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Author(s): Freedman, Rosa
Date: 2024
Abstract: Since 7th October 2023, when Hamas perpetrated the worst single massacre against Jews since the Holocaust, there has been a surge in antisemitism in UK universities. Some of this has tipped over into outright anti-Jewish discrimination and harassment. Jewish students and staff have reported feeling unable to fully participate in university life, for fear of being abused, harassed, or attacked. This report offers a summary of research by the IntraCommunal Professorial Group (ICPG) aimed at understanding free speech on university campuses especially with regard to the approaches to speech concerning Jews, Israel, Zionism, and the Middle East conflict.

This report sets out the key issues, and a series of recommendations based on the research and grouped together under the subheadings of our three key findings. Those key findings are as follows:

1. UK universities have (a) a general legal duty, to protect freedom of expression on campus; (b) a duty to prevent discrimination and harassment based on protected characteristics; (c) a university-specific institutional duty to protect the academic freedoms of research and study. Currently UK universities are meeting neither (b) nor (c) in their response to the menace to Jewish students and academic staff posed by antisemitism, particularly antiIsrael antisemitism. That is, they are neither preventing discrimination and harassment, nor protecting freedom of research or freedom to study.

2. Anti-Israel protests and encampments on campuses, including in online spaces, have exacerbated what was already considered a hostile environment by many Jewish students and staff. Some university departments, trade unions, and student political milieus – inperson and online – have directly and indirectly discriminated against, abused, harassed and/or excluded Jewish students.

3. Traditional antisemitic concepts and tropes are being used by pro-Palestinian and/or antiIsrael staff and students. Israel and Zionism are regularly demonised and delegitimised, often using blood libels or other anti-Jewish hatred, and students or academics labelled as Zionists are routinely viewed as legitimate targets for discrimination, harassment, abuse, and/or attack.
Date: 2026
Abstract: This report finds that the decision to ban away supporters from the fixture was reached through a flawed risk assessment process.

We argue that the prohibition was not justified by the risks as assessed, and it represented an unnecessary departure from ordinary policing practice, which we believe would likely have been sufficient to secure the match.
The Parliamentary Select Committee similarly concludes that the decision-making process was flawed. However, it maintains that the prohibition was proportionate to the level of risk, even if that risk had been more rigorously assessed.

Our analysis considers a further, key point. A central weakness in the decision-making process was the failure clearly to specify the nature and source of the risk.

If the primary risk came from away supporters themselves, then exclusion may have been justified. But if the principal risk derived from anti-Israel protestors, boycott activists, and antizionist actors seeking to disrupt or attack the match, then banning the away supporters risked punishing those who were being threatened and who did not themselves constitute a significant threat.

In such circumstances, the appropriate response would have required consideration beyond technical policing calculations. If there was a significant antisemitic threat, a policy priority might have been to mobilise sufficient police resources to defend the match, the visiting team, and their supporters rather than excluding them.

The decision-making process appears to have overestimated the risk posed by Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters, in part through a misreading of the Amsterdam precedent and perhaps through reliance on politically committed sources of advice. It may have given insufficient weight to risks arising from boycott activism and to the risk of antisemitic violence of the kind that occurred in Amsterdam.

The process did not engage in a serious way with institutions or individuals from the Jewish community either locally or nationally, or with HM Independent Advisor on Antisemitism. Doing so would have given it a better chance of avoiding the mistakes that it made in understanding the precedent, possible alternatives and the predictable impact of the away fans ban on Jewish communities.

If there was a significant antisemitic dimension to the threat environment, the risk assessment process did not identify or articulate it clearly.
Date: 2025
Abstract: Nach dem Angriff der klerikal-faschistsichen Hamas auf Israel im Oktober 2023 kam es sehr schnell zu einer Mobilisierung für die Ziele der Terrororganisation. Diese waren von Anfang an getragen von antisemitischen Tropen und gingen einher mit einem rasanten Anstieg der antisemitisch motivierten Straft- und Gewalttaten. Relevante Trägergruppen dieses Antisemitismus sind dem eigenen Selbstverständnis nach im linken politischen Spektrum positioniert. Zeigt diese Mobilisierung eine bisher übersehene Verbreitung antisemitischer Ressentiments auch in der politischen Linken an? Und was sind mögliche Ursachen für das Vorkommen des Antisemitismus in Gruppen, für die Gerechtigkeitsnormen zum erklärten Selbstverständnis gehören? Auf Grundlage der Daten der Leipziger Autoritarismus Studie 2024 können wir zeigen, dass der Antisemitismus auch innerhalb der Linken verbreitet ist, wenn auch die Rationalisierung des Ressentiments teilweise anders ausfällt. Auffällig ist, dass innerhalb jüngerer Befragter der Antisemitismus häufiger anzutreffen ist, als bei älteren – mit Ausnahme des Schuldabwehrantisemitismus. Wir diskutieren diese Befunde auf auf kritisch-theoretischer Basis.Nach dem Angriff der klerikal-faschistsichen Hamas auf Israel im Oktober 2023 kam es sehr schnell zu einer Mobilisierung für die Ziele der Terrororganisation. Diese waren von Anfang an getragen von antisemitischen Tropen und gingen einher mit einem rasanten Anstieg der antisemitisch motivierten Straft- und Gewalttaten. Relevante Trägergruppen dieses Antisemitismus sind dem eigenen Selbstverständnis nach im linken politischen Spektrum positioniert. Zeigt diese Mobilisierung eine bisher übersehene Verbreitung antisemitischer Ressentiments auch in der politischen Linken an? Und was sind mögliche Ursachen für das Vorkommen des Antisemitismus in Gruppen, für die Gerechtigkeitsnormen zum erklärten Selbstverständnis gehören? Auf Grundlage der Daten der Leipziger Autoritarismus Studie 2024 können wir zeigen, dass der Antisemitismus auch innerhalb der Linken verbreitet ist, wenn auch die Rationalisierung des Ressentiments teilweise anders ausfällt. Auffällig ist, dass innerhalb jüngerer Befragter der Antisemitismus häufiger anzutreffen ist, als bei älteren – mit Ausnahme des Schuldabwehrantisemitismus. Wir diskutieren diese Befunde auf auf kritisch-theoretischer Basis.
Author(s): Pacurar, Anna
Date: 2026
Abstract: This article examines how normative logic embedded in reparations law continues to shape contemporary German criminal law, taking the Luxembourg Agreement of 1952 between the Federal Republic of Germany, the State of Israel and the Jewish Conference on Material Claims against Germany (JCC) as its very conceptual point of departure. Against the backdrop of rising antisemitic criminal offenses in Germany, the article focuses on the amendment of Section 46 (2) of the German Criminal Code (StGB; Strafgesetzbuch), which explicitly includes antisemitic motives among the circumstances relevant for sentencing. While this amendment has been criticized as merely declaratory or even ‘symbolic’, this article argues that such criticism overlooks the deeper legal genealogy of state responsibility that ultimately originates in the Luxembourg Agreement. Antisemitic motives intensify culpability and wrongfulness because they engage the foundational commitments of the post-war legal order that emerged in response to antisemitic state-driven violence. Explicitly naming such motives in sentencing law therefore constitutes a crucial institutional function by shaping investigative practices, judicial reasoning, and normative expectations within the criminal justice system. From a criminal legal perspective, the article develops an account of motives as normative indicators that affect both culpability and wrongfulness. Antisemitic motives, it argues, intensify the Unrechtsgehalt of an offense because they negate the equal moral status of the victim and symbolically attack the legal order that emerged in response to antisemitic state violence. The article concludes that the explicit inclusion of antisemitic motives in Section 46 (2) StGB reflects a coherent and legally grounded response to historically specific injustice and underscores the role of criminal law in stabilizing responsibility within the German legal order.
Date: 2026
Abstract: For this report, the Union of Jewish Students has collated dozens of testimonies from students who have
experienced antisemitism on campus.

The UJS also commissioned polling of 1,000 students, across all faiths and none, to assess the
impact of campus protests and the rise of antisemitism. The findings reveal alarming levels of campus
antisemitism, significant disruption caused by protests, and perceptions of Jewish students marred by
hostility and intolerance.

Key Findings:

1.Antisemitism has become normalised on our campuses.

- One in four students (23%) have seen behaviour that targets Jewish students for their religion/ethnicity.
- One in five (20%) students would be reluctant to, or would never, houseshare with a Jewish student.
- Jewish students have told us they have faced physical and verbal abuse, social ostracisation and
widespread antisemitic attitudes.

2.Glorification of terrorism is prevalent and unpunished.

- Our research has found that student groups have explicitly called for violence against Jews, even justifying the terrorist attack at Bondi Beach in December 2025.
- 49% of students have heard slogans or chants glorifying Hamas, Hezbollah or other proscribed groups on campus.
- 47% have witnessed justification of the October 7th attacks, rising to 77% among those who encounter Israel-Palestine protests regularly.

3. Protests disrupt all students, and universities have a clear mandate from students to take firmer action.

-Protests have disrupted learning for 65% of students, and 40% have altered their journey on campus to avoid disruption.
- Universities where protests are more frequent have seen higher levels of antisemitism, and four in ten (39%) of students who witness regular Israel-Palestine protests have seen Jewish students harassed often.
- 69% of students disapprove of protests blocking access to learning, and 82% deem calls to 'globalise the intifada' to be antisemitic.
Date: 2025
Abstract: I 2024 har AKVAH registreret det højeste antal antisemitiske hændelser nogensinde med i alt 207 antisemitiske hændelser. 1 Det er en stigning på 71 % fra 2023, hvor AKVAH registrerede 121 antisemitiske hændelser.

Terrorangrebet i Israel d. 7. oktober 2023, den efterfølgende krig i Gaza og den bredere konflikt i Mellemøsten dannede bagtæppe for størstedelen af de antisemitiske hændelser i 2024. I 125 (60 %) af de 207 antisemitiske hændelser var indholdet eller konteksten for hændelserne relateret til Israel, krigen i Gaza eller andre udviklinger og begivenheder i Mellemøsten.

Brandattentatet mod en jødisk kvindes hjem i maj 2024 var en ekstrem og personfarlig antisemitisme af en karakter, som AKVAH ikke har registreret siden terrorangrebet mod synagogen i 2015, hvor den frivillige vagt Dan Uzan
blev dræbt. AKVAH registrerede i 2024 hele 9 tilfælde af vold, overfald og anden fysisk chikane mod jøder, heriblandt et knivoverfald mod en jødisk dreng i Slagelse.

I 5 hændelser i 2024 modtog jødiske borgere konkrete og eksplicitte dødstrusler. I yderligere 20 hændelser blev der opfordret til drab på jøder generelt eller udtrykt ønske om jøders død.

Over halvdelen (63 %) af de antisemitiske hændelser i 2024 var rettet mod personer eller institutioner, der tydeligt kunne identificeres som jøder eller jødiske.

Denne tendens var hyppig både offline (49 % af alle hændelserne offline) og i særdeleshed online (90 % af alle hændelserne online).3 AKVAH vurderer på den baggrund, at personer eller institutioner, der er synligt jødiske i det offentlige eller online rum, er i betydeligt forhøjet risiko for at blive udsat for antisemitiske hændelser.

I 2024 var der en udbredt tendens til, at jødiske borgere, institutioner eller organisationer i Danmark blev holdt kollektivt ansvarlige for Israels handlinger (71 hændelser). Denne tendens forekom både offline (56 % af de 71 tilfælde) og online (44 % af de 71 tilfælde).

Antisemitiske hændelser, der involverede børn og unge, var en udtalt og alvorlig problematik i 2024 (26 hændelser). Ligesom i 2023 var størstedelen af de antisemitiske tilfælde af overfald, trusler, chikane og mobning mod jødiske børn og unge i 2024 relateret til begivenheder i Israel, Gaza eller bredere udviklinger i konflikten i Mellemøsten (17 hændelser).

Referencer til Holocaust, 2. verdenskrig eller Hitler, eller eksplicit nazistisk symbolik, retorik og gestik indgik i 97 (47 %) af de antisemitiske hændelser for 2024. Dette forekom både med eksplicit afsæt i den ekstreme højrefløj, men
optrådte også hyppigt med relation til Israel, krigen i Gaza og begivenheder i Mellemøsten. Det vidner om en udbredt tendens til, at både nazismen som ideologi og Holocaust som historisk begivenhed benyttes som midler til
antisemitisk chikane med afsæt i forskellige ideologier, politiske overbevisninger og samfundsmæssige agendaer.
Antisemitiske hændelser offline udgjorde en større andel (66 %) af de registrerede hændelser i 2024 end i 2023 (47 %). Antallet af onlinebaserede antisemitiske hændelser var højere i 2024 (71) end i 2023 (64).

Antisemitiske konspirationsteorier optrådte i 28 % af de antisemitiske hændelser online.
Author(s): Woolley, Ursula
Date: 2024
Abstract: The article aims to discern whether and how the historiography of the Holocaust in Ukraine has shown, from an external perspective, signs of change since 24 February 2022.

It looks at approaches taken in research published on the topic in Ukraine before and since 24 Feb 22. The historical context includes a glance at the longer-term historiography of the Holocaust in Ukraine, from abroad as well as domestically. The importance of the wider context requires a look at some issues and debates in memory politics and public history. The article considers all this material in the context of recent historiography from outside Ukraine.

There have been frequent surveys of the academic literature on the Holocaust in Ukraine, including some published since 24 February 2022. The novelty of this article consists in taking an early look at the apparent effects of the full-
scale invasion on the scholarship in this field, with an external perspective which inevitably perceives context differently.

The article argues that the experience of the invasion and occupation, direct and indirect, may for a cross-section of scholars inspire new understanding and scholarship, however much unlooked for. It argues that scholarship
in the field continues to come closer to considering and understanding trauma inflicted and undergone; that Russian propaganda is well-resourced and impactful; and that the new trauma of the new war helps and hinders equally public discussion and wider public understanding, domestically and internationally.
Author(s): Wetzel, Juliane
Date: 2010
Abstract: Antisemitische Stereotype sind heute in allen politischen und gesellschaftlichen Kreisen virulent, sie sind in hohem Maße integrativer Bestandteil rechtsextremer Ideologie, finden sich im globalisierungskritischen und im linken Umfeld und sind auch in der Mitte der Gesellschaft längst kein Tabu mehr. Seit Beginn der Zweiten Intifada im Herbst 2000, als sich erneut zeigte, welchen Mobilisierungseffekt die Radikalisierung des Nahostkonflikts auf antisemitische Einstellungen und Aktionen hat, zeigt sich, dass antisemitische Stereotype und Propaganda in verschiedenen europäischen Ländern auch unter Migranten und deren Nachkommen virulent sind, die aus der arabischen Welt, aus Nordafrika oder der Türkei stammen. Wobei diese antisemitischen Vorurteilsstrukturen kaum Anknüpfungspunkte an etwaige Traditionen im Islam aufweisen, sondern vielmehr Ergebnis einer von europäischen Vordenkern des Antisemitismus in die muslimische Welt getragenen Topoi sind, die dort inzwischen einen zentralen Stellenwert einnehmen und sich insbesondere in einer antizionistischen Variante gegen Israel, aber ebenso gegen Juden überhaupt richten (vgl. zum Antisemitismus in der arabischen Welt Tibi 2003). Entgegen verbreiteter Vorstellungen – nach denen Araber als Semiten keine antisemitischen Vorurteile hegen könnten – schließt der Begriff „Antisemitismus“ auch Judenfeindschaft von Arabern ein. Der Begriff Antisemitismus, der gegen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts entstand, meint ausschließlich die Feindschaft gegen Juden und ist ein Konstrukt der Agitatoren seiner Entstehungszeit.
Author(s): Ilchuk, Yuliya
Date: 2024
Abstract: The contested historical memory of the Second World War in Ukraine has exposed an uneasy transition from an ethnolinguistic type of national identity to the idea of Ukraine as a political nation, expedited with the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. Many Ukrainian writers of non-Jewish origin began to write about the fate of Ukrainian Jews during the Holocaust. If a previous generation of post-Soviet Ukrainian writers have embedded Jewish characters and subplots about the Holocaust into their historical novels about colonization by the Soviet Union and the national struggle for independence during the war, the new generation of writers reveals a shift from the idea of a homogeneous “national memory” to an idea of the “multidirectional” memory of the Second World War which had a profound traumatic impact on all actors involved in it. The growing interest among non-Jewish Ukrainian writers in the contested history of the Holocaust has been shaped by the unexpected affinity seen between the suffering of Ukrainians at present and of Jews in the past, which unifies them in collective victimhood. This paper examines the contested memory of the Holocaust in Sofia Andrukhovych’s novel Amadoka (2020). The writer develops a complex narrative structure that captures the traumatic memory of Second World War from the perspective of different actors, showing that the extermination of Jews in Buczacz was a communal tragedy that can be represented only through a polyphonic act of remembrance taking place on a shared if uneven terrain. Employing two concepts from memory studies – dismemory and Postmemory – the analysis of the narrative construction of traumatic memory in Amadoka aims to show how literary narrative can capture trauma, on the one hand, and how trauma can shape identity, on the other.
Date: 2026
Abstract: In June 2025, Hadassah UK partnered with the Hadassah Medical Organization in Jerusalem to undertake important mental health research in the community. Developed by leading Israeli trauma experts, a UK-wide survey was presented to the community to understand how British Jews were coping with the psychological and social impact of October 7th, the ongoing conflict, and rising antisemitism.

This research involved 511 participants from diverse backgrounds within the UK Jewish community, representing various denominational affiliations, geographic locations, and demographic characteristics. The completed study provided robust statistical power for examining complex relationships between trauma exposure, psychological symptoms, and protective factors.Our comprehensive statistical analysis reveals critical insights into the psychological impact of exposure to the October 7th events and subsequent antisemitism on the UK Jewish community.

Participants were recruited through multiple channels including synagogues, Jewish community organisations, and social networks to ensure broad representation, as well as help to capture the full spectrum of experiences within the UK Jewish community.

From our study, we can see that the psychological impact of October 7th and subsequent events created significant mental health challenges within the UK Jewish community. A key finding showed that over one-third of participants exhibited clinically significant PTSD symptoms, including intrusive memories of attack imagery, avoidance of trauma reminders, and heightened reactive responses.
Date: 2019
Author(s): Hammel, Andrea
Date: 2019
Date: 2021
Abstract: Conspiracy fantasy or – to use the more common but less accurately descriptive term – ‘conspiracy theory’ is an enduring genre of discourse historically associated with authoritarian political movements. This article presents a literature review of research on conspiracy fantasy as well as two empirical studies of YouTube videos by three leading conspiracy fantasists. Two of these fantasists have been linked to the far right, while one maintains connections to figures on the far right and the far left. The first study employs content analysis of the 10 most popular videos uploaded by each of the three, and the second employs corpus analysis of keywords in comments posted on all videos uploaded by the three fantasists. Jewish-related entities such as Israel, Zionists and the Rothschild family are found to be among the entities most frequently accused of conspiracy in the videos. Conspiracy accusations against other Western nations (especially the United States and the United Kingdom), as well as their leaders and their media, were also common. Jewish-related lexical items such as ‘Zionist’, ‘Zionists’, ‘Rothschild’ and ‘Jews’ are found to be mentioned with disproportionate frequency in user comments. These findings would appear to reflect the conspiracy fantasy genre’s continuing proximity to its roots in the European antisemitic tradition and add weight to existing findings suggesting that the active YouTube audience responds to latently antisemitic content with more explicitly antisemitic comments.
Date: 2024