Abstract: Contre toute attente, l’antisémitisme est redevenu un phénomène politique et social d’actualité en France. Au-delà d’une simple persistance de préjugés anciens, il s’incarne depuis la fin de la guerre de 1939-1945 dans une expansion sans précédent des violences antijuives, allant des insultes jusqu’au meurtre. Sa reviviscence dans l’une des plus vieilles nations démocratiques d’Europe est le signe d’un malaise social et politique qui reste à interpréter. Quels sont les lieux, les milieux et les significations de cette animosité haineuse ? Doit-on y voir l’effet de la persistance de l’ancien ? d’un déplacement ? de la recomposition de formes inédites, portées par des acteurs nouveaux, dans un contexte pourtant gagné aux principes démocratiques ?
Alors même que l’ampleur du phénomène est de nature à mobiliser les sciences sociales pour l’élucider et aider à le combattre, cet antisémitisme s’est accompagné d’un certain déni : longtemps minimisé dans les médias, il peine à être reconnu dans le monde judiciaire et reste peu exploré par les sciences sociales. Cet ouvrage entend donc contribuer à l’analyse rigoureuse du phénomène, en proposant à la réflexion les textes d’historiens, de philosophes, de sociologues et de politistes.
Abstract: French students in the third and final year from the Humanities and Social Sciences license degree course traveled to Ukraine and Belorussia between 2017 and 2020, in order to carry out surveys of eyewitnesses to the so-called “Holocaust by Bullets.” The subject-matter stands out in the French scholarly scene, as the Holocaust usually attracts little attention at this level of studies. Students registered in the course hail from license degrees in History, Social Sciences or Geography, and have chosen to attend the course labeled “European Historical Heritage and Citizens’ Thoughts” as a complement to a more classical curriculum, and as a way of enhancing their own university curriculum. The research professors involved have also volunteered to participate as authors of the aforementioned multidisciplinary program, with the aim to raise awareness to research practices on the Holocaust. University professors and teams from the Yahad-in-Unum NGO take turns leading the two-hour weekly sessions. The professors help establish theoretical focus and provide methodological tools, develop lines of investigation on various areas of interest (e.g., mode of operation used in the shootings, collaboration and rescue operations, and neighbors of the crime scene), as well as the context (anti-Semitism, racism, local geopolitics, regional history, culture and society, etc.), while Yahad-in-Unum participants describe actual cases based on records, maps and filmed testimonies. They had the task to provide documents from Soviet and Nazi archives translated from Russian, or from German, and act as translators during fieldwork. Students are encouraged to participate as often as possible and have to prepare analytical reports and presentations following each session, while adopting the position of a researcher.
Abstract: Depuis 2012, l’histoire de la mémoire du génocide des Juifs est étudiée en terminale (série L, ES) dans le cadre du chapitre portant sur « L’historien et les mémoires de la Seconde Guerre mondiale ». Si les enseignants sont sollicités chaque année à l’occasion de journées commémoratives pour transmettre à leurs élèves la mémoire de la Shoah, porteuse d’un enjeu civique, l’introduction dans les programmes de ce sujet d’histoire relève d’une ambition pédagogique qui doit nécessairement s’articuler à la recherche scientifique. Dans cette perspective, cet article fait le point sur les récentes avancées historiographiques concernant l’histoire de la mémoire du génocide des Juifs en France qui permettent d’affiner un découpage chronologique que plusieurs manuels scolaires présentent de façon caricaturale. Il convient ainsi de remplacer le schéma narratif classique polarisé autour de « oubli/mémoire/temps du devoir de mémoire » par une périodisation qui prend en compte les traces -éparses mais significatives- de la mémoire du génocide dans la société française dès les années 1950, ce qui relativise fortement la thèse de son oubli. Les années 1970 et surtout 1980 sont marquées par des mises en récit publiques du génocide qui le situent dans un horizon commun de plus en plus partagé en le référant à des enjeux contemporains (lutte contre le négationnisme et l’antisémitisme, lutte contre l’extrême droite, reconnaissance et réparations dues aux victimes, reconnaissance officielle de la participation active de Vichy, exercice de la justice pour les crimes contre l’humanité). La prise en compte de cette mémoire dans les années 1990 par un État qui reconnait sa responsabilité historique dans le crime génocidaire entraîne de nombreuses actions publiques qui se déclinent sous différentes formes (commémorations, mémoriaux, voyages scolaires). L’Ecole est alors mobilisée comme un acteur privilégié de la transmission de cette mémoire qui est investie d’enjeux éducatifs fondés sur la promotion des valeurs des droits de l’homme et du vivre ensemble.
Abstract: Several decades on from Tommie Smith and John Carlos’s iconic Black Power salute at the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City, sociologists such as Douglas Hartmann and Ben Carrington argue that contemporary debates about sport, race, and protest are becoming ever more complicated. Within this context, the quenelle salute given by footballer Nicolas Anelka whilst playing for West Bromwich Albion in December 2013 merits analysis. The controversial and complicated gesture led to disciplinary action from the Football Association and his club, and ultimately to the end of his playing career. Due to its association with controversial French comedian Dieudonné, the quenelle is widely seen as anti-Semitic, although some argue that it is merely anti-system. Despite this potential ambiguity, it will be shown that the quenelle remains a protest gesture. In order to interpret Anelka’s actions, it is important to examine the quenelle’s roots and when he performed the gesture. Such analysis needs to be placed within the context of contemporary footballers’ engagement (or lack of engagement) with socio-political issues, and provides a means of assessing the relationship between football, politics, and protest in contemporary Europe.
Abstract: The Annual Antisemitism Worldwide Report, published by Tel Aviv University (TAU) and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), reveals that 2023 saw an increase of dozens of percentage points in the number of antisemitic incidents in Western countries in comparison to 2022. A particularly steep increase was recorded following the October 7 attacks, but the first nine months of 2023, before the war started, also witnessed a relative increase in the number of incidents in most countries with large Jewish minorities, including the United States, France, the UK, Australia, Italy, Brazil, and Mexico.
According to the Report, in New York, the city with the largest Jewish population in the world, NYPD recorded 325 anti-Jewish hate crimes in 2023 in comparison to the 261 it recorded in 2022, LAPD recorded 165 in comparison to 86, and CPD 50 in comparison to 39. The ADL recorded 7,523 incidents in 2023 compared to 3,697 in 2022 (and according to a broader definition applied, it recorded 8,873); the number of assaults increased from 111 in 2022 to 161 in 2023 and of vandalism from 1,288 to 2,106.
Other countries also saw dramatic increases in the number of antisemitic attacks, according to data collected by the Report from governmental agencies, law enforcement authorities, Jewish organizations, media, and fieldwork.
In France, the number of incidents increased from 436 in 2022 to 1,676 in 2023 (the number of physical assaults increased from 43 to 85); in the UK from 1, 662 to 4,103 (physical assaults from 136 to 266); in Argentina from 427 to 598; in Germany from 2,639 to 3,614; in Brazil from 432 to 1,774; in South Africa from 68 to 207; in Mexico from 21 to 78; in the Netherlands from 69 to 154; in Italy from 241 to 454; and in Austria from 719 to 1,147. Australia recorded 622 antisemitic incidents in October and November 2023, in comparison to 79 during the same period in 2022.
Antisemitic incidents increased also before October 7
While the dramatic increases in comparison to 2022 largely followed October 7, the Report emphasizes that most countries with large Jewish minorities saw relative increases also in the first nine months of 2023, before the war started.
For example, in the United States, ADL data (based on the narrower definition for antisemitic incidents) point to an increase from 1,000 incidents in October-December 2022 to 3,976 in the same period in 2023, but also to an increase from 2,697 incidents between January-September 2022 to 3,547 in the same period in 2023 (NYPD registered a decrease in that period, while LAPD an increase).
In France, the number of incidents during January-September 2023 increased to 434 from 329 during the same period in 2022; in Britain – from 1,270 to 1,404. In Australia, 371 incidents were recorded between January and September 2023, compared to 363 in the same period in 2022. On the other hand, Germany and Austria, where national programs for fighting antisemitism are applied, saw decreases.
Abstract: Jewish and Muslim women seeking to claim certain rights in the religious realm in France today, such as access to religious study, ritual space and public religious roles, are confronted with obstacles to gender justice both in Orthodox Judaism and in mainstream Islam. In this article, I begin by taking a brief look at strategies used by women in other countries to curtail male monopolies while remaining inside Orthodox Judaism and mainstream Islam: creating all-female spaces, partnering with men and advancing from within hegemonic institutions. These have produced new religious functions for women, including women imams and female Orthodox rabbis, Jewish and Muslim female spiritual guides (maharat, murshidat), women experts and counselors in Islamic and Jewish law (alimat, yo‘atzot halakhah), Jewish legal advocates (to‘anot rabbaniyot) and female judges (qadiya) in shari‘a courts. I then survey the situation in France, where few such innovations have taken hold. I conclude by suggesting some explanations for their absence (in Orthodox Judaism) or their very slow evolution (in Islam) in the French context.
Abstract: EUJS has published a report on the Rise of Antisemitism at European Universities as a result of the October 7 Massacre. For the compilation of this report, we received more than one hundred and ten (110) reports of antisemitic incidents across Europe. However, this in no way reflects the true magnitude of incidents that have taken place, as many have gone unreported.
This report has been sent out to the European Commission, Members of the European Parliament, major Jewish organisations, Heads of Jewish communities, our Partners, Universities, and the press.
The message we want to spread with the report is: Jewish students do not feel safe on their campuses. Jewish students have even stopped attending classes out of fear due to the extremely hostile campus atmosphere. In 2024, this is unacceptable.
The European Union of Jewish Students will continue to gather information and data on antisemitism from University campuses across Europe. We will continue to fight against all forms of antisemitism, be it on campus or online, and to protect our Jewish students. We will continue, throughout, to advocate for a world that will allow for Jews to showcase and celebrate their Judaism in a positive way. But for this, collaboration on a university, institutional, governmental, and societal level is needed
Abstract: The present report provides an overview of data on antisemitism as recorded by international organisations and by official and unofficial sources in the European Union (EU) Member States. Furthermore, the report includes data concerning the United Kingdom, which in 2019 was still a Member State of the EU. For the first time, the report also presents available statistics and other information with respect to North Macedonia and Serbia, as countries with an observer status to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). All data presented in the report are based on the respective countries’ own definitions and categorisations of antisemitic behaviour. At the same time, an increasing number of countries are using the working definition of antisemitism developed by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), and there are efforts to further improve hate crime data collection in the EU, including through the work of the Working Group on hate crime recording, data collection and encouraging reporting (2019–2021), which FRA facilitates. ‘Official data’ are understood in the context of this report as those collected by law enforcement agencies, other authorities that are part of criminal justice systems and relevant state ministries at national level. ‘Unofficial data’ refers to data collected by civil society organisations.
This annual overview provides an update on the most recent figures on antisemitic incidents, covering the period 1 January 2009 – 31 December 2019, across the EU Member States, where data are available. It includes a section that presents the legal framework and evidence from international organisations. The report also provides an overview of national action plans and other measures to prevent and combat antisemitism, as well as information on how countries have adopted or endorsed the non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) (2016) as well as how they use or intend to use it.
This is the 16th edition of FRA’s report on the situation of data collection on antisemitism in the EU (including reports published by FRA’s predecessor, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia).
Abstract: Quelques jours après l’attaque du Hamas en Israël, l’IFOP a réalisé pour le Journal du Dimanche, un sondage destiné à comprendre quelles étaient les représentations des Français à l’égard du conflit et de son impact sur une éventuelle importation de violences antisémites en France.
Premier enseignement de cette étude, le conflit au Proche-Orient apparaît comme particulièrement anxiogène. 86% des Français indiquent être inquiets (36% « tout à fait inquiets »), soit un niveau d’inquiétude proche de celui mesuré au début du conflit russo-ukrainien. Le sentiment d’inquiétude atteint son acmé dans certains segments de la population traditionnellement plus favorables à l’Etat Hébreu : les plus de 65 ans (44% de tout à fait inquiets parmi les plus de 65 ans contre 25% parmi les 18-24 ans) ou encore les électeurs de Valérie Pécresse (50% de « tout à fait inquiets »).
Deuxième enseignement de cette étude : les Français établissent clairement un lien entre les évènements au Proche-Orient et l’importation de violences antisémites en France. 48% des sondés estiment ainsi que les Français de confession juive sont plus en danger et 79% se déclarent inquiets que le conflit se traduise par une augmentation des actes antisémites.
Plus globalement, les Français identifient bien les « nouvelles formes d’antisémitisme » comme étant des causes à ce phénomène : 77% citent le rejet et la haine d’Israël, 76% les idées islamistes, soit des niveaux supérieurs à ceux mesurés pour les idées d’extrême droite (66%).
Dernier point, les pouvoirs publics bénéficient d’une certaine mansuétude dans l’opinion : 60% des Français estiment leur faire confiance pour assurer la sécurité des Français de confession juive. Jean-Luc Mélenchon suscite en revanche la défiance sur ce sujet : il apparait comme la personnalité politique qui suscite le moins de confiance pour lutter contre l’antisémitisme (17%), loin derrière Edouard Philippe (46%), Gerald Darmanin (42%), Marine Le Pen (42%) ou encore Emmanuel Macron (41%).
Abstract: 589 actes antisémites ont été recensés en 2021, soit une augmentation de près
de 75% par rapport à l'année précédente.
Les violences physiques ont augmenté de 36% comparativement à 2020.
‣ Les actes portant atteinte aux personnes représentent 45% des actes
antisémites, dont 10% sont des agressions physiques.
Selon les chiffres du Ministère de l'Intérieur, 73% des actes racistes portant atteinte aux
personnes sont dirigés contre des Juifs.
‣ Deux phénomènes inquiétants méritent une attention particulière :
๏ le nombre élevé d'actes antisémites commis dans la sphère privée (25% des actes
antisémites). Il s'agit essentiellement d'actes commis à proximité du domicile de la
victime, par un voisin d'immeuble ou par des personnes vivant dans le quartier.
๏ la proportion d'utilisation d'armes dans les agressions physiques (20%) et
menaces (10%) à caractère antisémite. Les armes les plus utilisées sont les couteaux
(9 cas) et les pistolets (5 cas). Les autres actes sont commis au moyen de carabines,
mortier de feu d’artifice, marteau, machette, pistolet à plomb, ciseaux.
‣ En 2021, deux pics d'augmentation des actes antisémites ont été relevés :
๏ en mai, pendant le déroulement de l'opération "Gardien des murailles" lancée par
Israël contre le Hamas. 5 actes antisémites ont été recensés en moyenne par
jour au cours de cette période. Il s'agit essentiellement d'insultes et de gestes
menaçants. Dans près de 1/3 de ces actes, le thème de la Palestine est évoqué.
๏ en août, pendant les premières mobilisations contre les restrictions sanitaires. Il
s'agit essentiellement d'inscriptions antisémites désignant les Juifs comme les profiteurs,
voire les instigateurs de la crise sanitaire.
Abstract: Reflecting on the months since the recent October 7 attack, rarely has the theme of Holocaust Memorial Day 2024, ‘The Fragility of Freedom’, felt so poignant. Communities globally experienced the shattering of presumed security, and antisemitic incidents responsively spiked.
Antisemitism rose across both mainstream and fringe social media platforms, and communities resultantly reported a rise in insecurity and fear. CCOA constituent countries have recorded significant rises in antisemitic incidents, including an immediate 240% increase in Germany, a three-fold rise in France, and a marked increase in Italy.
The antisemitism landscape, including Holocaust denial and distortion, had shifted so drastically since October 7 that previous assumptions and understands now demand re-examination. In the run up to Holocaust Memorial Day 2024, this research compilation by members of the Coalition to Counter Online Antisemitism offers a vital contemporary examination of the current and emergent issues facing Holocaust denial and distortion online. As unique forms of antisemitism, denial and distortion are a tool of historical revisionism which specifically targets Jews, eroding Jewish experience and threatening democracy.
Across different geographies and knowledge fields, this compilation unites experts around the central and sustained proliferation of Holocaust denial and distortion on social media.
Abstract: Over the past 3.5 years, the Decoding Antisemitism research project has been analysing antisemitism on the internet in terms of content, structure, and frequency. Over this time, there has been no shortage of flashpoints which have generated antisemitic responses. Yet the online response to the Hamas attacks of 7 October and the subsequent Israeli operations in Gaza has surpassed anything the project has witnessed before. In no preceding escalation phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict has the predominant antisemitic reaction been one of open jubilation and joy over the deaths of Israeli Jews. As demonstrated in the sixth and final Discourse Report, this explicit approval of the Hamas attacks was the primary response from web users. The response to 7 October therefore represents a turning point in antisemitic online discourse, and its repercussions will be felt long into the future.
The report contains analysis of the various stages of online reactions to events in the Middle East, from the immediate aftermath to the Israeli retaliations and subsequent accusations of genocide against Israel. As well as examining online reactions in the project’s core focus—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—this report also, for the first time, extends its view to analyse Israel-related web discourses in six further countries, including those in Southern and Eastern Europe as well as in North Africa. Alongside reactions to the escalation phase, the report also examines online responses to billionaire Elon Musk’s explosive comments about Jewish individuals and institutions.
Additionally, the report provides a retrospective overview of the project’s development over the past 3.5 years, tracking its successes and challenges, particularly regarding the conditions for successful interdisciplinary work and the ability of machine learning to capture the versatility and complexity of authentic web communication.
To mark the publication of the report, we are also sharing our new, interactive data visualisations tool, which lets you examine any two discourse events analysed by our research team between 2021 and 2023. You can compare the frequencies and co-occurrences of antisemitic concepts and speech acts by type and by country, look at frequencies of keywords in antisemitic comments, and plot keyword networks.
Abstract: Cet article vise à analyser les raisons pour lesquelles des femmes françaises et juives libérales ont été ordonnées rabbines tardivement, en 1990, malgré un principe d’égalité en vigueur depuis 1846, et en si petit nombre. Cette question sera abordée dans une perspective féministe, à l’aide d’approches et de concepts issus de la sociologie des
organisations et du travail. Nous tenterons de comprendre les mécanismes de « plafond de verre » (Laufer, 2004) et de vitrail (de Gasquet, 2009), qui freinent l’accès de ces femmes aux postes de pouvoir et à la fonction de rabbin selon l’approche « Genre – Organisation – Système » (Fagenson, 1990), approche non encore employée dans les études des institutions religieuses juives. Nous verrons alors que le poids du patriarcat systémique, un rabbinat organisé selon des valeurs, des modèles et une gestion masculine, ainsi que l’autocensure des femmes et l’enfermement des hommes dans des stéréotypes genrés, ont contribué à la construction d’un plafond de vitrail qui a eu raison des principes égalitaires.
Abstract: Cette recherche envisage la tension entre une conception englobante de la religion portée par les juifs orthodoxes et une conception privatisée et plurielle en vigueur dans la société française, une société laïque et sécularisée, des années 1980 à nos jours. Cette tension est explorée depuis ces deux points de vue. D’une part, elle interroge comment les juifs orthodoxes s’organisent pour ménager l’espace jugé nécessaire à leur pratique religieuse. Pour ce faire, elle explore leurs besoins, leurs demandes, ainsi que les stratégies qu’ils mettent en œuvre pour les porter. D’autre part, elle soulève la question de la gouvernance publique du religieux. Pour ce faire, elle étudie la manière dont l’État laïc appréhende une minorité religieuse, qui semble aller à contre-courant du mouvement de fond de la sécularisation. A partir d’un protocole de recherche mixte, et en mobilisant la sociologie électorale, la sociologie de l’action collective, l’analyse des politiques publiques, et des outils de sociologie de la religion, elle teste la consistance de l’intégralisme des juifs orthodoxes dans la société française. Elle réfléchit ainsi à la gouvernance de minorités religieuses intégralistes, à partir d’un autre cas que l’islam, et distingue ce qui relève d’une religion en particulier ou de l’orthodoxie. Elle montre une érosion de l’intégralisme religieux, du fait de réponses défavorables des institutions publiques et de la sécularisation qu’il ne parvient pas à enrayer.
Abstract: Un nombre considérable de juifs a quitté la France dans la dernière décennie, sans que les paroles rassurantes émanant des plus hautes autorités de l’État aient pu arrêter l’hémorragie. Quant à ceux qui restent, ils ne peuvent éviter l’idée de devoir peut-être partir un jour, au regard des événements et d’un climat général dont chacun perçoit le poids.
La sociologie politique, curieusement, n’a que bien peu à dire sur un tel phénomène. Prolixe sur la question de l’immigration, elle est pratiquement muette sur le fait que la France ait pu ainsi devenir une terre d’émigration. Qu’est-il donc arrivé ? Pour le comprendre, l’invocation commode des tensions intercommunautaires et du radicalisme islamiste est bien loin de suffire. C’est une généalogie au long cours de notre situation qui est requise, une restitution des dynamiques complexes où sont intriqués, depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les juifs, l’Europe et l’État d’Israël.
De cette manière, et de cette manière seulement, l’un des points les plus sensibles du malaise politique actuel peut enfin être affronté.
Abstract: Le franco-judaïsme est fini, bel et bien mort ! affirment bien des observateurs de la scène juive française. Pourtant d’autres parlent encore de rêve français. Vision naïve ou ambition renouvelée ? L’israélitisme du XIXe siècle, tout entier contenu dans le slogan consistorial « Patrie et religion », ne fut en fait que la première forme du franco-judaïsme. Deux institutions créées au lendemain de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, le CRIF et le FSJU, ont accompagné la pluralisation du judaïsme français et sa sécularisation. Dans les années 1980, un nouveau franco-judaïsme s’est affirmé en célébrant publiquement « la communauté » réunie autour d’une double fidélité à la France et à Israël, confirmant ce que le philosophe Levinas avait pressenti dès 1950 : la « fin du judaïsme confidentiel ». Cette synthèse harmonieuse serait-elle mise à mal aujourd’hui par le communautarisme des milieux ultraorthodoxes, présents au sein des écoles juives et même du Consistoire, et la politisation du CRIF ? Mais un pluralisme religieux inédit est apparu avec le succès croissant des courants libéraux et l’émergence d’une orthodoxie moderne au sein desquels des femmes jouent un rôle majeur. Et si l’adhésion enchantée à la France n’est certes plus de mise, le développement des relations interreligieuses et interculturelles apparaît comme une des réponses au nouvel antisémitisme. Aurait-on là aussi les ferments de recomposition d’un autre franco-judaïsme, celui des solidarités à construire ?
Abstract: Built from nothing on the Parisian periphery in the 1950s, the neighbourhood known as Les Flanades in Sarcelles is perhaps the single largest North African Jewish urban space in France. Though heavily policed since 2000, Les Flanades had been free from violence. However, on 20 July 2014, violence erupted close to the central synagogue (known as la grande syna’) during a banned pro-Palestinian march. The violence pitted protestors and residents against one another in a schematic Israel v. Palestine frame leading to confrontations between many descendants of North African Jews and Muslims. Using that moment as a strong indicator of a broken solidarity/affinity between people of North African descent, Everett’s article traces a process of de-racialization, amongst Jews in Les Flanades, through the use of place names. North African Jewish residents use the local names of first-, second- and third-generation residents for their neighbourhood, ranging from from Bab El-Oued (a suburb of Algiers), via un village méditerranéen (a Mediterranean village), to la petite Jérusalem (little Jerusalem). Using the lens of postcolonial and racialization theory—a lens seldomly applied to France, and even less so to Jews in France—and a hybrid methodology that combines ethnography with discursive and genealogical analyses, Everett traces the unevenness of solidarity/affinity between Muslim and Jewish French citizens of North African descent and the messy production of de-racialization. This approach involves looking at shifting landscapes and changing dynamics of demography, religiosity and security and describing some tendencies that resist these changes consciously or not. Examples include the re-appropriation of Arabic para-liturgy and an encounter with a lawyer from Sarcelles who has taken a stand in prominent racialized public legal contests.
Abstract: La migration des Juifs de France vers Israël, longtemps ignorée par les pouvoirs publics, interroge aujourd’hui la société française. Les départs devenus conséquents au tournant du XXIe siècle rappellent la constance de l’antisémitisme et disent la crainte d’une population fragilisée par les incivilités, les meurtres et les attentats. Dans le même temps, l’alya (immigration des Juifs en Israël) relève aussi de dynamiques migratoires anciennes, de pratiques de circulations internationales et de politiques d’appel organisées par l’État d’Israël pour répondre à ses besoins démographiques et économiques.
Prise entre des pratiques migratoires de temps long et des commentaires soulignant le poids des appartenances nationales, du conflit israélo-palestinien et d’une actualité anxiogène, l’alya de France demande cependant à être comprise dans ses processus, ses encadrements institutionnels et les justifications que les individus donnent de l’acte de partir.
Laissant une place importante à l’expérience migratoire, ce livre étudie cette migration dans sa dimension historique, géographique et sociologique. À partir d’archives israéliennes inédites, de données cartographiques originales et d’enquêtes de terrain, il donne des clefs de compréhension d’un phénomène très médiatisé mais toujours lu au prisme d’enjeux politiques et symboliques.
Abstract: Key findings
• Since 7 October, Decoding Antisemitism has analysed more than 11,000 comments
posted on YouTube and Facebook in response to mainstream media reports of the
Hamas terrorist attacks in Israel.
• Our analysis reveals a significant jump in the number of antisemitic comments, even
compared with other violent incidents in the Middle East.
• CELEBRATION, SUPPORT FOR and JUSTIFICATION OF THE HAMAS TERROR ATTACKS make up the
largest proportion of antisemitic comments – ranging between 19 % in German
Facebook comment sections and 53 and 54.7 % in French Facebook and UK YouTube
comment sections, respectively – in contrast to previous studies where direct
affirmation of violence was negligible.
• The number of antisemitic comments CELEBRATING THE ATROCITIES rises in response to
media reports of attacks on Israelis/Jews themselves, compared with reports on the
conflict more generally.
• Beyond affirmation of the Hamas attacks, other frequently expressed antisemitic
concepts across the corpus included DENIALS OF ISRAEL’S RIGHT TO EXIST, attributing SOLE
GUILT to Israel for the entire history of the conflict, describing Israel as a TERRORIST
STATE, CONSPIRACY THEORIES about Jewish POWER, and ideas of inherent Israeli EVIL.
• As with the project’s past research, this analysis reveals a diversity of antisemitic
concepts and communicative strategies. The findings reaffirm that antisemitism
appears as a multifaceted mosaic, as a result of which it is not possible to deal with
all the elements. Only the most prominent tendencies are brought into focus here.
Abstract: This factsheet looks into Jewish education in the UK and the rest of Europe, highlighting parents’ different motives when choosing a Jewish or non-Jewish school for their children. The paper draws data from three sources: previous JPR research on school registration numbers, a 2018 pan-European study sponsored by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), conducted by a joint JPR-Ipsos team, and JPR’s spring 2023 survey of Jews in the UK.
Some of the key findings in this factsheet:
The number of Jewish children attending Jewish schools has increased significantly over time and is expected to reach about 40,000 by the mid-2020s;
In the UK, the number of children attending Haredi schools outnumbers the number of Jewish children in mainstream Jewish schools by about three to two.
Parents in the UK, France and across Europe are most likely to point to a desire for their child to develop a strong Jewish identity as a motive for registering their children to a Jewish school;
Jewish identity is followed in most places by a desire for their children to have friends with similar values, with the exception of France, where concern about antisemitism in non-Jewish schools is a more common motive;
In the UK and France, the most common motive for parents to send their children to a non-Jewish school is actively preferring a non-Jewish (integrated) environment, cited by about two-thirds of all such parents in both countries;
Convenience also commonly features as a reason not to send children to a Jewish school, coming second on the list in the UK and France, and topping it elsewhere in Europe.
Academic standards and availability are also marked highly as reasons parents prefer a non-Jewish school for their children, particularly in the UK.
Abstract: From Introduction:
Antisemitism is global and multifaceted. One area in which ADL has seen a growth of antisemitism is within elements of the political left. This often takes the form of anti-Zionism, a movement that rejects the Jewish right to self-determination and of Israel to exist as a Jewish state, and frequently employs antisemitic tropes to attack Israel and its supporters. It also manifests through the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, a campaign that promotes diplomatic, financial, professional, academic and cultural isolation of Israel, Israeli individuals, Israeli institutions, and Jews who support Israel’s right to exist.
Political actors and advocacy movements associated with some left-wing political organizations have engaged in such antisemitism both in the U.S. and in Europe. While antisemitism from individuals associated with left-leaning political organizations is generally less violent than right-wing antisemitism, its penetration into the political mainstream is cause for concern and has in some cases alienated Jews and other supporters of Israel. Concerns are both political and physical. As described in this report, Jews and Jewish institutions have been targeted and have suffered violent attacks, associated with anti-Zionism, often in the wake of fighting between Israel and the Palestinians, most recently in 2021.
The challenges facing Jewish communities in Europe can be a bellwether for what is to come for the U.S. Jewish community, as evidenced for example by the recent rise in violent antisemitism in the U.S., which has plagued European Jewish communities for many years, and the increase in anti-Zionism in U.S. progressive spaces, something that has existed in Europe for some time. To better understand this phenomenon in Europe, ADL asked partners in the UK, France, Germany and Spain to describe some of the expressions of left-wing political antisemitism and anti-Israel bias in their countries. The individual contributors are responsible for the content of those chapters and their positions may differ with standard ADL practice and/or policy.
Our British partner, the Community Security Trust, is the British Jewish community’s security agency, which monitors, reports on, and educates about antisemitism among other vital tasks for the safety and security of the Jewish community.
Our French partner, the politics and culture magazine “K., The Jews, Europe, the 21st Century,” reports on contemporary challenges and opportunities for Jewish life in France and elsewhere in Europe.
Our German partner, Amadeu Antonio Foundation, is one of Germany's foremost independent non-governmental organizations working to strengthen democratic civil society and eliminate extremism, antisemitism, racism and other forms of bigotry and hate.
Our Spanish partner, ACOM, is a non-denominational and independent organization that strengthens the relationship between Spain and Israel, and whose work is inspired by the defense of human rights, democratic societies, civil liberties and the rule of law.
Those European contributions comprise the first sections of this report. Based on those essays, in the subsequent chapter, ADL analyzed common themes and notable differences among the four countries.
The final section adds ADL’s perspective on left-wing antisemitism in the political and advocacy spheres in the U.S. and provides suggested actions that can be taken to address antisemitism. To be sure, while not all antisemitism that has manifested in some elements of the political left in the U.S. is imported from Europe, lessons can be learned from this transatlantic phenomenon to protect against the mainstreaming of such antisemitism in U.S. politics.
Abstract: In this report:
We look into Jewish migration from 15 European countries - representing 94% of Jews living in Europe - comparing data from recent years to previous periods over the last century, and focusing on the signal that the current levels of Jewish migration from Europe send about the political realities perceived and experienced by European Jews.
Some of the key findings in this report:
Peak periods of Jewish migration in the past century – from Germany in the 1930s, North Africa in the 1960s and the Former Soviet Union in the 1990s, saw 50%-75% of national Jewish populations migrate in no more than a decade;
No European Jewish population has shown signs of migration at anywhere near that level for several decades, although recent patterns from Russia and Ukraine point to that possibility over the coming years;
France, Belgium, Italy and Spain saw strong surges in Jewish emigration in the first half of the 2010s, which declined subsequently, but not as far as pre-surge levels;
However, the higher levels of migration measured in these counties during the last decade have not reached the critical values indicating any serious Jewish ‘exodus’ from them;
For Russian and Ukrainian Jews, 2022 was a watershed year: if migration from these countries continues for seven years at the levels seen in 2022 and early 2023, 80%-90% of the 2021 Jewish population of Ukraine and 50%-60% of the 2021 Jewish population of Russia will have emigrated;
Jewish emigration from the UK, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark has mainly been stable or declining since the mid-1980s;
In Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, there has been some decline in Jewish migration over the observed period, with migration eventually settling at a new, lower level.
Abstract: Racism is a challenge to reason, especially scientific reason, since it is possible to demonstrate that human "races" do not exist for science, and that, for example, the genetic difference between two supposed "races" is no greater than that which can separate two individuals within the same "race". Racism is a denier of human rights. In short, whether it is a question of reason or of law, racism clashes head-on with universal values, and the anti-racist struggle should, in this perspective, only be backed by universalism.
Abstract: Visitor Experience at Holocaust Memorials and Museums is the first volume to offer comprehensive insights into visitor reactions to a wide range of museum exhibitions, memorials, and memory sites.
Drawing exclusively upon empirical research, chapters within the book offer critical insights about visitor experience at museums and memory sites in the United States, Poland, Austria, Germany, France, the UK, Norway, Hungary, Australia, and Israel. The contributions to the volume explore visitor experience in all its complexity and argue that visitors are more than just "learners". Approaching visitor experience as a multidimensional phenomenon, the book positions visitor experience within a diverse national, ethnic, cultural, social, and generational context. It also considers the impact of museums’ curatorial and design choices, visitor motivations and expectations, and the crucial role emotions play in shaping understanding of historical events and subjects. By approaching visitors as active interpreters of memory spaces and museum exhibitions, Popescu and the contributing authors provide a much-needed insight into the different ways in which members of the public act as "agents of memory", endowing this history with personal and collective meaning and relevance.
Visitor Experience at Holocaust Memorials and Museums offers significant insights into audience motivation, expectation, and behaviour. It is essential reading for academics, postgraduate students and practitioners with an interest in museums and heritage, visitor studies, Holocaust and genocide studies, and tourism.
Table of Contents
Introduction: Visitors at Holocaust Museums and Memory sites
Diana I. Popescu
Part I: Visitor Experience in Museum Spaces
Mobile Memory; or What Visitors Saw at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Michael Bernard-Donals
Visitor Emotions, Experientiality, Holocaust, and Human Rights: TripAdvisor Responses to the Topography of Terror (Berlin) and the Kazerne Dossin (Mechelen)
Stephan Jaeger
"Really made you feel for the Jews who went through this terrible time in History" Holocaust Audience Re-mediation and Re-narrativization at the Florida Holocaust Museum
Chaim Noy
Understanding Visitors’ Bodily Engagement with Holocaust Museum Architecture: A Comparative Empirical Research at three European Museums
Xenia Tsiftsi
Attention Please: The Tour Guide is Here to Speak Out. The Role of the Israeli Tour Guide at Holocaust Sites in Israel
Yael Shtauber, Yaniv Poria, and Zehavit Gross
The Impact of Emotions, Empathy, and Memory in Holocaust exhibitions: A Study of the National Holocaust Centre & Museum in Nottinghamshire, and the Jewish Museum in London
Sofia Katharaki
The Affective Entanglements of the Visitor Experience at Holocaust Sites and Museums
Adele Nye and Jennifer Clark
Part II: Digital Engagement Inside and Outside the Museum and Memory Site
"…It no longer is the same place": Exploring Realities in the Memorial Falstad Centre with the ‘Falstad Digital Reconstruction and V/AR Guide’
Anette Homlong Storeide
"Ways of seeing". Visitor response to Holocaust Photographs at ‘The Eye as Witness: Recording the Holocaust’ Exhibition
Diana I. Popescu and Maiken Umbach
Dachau from a Distance: The Liberation during The COVID-19 Pandemic
Kate Marrison
Curating the Past: Digital Media and Visitor Experiences at the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe
Christoph Bareither
Diversity, Digital Programming, and the Small Holocaust Education Centre: Examining Paths and Obstacles to Visitor Experience
Laura Beth Cohen and Cary Lane
Part III: Visitors at Former Camp Sites
The Unanticipated Visitor: A Case Study of Response and Poetry at Sites of Holocaust Memory
Anna Veprinska
"Did you have a good trip?" Young people’s Reflections on Visiting the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum and the Town of Oświęcim
Alasdair Richardson
Rewind, Relisten, Rethink: The Value of Audience Reception for Grasping Art’s Efficacy
Tanja Schult
"The value of being there" -Visitor Experiences at German Holocaust Memorial Sites
Doreen Pastor
"Everyone Talks About the Wind": Temporality, Climate, and the More-than Representational Landscapes of the Mémorial du Camp de Rivesaltes
Ian Cantoni
Guiding or Obscuring? Visitor Engagement with Treblinka’s Audio Guide and Its Sonic Infrastructure
Kathryn Agnes Huether
Abstract: In the early years of the 21st century it appeared that the memory of the Holocaust was secure in Western Europe; that, in order to gain entry into the European Union, the countries of Eastern Europe would have to acknowledge their compatriots' complicity in genocide. Fifteen year later, the landscape looks starkly different. Shedding fresh light on these developments, The Perversion of Holocaust Memory explores the politicization and distortion of Holocaust remembrance since 1989.
This innovative book opens with an analysis of events across Europe which buttressed confidence in the stability of Holocaust memory and brought home the full extent of nations' participation in the Final Solution. And yet, as Judith M. Hughes reveals in later chapters, mainstream accountability began to crumble as the 21st century progressed: German and Jewish suffering was equated; anti-Semitic rhetoric re-entered contemporary discourse; populist leaders side-stepped inconvenient facts; and, more recently with the revival of ethno-nationalism, Holocaust remembrance has been caught in the backlash of the European refugee crisis.
The four countries analyzed here – France, Germany, Hungary, and Poland – could all claim to be victims of Nazi Germany, the Allies or the Communist Soviet Union but they were also all perpetrators. Ultimately, it is this complex legacy which Hughes adroitly untangles in her sophisticated study of Holocaust memory in modern Europe.
Abstract: The ADL Global 100: An Index of AntisemitismTM is the most extensive poll on antisemitic attitudes ever conducted, involving 102 countries and territories. The ADL Global 100: An Index of Antisemitism has provided crucial insights into national and regional attitudes toward Jews around the world, the levels of acceptance of antisemitic stereotypes and knowledge of the Holocaust.
In 2023, ADL released a focused survey that included 10 European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Spain, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.
First conducted in 2014, with follow up surveys in select countries since that time, this data is utilized by policy makers, researchers, Jewish communities, NGOs and journalists around the globe. The findings allow understanding of the magnitude of antisemitic attitudes around the world, and exactly which anti-Jewish beliefs are the most seriously entrenched.
The 2023 survey found that roughly one out of every four residents of the European countries polled for the 2023 survey harbored antisemitic attitudes. This result is consistent with the survey’s 2019 findings, showing that antisemitism continues to be entrenched across Europe. At least one in three respondents in Western European countries believe that Jews are more loyal to Israel than the countries they reside in. In Eastern Europe, the most commonly held stereotypes is that of Jewish economic control and the perception of Jews as clannish.
Among the questions asked of respondents, 11 questions measuring general acceptance of various negative Jewish stereotypes were used to compile an index that has served as a benchmark for ADL polling around the world since 1964. Survey respondents who said at least 6 out of the 11 statements are “probably true” are considered to harbor antisemitic attitudes.
The survey was fielded between November 2022 and January 2023 with 500 nationally representative samples in each of the eight European countries and 1,000 nationally representative samples in Russia and Ukraine, respectively.
Abstract: Existing scholarship on contemporary antisemitism tends to sacrifice breadth for depth, typically focusing on a specific dimension of the phenomenon or a single national or ideological context. This myopia threatens to limit our understanding of current antisemitism because separate parts of a complex picture are studied in isolation, and because crucial questions about temporal and cross-national variation remain understudied. To help remedy this situation, this article introduces a more comprehensive conceptual and empirical framework along with a new dataset intended to encourage the study of antisemitism as a multidimensional, cross-national, and dynamic phenomenon. The framework provides a model for studying antisemitism in four core dimensions—attitudes, incidents, cultural imagery, and Jews’ exposure—and specifies relevant variables and indicators, thus facilitating future research and data collection efforts. To supplement the framework, the article introduces a new dataset (DIMA—Dimensions of Antisemitism) featuring publicly available data covering three of the four dimensions: attitudes, incidents, and exposure. Based on patterns emerging from these data, hypotheses for further study are suggested. These contributions are intended to prepare the ground for a new and theoretically more ambitious research agenda in the field of contemporary antisemitism research.
Abstract: Muslim–Jewish relations have a long and complex history. However, notions that all Jews and Muslims are eternal enemies are proven wrong both historically and by today’s survey data. A comprehensive review of the available survey data from the last two decades provides a glimpse into the views of Muslims and Jews of each other in countries where both communities are a minority. It is based on surveys from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S., including more than 91,000 respondents, comprising almost 27,000 Muslims and, in additional surveys, more than 52,000 Jewish respondents. Many Muslims and Jews acknowledge that the other community suffers from discrimination, albeit to varying degrees. Jews often see Islam and Muslim extremists as a threat to Jews, but most Jews, more than society in general, seem to distinguish between Muslim extremists and Muslims in general. Antisemitic attitudes are significantly higher among Muslims than among the general population in all surveys, even though the majority of Muslims in most European countries and in the United States do not exhibit antisemitic attitudes. The differences in anti-Jewish attitudes between Muslims and non-Muslims do not disappear when controlling for sociodemographic factors.
Abstract: The increase in the number of anti-Semitic acts since the start of the Second Intifada has sparked off a broad debate on the return of anti-Semitism in France. This article focuses on the question whether this anti-Semitism is still based on the alleged superiority of the Aryan race as in the time of Nazism, or if it does represent the birth of a „new Judeophobia“ that is more based on anti-Zionism and the polemical mixing of „Jews“, „Israelis“, and „Zionists“. One supposed effect of this transformation is that anti-Semitism is in the process of changing camps and migrating from the extreme right to the extreme left of the political arena, to the „alter“-globalizers, the communists, and the „neo-Trotskyists“.
Questions that will be answered in this article are: Are anti-Jewish views on the increase in France today? Do these opinions correlate or not with negative opinions of other minorities, notably Maghrebians and Muslims? Do they tend to develop among voters and sympathizers with the extreme right or on the extreme left of the political spectrum? And how are they related to opinions concerning Zionism and the Israelo-Palestinian conflict?
The evaluation of the transformations in French anti-Semitism will rely on two types of data. The first is police and gendarmerie statistics published by the National Consultative Committee on Human Rights (CNCDH), which is charged with presenting the prime minister with an annual report on the struggle against racism and xenophobia in France. The other is data from surveys, notably surveys commissioned by CNCDH for its annual report and surveys conducted at the Center for Political Research (CEVIPOF) at Sciences Po (Paris Institute for Political Research). They show that anti-Semitic opinions follow a different logic from acts, that the social, cultural and political profile of anti-Semites remains very close to that of other types of racists, and that anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism do not overlap exactly.
