Abstract: A new national study has revealed that, while Portugal maintains high levels of religious tolerance and broadly positive perceptions of the Jewish community, a profound lack of knowledge, persistent stereotypes, and growing international polarisation may create conditions conducive to the future rise of antisemitism if not addressed through education and public awareness.
The study, “Social Distance and Tolerance in Portugal: the place of the Jewish Community – conceptual literacy, antisemitism, religious tolerance and comparison with other social groups in Portugal”, was conducted by Pitagórica at the request of the Jewish Community of Lisbon (Comunidade Israelita de Lisboa, CIL). It surveyed a representative sample of 1,200 residents in mainland Portugal and the Autonomous Regions, aged 18 and over.
The research shows that Portuguese society remains broadly open and tolerant:
68% of respondents feel comfortable living with people of different cultures or religions.
92% support cultural and religious diversity, provided fundamental national values are respected.
94% defend freedom of religious practice for all faiths in compliance with Portuguese law.
The Jewish community is among the most positively perceived groups in the study. Nearly half of respondents consider its contribution to Portugal to be positive, and only 4% identify Jews as one of the most discriminated communities in the country.
However, the study highlights a striking paradox: strong acceptance coexists with very limited knowledge. Only 3% of respondents say they know the Jewish community well, while 75% admit to knowing little or nothing about it.
The findings point to significant gaps in conceptual and historical literacy:
19% have never heard of the term antisemitism, and only 40% correctly define it.
40% are unfamiliar with the term Zionism.
55% believe Holocaust education in schools is insufficient.
The study also identifies the persistence of stereotypes, with around 40% agreeing with statements suggesting that Jews have “too much economic power” or “excessive influence in politics and international media”.
While 59% of respondents say it is important to distinguish between Jews in Portugal and the State of Israel, almost half (49%) believe that events in Israel negatively affect the image of Jews more broadly. At the same time, 80% reject the idea that Jews outside Israel should be held responsible for the actions of the Israeli government.
The digital sphere emerges as a key area of concern:
52% believe the Jewish community is targeted by online hate speech.
37% report perceptions of vandalism against property.
30% mention physical attacks.
The study also finds that 52% of respondents consider online hate speech against the Jewish community likely to increase, while 34% anticipate further vandalism and 31% foresee potential physical attacks in the future. The main drivers identified are hate speech on social media (46%) and religious extremism (35%).
A further significant finding is that 67% of respondents are unaware that Lisbon’s synagogue currently requires permanent police protection.
Awareness of institutional frameworks is extremely limited:
90% are unaware of the European Strategy to Combat Antisemitism and Foster Jewish Life.
99% do not know the national coordinator of the strategy.
75% are unaware of which government ministry is responsible for the file.
According to the authors, the data suggest that Portugal does not exhibit signs of structural rejection of the Jewish community. On the contrary, attitudes are generally positive and levels of declared tolerance remain high.
However, this positive baseline is accompanied by three interlinked vulnerabilities: widespread ignorance about Jewish life in Portugal, the influence of international conflicts on perceptions of Jews, and the persistence of stereotypes in digital spaces.
As a result, perception tends to be shaped less by direct social contact and more by abstract associations and online narratives.
According to David Joffe Botelho, President of the Board of Directors of the Jewish
Community of Lisbon, “the objective of this independent study was to produce a robust and
comparable diagnosis of the place of the Jewish community in Portuguese society,
identifying protective factors, vulnerabilities and trends relevant to the development of
education, communication and prejudice prevention strategies,” since, adds the leader,
“Portuguese political leaders have not given due attention to this issue, and the urgent
adoption of a national strategy, aligned with the European strategy, is necessary to combat
antisemitism and promote Jewish life.”
Additionally, he also states, “our goal was to have a comparative portrait with other social
and religious realities, so the study, beyond the specific dimension related to antisemitism,
can be used by those in government to design and implement public policies based on
concrete and measurable data and not on mere perceptions.”
The study concludes that the principal challenge in Portugal is not widespread rejection of the Jewish community, but rather the combination of low levels of knowledge, limited direct contact, and exposure to polarised global narratives.
In a context where 72% of respondents believe tensions between social and cultural groups have increased in recent years, the report warns that these conditions, if left unaddressed, may gradually create an environment more susceptible to antisemitic attitudes.
It therefore calls for strengthened educational initiatives, improved Holocaust and religious literacy in schools, and closer alignment with European strategies aimed at combating antisemitism and promoting Jewish life.
Source : European Jewish congress
Abstract: – Beyond campus incidents, broader longitudinal survey data suggest attitudinal shifts across society, especially among younger populations. This longitudinal attitude survey suggests that there has been a significant rise in antisemitic sentiments in both Germany and the United States since the beginning of 2024 (unfortunately this is when the data set begins).
– Age is the strongest predictor of antisemitic attitudes, with younger respondents, particularly young men, consistently more likely to endorse exclusionary views about Jews in both the U.S. and Germany.
– High social media use and conspiratorial thinking strongly correlate with antisemitic sentiment, especially in the United States, indicating digital environments as key drivers of contemporary prejudice formation.
– In the United States young people are more likely to evince antisemitic views, while in Germany older people are more likely to be islamophobic.
– The data do not support a broad resurgence of left-wing antisemitism; instead, political polarization and xenophobia, especially on the right, remain central predictors of exclusionary attitudes.
Abstract: Public concern about antisemitism has increased globally in the twenty-first century, sparking renewed interest from social scientists. However, the crucial question of why trajectories of antisemitic hostility differ between countries remains unanswered due to a lack of studies designed to track temporal and cross-national variation. Addressing this gap, I evaluate the explanatory power of two main lines of argument that divide the literature: generalist and particularist. While generalists see antisemitism as a manifestation of general outgroup hostility common to various forms of prejudice, particularists stress the contextual specificity of antisemitism and posit that its twenty-first-century expressions are distinctively linked to anti-Zionist sentiment (enmity toward Israel and its supporters). I derive observable implications from these positions and conduct a comparative, longitudinal case study of antisemitic hostility in Germany, Sweden, and Russia (1990–2020), using a mixed-methods approach to integrate incident counts, victimization surveys, media analysis, and expert interviews. Findings match predictions from the particularist position, with flare-ups in the Israel–Palestine conflict generating or catalyzing antisemitic hostility depending on the strength of local anti-Zionist sentiment, thus demonstrating the centrality of the “Israel factor” in contemporary antisemitism.
Abstract: The study examines antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes in Sweden, analyzing their links to prejudicial attitudes, conspiracy beliefs, and institutional trust. Based on a representative survey of 3,507 individuals, the findings reveal that antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes are related, but differ in important ways. Antisemitism is associated with anti-immigrant and sexist attitudes and greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs, but is unrelated to institutional trust. By contrast, anti-Israel attitudes are unrelated to anti-immigrant attitudes and are positively associated with governemnt trust and media confidence. Cluster analyses have identified three profiles: Neutral Moderates (low antisemitism and low anti-Israel attitudes), Critical Engagers (low antisemitism but moderate anti-Israel attitudes), and Distrustful Sceptics (heightened levels of both). These profiles differ in socio-demographic characteristics, prejudicial attitudes, and conspiracy beliefs, with higher institutional trust increasing the likelihood of belonging to Critical Engagers. The findings suggest that institutional trust may channel individuals toward stronger anti-Israel attitudes, particularly in Sweden.
Abstract: Depuis les années 2000, et plus encore depuis le 7 octobre 2023, les actes antisémites se sont multipliés dans de nombreux pays, dont la Belgique.
Quel est l’état des lieux dans notre pays ? Quelle part de la population belge nourrit des préjugés antisémites ? La haine antisémite serait-elle de retour en Belgique ?
En s’appuyant sur les résultats détaillés du seul sondage d’envergure mené en Belgique sur ces sujets, Joël Kotek et Joël Amar se sont attachés, dans ce rapport, à répondre à ces questions. Dans une société belge en voie d’archipellisation, leur rapport montre la persistance d’opinions antisémites, ainsi que leur sur-représentation à l’extrême-droite, à l’extrême-gauche, chez les musulmans et à Bruxelles.
Il met en lumière quatre formes d’antisémitisme qui prennent en étau les Belges juifs, nourrissant chez eux un vif sentiment de solitude et d’inquiétude. En publiant ce rapport sur un sujet peu étudié et souvent frappé de déni, l’Institut Jonathas veut objectiver les différentes réalités de l’antisémitisme en Belgique et alerter sur les menaces qui pèsent sur les Juifs et, au-delà, sur la société belge dans son ensemble.
Il entend également contribuer à un sursaut, ayant la conviction que la lutte contre l’antisémitisme a besoin d’un « reset » en Belgique, c’est-à-dire d’une réinitialisation en vue d’une plus grande efficacité.
Abstract: Feindselige Einstellungen gegenüber religiösen und ethnischen Minoritäten sind weit verbreitet. Ziel dieser Studie ist es, Einstellungsmuster in der Schweizer Bevölkerung empirisch zu identifizieren und zu prüfen, wie diese mit Kontakthäufigkeit zu Minoritäten zusammenhängen. Grundlage ist ein repräsentativer Survey, der im Jahr 2022 durchgeführt wurde (N = 2 701). Dazu wurden Fragen zu feindseligen Einstellungen gegenüber Jüdinnen und Juden, Musliminnen und Muslimen sowie Schwarzen Menschen gestellt. Befragte mit vergleichbaren Einstellungen wurden mit einer Reihe latenter Klassenanalysen gruppiert. Mittels Bayesian Information Criterion wurde das am besten zu den Daten passende Modell identifiziert. Es fanden sich sechs distinkte Einstellungsgruppen: keine Feindseligkeit, nicht antisemitisch geprägte Kulturangst, antisemitische Feindseligkeit, Fremdenfeindlichkeit, antisemitisch geprägte Kulturangst und unspezifische Feindseligkeit. Mittels multinomialer logistischer Regression konnte gezeigt werden, dass die Kontakthäufigkeit mit der Gruppe nicht antisemitisch geprägte Kulturangst zusammenhängt. Personen mit feindseligen Einstellungen stellen keine homogene Gruppe dar. Antisemitismus und Kulturangst sind bei der Unterscheidung der Gruppen zentral, wobei Antisemitismus ein eigenständiges Phänomen ist.
Abstract: The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (Claims Conference) commissioned Schoen Cooperman Research to conduct a comprehensive national study of Holocaust Knowledge and Awareness in the Netherlands.
Schoen Cooperman Research conducted 2,000 interviews across the Netherlands. The margin of error for the study is 2 percent. This memo presents our key research findings and compares these findings with prior Claims Conference studies, which were conducted in five other countries.
Our latest study finds significant gaps in Holocaust knowledge and awareness in the Netherlands, as well as widespread concern that Holocaust denial and Holocaust distortion are problems in the Netherlands today.
We found that 23 percent of Dutch Millennials and Gen Z respondents believe the Holocaust is a myth, or that it occurred but the number of Jews who died has been greatly exaggerated – the highest percentage among Millennials and Gen Z respondents in all six countries the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against
Germany has previously studied.
Further, 29 percent of Dutch respondents, including 37 percent of Dutch Millennials and Gen Z respondents believe that two million or fewer Jews were killed during the Holocaust. Moreover, despite the fact that more than 70 percent of the Netherlands’ Jewish population perished during the Holocaust, a majority of Dutch respondents (53
percent), including 60 percent of Dutch Millennials and Gen Z, do not cite the Netherlands as a country where the Holocaust took place. Finally, 53 percent of Dutch respondents believe that something like the Holocaust
could happen again today.
Abstract: Aktuell wird in Deutschland vermehrt über die Verbreitung von antisemitischen Vorurteilen sowie die Entwicklung der Anzahl registrierter Straftaten und Gewaltvorfälle mit antisemitischem Hintergrund diskutiert. Die Daten des Hellfelds der polizeilich registrierten, politisch motivierten Kriminalität (PMK) verweisen insofern auf Anstiege registrierter, antisemitisch motivierter Straftaten. Opferberatungsstellen berichten gleichfalls über Zunahmen der Meldungen betroffener Opfer. Seitens des zuständigen Bundesinnenministeriums wird insoweit auch der Antisemitismus bei in Deutschland lebenden Menschen mit muslimischer Religionszugehörigkeit besonders in den Blick genommen. Differenzierte Analysen, die über das registrierte Hellfeld hinaus die Frage einer besonderen Belastung von Migrant:innen oder Muslim:innen mit Blick auf die Verbreitung entsprechender Einstellungen untersucht haben, sind bislang allerdings nur begrenzt verfügbar. Die Klärung dieser Frage erscheint sowohl für die Konzeption zielgerichtete Formen der Prävention als auch für die Gestaltung politisch-rechtlicher Interventionen zur Reduzierung von Antisemitismus in Deutschland relevant. Im folgenden Artikel wird auf Grundlage der Daten einer im Jahr 2022 durchgeführten bundesweit repräsentativen Befragung mit n=4 319 Personen untersucht, wie verbreitet unterschiedliche Formen antisemitischer Vorurteile in Deutschland sind. Der Umstand, dass diese Erhebung große Oversamples muslimischer Migrant:innen einerseits sowie nichtmuslimischer Migrant:innen anderseits enthält, wird genutzt, um auf einer breiten Datenbasis auch die Frage zu verfolgen, inwieweit migrationsspezifische Hintergründe für Antisemitismus erkennbar sind bzw. ob diesbezüglich religionsbezogene Besonderheiten mit Blick auf Menschen muslimischen Glaubens bestehen. Die Ergebnisse verweisen darauf, dass – auch nach statistischer Kontrolle der Effekte soziodemografischer Merkmalen sowie von Diskriminierungs- und Marginalisierungserfahrungen – unter in Deutschland lebenden Muslim:innen signifikant erhöhte Raten antisemitischer Einstellungen festzustellen sind. Es sind allerdings ganz erhebliche Binnendifferenzen zu beachten. Es sind vier gut unterscheidbare religiöse Orientierungsmuster bei Muslim:innen identifizierbar, für die sich im Hinblick auf das Ausmaß antisemitischer Einstellungen große Unterschiede zeigen. Implikationen dieser Befunde für die Politik sowie für die Praxis der Prävention von Antisemitismus werden erörtert.
Abstract: This study examines the extent of antisemitic bias in German higher education through a survey experiment conducted among students (N=1,416) at an average-sized German university in the fall of 2024/2025. Using a between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to evaluate English academic writing courses taught by fictitious instructors whose profiles varied by gender and ethnic/religious background—categorized as German, Israeli, and Jewish. Instructors were rated on sympathy and competence using a 7-point scale. While no significant differences emerged for competence ratings, results reveal notable bias in sympathy ratings: instructors identified as Jewish, particularly male Jewish instructors, received significantly lower ratings compared to their German counterparts. Instructors from Israel without a visible Jewish symbol were not rated significantly differently. There was also a gender bias, as female instructors with a German profile were rated less favorably than male instructors. Interestingly, the anti-Jewish bias was predominantly driven by female student raters, whereas male students primarily exhibited gender bias without significant antisemitic tendencies. These findings suggest that antisemitic motives, rather than anti-Israel sentiment, underlie the negative evaluations observed in this academic setting, and highlight the complex interplay between ethnic/religious prejudice and gender bias.
Abstract: Reports have indicated an increase in anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitic incidents following the Hamas terrorist attack in Israel on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war in Gaza. In two studies (NStudy1 = 354 and NStudy2 = 490), we experimentally investigated the impact of priming with material referring to the war in Gaza on hostility toward Jews, and on antisemitism as well as other various ethnic groups (to determine whether this exposure specifically affected attitudes toward Jews or had a broader impact on ethnic attitudes in general). We also examined the indirect relationship between political orientation and anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism, through sociopolitical factors such as global identification, out-group identity fusion, social dominance orientation, and misanthropy. Our results showed an experimental effect of increased negative attitudes toward Jews, as well as toward Britons and Scandinavians, but did not reveal an increase in antisemitism. This effect was not replicated in Study 2, possibly due to reduced media attention. The indirect effects suggested that political orientation (left vs. right-wing) was positively associated with anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism through social dominance orientation. In contrast, conservative political orientation was negatively associated with antisemitism through out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people. Our findings imply two distinct political pathways to antisemitism: one linked with classical political right-wing orientation and the other to a complex identity-based conflation of attitudes toward Israel with prejudice toward the Jewish ethnic group.
Abstract: For many people, the coronavirus pandemic meant an enormous and existential loss of control. At the same time, an increase in right-wing extremist attitudes like xenophobia could be observed in Germany. In this study, we hypothesize that the loss of control caused by the pandemic has contributed to the rise in xenophobic and anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany. We propose that this occurs through an attempt to restore control via elements of a revised authoritarian syndrome understood as both the classic authoritarian dynamic of aggression, submission and conventionalism on the one hand, and a general belief in conspiracy theories on the other. In a representative, probability-based study, N = 2522 participants were surveyed on locus of control, right-wing authoritarianism, conspiracy mentality, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. It was found that right-wing authoritarianism and conspiracy mentality mediated the relationship between external locus of control and xenophobia (partial mediation) and anti-Semitism (full mediation). Surprisingly, internal control beliefs had a direct effect on right-wing authoritarianism—an effect that also leads to increased resentment. We conclude that social crises make people particularly vulnerable to regaining control via conspiracy theories and authoritarianism, which harbors dangers such as right-wing extremism as a consequence. Limitations are discussed.
Abstract: Since the unification of the two German states in 1990, antisemitic attitudes have been repeatedly polled in cross-sectional or longitudinal national surveys (e.g., the long-term GFE surveys). So far, comparative studies analyzing the development of antisemitism in East and West Germany over a longer time period are scarce. The study covers a time span of 30 years to investigate two forms of antisemitism (classical and secondary), especially with respect to inner-German differences. Applying model-based age-period-cohort analyses (APC) with a total of 19 available representative surveys (maximal period: 1991–2021), theory-driven hypotheses are tested. The statistical approach and respective findings are discussed with emphasis on several challenges accompanying the utilized heterogenous data and different survey modes. Findings reveal that life-cycle effects play a decisive role in the attitudinal development and distribution of antisemitic attitudes. Moreover, approval of antisemitism is to some extent cohort related in both East and West Germany, while disentangling period effects empirically poses challenges due to data limitations. Furthermore, the observed APC structures differ for classical and secondary antisemitism. The chapter concludes with a critical discussion of the results, limitations, and some further thoughts on the open science philosophy in applied social science research.
Abstract: In Germany, pro-Palestine protests in the form of camps and institute occupations have occurred and continue to take place at universities. Antisemitic incidents have been reported at many of these protests. Following the initial data collection in December 2023, this report provides a new, focused, up-to-date assessment of the opinion climate in the context of the Middle East conflict and antisemitic attitudes at German universities. Exactly one year after the first report, the results of two recent surveys by the Higher Education Research Unit (AG Hochschulforschung) are summarized here. First, based on a large online survey conducted in December 2024 with over 1,800 students, we report on these students’ assessments of the conflict and antisemitic tendencies among them. This follows
on directly from the previous study mentioned earlier (Hinz et al., 2024), enabling us to describe possible changes compared to last year. In some places, we also examine the assessments and attitudes of students compared to a sample from the general population. Second, we present the results of a simultaneous survey of university rectorates on antisemitic incidents and the universities' reactions to these incidents. At the invitation of the German Rectors’ Conference (HRK), a total of 94 university management teams took part in this separate online survey.
The results indicate that universities have been strongly affected by antisemitic incidents and that antisemitic resentment remains at a constant level. A high level of vigilance is still required, particularly
with regards to Israel-related antisemitism
Abstract: What drives antisemitic hostility in the 21st century? Competing theoretical frameworks provide different answers: the generalist framework views antisemitism as a manifestation of general outgroup hostility common to various
forms of prejudice, while the particularist framework posits that antisemitism today is distinctively linked to antizionist sentiment—enmity toward Zionism, Israel, and its supporters. This study evaluates these frameworks through a comparative, longitudinal case study of antisemitic hostility in Germany, Sweden, and Russia (1990–2020), using a mixed-methods approach to integrate incident counts, victimization surveys, media analysis, and expert interviews. Findings suggest that the particularist framework better explains observed patterns of variation in antisemitic hostility, with flare-ups in the Middle East conflict generating or catalyzing antisemitic hostility in other societies depending on the strength of local antizionist sentiment. The results support new directions
in prejudice research that differentiate between generalized and group-specific forms of hostility, where the latter are highly context-dependent.
Abstract: On October 7, 2023, a Hamas-led terrorist attack in Israel killed 1,200 Israelis and kidnapped about 250 others. The almost immediate spread of news and images of the attack produced heavy emotional reactions in public opinion in many countries. The article analyzes data from a representative survey on the attitudes toward Jews and Muslims of Italian undergraduates conducted between late September and late October 2023, encompassing both those dramatic events and the war that followed. Four main findings emerge. First, Italian students tend to organize attitudes towards Jews around three main dimensions, those toward Muslims around one. Second, attitudes towards the two groups vary according to cultural values of reference, commitment to study, and political orientation. Third, negative attitudes towards Muslims are more prevalent than those toward Jews, but this difference narrows between center-left and left-leaning students and, in some cases, reverses. Finally, the analysis shows that one of the dimensions organizing unfavourable attitudes towards Jews experienced very substantial growth on the days immediately following October 7, that is, the date of the Hamas terrorist attack inside Israeli territory.
Topics: Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Attitude Surveys, Antisemitism: Christian, Antisemitism: Definitions, Antisemitism: Discourse and Tropes, Antisemitism: Education against, Antisemitism: Right-Wing, Antisemitism: Left-Wing, Antisemitism: Incident Monitoring, Antisemitism: Muslim, Antisemitism: New Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Online, Internet, Antisemitism: Jewish Perceptions and Experiences, Attitudes to Jews, Anti-Zionism, Israel Criticism, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Methodology, Social Media
Abstract: This open access book is the first comprehensive guide to identifying antisemitism online today, in both its explicit and implicit (or coded) forms. Developed through years of on-the-ground analysis of over 100,000 authentic comments posted by social media users in the UK, France, Germany and beyond, the book introduces and explains the central historical, conceptual and linguistic-semiotic elements of 46 antisemitic concepts, stereotypes and speech acts. The guide was assembled by researchers working on the Decoding Antisemitism project at the Centre for Research on Antisemitism at Technische Universität Berlin, building on existing basic definitions of antisemitism, and drawing on expertise in various fields. Using authentic examples taken from social media over the past four years, it sets out a pioneering step-by-step approach to identifying and categorising antisemitic content, providing guidance on how to recognise a statement as antisemitic or not. This book will be an invaluable tool through which researchers, students, practitioners and social media moderators can learn to recognise contemporary antisemitism online – and the structural aspects of hate speech more generally – in all its breadth and diversity.
Topics: Antisemitism: Attitude Surveys, Antisemitism: Incident Monitoring, Antisemitism: Online, Antisemitism: Left-Wing, Antisemitism: Muslim, Antisemitism: Discourse and Tropes, Israel Criticism, Anti-Zionism, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Policy, October 7 2023 attacks + aftermath
Abstract: In this policy paper:
How have levels of antisemitism in the UK and across Europe changed since the October 7 attack on Israel and the war in Gaza? Using the most recent survey data from July 2024, this policy paper demonstrates how the antisemitic incident reporting figures most commonly quoted significantly underestimate the number of incidents happening in reality. The paper also introduces the concept of ‘ambient antisemitism’ – Jews experiencing antisemitism that isn’t personally directed at them –looking at how the context in which Jews are living today affects their perceptions of antisemitism. It also explores the general population’s attitudes to Jews and Israel before and after October 7, 2023.
The paper concludes that better research methods are required to accurately assess the general population’s attitudes to Jews and Israel and Jewish people’s perceptions and experiences of antisemitism. It points to a critical gap in research compared with the EU and calls on the UK Government and philanthropic community to plug it as a matter of urgency.
Some of the key findings in this policy paper:
Reports of antisemitic incidents increased dramatically in the months following the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7 in multiple European countries.
Survey data demonstrate that the number of antisemitic incidents being recorded by the police and community monitoring agencies vastly underestimates the amount of antisemitism taking place.
An evident rise in antisemitism since October 7 has had a significant impact on Jewish people’s feelings of safety and security in the UK and across Europe.
The degree to which the Hamas attacks on October 7 were marked by open celebration and affirmation of violence reveals a level of antisemitic hate that exists within parts of Western Europe that poses a severe threat to Jews living on the continent.
A culture of ‘ambient antisemitism’ has emerged in the post-October 7 period, marked by incidents such as defacing or tearing down posters of Israeli hostages, that, whether strictly antisemitic or not, create a broader milieu that feels threatening and hostile to many Jewish people.
Inaccurate and irresponsible media reporting can lead directly to an increase in antisemitism, although more research is required to understand how and when this occurs.
There has been a significant increase in sympathy for the Palestinians among young people and those on the political left since October 7; levels of sympathy for Israel are much lower, even in the very immediate aftermath of the Hamas attacks.
The lack of sympathy for Israel is likely to lead to many Jews feeling a greater sense of alienation from the societies in which they live over time.
Given the apparent levels of concern among Jews today, much more needs to be done to invest in a robust and systematic approach to measuring antisemitism in society and its effects on Jews as part of a serious strategy to combat it going forward. This is particularly the case in the UK, which has fallen far behind the EU since leaving the European Union in this respect.
Abstract: La ricerca rientra nel progetto PCTO sull’antisemitismo a cui hanno aderito 84 studenti di tre scuole superiori della Regione Lazio, due licei e un istituto d’istruzione superiore, insieme a Progetto Memoria e alla Fondazione CDEC per l’anno scolastico 2022-2023.
Studenti e studentesse delle classi terze e quarte, insieme ai docenti referenti hanno coinvolto Progetto Memoria quale tutor esterno (Sandra Terracina) e due dipartimenti della Fondazione CDEC (Betti Guetta, Stefano Gatti e Murilo Cambruzzi per l’Osservatorio antisemitismo; Patrizia Baldi per la Didattica) per sviluppare il progetto, ricevere formazione, essere coadiuvati nell’analisi e nella riflessione su stereotipi e pregiudizi, in particolare sugli ebrei. Tra gli obiettivi del progetto, la promozione di un processo conoscitivo sulle cause e sulle dinamiche dell’antisemitismo, indirizzato a far emergere comportamenti e atteggiamenti diffusi nella società, al fine di orientare ai valori di una collettività democratica e inclusiva, partendo dalla fotografia realizzata dall’indagine delle Fondazione CDEC. L’apprendimento di carattere storico, sociologico, psicosociale e statistico ha permesso agli studenti di sviluppare le attività a loro affidate. Sono stati stimolati a confrontarsi con figure esterne al mondo della scuola e a gestire, nelle varie fasi del progetto, dinamiche tra pari. Il lavoro di formazione e di tutoraggio si è tenuto in modalità ibrida.
Gli studenti coinvolti nel progetto di formazione hanno compilato un questionario (già utilizzato nell’anno scolastico precedente) finalizzato a valutare il grado di conoscenza degli ebrei e la presenza di pregiudizi e stereotipi nei loro confronti.
Il questionario è composto da 13 domande chiuse ed è stato somministrato tramite Google Forms, tra l’aprile e il maggio 2023, dagli studenti dei tre istituti che hanno partecipato alla seconda edizione del PCTO “Progetto sull’antisemitismo”.
La scelta metodologica è stata quella di coinvolgere nell’indagine i ragazzi del primo anno delle superiori e quelli dell’ultimo anno per cercare di valutare se il percorso scolastico (lungo 5 anni) possa avere un effetto sulla conoscenza degli ebrei e la condivisione di pregiudizi antisemiti.
In totale sono stati compilati 673 questionari 481 al liceo A (71.5%) e 29 al liceo B (4.3%), e 163 all’istituto d’istruzione superiore (24.2%). Il 73% degli studenti è iscritto al percorso scientifico e il 24% al tecnico, gli altri 3% si dividono tra il linguistico e il classico. Il 46 % degli studenti frequenta il primo anno e il 54 % il quinto. Il 45% ha dichiarato di appartenere al genere femminile e il 51% al maschile, il 4% rimanente non ha voluto indicarlo o ha indicato altro.
Abstract: Les différentes réalités de l’antisémitisme sont enfin objectivées.
L’Institut Jonathas présente les résultats du premier sondage réalisé en Belgique sur la perception des Juifs, de l’antisémitisme, des autres minorités et de la guerre en cours à Gaza et en Israël.
Créé en mars 2024, l’Institut Jonathas est un centre d’études et d’action contre l’antisémitisme et contre tout ce qui le favorise en Belgique. Il a demandé à IPSOS d’objectiver et de mesurer, à la veille des élections du 9 juin, les opinions des Belges sur des sujets qui sont au cœur de sa raison d’être.
IPSOS a interrogé, du 8 au 12 mai, un échantillon de 1.000 personnes, représentatif de la population belge de 18 ans et plus, avec le même panel et la même méthodologie que pour les sondages politiques.
En l’absence de sondages pouvant tenir lieu de points de comparaison en Belgique, plusieurs questions ont été reprises de sondages récents menés en France par IPSOS ou par IFOP. Les résultats français sont indiqués ci-après, lorsque la comparaison avec les résultats belges est pertinente.
Le sondage réalisé par IPSOS pour l’Institut Jonathas met en lumière et objective les différentes facettes de l’image des Juifs et de l’antisémitisme dans la société belge :
Une image très moyenne des Juifs, 80 ans après la Shoah.
Des marqueurs d’antisémitisme primaire prégnants dans toutes les composantes de la société belge et sur-représentés à l’extrême-gauche, à l’extrême-droite et chez les musulmans
En plus de ces préjugés « traditionnels » (argent, pouvoir, religion…), des marqueurs d’antisémitisme dit « secondaire », aboutissant à banaliser la Shoah et à nazifier Israël
Une méconnaissance générale des Juifs, du judaïsme et de la réalité de l’antisémitisme en Belgique
Trois premières sources d’antisémitisme en Belgique, selon les Belges : l’hostilité à Israël, l’islamisme radical et les préjugés sur les Juifs
Un écho limité chez les Belges des sujets relatifs à Israël, à la Palestine et à la guerre, à l’exception d’une minorité dont certains éléments souhaitent la destruction de l’Etat d’Israël
Distance ou indifférence d’environ 50% des Belges vis-à-vis de la guerre entre Israël et le Hamas, mais aussi polarisation sur ce conflit de segments précis de la population belge.
La guerre, source d’inquiétude pour les Juifs en Belgique selon la majorité des Belges, mais aussi matière à hostilité contre les Juifs en Belgique pour une minorité de Belges
Un antisémitisme s’inscrivant dans une société belge plutôt tendue et inquiète concernant ses relations avec les différents groupes minoritaires et, en particulier, les musulmans et les Maghrébins.
