Abstract: Comment les minorités peuvent-elles s’intégrer aux nations européennes ? Comment renouer avec le projet émancipateur de l’Europe moderne, qui apparaît plus que jamais en crise ? Pour répondre à ces interrogations, Bruno Karsenti adopte le prisme de la question juive : question qui se pose à propos de cette minorité que sont les juifs, question qu’ils se posent à eux-mêmes au fil de leur intégration. Il retrace l’essor et le déclin des centres que les juifs ont constitués tout au long de leur histoire moderne, entre assimilation et émancipation, discrimination et persécution. Cette trajectoire heurtée part de l’expulsion des juifs d’Espagne en 1492, s’instaure comme question juive dans l’Allemagne du xixe siècle, manque de disparaître avec l’anéantissement du monde juif à l’Est et se transforme avec la persistance d’un centre juif en France.
Nourri par des travaux d’histoire et de sociologie, ce livre de philosophie politique éclaire le rapport complexe des juifs de la diaspora à leur identité, aux nations dont ils sont devenus les citoyens et, depuis 1948, à l’État d’Israël. En restituant ce cadre, Bruno Karsenti met au jour les paradoxes qui traversent tous les processus d’intégration, depuis la Shoah, les décolonisations et le 7-Octobre. Ce diagnostic s’accompagne d’un engagement : comprendre l’antisémitisme et le racisme, interroger le sionisme et le modèle républicain, c’est rouvrir le champ d’une critique politique fidèle à l’idéal d’émancipation – et donc à la promesse européenne.
Abstract: The purpose of this study is to compare two groups of Jewish women, native-born and migrants, who reside in Brussels regarding their social integration into native-born Jewish and non-Jewish communities and the acculturation strategies they employ. It seems that Brussels is not as socially and culturally open, as perceived by the interviewees. Hence, the social networks of women in our study, as well as their acculturation patterns, differ in degree of separation between native-born Jewish women, non-Israeli immigrants and Israeli immigrants. The former maintain social networks characterized by fluid boundaries between them and the majority society, whereas non-Israeli immigrants are characterized by shared, not very dense networks with the native-born Jewish community and diasporic networks. Finally, Israeli women are characterized by almost completely closed social networks, which can be defined as a distinct “Israeli bubble.” As for their acculturation strategies, native-born women are those who are more integrated among non-Jews and native-born Jews, as expected from their familiarity with the culture and their long-term interactions, despite being partially marginalized as minority. Migrant women are less integrated and more separated from both native-born Jews and – to a larger extent – from non-Jews; so are Israelis. Social networks which gradually become communities are mainly created by women and maintained by them over the years. Therefore, the study of social networks, their structure and construction through daily interactions, and their contribution to the ethnic-diasporic community building have become the source of women’s strength in the host country – as immigrants and as a native-born minority group.
Abstract: Our narrative and expert interviews with Jewish and non-Jewish key figures in public and political life mainly focussed on the question of to what extent have Jewish-non Jewish relations changed, compared to the discord prior to 1933, and the general reservation and uncertainty after 1945? We also raised other key questions like: to what extent do Jews in Germany feel integrated into today’s non-Jewish majority society? What do they consider core elements of their Jewish identities? What is the meaning of Israel in their lives as Jews? How do they cope with new trends of antisemitism in Germany? As a complementary question, we wanted to know from our non-Jewish interviewees how different they consider Jewish/non-Jewish relations today? To what extent does Shoah memory (still) affect these relations? How do Jews and non-Jews cooperate in social activities, and are there new, joint strategies to combat antisemitism?
Our interviews revealed that Jews in present-day Germany do not romanticize their lives in the country of the former Nazi regime. However, they appreciate efforts by the state to promote future Jewish life, to carry out dignified politics of commemoration, and to ensure security. Antisemitism is perceived as a societal problem but not as an existential threat. None of the Jewish interview partners considered Germany as a place that is too dangerous for Jews. Memory of the Shoah is considered important, but building a Jewish future, especially for one’s
own children, is the more relevant issue.
A key finding of our interviews in Germany is that a new generation of young Jews has grown up neither justifying living in the “country of the offenders” nor considering themselves representatives of the State of Israel. Young Jews in Germany run their own multifaceted networks, understanding themselves as Jews but to a similar extent also as Germans. Some of them enjoy participation in public and political life, deliberately acting in both roles
Abstract: Cette recherche envisage la tension entre une conception englobante de la religion portée par les juifs orthodoxes et une conception privatisée et plurielle en vigueur dans la société française, une société laïque et sécularisée, des années 1980 à nos jours. Cette tension est explorée depuis ces deux points de vue. D’une part, elle interroge comment les juifs orthodoxes s’organisent pour ménager l’espace jugé nécessaire à leur pratique religieuse. Pour ce faire, elle explore leurs besoins, leurs demandes, ainsi que les stratégies qu’ils mettent en œuvre pour les porter. D’autre part, elle soulève la question de la gouvernance publique du religieux. Pour ce faire, elle étudie la manière dont l’État laïc appréhende une minorité religieuse, qui semble aller à contre-courant du mouvement de fond de la sécularisation. A partir d’un protocole de recherche mixte, et en mobilisant la sociologie électorale, la sociologie de l’action collective, l’analyse des politiques publiques, et des outils de sociologie de la religion, elle teste la consistance de l’intégralisme des juifs orthodoxes dans la société française. Elle réfléchit ainsi à la gouvernance de minorités religieuses intégralistes, à partir d’un autre cas que l’islam, et distingue ce qui relève d’une religion en particulier ou de l’orthodoxie. Elle montre une érosion de l’intégralisme religieux, du fait de réponses défavorables des institutions publiques et de la sécularisation qu’il ne parvient pas à enrayer.
Abstract: How attached do European Jews feel to the countries in which they live? Or to the European Union? And are their loyalties ‘divided’ in some way – between their home country and Israel? Answering these types of questions helps us to see how integrated European Jews feel today, and brings some empiricism to the antisemitic claim that Jews don’t fully ‘belong.’
This mini-report, based on JPR's groundbreaking report ‘The Jewish identities of European Jews’, explores European Jews’ levels of attachment to the countries in which they live, to Israel, and to the European Union, and compares them with those of wider society and other minority groups across Europe. Some of the key findings in this study written by Professor Sergio DellaPergola and Dr Daniel Staetsky of JPR’s European Jewish Demography Unit include:
European Jews tend to feel somewhat less strongly attached to the countries in which they live than the general population of those countries, but more strongly attached than other minority groups and people of no religion.
That said, levels of strong attachment to country vary significantly from one country to another, both among Jews and others.
European Jews tend to feel somewhat more strongly attached to the European Union than the general populations of their countries, although in many cases, the distinctions are small.
Some European Jewish populations feel more strongly attached to Israel than to the countries in which they live, and some do not. The Jewish populations that tend to feel more attached to Israel than the countries in which they live often have high proportions of recent Jewish immigrants.
Having a strong attachment to Israel has no bearing on Jewish people's attachments to the EU or the countries in which they live, and vice versa: one attachment does not come at the expense of another. They are neither competitive nor complementary; they are rather completely unrelated.
Jews of different denominations show very similar levels of attachment to the countries in which they live, but rather different levels of attachment to Israel and the EU.
Abstract: Migration, displacement, and flight are major worldwide phenomena and typically pose challenges to mental health. Therefore, migrants’ mental health, and the factors which may predict it, have become an important research subject. The present population-based cross-national comparison study explores symptoms of depression, anxiety, and somatization, as well as quality-of-life in samples of ex-Soviet Jewish migrants settling in three new countries: Germany, Austria and Israel, as well as in a sample of non-migrant ex-Soviet Jews in their country of origin, Russia. In the current study, we investigate the relationship of perceived xenophobiа and antisemitism, acculturation attitudes, ethnic and national identity, as well as affiliation with Jewish religion and culture to the psychological well-being of these migrants. Furthermore, we consider xenophobic and antisemitic attitudes as well as the acculturation orientation of the new countries’ societies, assessed in the native control samples. Our data suggest that attitudes of the new country’s society matter for the mental health of this migrant group. We conclude that the level of distress among ex-Soviet Jewish migrants seems to depend, among other factors, on the characteristics of the new country and/or specific interactions of the migrant population with the society they are settling in.
Abstract: Das Working Paper setzt sich mit Verschränkungen von Migrationserfahrung, Antisemitismus und antislawischem Rassismus auseinander und ergänzt damit die Publikationen des Projekts zu Russland und postsowjetischer Migration. Grundlage des Texts sind vier Interviews, die die Autorin Veronika Kiesche mit Angehörigen der zweiten Generation jüdischer Kontingentflüchtlinge durchgeführt hat.
Themen, die sich durch die Interviews ziehen, sind Fragen nach Zugehörigkeit und Identität, aber auch die Erfahrung von Fremdzuschreibung, Antisemitismus, antislawischem Rassismus und Diskriminierung.
Mit den jüdischen Zuwanderer*innen, die als sog. Kontingentflüchtlinge nach Deutschland kamen, waren bestimmte Vorstellungen, Erwartungen und Fantasien verbunden; die großzügige Einwanderungspolitik geschah nicht zuletzt auch vor dem Hintergrund der immer kleiner werdenden jüdischen Gemeinden in Deutschland. Die Menschen, die kamen, entsprachen allerdings nicht unbedingt diesen Vorstellungen. Wie die Autorin am Beispiel von Artikeln aus dem Spiegel zeigt, machten sich zunehmend Ressentiments breit und die Wahrnehmung der Zugewanderten verschob sich von Jüdinnen*Juden zu »Russen«. Verbunden damit waren alte, wiederkehrende antislawische Ressentiments – was nicht heißt, dass die jüdischen Immigrant*innen nicht auch Antisemitismus erlebten.
Der einführende Text von Prof. Dr. Hans-Christian Petersen zeigt die Ursprünge und Kontinuitäten des antiosteuropäischen und antislawischen Rassismus auf und macht deutlich: Postsowjetische Jüdinnen*Juden kommen in Migrationsdebatten noch zu wenig vor. Ihre Erfahrungen mit antislawischen Ressentiments bleiben eher unsichtbar, denn als weiße Migrant*innen werden sie nicht als von Rassismus Betroffene wahrgenommen.
Abstract: В статье рассматриваются некоторые понятия и термины, связанные с такими явлениями, как миграции, диаспора, постсоветские диаспоры, транснациональные сообщества. Опираясь на различные социологические исследования, автор доказывает, что современные российские евреи не являются классической диаспорой, а также так называемой «новой еврейской диаспорой». В настоящее время они представляют часть русскоязычного транснационального сообщества, базирующегося на системе различных связей. В то же время автор подчеркивает, что такое сообщество имеет временный характер, поскольку иммигранты во втором и третьем поколении все более полно интегрируются в принимающих обществах, в том числе в израильском.
Topics: Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Education against, Antisemitism: Far right, Antisemitism: Left-Wing, Antisemitism: Muslim, Antisemitism: New Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Monitoring, Antisemitism: Discourse, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Terrorism, European Union, Integration, Antisemitism: Strategy and Policy
Abstract: Катастрофа европейского еврейства привела к почти полному исчезновению еврейской общины Германии. Чудо случилось в 1990-х годах, когда русскоязычные евреи стали тысячами прибывать в эту страну. Для местных евреев неожиданная иммиграция казалась удачным шансом, выпавшим еврейским сообществам и обществу в целом. Однако первое поколение русско-еврейских иммигрантов столкнулось с большим числом социальных проблем и трудностей интеграции на рынок труда. К этому следует добавить культурное отчуждение от немецкого общества и серьезные различия в культуре, ментальности и идентичности с местными еврейскими общинами. А также конфликты между старожилами и новоприбывшими относительно желаемых моделей организации еврейской жизни – в силу чего и через тридцать лет после начала иммиграции русские евреи все еще мало представлены в общенациональном еврейском руководстве. И все же, впервые после окончания Второй мировой войны у еврейских общин Германии появился шанс построить плюралистическую модель религиозных, культурных, образовательных и политических проектов. Второе поколение русских евреев Германии не сталкивается с проблемами интеграции, подобные проблемам родителей, и большинство из этого поколения вольется в немецкий средний класс и профессиональную элиту страны – или уже находятся там. Но при этом совершенно непонятно пока, до какой степени второе поколение русских евреев будет искать собственные корни, интересоваться еврейским наследием и участвовать в жизни еврейских общин.
Abstract: A large share of Russian/Soviet Jews, especially among younger cohorts, are descendants of intermarriage. In this essay, I reflect on the implications of the built-in ambivalence of these mixed ethnics, comparing their identity qualms and social strategies in their native Russia and after migration to Israel. My analysis draws upon participant observation and interviews conducted in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and across Israel over the last 20 years. My theoretical anchors are recent discussions on the evolving nature of Jewish identity, formed at the intersection of religion, ethnicity, and culture, in the context of ongoing intermarriage and assimilation. The comparison between the (ex-)Soviet and Israeli context underscores the role of local social constructions of ethno-religious belonging, nationalism, and citizenship as synergistic forces in shaping social locations of mixed ethnics. It also sheds light on the tactics of adjustment and “passing” among individuals with ambivalent ethnic identities who experience rapid social transformation or migration.
Abstract: This chapter offers a comparative overview of immigrant trajectories and inte-gration outcomes of Russian-Jewish youths (the so-called 1.5 generation) who immigrated to Israel and Germany with their families over the last 25 years. At the outset, I compare Israeli and German reception contexts and policies and present the generic features of the 1.5 immigrant generation. Next I overview the Israeli research findings on Russian Israeli 1.5ers – their schooling, social mobility, cultural and linguistic practices, parents’ role in their integration, and juxtapose them with (still limited) German data. e final section presents two recent German studies of young Russian-Jewish adults and the initial findings from my own study among these immigrants living in four German cities. My interviews with 20 men and women, mostly successful professionals or entrepreneurs, indicate that their upward social mobility was facilitated by the continuous welfare support of their families, school integration programs, and low financial barriers to higher education. Despite common occupation-al and social downgrading of the parental generation in both countries, the 1.5-ers in Israel had to struggle harder to overcome their inherent immigrant disadvantage vs. native peers to access good schools and professional careers. Most young immigrants deem full assimilation in the host country’s main-stream unattainable and opt instead for a bilingual and/or bicultural strategy of integration
Abstract: Today, the dominant model for Jewish education is the community-wide, technologically advanced day school, where the Judaic subjects are taught by professional educators using student-friendly, interactive methodologies. Not so long ago, however, most Jewish education consisted of rote repetition of prayers and biblical passages and their translation into awkward English by teachers with no formal pedagogic training, in classes – often located in synagogue basements – held on Sunday or once a week after ‘ordinary’ school.
This book explains the radical reconfiguring of Jewish education in England in historical and sociocultural terms. It explores the transformations that took place in every aspect of Jewish education: curriculum, religious/ideological orientation, school format (afternoon classes vs day schools), funding (private vs state), and more. The author shows that this dramatic transition directly reflects both changes in the socioeconomic profile and self-identity of Anglo-Jewry as well as demographic and cultural changes in British society in general. Tracking the shift from integration to separation, this book maps the effect of competing societal, personal and communal agendas, pedagogic paradigms, and pragmatic constraints on the rise of the Jewish day school in England.
