Abstract: In all, 90% of Polish Jews, more than 3 million people, were murdered by the Nazis during the Holocaust, and 90% of the survivors left Poland. The survivors and their heirs, most of them not currently living in Poland, saw their land confiscated by the Nazis, nationalized by the communists and reprivatized and sold to others. Poland is the only country in the EU not to have a comprehensive restitution law. The issue of land restitution is still present in current debate in Poland, as part of a broader discussion over the Second World War, communism, privatization and corruption. While Poland blocked all restitution claims in 2021, Jewish communities as well as other governments called Poland to adopt a comprehensive restitution law for everyone. Now, 30 years after the fall of communism, what justifies such claims? This paper argues that forward-looking collective responsibility is the most helpful concept to understand the Jewish restitution problem in Poland today, and claims that any future settlement of this issue should be based on it. By applying this concept, as developed by Iris Marion Young, to the Polish restitution case, we look into the past – not to look for people to blame, but to look for social connections that have implications for the present. This way, we can remember the past, learn from it and heal relationships between people without being slaves to it.
Topics: Antisemitism: Monitoring, Antisemitism: Online, Elections, European Union, Hate, Internet, Islamophobia, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Social Media, Racism, Ukraine-Russia war (since 2014)
Abstract: W wyniku przeprowadzonego drugiego etapu pilotażowego monitoringu, mającego zbadać zjawisko narastającej liczby treści o charakterze nienawistnym w internecie w okresie kampanii wyborczej, dokonano wielu istotnych obserwacji.
Kampania do Parlamentu Europejskiego, będąca kolejną z serii kampanii wyborczych odbywających się w krótkim odstępie czasu od poprzednich, miała miejsce w okresie okołowakacyjnym, co wiązało się z mniejszym zaangażowaniem zarówno ze strony partii politycznych, jak i użytkowników internetu. Mimo tego obniżonego poziomu zaangażowania wzrost treści o charakterze nienawistnym był już zauważalny przed formalnym rozpoczęciem kampanii, co sugeruje, że polityczny i społeczny klimat pozostawał spolaryzowany na skutek poprzednich wyborów do Sejmu i Senatu, które odbyły się 9 października 2023 roku.
Wraz z formalnym rozpoczęciem kampanii wyborczej zaobserwowano stały wzrost aktywności w serwisach internetowych oraz ciągłą tendencję wzrostową treści o charakterze nienawistnym. Po zakończeniu kampanii doszło do istotnego zmniejszenia liczby tego typu treści.
Analiza zachowań użytkowników internetu podczas monitoringu ujawniła, że wzrost treści nienawistnych rozprzestrzeniał się między różnymi grupami, co świadczy o dynamicznym i płynnym charakterze tego zjawiska. Zauważono, że nienawistne treści skierowane do jednej grupy mniejszościowej często prowadziły do generowania nienawiści wobec innych grup mniejszościowych. Szczególnie interesującym aspektem jest fakt, że wzrost treści antysemickich korelował z nasileniem treści antyukraińskich i antyuchodczych, co sugeruje związek między różnymi formami nienawiści w dyskursie społecznym.
Zapraszamy do zapoznania się z raportem
Spis treści:
Wstęp
Metodologia
Badanie – wyniki
Analiza zmian
Treści o charakterze antysemickim
Treści o charakterze antyuchodźczym i antymuzułmańskim
Treści o charakterze antyukraińskim
Treści o charakterze anty-LGBT+
Wnioski końcowe
Publikacja powstała w ramach projektu „Kompleksowa strategia przeciwdziałania antysemickiej mowie nienawiści w przestrzeni publicznej”, finansowanego przez Fundację Pamięć, Odpowiedzialność i Przyszłość, realizowanego przez Żydowskie Stowarzyszenie Czulent przy wsparciu merytorycznym Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami.
Niniejsza publikacja nie prezentuje stanowiska i opinii Fundacji Pamięć, Odpowiedzialność i Przyszłość (EVZ).
Abstract: Over half a century after the Holocaust, in Eastern European countries where the Jewish community remained only a small part of the population, products of Jewish culture (or what is perceived as Jewish culture), including music, have become vital components of the popular public domain. In Poland, there are festivals and concerts of Jewish music, more and more records with this music, Jewish museums, and renovated Jewish districts, with Jewish cuisine, and music that are offered to tourists visiting Poland as the main attractions. They attract enthusiastic – and often non-Jewish – crowds. I consider how non-Jews involved in this movement in Poland perceive and implement Jewish culture, why they do it, how much it involves the recovery of Jewish heritage, and how this represents the musical culture of Jews in museums and at events organized for tourists. I also consider the relation of non-Jews as a majority group to Jews as a minority group, as well as the impact of the musical actions of the former on the musical culture of the latter. The article is based on field research and observations I have made during more than twenty years, both among the remaining Jews in Poland and in mixed or non-Jewish communities where music perceived as Jewish is promoted.
Abstract: NEW YORK, NEW YORK: January 23, 2025—The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (Claims Conference) today released the first-ever, eight-country Index on Holocaust Knowledge and Awareness, exposing a global trend in fading knowledge of basic facts about the Holocaust. The countries surveyed include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Austria, Germany, Poland, Hungary and Romania.
The majority of respondents in each country, except Romania, believe something like the Holocaust (another mass genocide against Jewish people) could happen again today. Concern is highest in the United States, where more than three-quarters (76%) of all adults surveyed believe something like the Holocaust could happen again today, followed by the U.K. at 69%, France at 63%, Austria at 62%, Germany at 61%, Poland at 54%, Hungary at 52%, and Romania at 44%.
Shockingly, some adults surveyed say that they had not heard or weren’t sure if they had heard of the Holocaust (Shoah) prior to taking the survey. This is amplified among young adults ages 18-29 who are the most recent reflection of local education systems; when surveyed, they indicated that they had not heard or weren’t sure if they had heard of the Holocaust (Shoah): France (46%), Romania (15%), Austria (14%) and Germany (12%). Additionally, while Auschwitz-Birkenau is the most well-known camp, nearly half (48%) of Americans surveyed are unable to name a single camp or ghetto established by the Nazis during World War II.
On a more positive note, there is overwhelming support for Holocaust education. Across all countries surveyed, nine-in-10 or more adults believe it is important to continue teaching about the Holocaust, in part, so it does not happen again.
Abstract: The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of the communist regimes in Europe represented a radical change for Judaism on the continent. The most striking change occurred, naturally, in Central and Eastern Europe, that is, in those countries that were behind the Iron Curtain, such as Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia or the German Democratic Republic. There, while the political decomposition of the Soviet bloc was gaining traction, thousands of people rediscovered their Jewish origins – forbidden, concealed, or silenced under communism, giving rise to a process of Jewish revivalism. In this context, numerous Jewish philanthropic organizations came to the region to support these developments with the mission of renewing local Jewish communities. The process involved a multitude of actors – Jewish agencies, organizations and foundations based in the United States, Europe and Israel – and entailed the mobilization of professionals, specialists and financial resources. This thesis explores the concrete dynamics of this cross-border mobilization of Jewish philanthropic bodies in favor of the Jewish communities of East Central Europe after the fall of communism in 1989. It studies in-depth the historical origins and evolution of transnational Jewish solidarity in modern times, enquires about the Jewish agencies and organizations that started to operate in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, especially, but not only, their sources of financing and the circulation of economic resources. Finally, it gives an account of the narrative corpus that emerged about European Jews before and during this process, identifying those actors who created and mobilized these narratives.
Abstract: W ramach półrocznego badania podjęliśmy działania mające na celu sprawdzenie, czy i kiedy nienawistne treści o charakterze antysemickim są usuwane przez międzynarodowe i polskie serwisy IT po otrzymaniu zgłoszenia od użytkowniczek i użytkowników o konieczności ich usunięcia. Chcieliśmy także sprawdzić, czy istnieje różnica w usuwaniu nienawistnych treści zgłaszanych przez zwykłych użytkowników a tzw. zaufane podmioty sygnalizujące.
W tym celu przeprowadziliśmy Badanie usuwania treści nielegalnych w internecie (zwane także MRE — Monitoring and Reporting Exercise), testując międzynarodowe platformy internetowe: Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, platforma X (dawniej Twitter) oraz dostawców polskich usług pośrednich: Agora, wp.pl, onet.pl, natemat.pl, dorzeczy.pl i wykop.pl pod kątem stosowania krajowych i unijnych przepisów nakazujących usunięcie lub uniemożliwienie dostępu do treści nielegalnych, w tym mowy nienawiści. Badanie zostało przeprowadzone w momencie wchodzenia w życie nowej unijnej regulacji dotyczącej poprawy bezpieczeństwa w przestrzeni cyfrowej, znanej jako Rozporządzenie 2022/2065 lub Akt o usługach cyfrowych.
Spis treści:
Wstęp
Słowniczek
Ramy prawne
Metodologia
Etapy MRE
Kluczowe dane
Wskaźniki usuwalności zgłoszeń
Wnioski i rekomendacje
Publikacja powstała w ramach projektu Zabezpieczenie naszej społeczności, ochrona naszej demokracji: zwalczanie antysemityzmu poprzez zintegrowane podejście do rzecznictwa i bezpieczeństwa (projekt PROTEUS), współfinansowanego przez Unię Europejską.
Abstract: This paper, intended as a contribution to transnational memory studies, analyzes museums devoted to people who helped Jews during the Holocaust that recently opened in Bulgaria, France, Germany, Lithuania, and Poland. The author’s particular interest lies in the “traveling motifs” of the “Righteous” narratives. This category encompasses symbols such as a list of names of the help-providers, a fruit tree/orchard, or a wall with photographs of Holocaust victims, which recur in many of the examined exhibitions and are a clear reference to Yad Vashem and other well-established Holocaust memorials. At first sight, they seem to point to a “cosmopolitanization” of Holocaust remembrance and to the emergence of a common reservoir of historical notions and images. However, on closer inspection one discovers that the use of these symbols varies and that they refer to differing ways of understanding and telling history.
Abstract: With Poland’s political transformation after 1989, religious minorities including Jews and Muslims gained more autonomy and support from the state authorities. At the same time, the liberal democracy principles of religious equality and the state’s neutrality have still not been fully implemented. The paper focuses on this problematic situation, using the concept of politicization to portray the situation of the Jews and Muslims in contemporary Poland, and their relations with the Polish state. It presents four instances of politicization of religious minorities (specifically, Muslims and/or Jews). The research is based on public surveys, interviews with members of the Jewish and Muslim communities, legal documents, and NGO reports. According to the hypothesis of the paper, Muslims and Jews are significantly politicized in the Polish public discourse, and both communities play significant roles in shaping the political identity of the Polish polity. Their roles differ in character due to historical factors and the contemporary international context.
Abstract: This book addresses the issues of memory (a more suitable word would be Marianne Hirsh’s term of postmemory) of the Holocaust among young Poles, the attitudes towards Jews and the Holocaust in the comparative context of educational developments in other countries. The term “Jews” is, as rightly noted Joanna Tokarska-Bakir (2010) a decontextualized term used here in the meaning of Antoni Sułek (2010) as a collective “symbolic” entity. The focus was on education (transmitting values), attitudinal changes and actions undertaken to preserve (or counteract) the memory of Jews and their culture in contemporary Poland. The study to which the book primarly refers was conducted in 2008 and was a second study on a national representative sample of Polish adolescents after the first one undertaken in 1998. The data may seem remote from the current political situation of stepping back from the tendency to increase education about the Holocaust which dominated after 1989 and especially between 2000 and 2005, nonetheless they present trends and outcomes of specific educational interventions which are universal and may set examples for various geopolitical contexts.
The focus of this research was not primarily on the politics of remembrance, which often takes a national approach, although state initiatives are also brought to the attention of the reader, but rather on grassroots action, often initiated by local civil society organizations (NGOs) or individual teachers and/or students. This study has attempted to discover the place that Jews have (or do not have) in the culture of memory in Poland, where there lived the largest Jewish community in pre-war Europe, more than 90% of which was murdered during the Holocaust. The challenge was to show the diversity of phenomena aimed at integrating Jewish history and culture into national culture, including areas of extracurricular education, often against mainstream educational policy, bearing in mind that the Jews currently living in Poland are also, in many cases, active partners in various public initiatives. It is rare to find in-depth empirical research investigating the ensemble of areas of memory construction and the attitudes of youth as an ensemble, including the evaluation of actions (programmes of non-governmental organisations and school projects) in the field of education, particularly with reference to the long-term effects of educational programmes. The assumption prior to this project was that the asking of questions appearing during this research would stimulate further studies.
The book is divided into three parts: Memory, Attitudes and Actions. All three parts of the book, although aimed at analysing an ongoing process of reconstructing and deconstructing memory of the Holocaust in post-2000 Poland, including the dynamics of the attitudes of Polish youth toward Jews, the Shoah and memory of the Shoah, are grounded in different theories and were inspired by various concepts. The assumption prior to the study was that this complex process of attitudinal change cannot be interpreted and explained within the framework on one single academic discipline or one theory. Education and the cultural studies definitely played a significant role in exploring initiatives undertaken to research, study and commemorate the Holocaust and the remnants of the rich Jewish culture in Poland, but the sociology, anthropology and psychology also played a part in helping to see this process from various angles.
Abstract: The article deals with two legitimate cultures that were created in Poland after 1989. "Legitimate culture" means the axiological frame of reference that defines the criteria of prestige and dishonor, that is, the criteria of supreme values and anti-values. No authority (in Poland or any other country) can exist without controlling legitimate culture. However, legitimate culture in Poland is threatened by a history of domestic violence against Jews (massive pre-war Polish anti-Semitism, the murder of Jews during the Holocaust, the murder and persecution of Jews in the post-war period). respect, any Polish authority must control Holocaust-related content. The first concept of Holocaust management, created within the framework of the first legitimate culture (corresponding to the legal and institutional arrangements of 1989–2005 and 2007–2015) treated the Holocaust and Polish attitudes toward Jews as: an affirmation of the need to weaken the “nation,” the religious community and other collective entities; a problem that each Pole individually solves on his/her own. The second legitimacy culture (2005–2007; 2015–2023) works to: recognize the Holocaust as a problem that only the Polish nation can resolve; criminalize claims that Poles murdered Jews; present (and justify) violence against Jews as a struggle against communism; and portray Poles helping Jews as the norm, which the majority met during the occupation. The first culture of legitimacy used the Holocaust to weaken the social bond; the second uses the Holocaust to reactivate nationalism. Both cultures are responsible for the current crisis of social communication, and therefore another legitimate culture is needed to emerge from this crisis.
Topics: Memory, Jewish Neighbourhoods, Jewish Space, Jewish Heritage, Oral History and Biography, Holocaust, Holocaust Commemoration, Holocaust Memorials, Holocaust Survivors, Holocaust Survivors: Children of, Main Topic: Holocaust and Memorial
Abstract: The Sixth Survey of European Jewish Community Leaders and Professionals, 2024, presents the results of an online survey offered in 10 languages and administered to 879 respondents in 31 countries. Conducted every three years using the same format, the survey seeks to identify trends and their evolution over time.
The 2024 survey came during a historically fraught moment for the Jewish people globally. The impact of the horrific October 7th attacks and the subsequent war in Israel cannot be understated. How is this affecting Jewish leadership and Jewish communal life? Therefore, in addition to the regular topics covered by the survey (community priorities, threats, security concerns, attitudes towards Europe and Israel), this edition included a special section designed to understand the impact of October 7th on Jewish life in Europe.
That October 7th has profoundly affected Jewish Europe is evident across multiple sections throughout the survey. Concern about antisemitism and the threat of physical attack has intensified. A large majority of 78% feel less safe living as Jews in their cities than they did before the Hamas attack, and respondents are more cautious about how they identify themselves as Jews. They are also more distant from their wider environments, with 38% reporting they have become more distant from non-Jewish friends.
The respondents were comprised of presidents and chairpersons of nationwide “umbrella organizations” or Federations; presidents and executive directors of private Jewish foundations, charities, and other privately funded initiatives; presidents and main representatives of Jewish communities that are organized at a city level; executive directors and programme coordinators, as well as current and former board members of Jewish organizations; among others
Abstract: FRA’s third survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU reveals their experiences and perceptions of antisemitism, and shows the obstacles they face in living an openly Jewish life.
The survey pre-dates the Hamas attacks on 7 October 2023 and Israel’s military response in Gaza. But the report includes information about antisemitism collected from 12 Jewish community organisations more recently. Jewish people have experienced more antisemitic incidents since October 2023, with some organisations reporting an increase of more than 400%.
The survey results point to:
Rising antisemitism: 80% of respondents feel that antisemitism has grown in their country in the five years before the survey.
High levels of antisemitism online: 90% of respondents encountered antisemitism online in the year before the survey.
Antisemitism in the public sphere: in the year before the survey, 56% of respondents encountered offline antisemitism from people they know and 51% in the media.
Harassment: 37% say they were harassed because they are Jewish in the year before the survey. Most of them experienced harassment multiple times. Antisemitic harassment and violence mostly take place in streets, parks, or shops.
Safety and security concerns: Most respondents continue to worry for their own (53%) and their family’s (60%) safety and security. Over the years, FRA research has shown that antisemitism tends to increase in times of tension in the Middle East. In this survey, 75% feel that people hold them responsible for the Israeli government’s actions because they are Jewish.
Hidden lives: 76% hide their Jewish identity at least occasionally and 34% avoid Jewish events or sites because they do not feel safe. As a reaction to online antisemitism, 24% avoid posting content that would identify them as Jewish, 23% say that they limited their participation in online discussions, and 16% reduced their use of certain platforms, websites or services.
The EU and its Member States have put in place measures against antisemitism, which have led to some progress. These include the EU’s first ever strategy on combating antisemitism and action plans in some EU countries. The report suggests concrete ways for building on that progress:
Monitoring and adequately funding antisemitism strategies and action plans: This includes adopting plans in those EU countries which do not have them and developing indicators to monitor progress.
Securing the safety and security of Jewish communities: Countries need to invest more in protecting Jewish people, working closely with the affected communities.
Tackling antisemitism online: Online platforms need to address and remove antisemitic content online, to adhere tothe EU’s Digital Services Act. They also need to better investigate and prosecute illegal antisemitic content online.
Encouraging reporting and improving recording of antisemitism: National authorities should step up efforts to raise rights awareness among Jews, encourage them to report antisemitic incidents and improve the recording of such incidents. Greater use of third-party and anonymous reporting could help.
The survey covers Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden where around 96% of the EU’s estimated Jewish population live. Almost 8,000 Jews aged 16 or over took part in the online survey from January to June 2023. This is the third survey of its kind, following those of 2013 and 2018.
Abstract: Rising antisemitism in the twenty-first century has alarmed Jewish communities and the general public, but antisemitic hate crime victimization remains understudied outside the US context. This study primarily relies on a comprehensive survey of 16,400 Jews across twelve European countries, supplemented with data from additional sources, to assess individual and country-level predictors of Jews’ experiences and fears of antisemitic harassment and violence. Multilevel models indicate that young age, perceived discrimination, identity visibility, and identification with Israel are pronounced individual risk factors for victimization. On the country level, negative opinion of Israel and Muslim population share predict victimization, highlighting the role of a “new” or Israel-derived antisemitism in the twenty-first century. The factors most strongly associated with fear are young age, previous victimization, perceptions of an ambient antisemitic threat, and recent occurrence of fatal antisemitic violence. Overall, the findings underscore the importance of integrating general theory on hate crime and victimization with context-specific factors when seeking to understand the experiences of targeted groups.
Abstract: Les manifestations de nationalisme et d’antisémitisme qui accompagnèrent la transition furent souvent interprétées en termes de retour du même. En témoignent des expressions chargées en connotations primordialistes telles que « retour des nations et du nationalisme », « réveil des nationalismes », « retour des vieux démons ». Effet « réfrigérant » de la domination du Parti-État, « vide idéologique » postcommuniste, telles furent, dans un premier temps, les explications communément invoquées pour en expliquer la réactivation.
C’est oublier que l’effondrement idéologique du communisme en Europe du Centre-Est a largement précédé celui du Mur de Berlin, et que les passions nationalistes n’avaient jamais été mises au frigidaire sous le régime communiste. Instrumentalisées par certaines élites du Parti comme par des fractions de l’opposition, elles n’ont pas attendu l’effondrement du Mur de Berlin pour se déployer. Reste que leurs manifestations récentes sont d’autant plus difficiles à interpréter en bloc que l’hétérogénéité sociologique de l’Europe du Centre-Est s’approfondit depuis la désintégration de l’Empire soviétique et que le concept même de nationalisme désigne parfois des réalités sociales et politiques diamétralement opposées.
En partant de l’idée que « le renouveau du nationalisme en Europe de l’Est est moins la cause de la situation actuelle que sa conséquence », nous montrerons à partir de l’exemple polonais, que celui-ci participe en réalité d’un phénomène classique de réinvention d’une tradition…
Abstract: In August 1942, a majority of Bochnia’s Jewish residents were deported to the Bełżec death camp by the German occupying forces – this was the beginning of the direct extermination of Bochnian Jews which lasted for over a year. To commemorate them, as well as all other Jews murdered during the German occupation of Bochnia, the Stanisław Fischer Museum in Bochnia organised an exhibition, inaugurated on the 80th anniversary of this tragic event. The exhibition showed the presence of Jews in the town, remembered important figures whose roots came from Bochnia, and presented the activity of some contemporary descendants of former Jewish inhabitants of the town. The items on display were, in part, property of the museum, Judaica on loan from other museums, scanned documents from the National Archive in Kraków, and also materials submitted by families, descended from Bochnia residents, who live abroad.
Abstract: The Holocaust monuments in Poland commemorate this historical event in the place of its occurrence. This empowers the commemoration, its meanings, and messages. However, the monuments also reflect the way the Polish state’s collective memory consolidates over the years. The memory of the glorious and significant Jewish past in Poland is in the form of ruined synagogues, displaced or neglected gravestones in cemeteries, warehouses full of relics, and ruins of concentration and extermination camps. The memory of this Jewish past remained in the hands of the Poles and became part of the Polish national landscape. One of the ways to commemorate the magnificent and rich Jewish past, the way the Jewish communities were destroyed, and the community members were murdered, is through monuments. Holocaust monuments in Poland were erected right after War World II and continue to be constructed until the present. What is the character of the commemoration presented in the monuments, Polish, Jewish, or universal? Which themes are commemorated, and which artistic expressions were chosen for this purpose? In this chapter, I will discuss Holocaust monuments erected in Poland through the years with tombstones, at the event sites, and former concentration camp sites, addressing their historiographical context, and the variety of visual expressions.
