Abstract: Quelques jours après l’attaque du Hamas en Israël, l’IFOP a réalisé pour le Journal du Dimanche, un sondage destiné à comprendre quelles étaient les représentations des Français à l’égard du conflit et de son impact sur une éventuelle importation de violences antisémites en France.
Premier enseignement de cette étude, le conflit au Proche-Orient apparaît comme particulièrement anxiogène. 86% des Français indiquent être inquiets (36% « tout à fait inquiets »), soit un niveau d’inquiétude proche de celui mesuré au début du conflit russo-ukrainien. Le sentiment d’inquiétude atteint son acmé dans certains segments de la population traditionnellement plus favorables à l’Etat Hébreu : les plus de 65 ans (44% de tout à fait inquiets parmi les plus de 65 ans contre 25% parmi les 18-24 ans) ou encore les électeurs de Valérie Pécresse (50% de « tout à fait inquiets »).
Deuxième enseignement de cette étude : les Français établissent clairement un lien entre les évènements au Proche-Orient et l’importation de violences antisémites en France. 48% des sondés estiment ainsi que les Français de confession juive sont plus en danger et 79% se déclarent inquiets que le conflit se traduise par une augmentation des actes antisémites.
Plus globalement, les Français identifient bien les « nouvelles formes d’antisémitisme » comme étant des causes à ce phénomène : 77% citent le rejet et la haine d’Israël, 76% les idées islamistes, soit des niveaux supérieurs à ceux mesurés pour les idées d’extrême droite (66%).
Dernier point, les pouvoirs publics bénéficient d’une certaine mansuétude dans l’opinion : 60% des Français estiment leur faire confiance pour assurer la sécurité des Français de confession juive. Jean-Luc Mélenchon suscite en revanche la défiance sur ce sujet : il apparait comme la personnalité politique qui suscite le moins de confiance pour lutter contre l’antisémitisme (17%), loin derrière Edouard Philippe (46%), Gerald Darmanin (42%), Marine Le Pen (42%) ou encore Emmanuel Macron (41%).
Abstract: Lorsqu’un tribunal allemand à Cologne décida que l’ablation du prépuce pour motif religieux relève de coups et blessures volontaires, il ne pensait pas faire de politique. Lorsque les porte-parole des Juifs en Allemagne s’indignèrent que cette décision revienne en somme à bannir les juifs du pays, éclata un scandale politique national aux proportions mondiales. La chancelière Angela Merkel, rapporte-t-on, réagit en disant « Je ne veux pas que l’Allemagne soit le seul pays au monde dans lequel les Juifs ne peuvent pratiquer leurs rites. Sinon on passerait pour une nation de guignols ». En réalité ce n’est pas le ridicule que l’Allemagne craignait, c’était qu’après avoir tenté d’éradiquer les Juifs d’Europe, avec un certain succès, elle affiche une inhospitalité foncière à l’égard des Juifs. Mais il n’est pas fortuit que ce soit précisément en Allemagne que les droits de l’homme, les droits les plus individuels, soient scrupuleusement approfondis jusqu’à une conclusion politiquement intenable.
Le tribunal de Cologne, en pénalisant la berit milah, ne fait pas de politique, il protège l’intégrité physique de la personne et déclenche pourtant un scandale politique et des réactions en chaîne qui poussèrent le législateur allemand à amender dans l’urgence cette embarrassante décision. Et les juifs, lorsqu’ils circoncisent, que font-ils exactement ? Les anthropologues ont échafaudés un ensemble d’hypothèses sur la fonction de la circoncision. Les réponses varient selon le groupe étudié, mais souvent se chevauchent…
Abstract: Si l’on considère à deux ans de distance le débat sur la circoncision qui a secoué l’Allemagne en 2012, et du point de vue d’un combattant juif alors focalisé uniquement sur la circoncision juive de garçons, ma conclusion est que la circoncision a perdu son innocence. Certes, il y a toujours eu des livres de Juifs et des articles de non-Juifs pour s’en prendre à la circoncision ; et certes, il y eut de nombreuses discussions sur certaines pratiques, comme la Metzitza bePeh, la succion du sang par le mohel qui exécute la circoncision, par exemple quant à savoir si l’usage d’une paille en verre devait être rendu obligatoire – et malgré tout, la circoncision était un acte qui semblait aller de soi. Et quiconque souhaitait y renoncer pour son fils y renonçait.
Or, avec le débat sur la circoncision, qui a eu lieu dans une Europe centrale qui considère la religion avec méfiance dès qu’elle poursuit des buts autres que thérapeutiques, les choses ont changé d’un coup. Au prétexte des complications qui survinrent lors de la circoncision d’un garçon musulman, circoncision qui n’avait pour ainsi dire rien à avoir avec une berit milah (considérant l’âge du garçon, le lieu, les participants et les conditions de l’acte) – la circoncision a été prise dans une spirale de légitimations, qui n’avait pour ainsi dire rien à voir avec le rapport que la majorité des juifs entretiennent à l’égard de cette tradition, ou, pour employer ici le terme religieux, de cette mitsvah.
Abstract: Partons d’un constat, qui est à l’origine de notre volonté – avec Danielle Cohen-Levinas – d’organiser ce colloque pour le penser collectivement : en juin 2012, un jugement de la cour d’appel de Cologne déclarait la circoncision d’un enfant pour des raisons religieuses constitutive d’atteinte à l’intégrité corporelle. Cette pratique très ancienne et commune au judaïsme et à l’islam était dès lors interdite dans toute l’Allemagne. Quelques semaines plus tard, l’Autriche et les hôpitaux universitaires de certains cantons suisses décidaient à leur tour d’un moratoire sur les circoncisions rituelles. Dans cette Allemagne repentante depuis des décennies, les Juifs se sont retrouvés de manière inattendue et soudaine au cœur d’une polémique puissante qui les renvoyait, aux côtés des musulmans, à une pratique décrétée mutilatrice, archaïque, voire barbare. Ce rituel, fondamental au point que son interdiction rendait impossible la présence juive en Allemagne, selon le Zentralrat der Juden, semblait contredire et bafouer des valeurs essentielles de la République fédérale. Ce débat s’est élargi, puisqu’en octobre 2013 c’est le Conseil de l’Europe qui publiait un avis préconisant de légiférer dans le sens d’une limitation, voire d’une interdiction de la circoncision rituelle à l’échelle du continent. L’affaire est sérieuse, une incompatibilité entre l’Europe et ses minorités juive et musulmane est explicitement énoncée, ce fait est sans précédent depuis la fin du nazisme.
Abstract: The question was asked by a girl of about 12 standing in front of the synagogue. It shows many of the aspects that play a role in the encounter with the New Synagogue Dresden as an out-of-school place of learning and which will be explored here. What is striking is a diffuse lifeworld knowledge with a simultaneous failure to differentiate between different religions, the understanding of symbolism and the double occupation of “Why?” between causal and final cognitive interest. On the one hand, then, the question speaks to the consideration of for what reason, and on the other hand, for what purpose, certain signs and practices occur. After an introduction to the New Synagogue, its potentials for the development of competencies, especially among children and young people, are explored. After that, the focus is on the conditions necessary for its use, and another section deals with the specific difficulties that can arise. The book concludes with a plea for the synagogue as an out-of-school place of learning, also beyond the topic of Judaism.
Abstract: This article follows up on assumptions of Rogers Brubaker and Benjamin Moffitt, according to whom, some Western and Northern European right-wing populist parties use ‘civilisationist’ and liberal-illiberal narratives that are, for instance, characterised by a ‘philo-Semitic stance’. The paper analyses to what extent the German right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) fits into this concept, considering the party’s ambivalent attitude towards Judaism, Jews, and Israel. Using qualitative content analysis, the study is based on an examination of AfD electoral manifestos and parliamentary documents from the federal level as well as from states such as Berlin, Baden-Württemberg, and Thuringia between 2014 and 2019. Our results reveal differences that range from open anti-Semitic statements to self-definitions as a ‘pro-Jewish’ party. We argue that different positions can be explained by regionally divergent discursive opportunity structures as well as personnel heterogeneity across the party sections under study. Furthermore, we reason that a combination of anti-Semitic and pro-Jewish/Israeli statements fits into the AfD’s strategy of addressing both voters from the radical right with anti-Semitic prejudices and more moderate, conservative voters that reject open hostility towards Jews and Israel. We conclude that the AfD fulfils Brubaker’s and Moffitt’s concepts only to a rather limited extent.
Abstract: Campaigning organisation Avaaz commissioned ICM Unlimited to conduct a nationally representative poll to look into attitudes of the British public towards Jews and Muslims.
Some of the key findings include:
Overall, just under half of British adults say that they have a positive view of Jews (47%), while 7% say that they have a negative view. When it comes to Muslims, the British public’s attitudes are more unfavourable. A quarter say that they have a negative view of Muslims (26%), while a third say that they have a positive view (32%).
2017 Conservative voters are more likely than those who voted Labour to have a negative view of Muslims. Just under four in ten of those who voted Conservative in 2017 say that they have a negative view of Muslims (37%), more than double the proportion of those who voted Labour who have a negative view (16%).
A greater proportion of people agree than disagree for four of the five statements about Muslims/Islam that Avaaz tested. That is, more people agree than disagree that: Islam threatens the British way of life (45% agree vs. 31% disagree), Islamophobia in Britain is a response to the everyday behaviour of Muslims (36% vs. 34%), parts of the UK are under Sharia law (33% vs. 28%), and that there should be a reduction in the number of Muslims entering Britain (41% vs. 25%). The only statement with which more people disagree than agree is: ‘Islamic terrorism reflects the views of the Muslim community in Britain’ (26% agree vs. 49% disagree).
Six in ten 2017 Conservative voters agree that ‘Islam threatens the British way of life’ (62%), compared to 35% of 2017 Labour voters.
When it comes to attitudes towards Jews, just over one in seven of people agree that ‘Jews have disproportionate influence in politics’ (15%). Among 2017 Labour voters, this figure rises to one in five (20%), compared to one in seven 2017 Conservative voters (14%).
Abstract: Celem tekstu jest próba uchwycenia integralnych, choć czasami antytetycznych i skrywanych więzi, które w europejskim (chrześcijańskim/zsekularyzowanym) imaginarium łączyły żydów i muzułmanów, Żydów i Arabów. Idea tekstu wyrasta z przekonania, że procesu konstytuowania się jakiejkolwiek tożsamości lub wspólnotowości nie da się satysfakcjonująco opisać bez wyjścia poza standardową analizę, która koncentruje się na tym, jak tożsamość ustanawia się poprzez odniesienie do tego, co wobec niej inne. Tezą autorki jest to, że w przypadku europejskich (chrześcijańskich/zsekularyzowanych) wspólnot i tożsamości kluczowym elementem odnoszenia się do „inności” jest konceptualne i polityczne żonglowanie różnymi kategoriami „innych”, a więc m.in. figurami „żyda” i „muzułmanina”, „Żyda” i „Araba”. Autorka rekonstruuje zmienne konfiguracje, w jakich na przestrzeni europejskiej historii pojawiały się te figury. Pokazuje, że ewoluowały one od etapu, na którym różnorodne wyobrażenia na temat żydów i muzułmanów, Żydów i Arabów zawierały często przekonanie o ich rozmaicie rozumianym pokrewieństwie i bliskości, do etapu, w którym następuje radykalne symboliczne i polityczne zerwanie między tym, co żydowskie i tym, co muzułmańskie/arabskie. Zawarta w tekście analiza przedstawiona jest jako baza do zrozumienia mechanizmów antysemityzmu i islamofobii, a także łączących je korelacji.
Abstract: The stereotyped content of outgroups denotes intergroup relations. Based on this notion, Susan Fiske and colleagues (2002, https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.878) created the stereotype content model (SCM), which links two dimensions, warmth and competence, with social structure. The structure of intergroup relations is not stable in time, nor is it shaped instantly. Based on the assumptions of SCM we predict that the history of intergroup relations is in part responsible for stereotypes. In order to test the hypothesis we reanalysed five Polish nationwide, representative surveys (total N = 4834). The studies followed a similar procedure for data collection, and each study asked an open-ended question about the traits of two ethnic groups (Jews and Germans). Answers were listed and coded using competent judges. The averages of the judges’ codes were used as indicators of stereotype content and an analysis of regional differences was conducted. Several significant results were obtained and are interpreted in line with warm – competition and competence – status relations. The results show that several historical situations and events, such as pre-WWII social structure or post-war migrations and territorial changes, can be linked to contemporary stereotypes.
Abstract: Muslim–Jewish relations have a long and complex history. However, notions that all Jews and Muslims are eternal enemies are proven wrong both historically and by today’s survey data. A comprehensive review of the available survey data from the last two decades provides a glimpse into the views of Muslims and Jews of each other in countries where both communities are a minority. It is based on surveys from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S., including more than 91,000 respondents, comprising almost 27,000 Muslims and, in additional surveys, more than 52,000 Jewish respondents. Many Muslims and Jews acknowledge that the other community suffers from discrimination, albeit to varying degrees. Jews often see Islam and Muslim extremists as a threat to Jews, but most Jews, more than society in general, seem to distinguish between Muslim extremists and Muslims in general. Antisemitic attitudes are significantly higher among Muslims than among the general population in all surveys, even though the majority of Muslims in most European countries and in the United States do not exhibit antisemitic attitudes. The differences in anti-Jewish attitudes between Muslims and non-Muslims do not disappear when controlling for sociodemographic factors.
Abstract: The article examines intercultural perception during the Hasidic pilgrimage in Ukraine on the examples of Uman and Medzhybizh. Pilgrimage is defined as a form of religious tourism, which is specifically expressed in the role of the sacred - the pilgrims do not need encounters with the Other (cross-cultural interaction), they search for the direct presence by the sacred object. Taking into account the closed character of this religious community, methodical emphasis of the research was made on semi-structured interviews with the locals (24 interviews in Medzhybizh, 10 interviews in Uman) and several Hasids (1 in Medzhybizh and 2 in Uman), as well as annual observations in Uman during the pilgrimage period in 2009-2012. The research gives ground to assert the existence of the conceptual differences in the perception of pilgrims by the locals of two mentioned settlements. Two basic topics are revealed in the perception of the phenomenon of pilgrimage: violation of the residents' comfort zone (leading theme in interviews with the locals) and a source of income for the population of Ukraine (one of the basic themes in interviews with the Hasids). The findings suggest that local residents perceive pilgrims mostly under the phase of «culture shock» or «honeymoon» phase, according to the three-phase concept of cross-cultural perception, offered by Furnhem and Bochner. This is facilitated by the multiplying image of an «eccentric pilgrim» in Ukrainian mass media and, at the same time, short-term nature of pilgrimage, closeness of the Hasidic community and consistent policy of mutual segregation. It is suggested that personal contacts with pilgrims affect more positive perception of pilgrimage, in a whole. Pilot interviews with the Hasids reveal that residents are perceived by pilgrims rather fragmentary: as landlords of apartments or representatives of the local Jewish community. Spatial isolationism, which accompanies the pilgrimage, narrows the possibilities for cross-cultural interactions.
Abstract: Autorka v tejto publikácii sumarizuje svoje aktuálne poznatky získané dlhodobým výskumom problematiky holokaustu na Slovensku, jeho reflexie v spomienkach pamätníkov i obrazy šírené v súčasnej spoločnosti Slovenska. Zamýšľa sa nad možnosťami metódy oral history pri výskume tejto témy, jej úskaliami i pozitívami. Významné je pre ňu využitie tejto kvalitatívnej metódy zameranej na mikroúroveň spoločnosti, na subjektívne prežívanie veľkých dejín, priamy kontakt bádateľa s človekom, ktorý tieto udalosti prežil. Predstavuje jednotlivé dlhodobé výskumné projekty, ktoré autorka realizovala, ich výskumné vzorky, spôsob a podmienky práce. V tretej časti predstavuje spomienky na holokaust z dvoch perspektív: obetí (židovských pamätníkov) a divákov (ich nežidovských susedov, ktorí boli svedkami, no nie priamymi aktérmi diania). V závere sa zamýšľa nad vzťahom pamäti spomienkového spoločenstva a jeho vlastnými identitami, porovnáva spôsoby spomínania u židovských a nežidovských respondentov a uvažuje, čo prezrádzajú o vzťahoch medzi nimi a o ich vlastných referenčných skupinách.
Abstract: This article examines the ways in which Jewish personal belongings that have been appropriated by gentiles during, and in the aftermath of, the Holocaust have been identified, demanded back, passed down from generation to generation, and commodified. Focusing on Biłgoraj and Izbica (Poland), and Mir and Iŭje (Belarus), our objective is to determine whether the Jewish identity of personal belongings appropriated by local non-Jewish communities during, or in the aftermath of, ‘Holocaust by bullets,’ survived in the postwar communities in which they have been circulating, and define what role they played for the postwar relations between Jews and non-Jews.
Abstract: For more than a decade, there has been a discussion about the scope and character of a “Muslim antisemitism” in Europe, spurred on by anti-Jewish harassment and terrorist attacks by Muslims in some European countries.* However, there are only a few major studies on the attitudes of Muslims towards Jews in Europe, while larger studies on the attitude of Jews towards Muslims have so far been missing completely. Based on the data from the 2017 survey, “Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway. Population Survey and Minority Study” (CHM), it is now possible to investigate how Jews and Muslims in Norway perceive each other, whether they see opportunities for cooperation as minorities and have common experiences of discrimination, what their positioning in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict looks like, and whether it influences their mutual perception. While the focus is on the relationship between Muslims and Jews, in some cases the results for the general Norwegian population are included as a tertium comparationis, since Jews and Muslims form part of Norwegian society.
Abstract: This paper examines whether the re-emergence of the “Jewish Question” in the 2010-2016 Hungarian public discourse has also re-surfaced the “us” and “them” distinction between Hungarians and Jews that has lain dormant within the Hungarian population, and whether this symbolic exclusion of Jews from the Hungarian nation creates new, additional Jewish and quasi-Jewish groups as “others”, to be lumped together with the “other others”. The paper was submitted in 2016 and therefore does not cover the discussions around the openly antisemitic 2018 election campain’s discourse. The paper makes two main claims. The first is that the state “protectively” treats Hungarian Jews as a distinct group, as a community that is distinguished by its “otherness”, separated from the “us” of the national narrative. The second claim is that an “out-grouped other”, which does not identify with the government’s concept of an ethnic nation, is depicted with stereotypes that historically described Jews, regardless of their background, origins or religion. As populist, ethnic nationalism is being resurrected in Europe, the following questions arise: How can affiliated Hungarian Jews and “outed”, “non-Jewish Jews” take part in a nation that rhetorically excludes them while cynically attempting to promote their (Jewish) separateness in a seemingly positive manner? Why is this separation important and perhaps even dangerous? And how can Hungarians (who are cast as Jewish) credibly participate in Hungary’s internal and external politics and democracy?It is argued that the current “Jewish Question” debate in Hungary after 2010 may have less to do with actual Jews and more to do with creating the populist fiction of a homogeneous, isolated, ethnic nation, reminiscent of the ethnic nationalist concepts championed during the 1920s and 1930s with tragic consequences.
Abstract: Antisemitische Feindbilder sind bei arabischen Flüchtlingen weit verbreitet. Dies belegt eine Studie, welche vom American Jewish Committee (AJC) in Auftrag gegeben wurde.
„Bisher beruhte diese wichtige Diskussion, etwa zum Thema Antisemitismus, lediglich auf der Ebene von Vermutungen. Nun haben wir ein wissenschaftlich-fundiertes Bild: Judenfeindliche Ressentiments, antisemitische Verschwörungstheorien und eine kategorische Ablehnung Israels sind bei vielen Flüchtlingen aus dem arabischen Raum weit verbreitet. Dies ist angesichts der tiefen Verwurzelung des Judenhasses in arabischen Ländern zwar nicht verwunderlich, dennoch hat uns die Klarheit einiger Aussagen überrascht. Das Problem ist komplexer als von manch einem angenommen“, sagte Deidre Berger, Direktorin des AJC Berlin Ramer Institute.
Die Studie wurde von dem Historiker und Antisemitismusforscher Dr. Günther Jikeli (Indiana University/Universität Potsdam) in Berlin durchgeführt. Hierfür wurden 68 Geflüchtete (18-52 Jahre) aus Syrien und dem Irak in Gruppeninterviews befragt. Eine aktuell laufende Folgestudie vom Forscher mit 85 Befragten bestätigt die Ergebnisse.
„Wir haben die Studie in Auftrag gegeben, um Antworten über Einstellungen zu Juden, Israel und demokratischen Werten unter Flüchtlingen aus dem arabischen Raum zu bekommen. Die Erkenntnisse sind von großer Bedeutung für die Frage, wie die Integration von Geflüchteten gelingen kann“, so Berger weiter. „Die Ergebnisse der Studie sind erschütternd, aber nicht alle Flüchtlinge sind gleich und unser Verständnis muss viel differenzierter werden. Gerade diejenigen, die in Syrien oder dem Irak als religiöse oder ethnische Minderheiten verfolgt wurden, positionieren sich häufiger gegen Antisemitismus und für Israel."
Abstract: Antisemitism from Muslims has become a serious issue in Western Europe, although not often acknowledged as such. Looking for insights into the views and rationales of young Muslims toward Jews, Günther Jikeli and his colleagues interviewed 117 ordinary Muslim men in London (chiefly of South Asian background), Paris (chiefly North African), and Berlin (chiefly Turkish). The researchers sought information about stereotypes of Jews, arguments used to support hostility toward Jews, the role played by the Middle East conflict and Islamist ideology in perceptions of Jews, the possible sources of antisemitic views, and, by contrast, what would motivate Muslims to actively oppose antisemitism. They also learned how the men perceive discrimination and exclusion as well as their own national identification. This study is rich in qualitative data that will mark a significant step along the path toward a better understanding of contemporary antisemitism in Europe.
Abstract: In den meisten islamischen Ländern fanden - anders als in Europa - keine gezielten Ermordungen von Jüdinnen und Juden oder Deportationen in Todeslager statt. Dieser Band geht der Frage nach, wie Musliminnen und Muslime als scheinbar "Unbeteiligte" zum Holocaust stehen. Behandelt werden unter anderem die Teilnahme von Muslimen am Holocaustgedenken, die Wahrnehmung der Schoah im arabischen und türkischen Raum sowie unter muslimischen Jugendlichen und die wachsende Verwendung antisemitischer Parolen.
Die Einstellungen von Muslimen zum Holocaust reichen von Mitgefühl und Anteilnahme über Gleichgültigkeit und die Frage "Was hat das mit uns zu tun?" bis zu Verharmlosung oder List es, so das Fazit, in der schulischen und außerschulischen Bildung umfassend über die Geschichte aufzuklären und dabei Perspektiven von Migrantinnen und Migranten stärker zu berücksichtigen.
Mit Beiträgen von Joëlle Allouche-Benayoun, Rifat Bali, Georges Bensoussan, Mehmet Can, Monique Eckmann, Remco Ensel, Evelien Gans, Karoline Georg, Ruth Hatlapa, Günther Jikeli, Philip Spencer, Kim Robin Stoller, Annemarike Stremmelaar, Sara Valentina di Palma, Esther Webman, Juliane Wetzel und Michael Whine
Abstract: First International Resources was commissioned by the AntiDefamation League to research attitudes and opinions toward Jews, the Middle East and the global financial crisis in sevenEuropean countries.
¾ Our research focused on the attitudes of the general public in
Austria, France, Hungary, Poland, Germany, Spain and the
United Kingdom.
¾ Data results for each individual country were weighted based
on age and gender. The completed interview data underwent
minor weighting to national population data using official
government information on age and gender.
¾ In addition to the individual country results, we have compiled
overall statistics which take into account the findings from the
seven countries surveyed as a whole. These figures are
combined results from our surveys, with each country’s
findings being weighted equally as one-seventh of the whole.
¾ Fieldwork was done by Taylor Nelson Sofres (TNS), which
conducted a total of 3,500 telephone interviews -- 500 in each of
the seven countries -- among the general public between
December 1, 2008 – January 13, 2009.
¾ Interviews were conducted in the native language of each of the
countries and were completed by TNS.
¾ The margin of error for each country is +/- 4 at 95% level of
confidence.
Abstract: First International Resources was commissioned by the AntiDefamation League to research attitudes and opinions toward Jews in twelve European countries.
• Our research focused on the prevalent attitudes of the general public
in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and for the first time,
Poland and Hungary.
• Data results for each individual country were weighted based on age
and gender. The completed interview data underwent minor weighting
to national population data using official government information on
age and gender.
• In addition to the individual country results, we have compiled overall
“European” statistics which take into account the findings from the
twelve countries surveyed as a whole. These “European” figures are
combined results from our surveys, with each country’s findings being
weighted equally as one-twelfth of the whole.
• Fieldwork was done by Taylor Nelson Sofres, which conducted a total
of 6,000 telephone interviews -- 500 in each of the twelve countries --
among the general public between April 11 -- May 6, 2005.
• Interviews were conducted in the native language of each of the
countries and were completed by TNS.
• The margin of error for each country is +/- 4.5 at 95% level of
confidence.
Abstract: First International Resources was commissioned by the AntiDefamation League to research attitudes and opinions in ten European countries toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
• Our research focused on the prevalent attitudes of the general public
in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland.
• Data results for each individual country were weighted based on age
and gender. The completed interview data underwent minor weighting
to national population data using official government information on
age and gender.
• Fieldwork was done by Taylor Nelson Sofres, which conducted a total
of 5,000 telephone interviews -- 500 in each of the ten countries --
among the general public between March 16-April 8, 2004.
• Interviews were conducted in the native language of each of the
countries and were completed by TNS.
• The margin of error for each country is +/- 4.4 at 95% level of
confidence.
