Abstract: This paper, intended as a contribution to transnational memory studies, analyzes museums devoted to people who helped Jews during the Holocaust that recently opened in Bulgaria, France, Germany, Lithuania, and Poland. The author’s particular interest lies in the “traveling motifs” of the “Righteous” narratives. This category encompasses symbols such as a list of names of the help-providers, a fruit tree/orchard, or a wall with photographs of Holocaust victims, which recur in many of the examined exhibitions and are a clear reference to Yad Vashem and other well-established Holocaust memorials. At first sight, they seem to point to a “cosmopolitanization” of Holocaust remembrance and to the emergence of a common reservoir of historical notions and images. However, on closer inspection one discovers that the use of these symbols varies and that they refer to differing ways of understanding and telling history.
Abstract: Drawing on ethnographic and interview-based research in six cities (Berlin and Frankfurt in Germany, London and Manchester in the UK and Paris and Strasbourg in France), this article explores intercultural, interethnic and interreligious encounter as exemplified by Jewish-Muslim interaction. We look at three sites across the cities: “staged” encounters which take place in formal interfaith and municipal settings, and “unstaged” encounters in public and commercial spaces, both often relying on the role of key “entrepreneurs of encounter”, who tend to occupy liminal or marginal spaces in relation to their ascribed identities. We show that the texture and the possibilities (and sometimes impossibility) of encounters are structured intersectionally (crucially by class and by generation), and shaped by patterns of insecurity and securitisation and by different available discursive repertoires and cognitive frames (produced at supra-national, national, local and micro-local levels – e.g. Israel/Palestine politics, laïcité or communitarianism, city narratives and neighbourhood identities respectively). Although insecurity, securitisation, policy panic and geopolitical pressures can block meaningful encounter, emerging transdiasporic cultural formations point towards some fragile resources for hope.
Topics: Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Attitude Surveys, Antisemitism: Christian, Antisemitism: Definitions, Antisemitism: Discourse, Antisemitism: Education against, Antisemitism: Far right, Antisemitism: Left-Wing, Antisemitism: Monitoring, Antisemitism: Muslim, Antisemitism: New Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Online, Internet, Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism, Attitudes to Jews, Anti-Zionism, Israel Criticism, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Methodology, Social Media
Abstract: This open access book is the first comprehensive guide to identifying antisemitism online today, in both its explicit and implicit (or coded) forms. Developed through years of on-the-ground analysis of over 100,000 authentic comments posted by social media users in the UK, France, Germany and beyond, the book introduces and explains the central historical, conceptual and linguistic-semiotic elements of 46 antisemitic concepts, stereotypes and speech acts. The guide was assembled by researchers working on the Decoding Antisemitism project at the Centre for Research on Antisemitism at Technische Universität Berlin, building on existing basic definitions of antisemitism, and drawing on expertise in various fields. Using authentic examples taken from social media over the past four years, it sets out a pioneering step-by-step approach to identifying and categorising antisemitic content, providing guidance on how to recognise a statement as antisemitic or not. This book will be an invaluable tool through which researchers, students, practitioners and social media moderators can learn to recognise contemporary antisemitism online – and the structural aspects of hate speech more generally – in all its breadth and diversity.
Abstract: The Sixth Survey of European Jewish Community Leaders and Professionals, 2024, presents the results of an online survey offered in 10 languages and administered to 879 respondents in 31 countries. Conducted every three years using the same format, the survey seeks to identify trends and their evolution over time.
The 2024 survey came during a historically fraught moment for the Jewish people globally. The impact of the horrific October 7th attacks and the subsequent war in Israel cannot be understated. How is this affecting Jewish leadership and Jewish communal life? Therefore, in addition to the regular topics covered by the survey (community priorities, threats, security concerns, attitudes towards Europe and Israel), this edition included a special section designed to understand the impact of October 7th on Jewish life in Europe.
That October 7th has profoundly affected Jewish Europe is evident across multiple sections throughout the survey. Concern about antisemitism and the threat of physical attack has intensified. A large majority of 78% feel less safe living as Jews in their cities than they did before the Hamas attack, and respondents are more cautious about how they identify themselves as Jews. They are also more distant from their wider environments, with 38% reporting they have become more distant from non-Jewish friends.
The respondents were comprised of presidents and chairpersons of nationwide “umbrella organizations” or Federations; presidents and executive directors of private Jewish foundations, charities, and other privately funded initiatives; presidents and main representatives of Jewish communities that are organized at a city level; executive directors and programme coordinators, as well as current and former board members of Jewish organizations; among others
Abstract: FRA’s third survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU reveals their experiences and perceptions of antisemitism, and shows the obstacles they face in living an openly Jewish life.
The survey pre-dates the Hamas attacks on 7 October 2023 and Israel’s military response in Gaza. But the report includes information about antisemitism collected from 12 Jewish community organisations more recently. Jewish people have experienced more antisemitic incidents since October 2023, with some organisations reporting an increase of more than 400%.
The survey results point to:
Rising antisemitism: 80% of respondents feel that antisemitism has grown in their country in the five years before the survey.
High levels of antisemitism online: 90% of respondents encountered antisemitism online in the year before the survey.
Antisemitism in the public sphere: in the year before the survey, 56% of respondents encountered offline antisemitism from people they know and 51% in the media.
Harassment: 37% say they were harassed because they are Jewish in the year before the survey. Most of them experienced harassment multiple times. Antisemitic harassment and violence mostly take place in streets, parks, or shops.
Safety and security concerns: Most respondents continue to worry for their own (53%) and their family’s (60%) safety and security. Over the years, FRA research has shown that antisemitism tends to increase in times of tension in the Middle East. In this survey, 75% feel that people hold them responsible for the Israeli government’s actions because they are Jewish.
Hidden lives: 76% hide their Jewish identity at least occasionally and 34% avoid Jewish events or sites because they do not feel safe. As a reaction to online antisemitism, 24% avoid posting content that would identify them as Jewish, 23% say that they limited their participation in online discussions, and 16% reduced their use of certain platforms, websites or services.
The EU and its Member States have put in place measures against antisemitism, which have led to some progress. These include the EU’s first ever strategy on combating antisemitism and action plans in some EU countries. The report suggests concrete ways for building on that progress:
Monitoring and adequately funding antisemitism strategies and action plans: This includes adopting plans in those EU countries which do not have them and developing indicators to monitor progress.
Securing the safety and security of Jewish communities: Countries need to invest more in protecting Jewish people, working closely with the affected communities.
Tackling antisemitism online: Online platforms need to address and remove antisemitic content online, to adhere tothe EU’s Digital Services Act. They also need to better investigate and prosecute illegal antisemitic content online.
Encouraging reporting and improving recording of antisemitism: National authorities should step up efforts to raise rights awareness among Jews, encourage them to report antisemitic incidents and improve the recording of such incidents. Greater use of third-party and anonymous reporting could help.
The survey covers Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden where around 96% of the EU’s estimated Jewish population live. Almost 8,000 Jews aged 16 or over took part in the online survey from January to June 2023. This is the third survey of its kind, following those of 2013 and 2018.
Abstract: The proliferation of hateful and violent speech in online media underscores the need for technological support to combat such discourse, create safer and more inclusive online environments, support content moderation and study political-discourse dynamics online. Automated detection of antisemitic content has been little explored compared to other forms of hate-speech. This chapter examines the automated detection of antisemitic speech in online and social media using a corpus of online comments sourced from various online and social media platforms. The corpus spans a three-year period and encompasses diverse discourse events that were deemed likely to provoke antisemitic reactions. We adopt two approaches. First, we explore the efficacy of Perspective API, a popular content- moderation tool that rates texts in terms of, e.g., toxicity or identity-related attacks, in scoring antisemitic content as toxic. We find that the tool rates a high proportion of antisemitic texts with very low toxicity scores, indicating a potential blind spot for such content. Additionally, Perspective API demonstrates a keyword bias towards words related to Jewish identities, which could result in texts being falsely flagged and removed from platforms. Second, we fine-tune deep learning models to detect antisemitic texts. We show that OpenAI’s GPT-3.5 can be fine-tuned to effectively detect antisemitic speech in our corpus and beyond, with F1 scores above 0.7. We discuss current achievements in this area and point out directions for future work, such as the utilisation of prompt-based models.
Abstract: Antisemitism often takes implicit forms on social media, therefore making it difficult to detect. In many cases, context is essential to recognise and understand the antisemitic meaning of an utterance (Becker et al. 2021, Becker and Troschke 2023, Jikeli et al. 2022a). Previous quantitative work on antisemitism online has focused on independent comments obtained through keyword search (e.g. Jikeli et al. 2019, Jikeli et al. 2022b), ignoring the discussions in which they occurred. Moreover, on social media, discussions are rarely linear. Web users have the possibility to comment on the original post and start a conversation or to reply to earlier web user comments. This chapter proposes to consider the structure of the comment trees constructed in the online discussion, instead of single comments individually, in an attempt to include context in the study of antisemitism online. This analysis is based on a corpus of 25,412 trees, consisting of 76,075 Facebook comments. The corpus is built from web comments reacting to posts published by mainstream news outlets in three countries: France, Germany, and the UK. The posts are organised into 16 discourse events, which have a high potential for triggering antisemitic comments. The analysis of the data help verify whether (1) antisemitic comments come together (are grouped under the same trees), (2) the structure of trees (lengths, number of branches) is significant in the emergence of antisemitism, (3) variations can be found as a function of the countries and the discourse events. This study presents an original way to look at social media data, which has potential for helping identify and moderate antisemitism online. It specifically can advance research in machine learning by allowing to look at larger segments of text, which is essential for reliable results in artificial intelligence methodology. Finally, it enriches our understanding of social interactions online in general, and hate speech online in particular.
Abstract: Social media platforms and the interactive web have had a significant impact on political socialisation, creating new pathways of community-building that shifted the focus from real-life, localised networks (such as unions or neighbourhood associations) to vast, diffuse and globalised communities (Finin et al. 2008, Rainie and Wellman 2012, Olson 2014, Miller 2017). Celebrities or influencers are often focal nodes for the spread of information and opinions across these new types of networks in the digital space (see Hutchins and Tindall 2021). Unfortunately, this means that celebrities’ endorsement of extremist discourse or narratives can potently drive the dissemination and normalisation of hate ideologies.
This paper sets out to analyse the reaction of French social media audiences to antisemitism controversies involving pop culture celebrities. I will focus on two such episodes, one with a ‘national’ celebrity at its centre and the other a ‘global’ celebrity: the social media ban of the French-Cameroonian comedian Dieudonné M’bala M’bala in June–July 2020 and the controversy following US rapper Kanye West’s spate of antisemitic statements in October–November 2022. The empirical corpus comprises over 4,000 user comments on Facebook, YouTube and Twitter (now X). My methodological approach is two-pronged: a preliminary mapping of the text through content analysis is followed by a qualitative Critical Discourse Analysis that examines linguistic strategies and discursive constructions employed by social media users to legitimise antisemitic worldviews. We lay particular emphasis on the manner in which memes, dog-whistling or coded language (such as allusions or inside jokes popular within certain communities or fandoms) are used not only to convey antisemitic meaning covertly but also to build a specific form of counter-cultural solidarity. This solidarity expresses itself in the form of “ deviant communities” (see Proust et al. 2020) based on the performative and deliberate transgression of societal taboos and norms.
Abstract: Rising antisemitism in the twenty-first century has alarmed Jewish communities and the general public, but antisemitic hate crime victimization remains understudied outside the US context. This study primarily relies on a comprehensive survey of 16,400 Jews across twelve European countries, supplemented with data from additional sources, to assess individual and country-level predictors of Jews’ experiences and fears of antisemitic harassment and violence. Multilevel models indicate that young age, perceived discrimination, identity visibility, and identification with Israel are pronounced individual risk factors for victimization. On the country level, negative opinion of Israel and Muslim population share predict victimization, highlighting the role of a “new” or Israel-derived antisemitism in the twenty-first century. The factors most strongly associated with fear are young age, previous victimization, perceptions of an ambient antisemitic threat, and recent occurrence of fatal antisemitic violence. Overall, the findings underscore the importance of integrating general theory on hate crime and victimization with context-specific factors when seeking to understand the experiences of targeted groups.
Abstract: Contre toute attente, l’antisémitisme est redevenu un phénomène politique et social d’actualité en France. Au-delà d’une simple persistance de préjugés anciens, il s’incarne depuis la fin de la guerre de 1939-1945 dans une expansion sans précédent des violences antijuives, allant des insultes jusqu’au meurtre. Sa reviviscence dans l’une des plus vieilles nations démocratiques d’Europe est le signe d’un malaise social et politique qui reste à interpréter. Quels sont les lieux, les milieux et les significations de cette animosité haineuse ? Doit-on y voir l’effet de la persistance de l’ancien ? d’un déplacement ? de la recomposition de formes inédites, portées par des acteurs nouveaux, dans un contexte pourtant gagné aux principes démocratiques ?
Alors même que l’ampleur du phénomène est de nature à mobiliser les sciences sociales pour l’élucider et aider à le combattre, cet antisémitisme s’est accompagné d’un certain déni : longtemps minimisé dans les médias, il peine à être reconnu dans le monde judiciaire et reste peu exploré par les sciences sociales. Cet ouvrage entend donc contribuer à l’analyse rigoureuse du phénomène, en proposant à la réflexion les textes d’historiens, de philosophes, de sociologues et de politistes.
Abstract: French students in the third and final year from the Humanities and Social Sciences license degree course traveled to Ukraine and Belorussia between 2017 and 2020, in order to carry out surveys of eyewitnesses to the so-called “Holocaust by Bullets.” The subject-matter stands out in the French scholarly scene, as the Holocaust usually attracts little attention at this level of studies. Students registered in the course hail from license degrees in History, Social Sciences or Geography, and have chosen to attend the course labeled “European Historical Heritage and Citizens’ Thoughts” as a complement to a more classical curriculum, and as a way of enhancing their own university curriculum. The research professors involved have also volunteered to participate as authors of the aforementioned multidisciplinary program, with the aim to raise awareness to research practices on the Holocaust. University professors and teams from the Yahad-in-Unum NGO take turns leading the two-hour weekly sessions. The professors help establish theoretical focus and provide methodological tools, develop lines of investigation on various areas of interest (e.g., mode of operation used in the shootings, collaboration and rescue operations, and neighbors of the crime scene), as well as the context (anti-Semitism, racism, local geopolitics, regional history, culture and society, etc.), while Yahad-in-Unum participants describe actual cases based on records, maps and filmed testimonies. They had the task to provide documents from Soviet and Nazi archives translated from Russian, or from German, and act as translators during fieldwork. Students are encouraged to participate as often as possible and have to prepare analytical reports and presentations following each session, while adopting the position of a researcher.
Abstract: Depuis 2012, l’histoire de la mémoire du génocide des Juifs est étudiée en terminale (série L, ES) dans le cadre du chapitre portant sur « L’historien et les mémoires de la Seconde Guerre mondiale ». Si les enseignants sont sollicités chaque année à l’occasion de journées commémoratives pour transmettre à leurs élèves la mémoire de la Shoah, porteuse d’un enjeu civique, l’introduction dans les programmes de ce sujet d’histoire relève d’une ambition pédagogique qui doit nécessairement s’articuler à la recherche scientifique. Dans cette perspective, cet article fait le point sur les récentes avancées historiographiques concernant l’histoire de la mémoire du génocide des Juifs en France qui permettent d’affiner un découpage chronologique que plusieurs manuels scolaires présentent de façon caricaturale. Il convient ainsi de remplacer le schéma narratif classique polarisé autour de « oubli/mémoire/temps du devoir de mémoire » par une périodisation qui prend en compte les traces -éparses mais significatives- de la mémoire du génocide dans la société française dès les années 1950, ce qui relativise fortement la thèse de son oubli. Les années 1970 et surtout 1980 sont marquées par des mises en récit publiques du génocide qui le situent dans un horizon commun de plus en plus partagé en le référant à des enjeux contemporains (lutte contre le négationnisme et l’antisémitisme, lutte contre l’extrême droite, reconnaissance et réparations dues aux victimes, reconnaissance officielle de la participation active de Vichy, exercice de la justice pour les crimes contre l’humanité). La prise en compte de cette mémoire dans les années 1990 par un État qui reconnait sa responsabilité historique dans le crime génocidaire entraîne de nombreuses actions publiques qui se déclinent sous différentes formes (commémorations, mémoriaux, voyages scolaires). L’Ecole est alors mobilisée comme un acteur privilégié de la transmission de cette mémoire qui est investie d’enjeux éducatifs fondés sur la promotion des valeurs des droits de l’homme et du vivre ensemble.
Abstract: Several decades on from Tommie Smith and John Carlos’s iconic Black Power salute at the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City, sociologists such as Douglas Hartmann and Ben Carrington argue that contemporary debates about sport, race, and protest are becoming ever more complicated. Within this context, the quenelle salute given by footballer Nicolas Anelka whilst playing for West Bromwich Albion in December 2013 merits analysis. The controversial and complicated gesture led to disciplinary action from the Football Association and his club, and ultimately to the end of his playing career. Due to its association with controversial French comedian Dieudonné, the quenelle is widely seen as anti-Semitic, although some argue that it is merely anti-system. Despite this potential ambiguity, it will be shown that the quenelle remains a protest gesture. In order to interpret Anelka’s actions, it is important to examine the quenelle’s roots and when he performed the gesture. Such analysis needs to be placed within the context of contemporary footballers’ engagement (or lack of engagement) with socio-political issues, and provides a means of assessing the relationship between football, politics, and protest in contemporary Europe.
Abstract: The Annual Antisemitism Worldwide Report, published by Tel Aviv University (TAU) and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), reveals that 2023 saw an increase of dozens of percentage points in the number of antisemitic incidents in Western countries in comparison to 2022. A particularly steep increase was recorded following the October 7 attacks, but the first nine months of 2023, before the war started, also witnessed a relative increase in the number of incidents in most countries with large Jewish minorities, including the United States, France, the UK, Australia, Italy, Brazil, and Mexico.
According to the Report, in New York, the city with the largest Jewish population in the world, NYPD recorded 325 anti-Jewish hate crimes in 2023 in comparison to the 261 it recorded in 2022, LAPD recorded 165 in comparison to 86, and CPD 50 in comparison to 39. The ADL recorded 7,523 incidents in 2023 compared to 3,697 in 2022 (and according to a broader definition applied, it recorded 8,873); the number of assaults increased from 111 in 2022 to 161 in 2023 and of vandalism from 1,288 to 2,106.
Other countries also saw dramatic increases in the number of antisemitic attacks, according to data collected by the Report from governmental agencies, law enforcement authorities, Jewish organizations, media, and fieldwork.
In France, the number of incidents increased from 436 in 2022 to 1,676 in 2023 (the number of physical assaults increased from 43 to 85); in the UK from 1, 662 to 4,103 (physical assaults from 136 to 266); in Argentina from 427 to 598; in Germany from 2,639 to 3,614; in Brazil from 432 to 1,774; in South Africa from 68 to 207; in Mexico from 21 to 78; in the Netherlands from 69 to 154; in Italy from 241 to 454; and in Austria from 719 to 1,147. Australia recorded 622 antisemitic incidents in October and November 2023, in comparison to 79 during the same period in 2022.
Antisemitic incidents increased also before October 7
While the dramatic increases in comparison to 2022 largely followed October 7, the Report emphasizes that most countries with large Jewish minorities saw relative increases also in the first nine months of 2023, before the war started.
For example, in the United States, ADL data (based on the narrower definition for antisemitic incidents) point to an increase from 1,000 incidents in October-December 2022 to 3,976 in the same period in 2023, but also to an increase from 2,697 incidents between January-September 2022 to 3,547 in the same period in 2023 (NYPD registered a decrease in that period, while LAPD an increase).
In France, the number of incidents during January-September 2023 increased to 434 from 329 during the same period in 2022; in Britain – from 1,270 to 1,404. In Australia, 371 incidents were recorded between January and September 2023, compared to 363 in the same period in 2022. On the other hand, Germany and Austria, where national programs for fighting antisemitism are applied, saw decreases.
Abstract: Jewish and Muslim women seeking to claim certain rights in the religious realm in France today, such as access to religious study, ritual space and public religious roles, are confronted with obstacles to gender justice both in Orthodox Judaism and in mainstream Islam. In this article, I begin by taking a brief look at strategies used by women in other countries to curtail male monopolies while remaining inside Orthodox Judaism and mainstream Islam: creating all-female spaces, partnering with men and advancing from within hegemonic institutions. These have produced new religious functions for women, including women imams and female Orthodox rabbis, Jewish and Muslim female spiritual guides (maharat, murshidat), women experts and counselors in Islamic and Jewish law (alimat, yo‘atzot halakhah), Jewish legal advocates (to‘anot rabbaniyot) and female judges (qadiya) in shari‘a courts. I then survey the situation in France, where few such innovations have taken hold. I conclude by suggesting some explanations for their absence (in Orthodox Judaism) or their very slow evolution (in Islam) in the French context.
Abstract: EUJS has published a report on the Rise of Antisemitism at European Universities as a result of the October 7 Massacre. For the compilation of this report, we received more than one hundred and ten (110) reports of antisemitic incidents across Europe. However, this in no way reflects the true magnitude of incidents that have taken place, as many have gone unreported.
This report has been sent out to the European Commission, Members of the European Parliament, major Jewish organisations, Heads of Jewish communities, our Partners, Universities, and the press.
The message we want to spread with the report is: Jewish students do not feel safe on their campuses. Jewish students have even stopped attending classes out of fear due to the extremely hostile campus atmosphere. In 2024, this is unacceptable.
The European Union of Jewish Students will continue to gather information and data on antisemitism from University campuses across Europe. We will continue to fight against all forms of antisemitism, be it on campus or online, and to protect our Jewish students. We will continue, throughout, to advocate for a world that will allow for Jews to showcase and celebrate their Judaism in a positive way. But for this, collaboration on a university, institutional, governmental, and societal level is needed
Abstract: The present report provides an overview of data on antisemitism as recorded by international organisations and by official and unofficial sources in the European Union (EU) Member States. Furthermore, the report includes data concerning the United Kingdom, which in 2019 was still a Member State of the EU. For the first time, the report also presents available statistics and other information with respect to North Macedonia and Serbia, as countries with an observer status to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). All data presented in the report are based on the respective countries’ own definitions and categorisations of antisemitic behaviour. At the same time, an increasing number of countries are using the working definition of antisemitism developed by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), and there are efforts to further improve hate crime data collection in the EU, including through the work of the Working Group on hate crime recording, data collection and encouraging reporting (2019–2021), which FRA facilitates. ‘Official data’ are understood in the context of this report as those collected by law enforcement agencies, other authorities that are part of criminal justice systems and relevant state ministries at national level. ‘Unofficial data’ refers to data collected by civil society organisations.
This annual overview provides an update on the most recent figures on antisemitic incidents, covering the period 1 January 2009 – 31 December 2019, across the EU Member States, where data are available. It includes a section that presents the legal framework and evidence from international organisations. The report also provides an overview of national action plans and other measures to prevent and combat antisemitism, as well as information on how countries have adopted or endorsed the non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) (2016) as well as how they use or intend to use it.
This is the 16th edition of FRA’s report on the situation of data collection on antisemitism in the EU (including reports published by FRA’s predecessor, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia).
Abstract: Quelques jours après l’attaque du Hamas en Israël, l’IFOP a réalisé pour le Journal du Dimanche, un sondage destiné à comprendre quelles étaient les représentations des Français à l’égard du conflit et de son impact sur une éventuelle importation de violences antisémites en France.
Premier enseignement de cette étude, le conflit au Proche-Orient apparaît comme particulièrement anxiogène. 86% des Français indiquent être inquiets (36% « tout à fait inquiets »), soit un niveau d’inquiétude proche de celui mesuré au début du conflit russo-ukrainien. Le sentiment d’inquiétude atteint son acmé dans certains segments de la population traditionnellement plus favorables à l’Etat Hébreu : les plus de 65 ans (44% de tout à fait inquiets parmi les plus de 65 ans contre 25% parmi les 18-24 ans) ou encore les électeurs de Valérie Pécresse (50% de « tout à fait inquiets »).
Deuxième enseignement de cette étude : les Français établissent clairement un lien entre les évènements au Proche-Orient et l’importation de violences antisémites en France. 48% des sondés estiment ainsi que les Français de confession juive sont plus en danger et 79% se déclarent inquiets que le conflit se traduise par une augmentation des actes antisémites.
Plus globalement, les Français identifient bien les « nouvelles formes d’antisémitisme » comme étant des causes à ce phénomène : 77% citent le rejet et la haine d’Israël, 76% les idées islamistes, soit des niveaux supérieurs à ceux mesurés pour les idées d’extrême droite (66%).
Dernier point, les pouvoirs publics bénéficient d’une certaine mansuétude dans l’opinion : 60% des Français estiment leur faire confiance pour assurer la sécurité des Français de confession juive. Jean-Luc Mélenchon suscite en revanche la défiance sur ce sujet : il apparait comme la personnalité politique qui suscite le moins de confiance pour lutter contre l’antisémitisme (17%), loin derrière Edouard Philippe (46%), Gerald Darmanin (42%), Marine Le Pen (42%) ou encore Emmanuel Macron (41%).
Abstract: 589 actes antisémites ont été recensés en 2021, soit une augmentation de près
de 75% par rapport à l'année précédente.
Les violences physiques ont augmenté de 36% comparativement à 2020.
‣ Les actes portant atteinte aux personnes représentent 45% des actes
antisémites, dont 10% sont des agressions physiques.
Selon les chiffres du Ministère de l'Intérieur, 73% des actes racistes portant atteinte aux
personnes sont dirigés contre des Juifs.
‣ Deux phénomènes inquiétants méritent une attention particulière :
๏ le nombre élevé d'actes antisémites commis dans la sphère privée (25% des actes
antisémites). Il s'agit essentiellement d'actes commis à proximité du domicile de la
victime, par un voisin d'immeuble ou par des personnes vivant dans le quartier.
๏ la proportion d'utilisation d'armes dans les agressions physiques (20%) et
menaces (10%) à caractère antisémite. Les armes les plus utilisées sont les couteaux
(9 cas) et les pistolets (5 cas). Les autres actes sont commis au moyen de carabines,
mortier de feu d’artifice, marteau, machette, pistolet à plomb, ciseaux.
‣ En 2021, deux pics d'augmentation des actes antisémites ont été relevés :
๏ en mai, pendant le déroulement de l'opération "Gardien des murailles" lancée par
Israël contre le Hamas. 5 actes antisémites ont été recensés en moyenne par
jour au cours de cette période. Il s'agit essentiellement d'insultes et de gestes
menaçants. Dans près de 1/3 de ces actes, le thème de la Palestine est évoqué.
๏ en août, pendant les premières mobilisations contre les restrictions sanitaires. Il
s'agit essentiellement d'inscriptions antisémites désignant les Juifs comme les profiteurs,
voire les instigateurs de la crise sanitaire.
Abstract: Reflecting on the months since the recent October 7 attack, rarely has the theme of Holocaust Memorial Day 2024, ‘The Fragility of Freedom’, felt so poignant. Communities globally experienced the shattering of presumed security, and antisemitic incidents responsively spiked.
Antisemitism rose across both mainstream and fringe social media platforms, and communities resultantly reported a rise in insecurity and fear. CCOA constituent countries have recorded significant rises in antisemitic incidents, including an immediate 240% increase in Germany, a three-fold rise in France, and a marked increase in Italy.
The antisemitism landscape, including Holocaust denial and distortion, had shifted so drastically since October 7 that previous assumptions and understands now demand re-examination. In the run up to Holocaust Memorial Day 2024, this research compilation by members of the Coalition to Counter Online Antisemitism offers a vital contemporary examination of the current and emergent issues facing Holocaust denial and distortion online. As unique forms of antisemitism, denial and distortion are a tool of historical revisionism which specifically targets Jews, eroding Jewish experience and threatening democracy.
Across different geographies and knowledge fields, this compilation unites experts around the central and sustained proliferation of Holocaust denial and distortion on social media.
Abstract: Over the past 3.5 years, the Decoding Antisemitism research project has been analysing antisemitism on the internet in terms of content, structure, and frequency. Over this time, there has been no shortage of flashpoints which have generated antisemitic responses. Yet the online response to the Hamas attacks of 7 October and the subsequent Israeli operations in Gaza has surpassed anything the project has witnessed before. In no preceding escalation phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict has the predominant antisemitic reaction been one of open jubilation and joy over the deaths of Israeli Jews. As demonstrated in the sixth and final Discourse Report, this explicit approval of the Hamas attacks was the primary response from web users. The response to 7 October therefore represents a turning point in antisemitic online discourse, and its repercussions will be felt long into the future.
The report contains analysis of the various stages of online reactions to events in the Middle East, from the immediate aftermath to the Israeli retaliations and subsequent accusations of genocide against Israel. As well as examining online reactions in the project’s core focus—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—this report also, for the first time, extends its view to analyse Israel-related web discourses in six further countries, including those in Southern and Eastern Europe as well as in North Africa. Alongside reactions to the escalation phase, the report also examines online responses to billionaire Elon Musk’s explosive comments about Jewish individuals and institutions.
Additionally, the report provides a retrospective overview of the project’s development over the past 3.5 years, tracking its successes and challenges, particularly regarding the conditions for successful interdisciplinary work and the ability of machine learning to capture the versatility and complexity of authentic web communication.
To mark the publication of the report, we are also sharing our new, interactive data visualisations tool, which lets you examine any two discourse events analysed by our research team between 2021 and 2023. You can compare the frequencies and co-occurrences of antisemitic concepts and speech acts by type and by country, look at frequencies of keywords in antisemitic comments, and plot keyword networks.
Abstract: Cet article vise à analyser les raisons pour lesquelles des femmes françaises et juives libérales ont été ordonnées rabbines tardivement, en 1990, malgré un principe d’égalité en vigueur depuis 1846, et en si petit nombre. Cette question sera abordée dans une perspective féministe, à l’aide d’approches et de concepts issus de la sociologie des
organisations et du travail. Nous tenterons de comprendre les mécanismes de « plafond de verre » (Laufer, 2004) et de vitrail (de Gasquet, 2009), qui freinent l’accès de ces femmes aux postes de pouvoir et à la fonction de rabbin selon l’approche « Genre – Organisation – Système » (Fagenson, 1990), approche non encore employée dans les études des institutions religieuses juives. Nous verrons alors que le poids du patriarcat systémique, un rabbinat organisé selon des valeurs, des modèles et une gestion masculine, ainsi que l’autocensure des femmes et l’enfermement des hommes dans des stéréotypes genrés, ont contribué à la construction d’un plafond de vitrail qui a eu raison des principes égalitaires.
Abstract: Cette recherche envisage la tension entre une conception englobante de la religion portée par les juifs orthodoxes et une conception privatisée et plurielle en vigueur dans la société française, une société laïque et sécularisée, des années 1980 à nos jours. Cette tension est explorée depuis ces deux points de vue. D’une part, elle interroge comment les juifs orthodoxes s’organisent pour ménager l’espace jugé nécessaire à leur pratique religieuse. Pour ce faire, elle explore leurs besoins, leurs demandes, ainsi que les stratégies qu’ils mettent en œuvre pour les porter. D’autre part, elle soulève la question de la gouvernance publique du religieux. Pour ce faire, elle étudie la manière dont l’État laïc appréhende une minorité religieuse, qui semble aller à contre-courant du mouvement de fond de la sécularisation. A partir d’un protocole de recherche mixte, et en mobilisant la sociologie électorale, la sociologie de l’action collective, l’analyse des politiques publiques, et des outils de sociologie de la religion, elle teste la consistance de l’intégralisme des juifs orthodoxes dans la société française. Elle réfléchit ainsi à la gouvernance de minorités religieuses intégralistes, à partir d’un autre cas que l’islam, et distingue ce qui relève d’une religion en particulier ou de l’orthodoxie. Elle montre une érosion de l’intégralisme religieux, du fait de réponses défavorables des institutions publiques et de la sécularisation qu’il ne parvient pas à enrayer.
Abstract: Un nombre considérable de juifs a quitté la France dans la dernière décennie, sans que les paroles rassurantes émanant des plus hautes autorités de l’État aient pu arrêter l’hémorragie. Quant à ceux qui restent, ils ne peuvent éviter l’idée de devoir peut-être partir un jour, au regard des événements et d’un climat général dont chacun perçoit le poids.
La sociologie politique, curieusement, n’a que bien peu à dire sur un tel phénomène. Prolixe sur la question de l’immigration, elle est pratiquement muette sur le fait que la France ait pu ainsi devenir une terre d’émigration. Qu’est-il donc arrivé ? Pour le comprendre, l’invocation commode des tensions intercommunautaires et du radicalisme islamiste est bien loin de suffire. C’est une généalogie au long cours de notre situation qui est requise, une restitution des dynamiques complexes où sont intriqués, depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les juifs, l’Europe et l’État d’Israël.
De cette manière, et de cette manière seulement, l’un des points les plus sensibles du malaise politique actuel peut enfin être affronté.
Abstract: Le franco-judaïsme est fini, bel et bien mort ! affirment bien des observateurs de la scène juive française. Pourtant d’autres parlent encore de rêve français. Vision naïve ou ambition renouvelée ? L’israélitisme du XIXe siècle, tout entier contenu dans le slogan consistorial « Patrie et religion », ne fut en fait que la première forme du franco-judaïsme. Deux institutions créées au lendemain de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, le CRIF et le FSJU, ont accompagné la pluralisation du judaïsme français et sa sécularisation. Dans les années 1980, un nouveau franco-judaïsme s’est affirmé en célébrant publiquement « la communauté » réunie autour d’une double fidélité à la France et à Israël, confirmant ce que le philosophe Levinas avait pressenti dès 1950 : la « fin du judaïsme confidentiel ». Cette synthèse harmonieuse serait-elle mise à mal aujourd’hui par le communautarisme des milieux ultraorthodoxes, présents au sein des écoles juives et même du Consistoire, et la politisation du CRIF ? Mais un pluralisme religieux inédit est apparu avec le succès croissant des courants libéraux et l’émergence d’une orthodoxie moderne au sein desquels des femmes jouent un rôle majeur. Et si l’adhésion enchantée à la France n’est certes plus de mise, le développement des relations interreligieuses et interculturelles apparaît comme une des réponses au nouvel antisémitisme. Aurait-on là aussi les ferments de recomposition d’un autre franco-judaïsme, celui des solidarités à construire ?
Abstract: Built from nothing on the Parisian periphery in the 1950s, the neighbourhood known as Les Flanades in Sarcelles is perhaps the single largest North African Jewish urban space in France. Though heavily policed since 2000, Les Flanades had been free from violence. However, on 20 July 2014, violence erupted close to the central synagogue (known as la grande syna’) during a banned pro-Palestinian march. The violence pitted protestors and residents against one another in a schematic Israel v. Palestine frame leading to confrontations between many descendants of North African Jews and Muslims. Using that moment as a strong indicator of a broken solidarity/affinity between people of North African descent, Everett’s article traces a process of de-racialization, amongst Jews in Les Flanades, through the use of place names. North African Jewish residents use the local names of first-, second- and third-generation residents for their neighbourhood, ranging from from Bab El-Oued (a suburb of Algiers), via un village méditerranéen (a Mediterranean village), to la petite Jérusalem (little Jerusalem). Using the lens of postcolonial and racialization theory—a lens seldomly applied to France, and even less so to Jews in France—and a hybrid methodology that combines ethnography with discursive and genealogical analyses, Everett traces the unevenness of solidarity/affinity between Muslim and Jewish French citizens of North African descent and the messy production of de-racialization. This approach involves looking at shifting landscapes and changing dynamics of demography, religiosity and security and describing some tendencies that resist these changes consciously or not. Examples include the re-appropriation of Arabic para-liturgy and an encounter with a lawyer from Sarcelles who has taken a stand in prominent racialized public legal contests.
Abstract: La migration des Juifs de France vers Israël, longtemps ignorée par les pouvoirs publics, interroge aujourd’hui la société française. Les départs devenus conséquents au tournant du XXIe siècle rappellent la constance de l’antisémitisme et disent la crainte d’une population fragilisée par les incivilités, les meurtres et les attentats. Dans le même temps, l’alya (immigration des Juifs en Israël) relève aussi de dynamiques migratoires anciennes, de pratiques de circulations internationales et de politiques d’appel organisées par l’État d’Israël pour répondre à ses besoins démographiques et économiques.
Prise entre des pratiques migratoires de temps long et des commentaires soulignant le poids des appartenances nationales, du conflit israélo-palestinien et d’une actualité anxiogène, l’alya de France demande cependant à être comprise dans ses processus, ses encadrements institutionnels et les justifications que les individus donnent de l’acte de partir.
Laissant une place importante à l’expérience migratoire, ce livre étudie cette migration dans sa dimension historique, géographique et sociologique. À partir d’archives israéliennes inédites, de données cartographiques originales et d’enquêtes de terrain, il donne des clefs de compréhension d’un phénomène très médiatisé mais toujours lu au prisme d’enjeux politiques et symboliques.
Abstract: Key findings
• Since 7 October, Decoding Antisemitism has analysed more than 11,000 comments
posted on YouTube and Facebook in response to mainstream media reports of the
Hamas terrorist attacks in Israel.
• Our analysis reveals a significant jump in the number of antisemitic comments, even
compared with other violent incidents in the Middle East.
• CELEBRATION, SUPPORT FOR and JUSTIFICATION OF THE HAMAS TERROR ATTACKS make up the
largest proportion of antisemitic comments – ranging between 19 % in German
Facebook comment sections and 53 and 54.7 % in French Facebook and UK YouTube
comment sections, respectively – in contrast to previous studies where direct
affirmation of violence was negligible.
• The number of antisemitic comments CELEBRATING THE ATROCITIES rises in response to
media reports of attacks on Israelis/Jews themselves, compared with reports on the
conflict more generally.
• Beyond affirmation of the Hamas attacks, other frequently expressed antisemitic
concepts across the corpus included DENIALS OF ISRAEL’S RIGHT TO EXIST, attributing SOLE
GUILT to Israel for the entire history of the conflict, describing Israel as a TERRORIST
STATE, CONSPIRACY THEORIES about Jewish POWER, and ideas of inherent Israeli EVIL.
• As with the project’s past research, this analysis reveals a diversity of antisemitic
concepts and communicative strategies. The findings reaffirm that antisemitism
appears as a multifaceted mosaic, as a result of which it is not possible to deal with
all the elements. Only the most prominent tendencies are brought into focus here.