Abstract: Syrian refugees have become a significant minority in Germany over the past decade, with approximately one million now residing in the country. Most of them plan to stay and are eager to integrate into German society. Alongside practical challenges such as uncertain legal status, securing housing, finding employment, facing racism, and learning the German language, they must also navigate an ideological environment where common views on the Middle East, Islam, Israel, Jews, and the Holocaust differ significantly from those in their home country. This necessitates a certain degree of adaptation. Based on qualitative interviews with more than 200 Arab and Kurdish Syrian refugees, we examine self-perceptions, views on developments in the Middle East, and attitudes toward Jews. Significant differences emerged between Arab and Kurdish respondents. Especially among Syrian Kurds, there’s a noticeable openness to challenge antisemitic attitudes, often motivated by a rejection of Arab nationalist ideology and anti-Zionist propaganda. Syrian Kurds often perceive Jews and Israel more favorably than Arab Syrians. Their history of discrimination and oppression in Syria contributes to their rejection of hatred of Jews and Israel.
Abstract: The report looks into what Jews in the UK think of key Israeli political leaders and the country’s future, drawing on data from the responses of over 4,500 adult British Jews, members of the JPR Research Panel, to the JPR Jewish Current Affairs Survey, held in June-July 2024. The report reveals that levels of pessimism about Israel’s current situation have increased significantly among British Jews when compared to data gathered before the October 7 attacks on Israel and the war in Gaza.
Some of the main findings in this report:
Three-quarters (74%) of Jews in the UK describe Israel’s situation as “bad” (37%) or “very bad” (37%), increasing from 57% measured in Apr/May 2023. Overall, Jews in the UK characterise Israel’s current state more negatively than Israelis.
95% of adult British Jews have an opinion on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the most widely known leader among those examined. Four in five Jews hold an unfavourable opinion of him, with 65% saying they “strongly disapprove” and 15% saying they “somewhat” disapprove of him.
Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich (-78%), Minister of Security Itamar Ben-Gvir (-77%) and Netanyahu (-68%) are the Israeli leaders British Jews least approve of when looking at their net approval ratings. Former Prime Minister Yair Lapid (+12%) and former Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister Benny Gantz (+10%) are the only two leaders showing positive net ratings among those examined.
Lapid is the only leader examined showing an increase in net approval rate compared to data from before October 7.
Politically ‘right-leaning’ Jews were much more likely to approve of Netanyahu than those who are ‘left-leaning’.
Abstract: As a consequence of the Holocaust, Israel’s security is officially regarded as part of Germany’s
“reason of state”. Yet the criteria for a responsible relationship between Germany and Israel are by
no means self-evident or without logical or practical contradictions. One of the complications is
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In order to better understand this complication, I examine two
familiar national narratives, one from each side, about possible connections between the Nazi era,
the Holocaust, and this conflict. I also put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a broader historical
context. It turns out that the examined relationships are not as obvious as the familiar narratives
describe them. The origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are older than the Nazi era and the
Holocaust, and they also point to broader European responsibilities more generally, to Europe’s
nationalism, anti-Semitism, colonialism and imperialism – with irresponsibilities towards both
Jews and Arabs. In no way does such a comprehensive perspective affect Germany’s special historical responsibilities resulting from the Holocaust. But it puts the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a
more complete and also more honest framework, with consequences for Germany’s moral and
political position
Abstract: The Gaza War is a watershed moment not only in the Middle East. It has also increased political divisions in Germany, where Israel’s security and the fight against anti-Semitism are part of its historical legacy and political and moral identity. Incidents of anti-Semitism have increased dramatically, as have overdrawn accusations of it. An analysis of controversies about the definition of anti-Semitism, about the use of the term apartheid for the situation in the West Bank, of the BDS movement (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions), and particularly the characterization
of Israel as a settler-colonial state shows how difficult it has become to maintain a fair, honest, and frank discussion considering different points of view. The current crisis should be used as an opportunity for Germany to, on the one hand, face the unavoidable contradictions in its responsibilities stemming from the crimes of its Nazi past and, on the other hand, come to grips not only with Arab and Iranian terrorism and eliminationist rhetoric but also with the deficiencies in Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians. Germany’s new leitmotiv ought to be: ‘Between the River
and the Sea, Jews and Arabs should be free.’
Abstract: Les différentes réalités de l’antisémitisme sont enfin objectivées.
L’Institut Jonathas présente les résultats du premier sondage réalisé en Belgique sur la perception des Juifs, de l’antisémitisme, des autres minorités et de la guerre en cours à Gaza et en Israël.
Créé en mars 2024, l’Institut Jonathas est un centre d’études et d’action contre l’antisémitisme et contre tout ce qui le favorise en Belgique. Il a demandé à IPSOS d’objectiver et de mesurer, à la veille des élections du 9 juin, les opinions des Belges sur des sujets qui sont au cœur de sa raison d’être.
IPSOS a interrogé, du 8 au 12 mai, un échantillon de 1.000 personnes, représentatif de la population belge de 18 ans et plus, avec le même panel et la même méthodologie que pour les sondages politiques.
En l’absence de sondages pouvant tenir lieu de points de comparaison en Belgique, plusieurs questions ont été reprises de sondages récents menés en France par IPSOS ou par IFOP. Les résultats français sont indiqués ci-après, lorsque la comparaison avec les résultats belges est pertinente.
Le sondage réalisé par IPSOS pour l’Institut Jonathas met en lumière et objective les différentes facettes de l’image des Juifs et de l’antisémitisme dans la société belge :
Une image très moyenne des Juifs, 80 ans après la Shoah.
Des marqueurs d’antisémitisme primaire prégnants dans toutes les composantes de la société belge et sur-représentés à l’extrême-gauche, à l’extrême-droite et chez les musulmans
En plus de ces préjugés « traditionnels » (argent, pouvoir, religion…), des marqueurs d’antisémitisme dit « secondaire », aboutissant à banaliser la Shoah et à nazifier Israël
Une méconnaissance générale des Juifs, du judaïsme et de la réalité de l’antisémitisme en Belgique
Trois premières sources d’antisémitisme en Belgique, selon les Belges : l’hostilité à Israël, l’islamisme radical et les préjugés sur les Juifs
Un écho limité chez les Belges des sujets relatifs à Israël, à la Palestine et à la guerre, à l’exception d’une minorité dont certains éléments souhaitent la destruction de l’Etat d’Israël
Distance ou indifférence d’environ 50% des Belges vis-à-vis de la guerre entre Israël et le Hamas, mais aussi polarisation sur ce conflit de segments précis de la population belge.
La guerre, source d’inquiétude pour les Juifs en Belgique selon la majorité des Belges, mais aussi matière à hostilité contre les Juifs en Belgique pour une minorité de Belges
Un antisémitisme s’inscrivant dans une société belge plutôt tendue et inquiète concernant ses relations avec les différents groupes minoritaires et, en particulier, les musulmans et les Maghrébins.
Abstract: This study considers the flying of Palestinian flags by Celtic Football Club supporters in Scotland as an illustration of political activism in sport. Despite being over 4000 kilometres away and holding no ethnic, national or religious connections with any community involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle-East, fans wave these flags to demonstrate backing for Palestinian people. With reference to an historical context of the ethno-religious origins of Celtic FC and its supporting fanbase being significantly composed of members of a multi-generational Irish-Catholic diasporic minority community in Scotland, through utilizing fan writings, self-representations, and the results of a small survey of supporters, this research provides for deeper understanding of the intermittent use of sport as a space for ‘taking sides’ in conflicts that have ethnic, national, religious, and political resonances. Critically, this insight also offers important reflections regarding narratives of antisemitism in football and beyond.
Abstract: Quelques jours après l’attaque du Hamas en Israël, l’IFOP a réalisé pour le Journal du Dimanche, un sondage destiné à comprendre quelles étaient les représentations des Français à l’égard du conflit et de son impact sur une éventuelle importation de violences antisémites en France.
Premier enseignement de cette étude, le conflit au Proche-Orient apparaît comme particulièrement anxiogène. 86% des Français indiquent être inquiets (36% « tout à fait inquiets »), soit un niveau d’inquiétude proche de celui mesuré au début du conflit russo-ukrainien. Le sentiment d’inquiétude atteint son acmé dans certains segments de la population traditionnellement plus favorables à l’Etat Hébreu : les plus de 65 ans (44% de tout à fait inquiets parmi les plus de 65 ans contre 25% parmi les 18-24 ans) ou encore les électeurs de Valérie Pécresse (50% de « tout à fait inquiets »).
Deuxième enseignement de cette étude : les Français établissent clairement un lien entre les évènements au Proche-Orient et l’importation de violences antisémites en France. 48% des sondés estiment ainsi que les Français de confession juive sont plus en danger et 79% se déclarent inquiets que le conflit se traduise par une augmentation des actes antisémites.
Plus globalement, les Français identifient bien les « nouvelles formes d’antisémitisme » comme étant des causes à ce phénomène : 77% citent le rejet et la haine d’Israël, 76% les idées islamistes, soit des niveaux supérieurs à ceux mesurés pour les idées d’extrême droite (66%).
Dernier point, les pouvoirs publics bénéficient d’une certaine mansuétude dans l’opinion : 60% des Français estiment leur faire confiance pour assurer la sécurité des Français de confession juive. Jean-Luc Mélenchon suscite en revanche la défiance sur ce sujet : il apparait comme la personnalité politique qui suscite le moins de confiance pour lutter contre l’antisémitisme (17%), loin derrière Edouard Philippe (46%), Gerald Darmanin (42%), Marine Le Pen (42%) ou encore Emmanuel Macron (41%).
Abstract: This chapter introduces the notion of ‘enabling concepts’: concepts which may or may not themselves constitute a mode of hate speech, but which through their broad social acceptability facilitate or legitimate the articulation of concepts which can be more directly classed as hate speech. We argue that each distinct hate ideology will contain its own, partly overlapping set of ‘enabling concepts.’ In this chapter, we will focus on the enabling role of references to apartheid for the constitution of antisemitism in British online discourse around Israel. This argument does not rest on agreement as to whether the ‘apartheid analogy’—comparisons between contemporary Israel and the former Apartheid regime in South Africa—itself constitutes a form of antisemitism. The chapter draws on qualitative analysis of more than 10,000 user comments posted on social media profiles of mainstream media in the UK, undertaken by the Decoding Antisemitism project in the wake of the May 2021 escalation phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We will show how web commenters frequently use the apartheid analogy to trigger more extreme antisemitic stereotypes, including age-old tropes, intensifying and distorting analogies (such as Nazi comparisons) or calls for Israel’s elimination. The results will be presented in detail based on a pragmalinguistic approach taking into account the immediate context of the comment thread and broader world knowledge. Both of these aspects are relevant preconditions for examining all forms of antisemitic hate speech that can remain undetected when conducting solely statistical analysis. Based on this large dataset, we suggest that—under the cover of its widespread social acceptability—the apartheid analogy thus facilitates the articulation and legitimation of extreme antisemitic concepts that would, without this prior legitimation, be more likely to be rejected or countered.
Abstract: Over the past 3.5 years, the Decoding Antisemitism research project has been analysing antisemitism on the internet in terms of content, structure, and frequency. Over this time, there has been no shortage of flashpoints which have generated antisemitic responses. Yet the online response to the Hamas attacks of 7 October and the subsequent Israeli operations in Gaza has surpassed anything the project has witnessed before. In no preceding escalation phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict has the predominant antisemitic reaction been one of open jubilation and joy over the deaths of Israeli Jews. As demonstrated in the sixth and final Discourse Report, this explicit approval of the Hamas attacks was the primary response from web users. The response to 7 October therefore represents a turning point in antisemitic online discourse, and its repercussions will be felt long into the future.
The report contains analysis of the various stages of online reactions to events in the Middle East, from the immediate aftermath to the Israeli retaliations and subsequent accusations of genocide against Israel. As well as examining online reactions in the project’s core focus—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—this report also, for the first time, extends its view to analyse Israel-related web discourses in six further countries, including those in Southern and Eastern Europe as well as in North Africa. Alongside reactions to the escalation phase, the report also examines online responses to billionaire Elon Musk’s explosive comments about Jewish individuals and institutions.
Additionally, the report provides a retrospective overview of the project’s development over the past 3.5 years, tracking its successes and challenges, particularly regarding the conditions for successful interdisciplinary work and the ability of machine learning to capture the versatility and complexity of authentic web communication.
To mark the publication of the report, we are also sharing our new, interactive data visualisations tool, which lets you examine any two discourse events analysed by our research team between 2021 and 2023. You can compare the frequencies and co-occurrences of antisemitic concepts and speech acts by type and by country, look at frequencies of keywords in antisemitic comments, and plot keyword networks.
Topics: Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Discourse, Antisemitism: Monitoring, Internet, Social Media, Main Topic: Antisemitism, War, Terrorism, Attitudes to Israel, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS)
Abstract: This article follows up on assumptions of Rogers Brubaker and Benjamin Moffitt, according to whom, some Western and Northern European right-wing populist parties use ‘civilisationist’ and liberal-illiberal narratives that are, for instance, characterised by a ‘philo-Semitic stance’. The paper analyses to what extent the German right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) fits into this concept, considering the party’s ambivalent attitude towards Judaism, Jews, and Israel. Using qualitative content analysis, the study is based on an examination of AfD electoral manifestos and parliamentary documents from the federal level as well as from states such as Berlin, Baden-Württemberg, and Thuringia between 2014 and 2019. Our results reveal differences that range from open anti-Semitic statements to self-definitions as a ‘pro-Jewish’ party. We argue that different positions can be explained by regionally divergent discursive opportunity structures as well as personnel heterogeneity across the party sections under study. Furthermore, we reason that a combination of anti-Semitic and pro-Jewish/Israeli statements fits into the AfD’s strategy of addressing both voters from the radical right with anti-Semitic prejudices and more moderate, conservative voters that reject open hostility towards Jews and Israel. We conclude that the AfD fulfils Brubaker’s and Moffitt’s concepts only to a rather limited extent.
Abstract: In this report:
Five weeks after the barbaric attack on innocent Israeli civilians by Hamas, this factsheet uses data from recent polling by two major polling agencies, Ipsos and YouGov, alongside historical data on these issues, to shed light on what people in the UK think about the conflict, where their sympathies lie, and what they believe the British government should do in response to the latest events in Israel and Gaza.
Some of the key findings in this report:
Since the 7 October attack, the proportion of British adults sympathising with the Israeli side has doubled from a pre-war level of about 10% to about 20%, whereas sympathy for the Palestinian side has fallen by a few percentage points from 24% to around 15%-21%;
Nevertheless, levels of sympathy for the Palestinian side have been gradually climbing since October 7, and are now approaching their pre-war levels;
Young adults are much more likely to sympathise with the Palestinians than the Israelis; older people hold the opposite view;
British adults are over twice as likely to think that Israel does not try to minimise harm to civilians than it does make such efforts;
British adults are more likely to think the UK should be more critical toward Israel than it has been, as opposed to more supportive. The younger respondents are, the more likely they are to believe the UK should be more critical;
British adults are twice as likely to think the police should be making more arrests at pro-Palestinian demonstrations than less, though there is are clear generational differences of opinion on this issue;
Almost all subgroups think the police should arrest people who openly support Hamas at demonstrations in the UK.
Abstract: Antisemitische Feindbilder sind bei arabischen Flüchtlingen weit verbreitet. Dies belegt eine Studie, welche vom American Jewish Committee (AJC) in Auftrag gegeben wurde.
„Bisher beruhte diese wichtige Diskussion, etwa zum Thema Antisemitismus, lediglich auf der Ebene von Vermutungen. Nun haben wir ein wissenschaftlich-fundiertes Bild: Judenfeindliche Ressentiments, antisemitische Verschwörungstheorien und eine kategorische Ablehnung Israels sind bei vielen Flüchtlingen aus dem arabischen Raum weit verbreitet. Dies ist angesichts der tiefen Verwurzelung des Judenhasses in arabischen Ländern zwar nicht verwunderlich, dennoch hat uns die Klarheit einiger Aussagen überrascht. Das Problem ist komplexer als von manch einem angenommen“, sagte Deidre Berger, Direktorin des AJC Berlin Ramer Institute.
Die Studie wurde von dem Historiker und Antisemitismusforscher Dr. Günther Jikeli (Indiana University/Universität Potsdam) in Berlin durchgeführt. Hierfür wurden 68 Geflüchtete (18-52 Jahre) aus Syrien und dem Irak in Gruppeninterviews befragt. Eine aktuell laufende Folgestudie vom Forscher mit 85 Befragten bestätigt die Ergebnisse.
„Wir haben die Studie in Auftrag gegeben, um Antworten über Einstellungen zu Juden, Israel und demokratischen Werten unter Flüchtlingen aus dem arabischen Raum zu bekommen. Die Erkenntnisse sind von großer Bedeutung für die Frage, wie die Integration von Geflüchteten gelingen kann“, so Berger weiter. „Die Ergebnisse der Studie sind erschütternd, aber nicht alle Flüchtlinge sind gleich und unser Verständnis muss viel differenzierter werden. Gerade diejenigen, die in Syrien oder dem Irak als religiöse oder ethnische Minderheiten verfolgt wurden, positionieren sich häufiger gegen Antisemitismus und für Israel."
Abstract: First International Resources was commissioned by the AntiDefamation League to research attitudes and opinions toward Jews, the Middle East and the global financial crisis in sevenEuropean countries.
¾ Our research focused on the attitudes of the general public in
Austria, France, Hungary, Poland, Germany, Spain and the
United Kingdom.
¾ Data results for each individual country were weighted based
on age and gender. The completed interview data underwent
minor weighting to national population data using official
government information on age and gender.
¾ In addition to the individual country results, we have compiled
overall statistics which take into account the findings from the
seven countries surveyed as a whole. These figures are
combined results from our surveys, with each country’s
findings being weighted equally as one-seventh of the whole.
¾ Fieldwork was done by Taylor Nelson Sofres (TNS), which
conducted a total of 3,500 telephone interviews -- 500 in each of
the seven countries -- among the general public between
December 1, 2008 – January 13, 2009.
¾ Interviews were conducted in the native language of each of the
countries and were completed by TNS.
¾ The margin of error for each country is +/- 4 at 95% level of
confidence.
Abstract: First International Resources was commissioned by the AntiDefamation League to research attitudes and opinions toward Jews in twelve European countries.
• Our research focused on the prevalent attitudes of the general public
in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and for the first time,
Poland and Hungary.
• Data results for each individual country were weighted based on age
and gender. The completed interview data underwent minor weighting
to national population data using official government information on
age and gender.
• In addition to the individual country results, we have compiled overall
“European” statistics which take into account the findings from the
twelve countries surveyed as a whole. These “European” figures are
combined results from our surveys, with each country’s findings being
weighted equally as one-twelfth of the whole.
• Fieldwork was done by Taylor Nelson Sofres, which conducted a total
of 6,000 telephone interviews -- 500 in each of the twelve countries --
among the general public between April 11 -- May 6, 2005.
• Interviews were conducted in the native language of each of the
countries and were completed by TNS.
• The margin of error for each country is +/- 4.5 at 95% level of
confidence.
Abstract: First International Resources was commissioned by the AntiDefamation League to research attitudes and opinions in ten European countries toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
• Our research focused on the prevalent attitudes of the general public
in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland.
• Data results for each individual country were weighted based on age
and gender. The completed interview data underwent minor weighting
to national population data using official government information on
age and gender.
• Fieldwork was done by Taylor Nelson Sofres, which conducted a total
of 5,000 telephone interviews -- 500 in each of the ten countries --
among the general public between March 16-April 8, 2004.
• Interviews were conducted in the native language of each of the
countries and were completed by TNS.
• The margin of error for each country is +/- 4.4 at 95% level of
confidence.
Abstract: Many in Europe today are concerned about the rise in violence against Jews, which clearly raises fears in Jewish communities on the Continent. Neither Jewish communities nor individual Jews can be protected unless there is data on antisemitic incidents and scientifically thorough situation analysis. We need to know and analyze the current social attitudes related to antisemitism, to the coexistence with Jews, mutually held prejudices, related taboos in a representative sample of the European countries’ population.
This is the reason why we have launched the largest European antisemitism survey. The research, initiated by the Action and Protection League and carried out by the polling companies Ipsos and Inspira, aims to provide a comprehensive picture of antisemitic prejudice in 16 countries in the European Union.
Data were collected between December 2019 and January 2020 in 16 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 1000 people were surveyed in each country.
We used a total of 24 questions to measure antisemitism. We measured the cognitive and conative dimensions of prejudice with 10 questions, and three additional questions for the affective dimension of antisemitism, that is, to measure the emotional charge of antisemitic prejudice. We mapped secondary antisemitism relativizing the Holocaust with seven questions and antisemitic hostility against Israel with four questions. We used two and three questions, respectively, to measure sympathy for Jews and for Israel.
With the exception of questions about affective antisemitism, all questions were asked in the same form: Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point scale how much they agreed with the statements in the question (strongly agree; tend to agree; neither agree nor disagree; tend to disagree; strongly disagree).
Abstract: Many in Europe today are concerned about the rise in violence against Jews, which clearly raises fears in Jewish communities on the Continent. Neither Jewish communities nor individual Jews can be protected unless there is data on antisemitic incidents and scientifically thorough situation analysis. We need to know and analyze the current social attitudes related to antisemitism, to the coexistence with Jews, mutually held prejudices, related taboos in a representative sample of the European countries’ population.
This is the reason why we have launched the largest European antisemitism survey. The research, initiated by the Action and Protection League and carried out by the polling companies Ipsos and Inspira, aims to provide a comprehensive picture of antisemitic prejudice in 16 countries in the European Union.
Data were collected between December 2019 and January 2020 in 16 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 1000 people were surveyed in each country.
We used a total of 24 questions to measure antisemitism. We measured the cognitive and conative dimensions of prejudice with 10 questions, and three additional questions for the affective dimension of antisemitism, that is, to measure the emotional charge of antisemitic prejudice. We mapped secondary antisemitism relativizing the Holocaust with seven questions and antisemitic hostility against Israel with four questions. We used two and three questions, respectively, to measure sympathy for Jews and for Israel.
With the exception of questions about affective antisemitism, all questions were asked in the same form: Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point scale how much they agreed with the statements in the question (strongly agree; tend to agree; neither agree nor disagree; tend to disagree; strongly disagree).
Abstract: This article analyzes the attitudes of 25 refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, now living in Germany, toward Jews, the Holocaust, Israel, and the Middle East conflict. It reveals both anti-Jewish and anti-Israel sentiments among many of the respondents, as well as a lack of knowledge about the Holocaust, and a wide range of attitudes between individual participants. Some of the factors influencing attitudes include everyday knowledge in the countries of origin, Arab nationalism, as well as specific religious and ethnic identities. The findings are discussed in relation to other recent studies, and against the backdrop of German media discourse, current debates about an “imported” antisemitism among refugees and migrants, and the relationship between experiences of racial discrimination and anti-Jewish attitudes.
Abstract: Unbestritten sind anti-jüdische Einstellungen unter Muslimen weit verbreitet. Aber warum? Die gängigen Definitionen und Erkenntnismuster, erklärt David Ranan, reichen nicht mehr aus, um den Antisemitismus vieler Muslime zu beschreiben. Hat das Ganze nur mit dem Nahostkonflikt zu tun oder sind Muslime grundsätzlich antisemitisch? Ist Judenhass ein integraler Teil des Islam? Oder ist er eine Erscheinungsform des Islamismus?
Um eine Antwort zu finden, hat Ranan mehr als 70 Interviews mit jungen muslimischen Studierenden und Akademikern vor allem in Deutschland geführt. Im Zentrum standen ihre Haltungen und Gefühle zu Juden, Judentum, dem Holocaust und Israel und schließlich die Frage, wie sie sich zu Deutschland stellen, seiner Israelpolitik und seiner Geschichtskultur. Mit den Ergebnissen der Gespräche, die er in die historischen Beziehungen zwischen Juden und Muslimen und den ungelösten Nahostkonflikt einbettet, zeigt Ranan, dass dieses brisante, heftig umkämpfte Feld neu angegangen werden muss.
Abstract: Describes and gives results of an opinion poll conducted by the American Jewish Committee, working with D3 Systems, a U.S. opinion-research organization, and the Emnid Institute, a similar organization in Germany (both West and East) in October 1990. The questionnaires included questions concerning the memory of the Holocaust, special relations between Germany and Israel, Jewish influence in the world, Zionism, and the danger of antisemitism in contemporary Germany. Results showed that disturbingly high percentages of the population exhibited negative attitudes toward Jews, Israel, and remembrance of the Holocaust. (From the Bibliography of the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism)
Abstract: Contemporary expressions of Judeophobia—in Germany, as elsewhere in Europe—contain a potentially explosive mix of traditional and newer forms of antisemitism. Since 9/11, and especially in the wake of the Iraq war, anti-Americanism has been a potent factor in envenoming hostile attitudes to Israel and the Jews—as alleged architects of the war, and “aggressors” in the Middle East. Conspiracy theories, with an antisemitic subtext, have flourished on the Left and in the mainstream media, as well as on the far Right. One-sided representations of the Middle East conflict, downplaying Palestinian terrorism, the threat posed by radical Islam and the genocidal antisemitism rampant in the Muslim and Arab media—while highlighting Israeli counter-violence as gratuitous sadism—have contributed to fostering anti-Jewish feelings. “AntiSharonism” has been widely used as a cover to present Israel as a
“criminal” state in its essence.
Such commentaries reinforce long-standing and widespread antiJewish stereotypes, revealed by surveys of German public opinion over the years—especially those related to Jewish money, power, and exploitative “abuse” of the Holocaust. Much of contemporary German antisemitism can best be understood as a form of ressentiment against constant reminders of the Nazi past and the desire to reverse the roles, to turn Israelis/Jews into “perpetrators”
and Germans into “victims.”
Abstract: In late 2017, JPR published a major study of attitudes towards Jews and Israel among the population of Great Britain, a project supported by the Community Security Trust and the Department for Communities and Local Government. We regard it as a groundbreaking piece of work - the first study conducted anywhere that empirically demonstrates a clear connection between extreme hostility towards Israel and more traditional forms of antipathy towards Jews.
This report explores this connection yet further, focusing specifically on two particularly prevalent ideas that are often experienced by Jews as antisemitic: the contention that Israel is 'an apartheid state' and that it should be subjected to a boycott.
In the first instance, the study finds that large proportions of people actually have no view at all on these ideas, either because they do not know anything about the issues, or because they are simply unsure of where they stand on them. This is particularly the case for young people and women - knowledge levels improve and opinions sharpen the older people are, and, as has been found in numerous other studies, women tend to be less opinionated than men on these types of political issues.
However, among those who do have a view, 21% agree with the contention that 'Israel is an apartheid state,' 5% strongly so, and 10% endorse the argument that 'people should boycott Israeli goods and products (3% strongly so). About the same proportion (18%) disagrees with the apartheid contention as agree with it, but a much higher proportion disagrees with the boycott one (47%) than agrees with it.
Disagreement with the boycott idea is higher in older age bands than in younger ones, increasingly so among those aged 40-plus, a phenomenon that is not found in relation to the apartheid contention. But the ideas are not particularly sensitive to educational level - both agreement and disagreement with both contentions increase the higher the educational qualification achieved.
However, clear distinctions can be found when looking at the data through the lens of religion, with Muslims much more likely than other groups to support both contentions.
The report goes on to explore the correlations between these views and more traditional anti-Jewish ones, and finds clear links between the two, although this is more the case with the boycott idea than the apartheid one. However, it also notes that the correlation is stronger with other anti-Israel beliefs, particularly those arguing that Israel exploits the Holocaust for its own purposes, and those claiming that Israel is excessively powerful or the primary cause of troubles in the Middle East.
Abstract: In the discourse surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, extreme criticisms of Israel (e.g., Israel is an apartheid state,theIsrael Defense Forces deliberately target Palestinian civilians),coupled with extreme policy proposals (e.g., boycott of Israeli academics and institutions, divest from companies doing business with Israel), have sparked counterclaims that such criticisms are anti-Semitic (for only Israel is singled out). The research in this article shines a different, statistical light on this question: based on a survey of 500 citizens in each of 10 European countries, the authors ask whether those individuals with extreme anti-Israel views are more likely to be anti-Semitic. Even after controlling for numerous potentially confounding factors, they find that anti-Israel sentiment consistently predicts the probability that an individual is anti-Semitic, with the likelihood of measured anti-Semitism increasing with the extent of anti-Israel sentiment observed.
