und ergänzt damit die Publikationen des Projekts zu Russland und postsowjetischer Migration. Grundlage des Texts sind vier Interviews, die die Autorin Veronika Kiesche mit Angehörigen der zweiten Generation jüdischer Kontingentflüchtlinge durchgeführt hat.
Themen, die sich durch die Interviews ziehen, sind Fragen nach Zugehörigkeit und Identität, aber auch die Erfahrung von Fremdzuschreibung, Antisemitismus, antislawischem Rassismus und Diskriminierung.
Mit den jüdischen Zuwanderer*innen, die als sog. Kontingentflüchtlinge nach Deutschland kamen, waren bestimmte Vorstellungen, Erwartungen und Fantasien verbunden; die großzügige Einwanderungspolitik geschah nicht zuletzt auch vor dem Hintergrund der immer kleiner werdenden jüdischen Gemeinden in Deutschland. Die Menschen, die kamen, entsprachen allerdings nicht unbedingt diesen Vorstellungen. Wie die Autorin am Beispiel von Artikeln aus dem Spiegel zeigt, machten sich zunehmend Ressentiments breit und die Wahrnehmung der Zugewanderten verschob sich von Jüdinnen*Juden zu »Russen«. Verbunden damit waren alte, wiederkehrende antislawische Ressentiments – was nicht heißt, dass die jüdischen Immigrant*innen nicht auch Antisemitismus erlebten.
Der einführende Text von Prof. Dr. Hans-Christian Petersen zeigt die Ursprünge und Kontinuitäten des antiosteuropäischen und antislawischen Rassismus auf und macht deutlich: Postsowjetische Jüdinnen*Juden kommen in Migrationsdebatten noch zu wenig vor. Ihre Erfahrungen mit antislawischen Ressentiments bleiben eher unsichtbar, denn als weiße Migrant*innen werden sie nicht als von Rassismus Betroffene wahrgenommen.
Abstract: В статье рассматриваются некоторые понятия и термины, связанные с такими явлениями, как миграции, диаспора, постсоветские диаспоры, транснациональные сообщества. Опираясь на различные социологические исследования, автор доказывает, что современные российские евреи не являются классической диаспорой, а также так называемой «новой еврейской диаспорой». В настоящее время они представляют часть русскоязычного транснационального сообщества, базирующегося на системе различных связей. В то же время автор подчеркивает, что такое сообщество имеет временный характер, поскольку иммигранты во втором и третьем поколении все более полно интегрируются в принимающих обществах, в том числе в израильском.
Topics: Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Education against, Antisemitism: Far right, Antisemitism: Left-Wing, Antisemitism: Muslim, Antisemitism: New Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Monitoring, Antisemitism: Discourse, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Terrorism, European Union, Integration
Abstract: Катастрофа европейского еврейства привела к почти полному исчезновению еврейской общины Германии. Чудо случилось в 1990-х годах, когда русскоязычные евреи стали тысячами прибывать в эту страну. Для местных евреев неожиданная иммиграция казалась удачным шансом, выпавшим еврейским сообществам и обществу в целом. Однако первое поколение русско-еврейских иммигрантов столкнулось с большим числом социальных проблем и трудностей интеграции на рынок труда. К этому следует добавить культурное отчуждение от немецкого общества и серьезные различия в культуре, ментальности и идентичности с местными еврейскими общинами. А также конфликты между старожилами и новоприбывшими относительно желаемых моделей организации еврейской жизни – в силу чего и через тридцать лет после начала иммиграции русские евреи все еще мало представлены в общенациональном еврейском руководстве. И все же, впервые после окончания Второй мировой войны у еврейских общин Германии появился шанс построить плюралистическую модель религиозных, культурных, образовательных и политических проектов. Второе поколение русских евреев Германии не сталкивается с проблемами интеграции, подобные проблемам родителей, и большинство из этого поколения вольется в немецкий средний класс и профессиональную элиту страны – или уже находятся там. Но при этом совершенно непонятно пока, до какой степени второе поколение русских евреев будет искать собственные корни, интересоваться еврейским наследием и участвовать в жизни еврейских общин.
Abstract: A large share of Russian/Soviet Jews, especially among younger cohorts, are descendants of intermarriage. In this essay, I reflect on the implications of the built-in ambivalence of these mixed ethnics, comparing their identity qualms and social strategies in their native Russia and after migration to Israel. My analysis draws upon participant observation and interviews conducted in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and across Israel over the last 20 years. My theoretical anchors are recent discussions on the evolving nature of Jewish identity, formed at the intersection of religion, ethnicity, and culture, in the context of ongoing intermarriage and assimilation. The comparison between the (ex-)Soviet and Israeli context underscores the role of local social constructions of ethno-religious belonging, nationalism, and citizenship as synergistic forces in shaping social locations of mixed ethnics. It also sheds light on the tactics of adjustment and “passing” among individuals with ambivalent ethnic identities who experience rapid social transformation or migration.
Abstract: This chapter offers a comparative overview of immigrant trajectories and inte-gration outcomes of Russian-Jewish youths (the so-called 1.5 generation) who immigrated to Israel and Germany with their families over the last 25 years. At the outset, I compare Israeli and German reception contexts and policies and present the generic features of the 1.5 immigrant generation. Next I overview the Israeli research findings on Russian Israeli 1.5ers – their schooling, social mobility, cultural and linguistic practices, parents’ role in their integration, and juxtapose them with (still limited) German data. e final section presents two recent German studies of young Russian-Jewish adults and the initial findings from my own study among these immigrants living in four German cities. My interviews with 20 men and women, mostly successful professionals or entrepreneurs, indicate that their upward social mobility was facilitated by the continuous welfare support of their families, school integration programs, and low financial barriers to higher education. Despite common occupation-al and social downgrading of the parental generation in both countries, the 1.5-ers in Israel had to struggle harder to overcome their inherent immigrant disadvantage vs. native peers to access good schools and professional careers. Most young immigrants deem full assimilation in the host country’s main-stream unattainable and opt instead for a bilingual and/or bicultural strategy of integration
Abstract: Today, the dominant model for Jewish education is the community-wide, technologically advanced day school, where the Judaic subjects are taught by professional educators using student-friendly, interactive methodologies. Not so long ago, however, most Jewish education consisted of rote repetition of prayers and biblical passages and their translation into awkward English by teachers with no formal pedagogic training, in classes – often located in synagogue basements – held on Sunday or once a week after ‘ordinary’ school.
This book explains the radical reconfiguring of Jewish education in England in historical and sociocultural terms. It explores the transformations that took place in every aspect of Jewish education: curriculum, religious/ideological orientation, school format (afternoon classes vs day schools), funding (private vs state), and more. The author shows that this dramatic transition directly reflects both changes in the socioeconomic profile and self-identity of Anglo-Jewry as well as demographic and cultural changes in British society in general. Tracking the shift from integration to separation, this book maps the effect of competing societal, personal and communal agendas, pedagogic paradigms, and pragmatic constraints on the rise of the Jewish day school in England.
Abstract: Demographic research by the Jewish social organization JMW shows that three-quarters of the Dutch Jewish community, which numbers about 30,000, is not organized in one of the three religious organizations-the Ashkenazi, Progressive, and Portuguese. Among other things, this means they do not send their children to a Jewish school and, if they are ill, do not go to the Jewish hospital. Close to half of the Jews live in Amsterdam and the adjacent southern suburb of Amstelveen.
The immigration of Muslims and the rise of Islam in the Netherlands have created problems for the Jewish community and will continue to do so. There are about one million Muslims in the Netherlands. Their influence on the political system is increasing. This cannot be positive for the Jews. The more power the Muslim community gains, the more it will weaken the Jewish community’s relations with a number of ministries.
The Jewish community faces increasing anti-Semitism. This has led to enhanced security measures. It also threatens to intensify attitudes based on fear.
An important element in Dutch Jewish history over the past decade was the restitution negotiations. As a result, the Dutch government made a payment of 400 million guilders (180 million Euros) to the Dutch community. Banks, insurance companies, and the stock exchange made additional payments that totaled 340 million guilders (155 million Euros).
Abstract: Key Points:
General:
• Faith communities tend to be heterogeneous rather than homogenous and the diversity of all faith communities must be recognised.
• Public policymakers need to be aware of cultural sensitivities in devel-oping policies that promote cohesion and integration. This can only be achieved through promoting shared values whilst acknowledging the positive contribution that the diverse minority make to Britain.
• Government must be sensitive, astute and acknowledge that integra-tion takes time. The Home Office has acknowledged in the past, one size does not fit all and a tailor-made approach to cohesion is needed. Inequality and poverty need to be tackled to achieve social cohesion.
• The Government has provided welcomed support for voluntary sector initiatives and worked in partnership with them in building cohesion through a variety of programmes. However, the public sector needs to encourage the sustainability of these projects and good practice by fo-cussing on both a long term strategic framework and longer term fund-ing cycles for these projects.
• There is a need to understand the complexity of religious belief and faith communities and their different needs. In addition, there needs to be an acknowledgement by policymakers that communities have a wide range of views on many issues.
• There are many instances where ethnic and faith minority communi-ties work together on issues where we are all affected. However, while sometimes communities and individuals within them agree on issues, sometimes they disagree. The essential thing is to build a framework for open and respectful dialogue where good relationships are main-tained through better communication.
• It is evident that British citizens increasingly have multi-dimensional identities. In particular more work needs to be done to explore the rela-tionship between faith and ethnicity.
Specific:
• The Jewish community is diverse.
• The Jewish community sees itself as simultaneously a people, faith and ethnic group. It is not useful to compartmentalise these identities.
• British Jewry has developed over several centuries a notion of ‘inte-gration without assimilation’.
• Jewish experience of immigration shows that integration can happen but takes time, in particular in terms of institutional development.
• The Jewish community promotes inter and intra communal initiatives on a number of levels in the areas of social cohesion, education, community development, interfaith relations, social action and welfare. Strategic national, regional and grassroots projects exist that are sup-ported by the public, private and voluntary sectors
• Rising numbers of antisemitic attacks is a concern that needs to be tackled.
• The Jewish community is keen to promote good community relations.
• Jewish schools can be agents of social cohesion and promoters of ac-tive citizenship.
Abstract: Since German reunification in 1989, about 185,000 former Soviet Jews have been granted refugee status in Germany. Drawing on my observations and in-depth interviews with recent immigrants in five German cities, this qualitative study explores the identity dilemmas faced by Russian Jews who moved to the lands of the historic nemesis loaded with the memories of the Holocaust. The findings suggest that for most informants migrating to Germany (rather than Israel or North America) was a pragmatic decision based on the anticipated benefits from the German welfare system, security and comfort of living in Europe. All but a few informants were secular and had limited interest in the Jewish life, keeping in touch with the Jewish communities only inasmuch as it proved useful for their resettlement. Most middle-aged informants were traumatised by their occupational downgrading and/or chronic unemployment, but many also believed that the welfare aid they receive from the German state is morally justified as a continuing retribution for the wartime crimes. Older immigrants did not even try to narrow a cultural gap with German society, kept to their co-ethnic social circle, and were permanently intimidated by the shadow of anti-Semitism. Conversely, many younger informants opined that past grievances were no longer relevant, tried to adopt some cultural features of the mainstream, and saw themselves as citizens of unified Europe, rather than Germany as such.
