Abstract: This groundbreaking report released by the JPR European Demography Unit finds that 630,000 ex-pat Israelis live across the world, most of whom choose English-speaking and European countries as their new home. The report notes that an estimated 325,000 children have been born to these Israelis when living abroad, bringing the total number of Israeli migrants and their children to close to a million. The report also finds that in certain destination countries, the proportion of ex-pat Israelis and their families now exceeds 20% of the national Jewish population.
Some of the key findings in this report:
About 630,000 Israelis lived outside Israel in 2021-2023. Of these, 328,000 were born in Israel, and another 302,000 were born elsewhere but acquired Israeli citizenship and lived in Israel during their lives.
Estimating the number of children born to Israelis living abroad, the report concludes there are 955,000 ‘Israel-connected’ people worldwide.
The ‘Israel-connected’ Jewish population currently constitutes 9% of the population of the Jewish Diaspora.
The largest Israel-born Jewish communities are in English-speaking countries (US, Canada, and UK) and European countries (with those in Germany and the UK making up nearly 50% of Israelis living in Europe).
Europe hosts about one-third of Israeli ex-pats but only 16% of all Jews living in the Diaspora.
Israel-born Jews make up nearly half of the Jewish population in Norway, 41% in Finland, and over 20% of the Jewish communities in Bulgaria, Ireland, Spain and Denmark.
Over the past decade, Israeli-born populations have grown significantly in the Baltic countries (up 135%), Ireland (+95%), Bulgaria (+78%), Czechia (+74%), Spain (+39%), The Netherlands (+36%), Germany (+34%) and the UK (+27%).
Israeli ex-pat communities in Europe are among the fastest growing in the world.
Abstract: In this report:
The number of Jewish pupils enrolled in Jewish schools has been climbing consistently for several decades and has increased significantly since the mid-1990s. This rise, described in previous JPR Jewish schools bulletins, has occurred in both the 'mainstream' and the 'Strictly Orthodox' sectors, though at different rates.
According to the latest official figures, while the overall number of registered pupils in 2023/24 shows an increase of 0.2% per annum since figures were last published by JPR three years ago, in the previous year alone, there was a reduction of 471 pupils, or 1.3%. This marks the first decrease in numbers since JPR started collecting data annually in 1995/96.
Some of the key findings in this report:
There are 136 Jewish schools in the UK, a net increase of 3 schools since 2021. The total figure is comprised of 45 mainstream Jewish schools and 91 Strictly Orthodox schools.
36,064 Jewish pupils studied in these schools in the academic year 2023/24. This represents an increase of 239 pupils, or 0.2% per annum since figures were published three years ago.
However, this growth only occurred in the first two years of these three years; in the third year (between 2022/23 and 2023/24), there was a reduction of 471 pupils, or 1.3% - the first decrease in numbers since JPR started collecting data annually in 1995/96.
For the first time, the mainstream sector has decreased across all three years in secondary and primary schools.
The Strictly Orthodox sector saw an overall increase. However, in the last academic year, the number of pupils in Strictly Orthodox schools fell by 358. This is not a result of demographic decline or a change in parental preference; instead, it reflects shifting government policy and practice in schools, reducing the number of children recorded in registered Strictly Orthodox schools.
The balance between registered mainstream and Strictly Orthodox schools has remained stable. 60% of Jewish pupils in Jewish schools are in Strictly Orthodox schools; 40% are in mainstream Jewish schools. This is a significant shift since the mid-1990s when the ratio was 55% mainstream to 45% Strictly Orthodox.
87% of all Jewish pupils in mainstream schools are in Greater London and South Hertfordshire. This distinction is much less pronounced in the Strictly Orthodox sector, with 63% being in London.
Abstract: CST recorded 3,528 antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2024, the second-highest total ever reported to CST in a single calendar year. This is a decrease of 18% from the 4,296 anti-Jewish hate incidents recorded by CST in 2023, which remains the record annual total ever reported, and was fuelled by responses to the 7 October terror attack by Hamas on Israel that year. CST recorded 1,662 antisemitic incidents in 2022, 2,261 in 2021, and 1,684 in 2020.
Although the 3,528 anti-Jewish hate incidents recorded in 2024 is a fall from the all-time high of 2023, it remains an unusually large total: 56% higher than the third-highest annual figure of 2,261 incidents reported in 2021. It is a reflection of the sustained levels of antisemitism that have been recorded across the UK since the Hamas terror attack in Israel on 7 October 2023. CST’s Antisemitic Incidents Report 2023 charted the immediacy and scope of the rise in anti-Jewish hate following that attack, before Israel had set in motion any extensive military response in Gaza. The subsequent ongoing war, and the public attention that it continues to hold, impacted both the volume and content of antisemitism in 2024.
Abstract: The findings of this report demonstrate a concerning rise in antisemitism and anti-Zionism in Europe since October 7, 2023, drawing on extensive data analysis of incidents, trends, online sentiments, and influential figures utilizing Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) methodologies.
Dramatic Increase in Sentiment: There has been a significant and consistent surge in both antisemitic and anti-Zionist sentiments across Europe, among both far-right and far-left groups. This more than 400% increase in hateful content is primarily linked to heightened anti-Israel sentiments following the country s response to the October 7
attacks.
Traditional Antisemitism: While the surge in sentiment correlates with growing anti-Israel sentiment, it has increasingly become intertwined with long-standing antisemitic stereotypes. Narratives suggesting that Jews exert disproportionate control, equating Jews with Nazis, or accusing them of genocidal intentions have
become more prevalent.
Geographical Concentration: The most concerning developments have been observed in the UK, France, and Germany—countries with substantial Jewish populations. This trend underscores the heightened risks faced by these communities, both online and in physical spaces.
Influencers and Content Generators: The primary drivers of antisemitic and anti-Zionist content have been pro-Palestinian advocates (both politicians, groups, and influencers) who o en employ antisemitic rhetoric to advance an anti-Israel agenda. This rhetoric seeks to delegitimize the state of Israel and its right to self-defense in the aftermath of the October 7 attacks.
This report serves as a critical resource for understanding the contemporary landscape of antisemitism and anti-Zionism in Europe, highlighting the urgent need for awareness and action in combating these dangerous trends.
Abstract: NEW YORK, NEW YORK: January 23, 2025—The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (Claims Conference) today released the first-ever, eight-country Index on Holocaust Knowledge and Awareness, exposing a global trend in fading knowledge of basic facts about the Holocaust. The countries surveyed include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Austria, Germany, Poland, Hungary and Romania.
The majority of respondents in each country, except Romania, believe something like the Holocaust (another mass genocide against Jewish people) could happen again today. Concern is highest in the United States, where more than three-quarters (76%) of all adults surveyed believe something like the Holocaust could happen again today, followed by the U.K. at 69%, France at 63%, Austria at 62%, Germany at 61%, Poland at 54%, Hungary at 52%, and Romania at 44%.
Shockingly, some adults surveyed say that they had not heard or weren’t sure if they had heard of the Holocaust (Shoah) prior to taking the survey. This is amplified among young adults ages 18-29 who are the most recent reflection of local education systems; when surveyed, they indicated that they had not heard or weren’t sure if they had heard of the Holocaust (Shoah): France (46%), Romania (15%), Austria (14%) and Germany (12%). Additionally, while Auschwitz-Birkenau is the most well-known camp, nearly half (48%) of Americans surveyed are unable to name a single camp or ghetto established by the Nazis during World War II.
On a more positive note, there is overwhelming support for Holocaust education. Across all countries surveyed, nine-in-10 or more adults believe it is important to continue teaching about the Holocaust, in part, so it does not happen again.
Abstract: W ramach półrocznego badania podjęliśmy działania mające na celu sprawdzenie, czy i kiedy nienawistne treści o charakterze antysemickim są usuwane przez międzynarodowe i polskie serwisy IT po otrzymaniu zgłoszenia od użytkowniczek i użytkowników o konieczności ich usunięcia. Chcieliśmy także sprawdzić, czy istnieje różnica w usuwaniu nienawistnych treści zgłaszanych przez zwykłych użytkowników a tzw. zaufane podmioty sygnalizujące.
W tym celu przeprowadziliśmy Badanie usuwania treści nielegalnych w internecie (zwane także MRE — Monitoring and Reporting Exercise), testując międzynarodowe platformy internetowe: Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, platforma X (dawniej Twitter) oraz dostawców polskich usług pośrednich: Agora, wp.pl, onet.pl, natemat.pl, dorzeczy.pl i wykop.pl pod kątem stosowania krajowych i unijnych przepisów nakazujących usunięcie lub uniemożliwienie dostępu do treści nielegalnych, w tym mowy nienawiści. Badanie zostało przeprowadzone w momencie wchodzenia w życie nowej unijnej regulacji dotyczącej poprawy bezpieczeństwa w przestrzeni cyfrowej, znanej jako Rozporządzenie 2022/2065 lub Akt o usługach cyfrowych.
Spis treści:
Wstęp
Słowniczek
Ramy prawne
Metodologia
Etapy MRE
Kluczowe dane
Wskaźniki usuwalności zgłoszeń
Wnioski i rekomendacje
Publikacja powstała w ramach projektu Zabezpieczenie naszej społeczności, ochrona naszej demokracji: zwalczanie antysemityzmu poprzez zintegrowane podejście do rzecznictwa i bezpieczeństwa (projekt PROTEUS), współfinansowanego przez Unię Europejską.
Abstract: Current approach to tackling antisemitism not working, our report with the Birkbeck Institute for the Study of Antisemitism shows.
Antisemitism is deeply embedded into our common culture; it exists as a reservoir of racist stereotypes and narratives about Jewish people, which are normalised and widespread. Antisemitic incidents have spiked over the last year, particularly in response to the events of October 7th 2023 and the ongoing violence in Gaza. Yet, discussions around antisemitism have become highly politicised in ways that have been detrimental to Jewish communities’ safety and wellbeing.
Particularly damaging is the fact that these politicised discussions have inhibited the possibility of forging anti-racist solidarities with other communities that have been subject to the rise in far-right violence, and to the mainstreaming of racist rhetoric and policies.
Facing antisemitism highlights that:
Antisemitism is hardwired into UK society;
Current methods of defining, measuring and reacting to it are deeply contested and politicised;
The arguments that anti-Zionism always equates to antisemitism prevents meaningful and productive action to eradicate antisemitism in the UK;
Like other forms of racism, antisemitism in the UK consists of hateful attitudes and individual incidents but also institutional and structural racism;
The UK must move beyond framing and discussing antisemitism in ways that pit communities against one another, prohibit solidarity and encourage division;
Combating antisemitism must be undertaken as part of wider anti-racist initiatives, including building alliances with other racialised minorities.
The Runnymede Trust urgently calls for a different approach to combating antisemitism, including from the government and wider anti-racist organisations.
Abstract: The new report by the JPR European Demography Unit estimates the ‘core’ Jewish population in the Netherlands is about 35,000. Furthermore, while the natural balance of Dutch Jews is negative (the population experiences more deaths than births), the Dutch Jewish population is growing slowly as a result of one single factor: migration, mainly from Israel.
The report was launched in Amsterdam in January 2025 in partnership with the Jewish Social Work Foundation/Joods Maatschappelijk Werk (JMW) and the Committee for Demography of Jews in the Netherlands.
Some of the key findings in this report:
The ‘core’ Jewish population of the Netherlands is estimated to be about 35,000 today (a mid-point of a 29,000–41,000 range), constituting 0.2% of the Dutch population.
According to the Israeli Law of Return, which applies to Jews, children and grandchildren of Jews, and all respective spouses, the estimated eligible population in the Netherlands might be as high as 65,000.
The Dutch Jewish population experiences more deaths than births and cannot grow on its own. Nevertheless, it is slowly increasing due to one single factor: migration. This situation is similar to that of the Dutch population as a whole.
Jews born in Israel constitute about 20% of the Jews living in the Netherlands today. The population with a direct connection to Israel, including those born in the Netherlands but with at least one parent born in Israel, comes to about a third of the Dutch Jewish population. A majority of Dutch Jewish children today are either Israel-born or born to Israeli parents already in the Netherlands.
Dutch Jews are one of the most secularised European Jewish communities. Only about 20% identify as ‘Orthodox’ or ‘Traditional’, and just 10%–20% are fully religiously observant. About 60% of partnered Dutch Jews are married to someone who is not Jewish.
A significant proportion of Dutch Jews (about 50%) currently identify with the Centre-Right in political terms. About a quarter are political centrists, and another quarter are Centre-Left. This situation is similar to the Dutch electorate as a whole.
Abstract: Since 7th October 2023, the date when Hamas perpetrated the worst and most murderous single massacre against Jews since the Holocaust, there has been a surge in antisemitism in UK universities. This report offers a summary of research by the Intra-Community Professorial Group (ICPG) about antisemitism at UK universities since the 7th October attacks, aimed at understanding and documenting problems on and off campus and proposing evidence-based solutions to address them.
Key findings include:
1. There has been up to 34 percentage points increase in rates of antisemitic abuse in universities since Oct 7th. These include physical attacks, threats of rape, violence, verbal abuse, harassment, and use of Nazi imagery.
2. Jewish students are withdrawing from all aspects of university life, including lecture theatres and seminar rooms,
online learning spaces, social activities, and entire areas of campus. More than half of respondents reported being
fearful of being on campus, and three quarters being uncomfortable to be open about their Jewish identity. The
consequential impact on their ability to participate in university life, let alone their mental and physical health, is
profound.
3. There is compelling evidence that some universities are failing in their responsibility to adequately safeguard
Jewish students from verbal abuse and physical attack.
Abstract: In this report:
This landmark report looks at how the October 7 attacks on Israel and the war in Gaza have impacted the British Jewish community one year on. The report demonstrates the profound impact the events of the last year have had on Jews in the UK by analysing the responses of over 4,500 adult British Jews to the JPR Jewish Current Affairs Survey in July 2024 – the largest survey of British Jews since October 7, 2023.
Among other things, the report explores how the original Hamas attack and the subsequent war have affected how British Jews view Israel politically, how the public reaction to the conflict has affected Jews’ sense of security and trust in critical organisations in the UK, and how the conflict has impacted the Jewish lives of British Jews – their connections to Israel and the Jewish community. The findings also form the basis for the second series of the JPR/JW3 “Jews Do Count” podcast, available on the JPR website and all major platforms.
Some of the key findings in this report:
British Jews express far more concern today about the state of Israel’s democracy than they did fifteen or so years ago. Nevertheless, more still believe it to be alive and well today than do not, by 52% to 38%.
British Jews are more likely to agree than to disagree that the IDF is acting morally and according to international law, though we see much division in the responses. 50% of British Jews feel that the IDF military action against Hamas since October 7 has been unsuccessful
For all the division and criticism, British Jews are still more likely to have felt proud of Israel than ashamed since October 7.
Just 54% of Jews in the UK agree that a two-state solution is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours, compared to 77% who did so in 2010. Only about one in four (26%) British Jews think that most Palestinians want peace with Israel, compared to nearly half (47%) in 2010.
Nearly four in five British Jews say that they often feel that they are being held responsible by non-Jews for the actions of Israel’s government, with 43% ‘strongly agreeing’ with this statement.
Nearly half of British Jews (46%) say that antisemitism is ‘a very big problem’ in the UK today, compared to 28% in 2018 and only 11% in 2012. In total, 83% of British define antisemitism as a problem in Britain, the highest proportion found since records began over a decade ago.
Nearly three in four respondents say they feel less safe as a Jewish person living in the UK, and almost two in three adult British Jews said they feel less confident displaying their Jewishness since the October 7 attacks.
Although most British Jews report no overall change in this regard, substantial proportions of British Jews say that they feel closer to their Jewish friends since October 7 (39%) and less close to their non-Jewish friends (24%). The findings also suggest a notable increase in levels of attachment to their local Jewish community.
Attachment levels of British Jews to Israel were steady before October 7 but have risen significantly since then, with half of British Jews saying they are ‘very’ attached to Israel today (up from 40% in 2022).
About two in three British Jews (65%) identify as Zionist, up slightly compared to before October 7. 10% identify as anti-Zionist, also up slightly.
Levels of anxiety among British Jews are higher than they were before October 7 and are notably higher than they are among the general population of Britain.
There is no evidence to indicate Jews are leaving the UK in elevated numbers in the past year – on the contrary, emigration levels are generally low and stable and have been for several decades. At the same time, a slight change in sentiment around this issue has occurred over the past year, with many moving up one notch from wherever they were on it before October 7.
Topics: Antisemitism: Attitude Surveys, Antisemitism: Monitoring, Antisemitism: Online, Antisemitism: Left-Wing, Antisemitism: Muslim, Antisemitism: Discourse, Israel Criticism, Anti-Zionism, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Policy, October 7 2023 attacks + aftermath
Abstract: In this policy paper:
How have levels of antisemitism in the UK and across Europe changed since the October 7 attack on Israel and the war in Gaza? Using the most recent survey data from July 2024, this policy paper demonstrates how the antisemitic incident reporting figures most commonly quoted significantly underestimate the number of incidents happening in reality. The paper also introduces the concept of ‘ambient antisemitism’ – Jews experiencing antisemitism that isn’t personally directed at them –looking at how the context in which Jews are living today affects their perceptions of antisemitism. It also explores the general population’s attitudes to Jews and Israel before and after October 7, 2023.
The paper concludes that better research methods are required to accurately assess the general population’s attitudes to Jews and Israel and Jewish people’s perceptions and experiences of antisemitism. It points to a critical gap in research compared with the EU and calls on the UK Government and philanthropic community to plug it as a matter of urgency.
Some of the key findings in this policy paper:
Reports of antisemitic incidents increased dramatically in the months following the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7 in multiple European countries.
Survey data demonstrate that the number of antisemitic incidents being recorded by the police and community monitoring agencies vastly underestimates the amount of antisemitism taking place.
An evident rise in antisemitism since October 7 has had a significant impact on Jewish people’s feelings of safety and security in the UK and across Europe.
The degree to which the Hamas attacks on October 7 were marked by open celebration and affirmation of violence reveals a level of antisemitic hate that exists within parts of Western Europe that poses a severe threat to Jews living on the continent.
A culture of ‘ambient antisemitism’ has emerged in the post-October 7 period, marked by incidents such as defacing or tearing down posters of Israeli hostages, that, whether strictly antisemitic or not, create a broader milieu that feels threatening and hostile to many Jewish people.
Inaccurate and irresponsible media reporting can lead directly to an increase in antisemitism, although more research is required to understand how and when this occurs.
There has been a significant increase in sympathy for the Palestinians among young people and those on the political left since October 7; levels of sympathy for Israel are much lower, even in the very immediate aftermath of the Hamas attacks.
The lack of sympathy for Israel is likely to lead to many Jews feeling a greater sense of alienation from the societies in which they live over time.
Given the apparent levels of concern among Jews today, much more needs to be done to invest in a robust and systematic approach to measuring antisemitism in society and its effects on Jews as part of a serious strategy to combat it going forward. This is particularly the case in the UK, which has fallen far behind the EU since leaving the European Union in this respect.
Abstract: The report looks into what Jews in the UK think of key Israeli political leaders and the country’s future, drawing on data from the responses of over 4,500 adult British Jews, members of the JPR Research Panel, to the JPR Jewish Current Affairs Survey, held in June-July 2024. The report reveals that levels of pessimism about Israel’s current situation have increased significantly among British Jews when compared to data gathered before the October 7 attacks on Israel and the war in Gaza.
Some of the main findings in this report:
Three-quarters (74%) of Jews in the UK describe Israel’s situation as “bad” (37%) or “very bad” (37%), increasing from 57% measured in Apr/May 2023. Overall, Jews in the UK characterise Israel’s current state more negatively than Israelis.
95% of adult British Jews have an opinion on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the most widely known leader among those examined. Four in five Jews hold an unfavourable opinion of him, with 65% saying they “strongly disapprove” and 15% saying they “somewhat” disapprove of him.
Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich (-78%), Minister of Security Itamar Ben-Gvir (-77%) and Netanyahu (-68%) are the Israeli leaders British Jews least approve of when looking at their net approval ratings. Former Prime Minister Yair Lapid (+12%) and former Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister Benny Gantz (+10%) are the only two leaders showing positive net ratings among those examined.
Lapid is the only leader examined showing an increase in net approval rate compared to data from before October 7.
Politically ‘right-leaning’ Jews were much more likely to approve of Netanyahu than those who are ‘left-leaning’.
Abstract: This report draws on data collected in June and July 2024, eight months after the October 7 attacks on Israel and in the context of the war in Gaza, to explore Jewish parents' understanding of whether their children have experienced antisemitism either at school, in the vicinity of school, and travelling to and from school. The research goes further to investigate whether parents would make different choices about where to educate their Jewish children in light of the events of October 7, the war in Gaza and the rise in antisemitism in the UK.
This is part of a growing body of evidence demonstrating how antisemitism can drive Jews away from participation in wider society, and that should be of concern to anyone who cares about building a more cohesive and understanding society. The findings raise critical questions for mainstream school administrators about how to manage the issue of antisemitism in their schools and, indeed, for government leaders about social cohesion.
Some of the key findings in this report:
A little under a quarter (23%) of British Jewish parents surveyed reported that their child or children had experienced antisemitism at school (12%), in the vicinity of school (6%) or travelling to or from school (9%).
Parents of children at a Jewish school are more likely to report that their children experienced antisemitism while travelling to or from school (13%) than at school (3%).
In comparison, those with children at mainstream schools are more likely to report their children experienced antisemitism at school (21%) than travelling to/from it (2%).
Three-quarters (73%) of Jewish parents with children in mainstream schools said that the October 7 attacks and the war in Gaza would not affect their choice about where to educate the children, but one in five (20%) said they would now be more likely to send their children to a Jewish school.
This proportion doubles (40%) for parents whose children have experienced antisemitism in, around or travelling to or from their mainstream school.
Just over half of Jewish parents with children in Jewish schools (52%) said that the attacks on Israel and the war in Gaza would not affect their school choice, with most of the remainder (46%) saying they would be even more likely to opt for Jewish schooling now.
Abstract: “More than Jews have kept Shabbat, Shabbat has kept the Jews”, said A’had Ha’am, encapsulating the significance of the day of rest to many Jews everywhere over the centuries. While its origins are biblical, and the requirement to observe it appears in the Ten Commandments, in contemporary times, Shabbat is observed in many ways by different types of Jews.
This factsheet uses data from JPR’s recent study of Jewish identity in the UK today to explore the social and religious significance of Shabbat to British Jews and how it manifests in their behaviour. The study is based on the responses of nearly 5,000 British Jews, members of the JPR Research Panel, to its UK National Jewish Identity Survey, held in November – December 2022
Some of the key findings in this factsheet:
Just over one in three Jews (34%) say Shabbat is ‘very important’ to their Jewish identity, a substantially lower proportion than those who say the same about ‘remembering the holocaust’ (71%), ‘strong moral and ethical behaviour’ (69%) or ‘feeling part of the Jewish People’ (65%).
While 88% of Orthodox Jews say Shabbat is ‘very important’ to their Jewish identity, this is only the case for 36% of Traditional Jews and just 28% of Reform/Progressive Jews.
About six in ten (61%) British Jews attend Friday night meals most weeks, while 58% regularly make time for family and friends, and 50% take a break from work on Shabbat.
80% of British Jews light candles on Friday night at least occasionally, and about the same proportion report buying Challah (plaited bread) at least occasionally. Observance of Shabbat peaks between the ages 40-49.
27% of respondents attend synagogue most Shabbats or more often. 23% abstain from driving during Shabbat, and 20% say they do not switch on electric lights on Shabbat.
Abstract: CST recorded 1,978 antisemitic incidents across the UK in the first half of 2024, the highest total ever reported to CST in the first six months of any year. This is an increase of 105% from the 964 antisemitic incidents recorded by CST in the January-to-June period of 2023, which was the third-highest half year figure reported to CST. CST recorded 823 incidents in the first six months of 2022, 1,371 from January to June 2021, and 875 in the first half of 2020.
The 1,978 antisemitic incidents recorded in the first six months of 2024 is 44% higher than the previous half-year record of 1,371 incidents in 2021, and is a reflection of the ongoing high volume of anti-Jewish hate reported since the Hamas terror attack in Israel on 7 October 2023. As documented in CST’s Antisemitic Incidents Report 2023, there was an instant increase in antisemitic incident levels in the UK following Hamas’ attack on Israel, before Israel had coordinated any large scale military response in Gaza. The subsequent war, and the widespread public focus it has drawn, have continued to impact the scale and content of antisemitism so far this year.
Abstract: Federace židovských obcí v České republice (dále jen FŽO) zaznamenala v roce 2023 celkem 4 328 antisemitských incidentů. Ve srovnání s rokem 2022, kdy bylo registrováno 2 277 incidentů, tak došlo k nárůstu o 90 %. Rok 2023 tedy znovu potvrdil konstantní trend dramatického nárůstu antisemitismu.
Shromážděná data nejsou úplným statistickým přehledem všech antisemitských incidentů za rok 2023. FŽO čerpá informace výlučně z otevřených zdrojů, které zahrnují pouze malý výsek popisované reality. Počet registrovaných incidentů závisí rovněž na ochotě a možnostech obětí i svědků projevy antisemitismu hlásit. V České republice, stejně jako v jiných zemích, přetrvává nedostatečná míra nahlašování nenávistných činů, často kvůli stigmatizaci, nedůvěře v instituce nebo obavám o osobní bezpečnost. Statistiky FŽO neumí odpovědět na otázku, jaká část české populace smýšlí či jedná antisemitsky, vypovídají však o trendech v jeho vnímání a o společenském klimatu ve vztahu k protižidovské předsudečné nenávisti. K antisemitsky motivovanému fyzickému násilí dochází v České republice pouze výjimečně. V posledních pěti letech byly FŽO nahlášeny dva násilné útoky (2020, 2021). V roce 2023 nebylo evidováno žádné napadení. Z hlediska fyzické bezpečnosti zůstala v roce 2023 Česká republika pro židovskou komunitu bezpečnou zemí.
Témata, motivy a rychlost šíření antisemitismu ovlivňovala řada domácích a zahraničních událostí. Až do samého konce roku 2023 se objevovaly antisemitské narativy spojené s ruskou vojenskou agresí proti Ukrajině i s doznívající pandemií nemoci covid-19. Jednoznačným zlomem se stal 7. říjen 2023, kdy palestinské teroristické organizace pod vedením Hamásu zaútočily z Pásma Gazy proti civilním a vojenským cílům v jižním Izraeli. Bezprecedentní útok zahájil válku mezi Izraelem a Hamásem. Bezprostředně po 7. říjnu následovala celosvětová explozivní vlna antisemitismu, která silně zasáhla i Českou republiku.
Měsíční statistiky zcela jednoznačně dokládají masivní nárůst antisemitismu v posledním čtvrtletí roku 2023. Za období leden–září bylo registrováno 2 528 incidentů, tj. 58,41 % celkového počtu, za období říjen–prosinec pak dalších 1 800 incidentů, které představují 41,59 % celkového počtu. Pro období leden–září 2023 platí, že průměrný měsíční nárůst v porovnání s rokem 2022 činil 50,03 %. V období říjen–prosinec byl průměrný nárůst 254,32 %.
Z hlediska šíření antisemitismu došlo v posledních pěti letech k aktivizaci všech hlavních ideologických proudů. Do roku 2019 představoval největší hrozbu pro židovskou komunitu pravicový extremismus. V letech 2020–2023 v souvislosti s pandemií nemoci covid-19 a s ruskou agresí proti Ukrajině významně posílil vliv dezinformačních platforem. Po teroristickém útoku 7. října akcelerovaly aktivity krajní levice a islamismu. Protižidovská nenávist zejména v podobě démonizace a delegitimizace Státu Izrael v roce 2023 masivně vstoupila do veřejného prostoru a stala se společensky přijatelným postojem. Stoupala agresivita antisemitských incidentů, které byly čím dál častěji adresovány konkrétním osobám či institucím. Protižidovské postoje přejímalo a šířilo stále více jednotlivců, kteří jinak neprojevovali žádné sympatie k politickému či ideologickému extremismu. Závěr roku 2023 tak přinesl zcela nový trend normalizace antisemitismu.
Abstract: The Sixth Survey of European Jewish Community Leaders and Professionals, 2024, presents the results of an online survey offered in 10 languages and administered to 879 respondents in 31 countries. Conducted every three years using the same format, the survey seeks to identify trends and their evolution over time.
The 2024 survey came during a historically fraught moment for the Jewish people globally. The impact of the horrific October 7th attacks and the subsequent war in Israel cannot be understated. How is this affecting Jewish leadership and Jewish communal life? Therefore, in addition to the regular topics covered by the survey (community priorities, threats, security concerns, attitudes towards Europe and Israel), this edition included a special section designed to understand the impact of October 7th on Jewish life in Europe.
That October 7th has profoundly affected Jewish Europe is evident across multiple sections throughout the survey. Concern about antisemitism and the threat of physical attack has intensified. A large majority of 78% feel less safe living as Jews in their cities than they did before the Hamas attack, and respondents are more cautious about how they identify themselves as Jews. They are also more distant from their wider environments, with 38% reporting they have become more distant from non-Jewish friends.
The respondents were comprised of presidents and chairpersons of nationwide “umbrella organizations” or Federations; presidents and executive directors of private Jewish foundations, charities, and other privately funded initiatives; presidents and main representatives of Jewish communities that are organized at a city level; executive directors and programme coordinators, as well as current and former board members of Jewish organizations; among others
Abstract: FRA’s third survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU reveals their experiences and perceptions of antisemitism, and shows the obstacles they face in living an openly Jewish life.
The survey pre-dates the Hamas attacks on 7 October 2023 and Israel’s military response in Gaza. But the report includes information about antisemitism collected from 12 Jewish community organisations more recently. Jewish people have experienced more antisemitic incidents since October 2023, with some organisations reporting an increase of more than 400%.
The survey results point to:
Rising antisemitism: 80% of respondents feel that antisemitism has grown in their country in the five years before the survey.
High levels of antisemitism online: 90% of respondents encountered antisemitism online in the year before the survey.
Antisemitism in the public sphere: in the year before the survey, 56% of respondents encountered offline antisemitism from people they know and 51% in the media.
Harassment: 37% say they were harassed because they are Jewish in the year before the survey. Most of them experienced harassment multiple times. Antisemitic harassment and violence mostly take place in streets, parks, or shops.
Safety and security concerns: Most respondents continue to worry for their own (53%) and their family’s (60%) safety and security. Over the years, FRA research has shown that antisemitism tends to increase in times of tension in the Middle East. In this survey, 75% feel that people hold them responsible for the Israeli government’s actions because they are Jewish.
Hidden lives: 76% hide their Jewish identity at least occasionally and 34% avoid Jewish events or sites because they do not feel safe. As a reaction to online antisemitism, 24% avoid posting content that would identify them as Jewish, 23% say that they limited their participation in online discussions, and 16% reduced their use of certain platforms, websites or services.
The EU and its Member States have put in place measures against antisemitism, which have led to some progress. These include the EU’s first ever strategy on combating antisemitism and action plans in some EU countries. The report suggests concrete ways for building on that progress:
Monitoring and adequately funding antisemitism strategies and action plans: This includes adopting plans in those EU countries which do not have them and developing indicators to monitor progress.
Securing the safety and security of Jewish communities: Countries need to invest more in protecting Jewish people, working closely with the affected communities.
Tackling antisemitism online: Online platforms need to address and remove antisemitic content online, to adhere tothe EU’s Digital Services Act. They also need to better investigate and prosecute illegal antisemitic content online.
Encouraging reporting and improving recording of antisemitism: National authorities should step up efforts to raise rights awareness among Jews, encourage them to report antisemitic incidents and improve the recording of such incidents. Greater use of third-party and anonymous reporting could help.
The survey covers Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden where around 96% of the EU’s estimated Jewish population live. Almost 8,000 Jews aged 16 or over took part in the online survey from January to June 2023. This is the third survey of its kind, following those of 2013 and 2018.
Abstract: On the eve of the 2024 UK General Election, national polls show the Labour Party ahead of the
Conservative Party by 20 percentage points. An average of polls at the time of publication has Labour
at 41.9% and Conservatives at 22.2%, with Reform UK at 15.0%, well ahead of the Liberal Democrats,
Greens, Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru and other parties. These polls do not, however,
show the voting intention of Jewish people in the UK. The JPR Research Panel provides the research
infrastructure to gather nationally representative data about Jewish people’s behaviours and attitudes
on a wide range of social and political issues. This paper presents initial data on voting intentions for
4 July 2024, based on 2,717 UK-based Jewish adults who responded to a survey between 14-20 June
Abstract: La ricerca rientra nel progetto PCTO sull’antisemitismo a cui hanno aderito 84 studenti di tre scuole superiori della Regione Lazio, due licei e un istituto d’istruzione superiore, insieme a Progetto Memoria e alla Fondazione CDEC per l’anno scolastico 2022-2023.
Studenti e studentesse delle classi terze e quarte, insieme ai docenti referenti hanno coinvolto Progetto Memoria quale tutor esterno (Sandra Terracina) e due dipartimenti della Fondazione CDEC (Betti Guetta, Stefano Gatti e Murilo Cambruzzi per l’Osservatorio antisemitismo; Patrizia Baldi per la Didattica) per sviluppare il progetto, ricevere formazione, essere coadiuvati nell’analisi e nella riflessione su stereotipi e pregiudizi, in particolare sugli ebrei. Tra gli obiettivi del progetto, la promozione di un processo conoscitivo sulle cause e sulle dinamiche dell’antisemitismo, indirizzato a far emergere comportamenti e atteggiamenti diffusi nella società, al fine di orientare ai valori di una collettività democratica e inclusiva, partendo dalla fotografia realizzata dall’indagine delle Fondazione CDEC. L’apprendimento di carattere storico, sociologico, psicosociale e statistico ha permesso agli studenti di sviluppare le attività a loro affidate. Sono stati stimolati a confrontarsi con figure esterne al mondo della scuola e a gestire, nelle varie fasi del progetto, dinamiche tra pari. Il lavoro di formazione e di tutoraggio si è tenuto in modalità ibrida.
Gli studenti coinvolti nel progetto di formazione hanno compilato un questionario (già utilizzato nell’anno scolastico precedente) finalizzato a valutare il grado di conoscenza degli ebrei e la presenza di pregiudizi e stereotipi nei loro confronti.
Il questionario è composto da 13 domande chiuse ed è stato somministrato tramite Google Forms, tra l’aprile e il maggio 2023, dagli studenti dei tre istituti che hanno partecipato alla seconda edizione del PCTO “Progetto sull’antisemitismo”.
La scelta metodologica è stata quella di coinvolgere nell’indagine i ragazzi del primo anno delle superiori e quelli dell’ultimo anno per cercare di valutare se il percorso scolastico (lungo 5 anni) possa avere un effetto sulla conoscenza degli ebrei e la condivisione di pregiudizi antisemiti.
In totale sono stati compilati 673 questionari 481 al liceo A (71.5%) e 29 al liceo B (4.3%), e 163 all’istituto d’istruzione superiore (24.2%). Il 73% degli studenti è iscritto al percorso scientifico e il 24% al tecnico, gli altri 3% si dividono tra il linguistico e il classico. Il 46 % degli studenti frequenta il primo anno e il 54 % il quinto. Il 45% ha dichiarato di appartenere al genere femminile e il 51% al maschile, il 4% rimanente non ha voluto indicarlo o ha indicato altro.
Abstract: The EU-Funded RELATION – RESEARCH, KNOWLEDGE & EDUCATION AGAINST ANTISEMITISM project (https://www.relationproject.eu) aims at defining an innovative strategy that starts from a better knowledge of the Jewish history/traditions as part of the common history/traditions, and puts in place a set of educational activities in Belgium, Italy, Romania and Spain as well as online actions in order to tackle the phenomenon.
The project activities include the monitoring of antisemitism phenomenon online in the four countries of the project (Belgium, Italy, Romania and Spain) by creating a cross-country web-monitoring of illegal antisemitic hate speech.
The shadow monitoring exercises aim at:
● Analyzing the removal rate of illegal antisemitic hate speech available on diverse Social Media Platforms signatory to the Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online, namely Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and TikTok.
● Analyzing the types of content and narratives collected by the research team.
Partners organizations focused on their country language: French for Belgium, Italian, Romanian and Spanish. Four organizations from four different countries (Belgium, Italy, Spain and Romania) took part in the monitoring exercise: Comunitat Jueva Bet Shalom De Catalunya (Bet Shalom, Spain), CEJI - A Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe
(Belgium), Fondazione Centro Di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea (CDEC, Italy), Intercultural Institute Timișoara (IIT, Romania).
The monitoring exercise follows the definition of Illegal hate speech as defined “by the Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law and national laws transposing it, means all conduct publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion,
descent or national or ethnic origin.”
The content was collected and reported to social media platforms in three rounds between October 2022 and October 2023. Content was checked for removal after a week or so to give enough time to social media platforms to analyze and remove the content. The monitoring exercises devote particular attention to the intersection of antisemitism and sexism.
Abstract: The EU-Funded RELATION – RESEARCH, KNOWLEDGE & EDUCATION AGAINST ANTISEMITISM project (https://www.relationproject.eu) aims at defining an innovative strategy that starts from a better knowledge of the Jewish history/traditions as part of the common history/traditions, and puts in place a set of educational activities in Belgium, Italy, Romania and Spain as well as online actions in order to tackle the phenomenon.
The project activities include the monitoring of antisemitism phenomenon online in the four countries of the project (Belgium, Italy, Romania and Spain) by creating a cross-country webmonitoring of illegal antisemitic hate speech.
The monitoring exercises aim at:
● Analyzing the removal rate of illegal antisemitic hate speech available on diverse Social Media Platforms, namely Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and TikTok.
● Partners organizations focused on their country language: French in Belgium, Italian, Romanian and Spanish;
● Analyzing the types of content and narratives collected by the research team
Four organizations from four different countries (Belgium, Italy, Spain and Romania) took part in the monitoring exercise. Comunitat Jueva Bet Shalom De Catalunya (Bet Shalom, Spain), CEJI - A Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe (Belgium), Fondazione Centro Di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea (CDEC, Italy), Intercultural Institute Timișoara (IIT, Romania).
The monitoring exercise follows the definition of Illegal hate speech as defined “by the Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law and national laws transposing it, means all conduct publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin.”
The content was collected and reported to social media platforms between April 21st and 22nd, 2023. Content was checked for removal on April 26th to give enough time to social media platforms to analyze and remove the content.1 The monitoring exercises devote particular attention to the intersection of antisemitism and sexism.
Abstract: The EU-Funded RELATION – RESEARCH, KNOWLEDGE & EDUCATION AGAINST ANTISEMITISM project https://www.relationproject.eu) aims at defining an innovative strategy that starts from a better knowledge of the Jewish history/traditions as part of the common history/traditions, and puts in place a set of educational activities in Belgium, Italy, Romania and Spain as well as online actions in order to tackle the phenomenon.
The project activities include the monitoring of antisemitism phenomenon online in the four countries of the project (Belgium, Italy, Romania and Spain) by creating a cross-country webmonitoring of illegal antisemitic hate speech.
The monitoring exercises aim at
• Analysing the removal rate of illegal antisemitic hate speech available on diverse Social Media Platforms, namely Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and TikTok.
• Partners organisations focused on their country language: French in Belgium, Italian, Romanian and Spanish;
• Analysing the types of content and narratives collected by the research team.
Four organisations from four different countries (Belgium, Italy, Spain and Romania) took part in the monitoring exercise. Comunitat Jueva Bet Shalom De Catalunya (Bet Shalom, Spain), CEJI - A Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe (Belgium), Fondazione Centro Di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea (CDEC, Italy), Intercultural Institute Timișoara (IIT, Romania).
The monitoring exercise follows the definition of Illegal hate speech as defined “by the Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law and national laws transposing it, means all conduct publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin.”
The content was collected and reported to social media platforms between October 6th and 7th, 2022. Content was checked for removal on October 12th to give enough time to social media platforms to analyse and remove the content. The monitoring exercises devote particular attention to the intersection of antisemitism and sexism.
Abstract: Zwei Jahre nach dem ersten Lockdown zur Eindämmung der Coronapandemie, und immer noch mittendrin, erscheint unsere neue Handreichung genau zum Thema. Wir wollten erfahren, wie es Jugendlichen in der Pandemie ergeht, die ohnehin Rassismus und Antisemitismus ausgesetzt sind. Gleich zu Beginn der Pandemie wurden asiatisch gelesene Menschen angefeindet, weil sie für die Verbreitung des Virus verantwortlich gemacht wurden, auch italienische Restaurants wurden angegriffen, als die Nachrichten über die starke Verbreitung von Covid 19 hier ankamen. Viele Jugendliche, die sich zunächst genauso wie die deutsch gelesenen Jugendlichen nicht an Abstandsregeln hielten, wurden nicht wie diese mehr oder weniger freundlich an die neuen Regeln erinnert, sondern rigoros kontrolliert. Bald schon kursierten erste Verschwörungserzählungen darüber, dass das Virus von Juden erfunden worden sei, um den Menschen zu schaden.
In den Interviews mit Fachkräften aus der (Offenen) Jugendarbeit werden wichtige Einsichten und Erkenntnisse ausgesprochen, die die Tiefe der diskriminierenden Strukturen aufzeigen und gute Einblicke in die Lebenswelten Berliner Jugendlicher geben. Die Interviews stehen für die Vielfalt Berliner Jugendarbeit und zeigen die große Bedeutung dieses oft vernachlässigten Arbeitsfeldes auf!
Abstract: Die Antisemitismusdebatten im zweiten und dritten Quartal 2022 waren von der internationalen Kunstausstellung documenta fifteen geprägt, die 100 Tage lang in Kassel stattfand. Das bedeutet nicht, dass die Verschwörungserzählungen im Kontext der Covid-19-Pandemie und des russischen Krieges gegen die Ukraine verschwunden sind. Allerdings wird in der Debatte um die documenta fifteen deutlich, wie die deutsche Gesellschaft mit Antisemitismus und insbesondere mit israelbezogenem Antisemitismus umgeht. Bereits Anfang 2022 wurde darauf hingewiesen, dass es zu antisemitischen Vorfällen im Kontext der Kunstschau kommen kann. Der Hinweis wurde abgewehrt und ignoriert. Doch mit der Eröffnung der Ausstellung hat sich die Warnung in jeder Hinsicht bestätigt: Die documenta fifteen zeigte eine Vielzahl antisemitischer Darstellungen, was weitgehend konsequenzlos blieb. Das Fazit des Lagebildes: Die deutsche Gesellschaft hat keinen guten Umgang mit Antisemitismus.
Die Darstellungen und der Umgang mit den Darstellungen bilden einen Schwerpunkt unseres Lagebildes. Neben der documenta fifteen konnte anhand mehrerer Ereignisse, z.B. in der Debatte um das BGH-Urteils zur Wittenberger „Judensau“, beobachtet werden, wie jüdische Perspektiven und Stimmen zwar gehört, aber letzten Endes nicht berücksichtigt werden. Ein Interview mit dem israelischen Soziologen Natan Sznaider und eine Auswahl antisemitischer Vorfälle, die sich im zweiten und dritten Quartal in Deutschland ereignet haben, führen vor Augen, wie konkret und real die Bedrohungslage für Jüdinnen*Juden in der Bundesrepublik ist.
Abstract: Seit dem tödlichsten Angriff auf jüdisches Leben seit der Shoah am 7. Oktober erreicht der offene Antisemitismus auch in Deutschland eine beispiellose Qualität. Dabei nehmen die Berührungsängste zwischen islamistischen, antiimperialistischen und sich selbst als progressiv verstehenden Milieus immer weiter ab. Im Zuge dessen wird Islamismus verharmlost und israelbezogener Antisemitismus verbreitet. Es kommt zu einer folgenschweren Radikalisierung, die insbesondere eine Bedrohung für Jüdinnen und Juden ist. Im Zivilgesellschaftlichen Lagebild #13 widmen wir uns diesen antisemitischen Allianzen, die Terror verharmlosen, Kultureinrichtungen und Geschäfte mit roten Dreiecken beschmieren, dem Symbol der islamistischen Hamas, die auf diese Art Feinde und mögliche Anschlagsziele kennzeichnet. Die vergangenen Wochen weit über den 7. Oktober haben gezeigt, dass diese Allianzen zu blankem Antisemitismus führen. Das stellt seit Monaten eine bedrohliche und gefährliche Situation für Jüdinnen und Juden in Deutschland dar, die droht auf kurz oder lang in Terror gegen Juden umzuschlagen.
Unsere Kernbeobachtungen:
1. Für Jüdinnen*Juden ist die Lage seit dem 7. Oktober katastrophal, auch in der Diaspora
Die sicheren Räume werden weniger und die Bedrohungslage ist dramatisch. Israelbezogener Antisemitismus greift um sich, getragen von einer Allianz aus Islamismus und Antiimperialismus.
2. Die antiimperialistische Linke erneuert im Kampf gegen den Staat Israel ihre altbewährte Allianz mit Islamist*innen
In den Auseinandersetzungen um den Hamas-Terror vom 7. Oktober 2023 fand eine erneute Fusionierung des antiimperialistischen mit dem islamistischen Antizionismus statt. Gruppierungen aus beiden Lagern stehen Seite an Seite, ihre Demosprüche fließen ineinander.
3. Rechtsextreme instrumentalisieren den Kampf gegen Antisemitismus und Israelhass, um ihren Rassismus offen überall platzieren zu können
Die Reaktionen nach dem 7. Oktober 2023 haben einmal mehr gezeigt, dass Teile der extremen Rechten ein instrumentelles Verhältnis zu Jüdinnen*Juden und zur Feindschaft ihnen gegenüber haben. AfD & Co. nutzen die Verherrlichung des Hamas-Terrors als Anlass, um Rassismus zu verbreiten.
4. Israelhass wirkt identitätsstiftend
Die Rede von und die Forderung nach bedingungsloser Solidarität mit Palästina führt immer wieder zu israelbezogenem Antisemitismus und bedeutet schließlich auch die Unterstützung palästinensischer Terrororganisationen wie Hamas und PFLP, was eine Gefahr für die Demokratie darstellt. Sie bietet eine Gelegenheit, sich über Trennendes hinweg eine gemeinsame Identität zu konstruieren.
5. Soziale Medien spielen in der Allianzbildung eine entscheidende Rolle
Die Gruppierungen und Netzwerke der antiimperialistischen Linken und des Islamismus sind in den sozialen Medien sehr aktiv. Einige heizen, durch manipulatives Framing und Desinformation, die Stimmung gegen Jüdinnen*Juden und den Staat Israel an. Gerade antizionistische Influencer*innen nutzen die Dynamik, um Hetze zu verbreiten
