Abstract: Reflecting on the months since the recent October 7 attack, rarely has the theme of Holocaust Memorial Day 2024, ‘The Fragility of Freedom’, felt so poignant. Communities globally experienced the shattering of presumed security, and antisemitic incidents responsively spiked.
Antisemitism rose across both mainstream and fringe social media platforms, and communities resultantly reported a rise in insecurity and fear. CCOA constituent countries have recorded significant rises in antisemitic incidents, including an immediate 240% increase in Germany, a three-fold rise in France, and a marked increase in Italy.
The antisemitism landscape, including Holocaust denial and distortion, had shifted so drastically since October 7 that previous assumptions and understands now demand re-examination. In the run up to Holocaust Memorial Day 2024, this research compilation by members of the Coalition to Counter Online Antisemitism offers a vital contemporary examination of the current and emergent issues facing Holocaust denial and distortion online. As unique forms of antisemitism, denial and distortion are a tool of historical revisionism which specifically targets Jews, eroding Jewish experience and threatening democracy.
Across different geographies and knowledge fields, this compilation unites experts around the central and sustained proliferation of Holocaust denial and distortion on social media.
Abstract: Common antisemitic visual representations are rooted in Ancient Christianity and the Middle Ages, but we have also witnessed new developments after the Holocaust and the condemnation of fascism. Stereotyping and dehumanization through zoomorphism, demonization, exaggeration of certain physical features anchored in the false presumptions of physiognomy and other visual devices have been weaponized across the centuries for racist and antisemitic agendas. This study undergoes a comparative analysis of two corpuses of antisemitic images from the Romanian press and social media at a distance of one century between them. I analyze the persistency, transformations, and new developments of antisemitic image codes popularized by the Romanian far-right from the start of the 20th century, through to the rise of fascism and the Second World War, up to the present-day social media. This visual qualitative analysis with critical historical insights is carried out on the following corpuses: a) a contemporary subset of 81 memes, digital stickers, and other visuals from 17 Romanian far-right Telegram channels and groups posted over the course of one year (August 2022 – August 2023); and b) 70 archival political cartoons published by 17 far-right ultranationalist newspapers (and one pro-Soviet communist newspaper) between 1911 and 1948. Findings show how persistent certain antisemitic stereotypes have proven across time and different cultural spaces – the hook-nose, zoomorphism, the blood-libel accusations, Judeo-Bolshevism, the satanic representations – and how the visual dimension serves to efficiently implant antisemitic narratives in the collective mind. These (visual) narratives are skillfully recontextualized to fit new (geo-)political realities – the post-Holocaust times, the COVID-19 crisis, the war in Ukraine.
Abstract: This article follows up on assumptions of Rogers Brubaker and Benjamin Moffitt, according to whom, some Western and Northern European right-wing populist parties use ‘civilisationist’ and liberal-illiberal narratives that are, for instance, characterised by a ‘philo-Semitic stance’. The paper analyses to what extent the German right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) fits into this concept, considering the party’s ambivalent attitude towards Judaism, Jews, and Israel. Using qualitative content analysis, the study is based on an examination of AfD electoral manifestos and parliamentary documents from the federal level as well as from states such as Berlin, Baden-Württemberg, and Thuringia between 2014 and 2019. Our results reveal differences that range from open anti-Semitic statements to self-definitions as a ‘pro-Jewish’ party. We argue that different positions can be explained by regionally divergent discursive opportunity structures as well as personnel heterogeneity across the party sections under study. Furthermore, we reason that a combination of anti-Semitic and pro-Jewish/Israeli statements fits into the AfD’s strategy of addressing both voters from the radical right with anti-Semitic prejudices and more moderate, conservative voters that reject open hostility towards Jews and Israel. We conclude that the AfD fulfils Brubaker’s and Moffitt’s concepts only to a rather limited extent.
Abstract: Im Jahr 2021 wurden in Deutschland 3.028 antisemitische Straftaten erfasst. Dies ist der höchste jemals gemessene Wert seit Beginn der Erfassung in der polizeilichen Kriminalstatistik im Jahr 2001. Allerdings handelt es sich bei dieser Zahl nur um einen Ausschnitt, da sich das Problem des Antisemitismus in der deutschen Gesellschaft nicht allein auf Straftaten reduzieren lässt. So wichtig es natürlich ist, dass jede antisemitische Straftat entschlossen und mit allen rechtsstaatlichen Möglichkeiten verfolgt wird, muss der Kampf gegen Judenhass in einem breiten Kontext verstanden und adressiert werden. Denn die antisemitischen Vorfälle sind Ausdruck und Ergebnis eines gesamtgesellschaftlichen Klimas, in welchem antisemitische Stereotype und Ressentiments weit verbreitet und akzeptiert sind. Neben den Straftaten kommt eine große Zahl antisemitischer Vorfälle unterhalb der Strafbarkeitsgrenze hinzu, wie sie der Bundesverband der Recherche- und Informationsstelle Antisemitismus (RIAS) jährlich in seinem Bericht dokumentiert. Zudem gilt es zu bedenken, dass sowohl die Straftaten als auch die von RIAS dokumentierten Vorfälle nur jene sind, die zur Anzeige gebracht beziehungsweise gemeldet wurden. Die European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) kam im Jahr 2018 im Rahmen einer Befragung von Jüdinnen und Juden in zwölf europäischen Ländern zu dem Ergebnis, dass überhaupt nur 20 Prozent der Betroffenen antisemitische Straftaten zur Anzeige bringen oder anderweitig melden. Es ist also davon auszugehen, dass die Dunkelziffer nochmals erheblich höher ist.
Aufgrund dieser Erkenntnisse hat das American Jewish Committee (AJC) das Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach (IFD) mit der vorliegenden repräsentativen Umfrage beauftragt.
Und die Ergebnisse sind erneut ein Grund zur Sorge. Zwar zeigen die Daten nicht, dass antisemitische Einstellungen in der Bevölkerung stark zugenommen haben, dennoch bestätigen sie, dass ein beachtlicher Teil der deutschen Bevölkerung antisemitische Stereotype und Ressentiments teilen, wie es seit Jahren konstant in anderen Umfragen nachgewiesen wurde. Dabei haben wir auch untersuchen lassen, wie verbreitet diese Einstellungen unter den Wählerinnen und Wählern der sechs im Bundestag vertretenen Parteien sind. Die Ergebnisse verdeutlichen abermals, dass Antisemitismus nicht allein ein Problem der politischen Ränder ist, sondern in der Mitte der Gesellschaft tief verankert ist. Hier sind deshalb ausnahmslos alle demokratischen Parteien gefordert, diese Realität anzuerkennen und entsprechend zu handeln. Auch deswegen können wir nur davor warnen, dass das Thema Antisemitismus als Gegenstand parteipolitischer Auseinandersetzungen genutzt wird. Die demokratischen Parteien sollten es vielmehr als ihre Aufgabe begreifen, über sonstige politische Differenzen hinaus zusammenzustehen und Antisemitismus gemeinsam entschlossen zu bekämpfen.
Im Gegensatz zu vielen bisherigen Studien haben wir im Rahmen dieser Untersuchung auch die Einstellungen von Musliminnen und Muslimen in Deutschland abgefragt. Ausschlaggebend waren hierbei nicht zuletzt die antisemitischen Ausschreitungen hierzulande im Mai 2021 während der israelischen Selbstverteidigungsmaßnahmen gegen den Raketenbeschuss der islamistischen Terrororganisation Hamas. Wenngleich es in der Vergangenheit immer wieder zu antisemitischen Ausschreitungen vor dem Hintergrund derartiger Auseinandersetzungen gekommen ist, so waren jene im vergangenen Jahr nicht nur erheblich gewalttätiger, sondern es zogen zum ersten Mal anti-israelische Demonstrationen in verschiedenen Städten gezielt vor Synagogen. Nur das Eingreifen der Polizei, wenn auch zum Teil verspätet, konnte Schlimmeres verhindern. Im Zuge dieser Proteste kam es zu zahlreichen antisemitischen Vorfällen, Bedrohungen und körperlichen Angriffen. Allerdings hat sich die quantitative Sozialforschung, zumindest in Deutschland, diesem Phänomen bisher nur unzureichend gewidmet. Dies ist umso überraschender, da in der bereits erwähnten Studie der FRA befragte Jüdinnen und Juden in Deutschland auf die Frage, welchem Spektrum sie den schlimmsten antisemitischen Vorfall, der ihnen in den letzten 5 Jahren widerfahren ist, zuordnen, mit 41 Prozent die Täterinnen und Täter als „Someone with a Muslim extremist view“ angaben. Unter den zwölf befragten Ländern war dies der höchste Wert in dieser Kategorie. Und die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Umfrage bestätigen, dass antisemitische Stereotype und Ressentiments in dieser Bevölkerungsgruppe durchgängig deutlich stärker vertreten sind als im Bevölkerungsdurchschnitt. Wie die Umfrage aber auch belegt, bedeutet dies selbstredend nicht, dass Antisemitismus allein ein Problem der muslimischen Community ist. Allerdings kann dieses immense Problem auch nicht ausgeblendet werden, wenn der Kampf gegen Antisemitismus erfolgreich sein soll.
Abstract: Eine internationale Mobilisierung des israelbezogenen Antisemitismus durch Organisationen, die der islamistischen Muslimbruderschaft und den Terrorgruppen Hamas und PFLP nahestehen oder mit ihnen sympathisieren, bildete den Hintergrund für zahlreiche Gewaltvorfälle und Bedrohungen von Jüdinnen_Juden im vergangenen Mai. Viele antisemitische Vorfälle ereigneten sich im Umfeld antiisraelischer Versammlungen, doch war für jüdische Communities die Bedrohung durch Antisemitismus vielfältig im Alltag spürbar. Dies geht aus dem gemeinsamen Bericht des Bundesverbandes der Recherche- und Informationsstellen Antisemitismus e.V. (Bundesverband RIAS) und des Internationalen Institut für Bildung, Sozial- und Antisemitismusforschung (IIBSA) über antisemitische Vorfälle im Kontext der Eskalation der Gewalt im Nahen Osten im Mai 2021 hervor.
Der Bericht „Mobilisierungen von israelbezogenem Antisemitismus im Bundesgebiet 2021” befasst sich mit der internationalen und bundesweiten Mobilisierung von israelbezogenem Antisemitismus im Mai 2021 sowie mit den zwischen dem 9. und 24. Mai 2021 bekannt gewordenen antisemitischen Vorfällen in Deutschland im Zeitraum des bewaffneten Konflikts zwischen der Hamas und Israel.
Die Analysen des Forschungsinstituts IIBSA zeigen eine breite Mobilisierung des Antisemitismus, die von links/antiimperialistischem Spektrum über die politische Mitte bis hin zu nationalistischen, neonazistischen und islamistischen Milieus reichte. Verschiedene internationale Akteur_innen und ihre Sympathisant_innen waren an der Aufstachelung von antisemitischem Hass, Gewalt oder Terrorismus beteiligt, etwa die Palästinensische Front zur Befreiung Palästinas (PFLP), die Millî Görüş-Bewegung, die Grauen Wölfe und das türkische Präsidium für religiöse Angelegenheiten, Diyanet. Eine besondere Rolle nahmen hierbei bereits im Vorfeld der kriegerischen Auseinandersetzung Organisationen ein, die der islamistischen Muslimbruderschaft und den Terrorgruppen Hamas nahestehen oder mit ihnen sympathisieren, wie etwa die Palästinensische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland (PGD).
Zeitgleich zur Eskalation im israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt zwischen dem 9. und dem 24. Mai 2021 dokumentierte der Bundesverband RIAS deutschlandweit 261 antisemitische Vorfälle mit einem entsprechenden Bezug – im Schnitt mehr als 16 Vorfälle am Tag. Bekannt wurden u.a. 10 Angriffe, 22 gezielte Sachbeschädigungen und 18 Bedrohungen.
Dabei war Antisemitismus nicht nur auf den antiisraelischen Versammlungen zu beobachten, sondern ein alltagsprägendes Phänomen für Jüdinnen_Juden: Er begegnete ihnen am Arbeitsplatz, in Gesprächen und Diskussionen im Bekannten- oder Freundeskreis, im Umfeld von Synagogen, während zufälliger Begegnungen im Supermarkt, im öffentlichen Personennahverkehr, auf der Straße und im eigenen Wohnumfeld.
Abstract: In this paper, we explore antisemitism in contemporary Hungary. After briefly introducing
the different types of antisemitism, we show the results of a quantitative survey carried out
in 2017 on a nationally representative sample. Next, we present the research we conducted
on the articles related to Jews from the far-right site Kuruc.info. Our corpus contained
2,289 articles from the period between February 28, 2016, and March 20, 2019. To identify
latent topics in the text, we employed one of the methods of Natural Language Processing
(NLP), namely topic modeling using the LDA method. We extracted fifteen topics. We found
that racial antisemitism, unmeasurable by survey research, is overtly present in the discourse of Kuruc.info. Moreover, we identified topics that were connected to other types of antisemitism.
Topics: Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Christian, Antisemitism: Far right, Cemeteries, Jewish - Christian Relations, Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism, Nationalism, Main Topic: Holocaust and Memorial, Holocaust, Holocaust Commemoration, Holocaust Memorials, Memory
Abstract: With the breakdown of the Soviet Union, and with Mikhail Gorbachev’s politics of glasnost and perestroika, suppressed religious and national movements emerged as visible elements of political conflict in what once constituted the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). While in the former USSR this concerned the huge former “Turkestan” region with its religious roots in Islam, and the Orthodox denominations of Russia and the Ukraine, the post-USSR Eastern European satellite states saw an eruption of both nationalism and/or suppressed Catholicism. Mark Juergensmeyer (2008: 152) describes how in Russia, the Ukraine, and Poland “religion became the expression of a nationalist rejection of the secular socialist ideology.” Partly, the free expression of religion was a component of what could be termed a democratic “eruption,” and at the same time it created strong links to “nationalist and transnationalist identities of a bygone era” (Juergensmeyer 2008: 156). The role of right-wing extremism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism ought to be assessed in the context of the transformation of the post-Stalinist political cultures of Eastern Europe and Russia. As much as religion and its institutions were indispensable for the opposition to the Stalinist state, they helped to recreate the old nationalisms of the 19th century (and earlier) of which anti-Semitism was often an integral component. Religious zeal combined with nationalistic patriotism contains ideologies of purity for which “others,” be they ethnic minorities or Jews, were the paramount danger and source of a feared “racial pollution” (cf. Douglas 1966/2007). In the early 1990s, after German re-unification, similar developments could be observed in parts of the former German Democratic Republic. Minkenberg (2002) sees the rehabilitation of the nation state (National-staat) in Eastern Europe in line with the spread of nationalistic rhetoric and the concept of a national ethnic identity. In the context of economic, and partly also cultural crisis, minorities are used as a scapegoat for the problems at hand. Combined with a rejection of internationalism, diversity, and European Union (EU) integration, such resentments seem like “natural” consequences of newly formed national identities (Thieme 2007a, 2007b). In the findings of the European Social Survey (2006), Polish, Hungarian, and Ukrainian populations frequently show more sympathy for conservative (right-wing) politics, gender inequality, and homophobia than Western European societies.
Abstract: In the wake of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has witnessed a substantial growth in organized anti-Semitism. Central to this development is an organization, known as the Interregional Academy of Human Resources, better known by its Ukrainian acronym MAUP. It operates a well-connected political network that reaches the very top of the Ukrainian society. MAUP is the largest private university in Ukraine, with 57,000 students at 24 regional campuses. MAUP is connected to the KKK; David Duke is teaching courses in history and international relations at the university. Funded by Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iran, MAUP’s printing house publishes about 85% of the anti-Semitic literature in Ukraine. Until very recently, Ukrainian President Yushchenko and Foreign Minister Tarasiuk served on its board; former President Kravchuk still does. This paper is a study of anti-Semitism in Ukraine, of its intellectual roots, influence and strength. It traces the Soviet, Christian, German and racist political traditions and outlines the political ambitions of organized anti-Semitism in post-Orange Revolution Ukraine.
Abstract: In current political developments in Europe and the USA, it is striking that a strengthening of nationalism goes hand in hand with certain gender stereotypes, and often this discourse is also linked to moments of antisemitism. Using the example of the Austrian Freedom Party, this chapter analyses this mutual interplay of ideologies and elaborates in particular on the question of how and to what extent an antisemitism that is not expressed openly, can latently be effective in nationalism and antifeminism. Especially against the background of the taboo of manifest and racist antisemitism in the Western, post-national-socialist political public sphere in Germany and Austria, an analysis of this phenomenon is highly relevant. I call this phenomenon the intersectionality of ideologies. It can provide insight into whether antisemitism, as sometimes pretended, has actually been overcome, or whether it is not in fact effective within other ideologies, such as nationalism or antifeminism. The chapter will therefore focus on an analysis of the similarities of antisemitic and antifeminist discourses in the Austrian Freedom Party and their contribution to the strengthening of a nationalist collective.
Abstract: This study explores how an extreme far-right alternative media site uses content from professional media to convey uncivil news with an antisemitic message. Analytically, it rests on a critical discourse analysis of 231 news items, originating from established national and international news sources, published on Frihetskamp from 2011–2018. In the study, we explore how news items are recontextualised to portray both overt and covert antisemitic discourses, and we identify four antisemitic representations that are reinforced through the selection and adjustment of news: Jews as powerful, as intolerant and anti-liberal, as exploiters of victimhood, and as inferior. These conspiratorial and exclusionary ideas, also known from historical Nazi propaganda, are thus reproduced by linking them to con-temporary societal and political contexts and the current news agenda. We argue that this kind of recontextualised, uncivil news can be difficult to detect in a digital public sphere.
Abstract: This paper proposes that understanding the causes of anti-Semitic hate crime requires the
recognition of the cultural specificity of anti-Semitism, reflected in its unique mythical and
conspiratorial nature. By neglecting to consider the idiosyncrasies of anti-Semitic rhetoric,
general theories of hate crime often fail to provide an adequate explanation for the
persistence of anti-Jewish violence, especially in cultures where Jews do not constitute a
conspicuous minority, or where there is no noticeable tradition of anti-Jewish sentiment.
This point is illustrated using as an example the emergence of anti-Semitic hate crime in
Serbia in the aftermath of political changes in October 2000. The paper explores this
development in the context of Serbia’s recent past, arguing that the onset of violent
incidents towards Jews entailed two distinct but related stages, both of which are linked to
the conspiratorial nature of anti-Semitic ideology. The first phase – which culminated at
the time of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia – involved the proliferation of the belief in
Jewish conspiracy. At this stage, anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, which were to be found
even in the mainstream media, retained an ‘abstract’ quality and their proliferation did
not, in itself, lead to anti-Jewish hate crime. The onset of anti-Semitic violence is
associated with the second phase, which followed Milošević’s downfall, when, with the
marginalisation of conspiratorial culture, the belief in Jewish conspiracy, as an abstract
ideological position, became reified and transformed into concrete instances of violence
against the local Jewish population. In exploring this two-stage process, the paper
highlights the way in which a closer examination of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and
other anti-Semitic texts can help shed some light on the dynamic underpinning the
persistence of anti-Jewish hate crime in modern society.
Abstract: Antisemitism is a problem that is prevalent throughout the world. Violence and riots have frequently occurred for many years in football games in many countries, committed by fans of a club or by hooligans. Antisemitism has also become common at games, with football clubs using antisemitic language and symbols against their rivals. Sometimes, antisemitism is used by far-right political organizations at football stadiums for propaganda purposes and as a device to incite violence. It is interesting, and puzzling, that some fans of two teams, Spurs in London, and Ajax in Amsterdam, have declared themselves “Jewish,” and adopted and displayed Jewish symbols, as a response to antisemitic attacks on their club. While it is difficult to eradicate manifestations of antisemitism, it is encouraging that various private organizations, football clubs, and local and national governmental bodies have begun to formulate rules to punish those responsible for antisemitic language and actions.
Abstract: Threats and violence from radicalized Islamists have led to heightened security measures for Jewish organizations in France. French soldiers are protecting Jewish schools, kindergartens, community centers, and other Jewish institutions. In addition to terrorism, there are a number of other factors that have led to increased antisemitism in France. This article discusses data on antisemitic incidents and surveys on antisemitic attitudes in France. While there is a clear rise in antisemitic incidents, the trend in antisemitic attitudes is less clear. Levels of antisemitic attitudes are particularly high among Muslims, the far-right, and also the far-left, but not necessarily among the general French population. However, the rise of antisemitism has hit observant Jews more than non-observant Jews and it has led to changes in behavior, including in the display of religious signs and avoidance of places of worship. Many French Jews today question their future in France.
Abstract: This article examines three case studies of new-old sensibilities toward antisemitism, the Holocaust, and liberalism, in Hungary, which show: 1) how in a climate of mutual resentment, a debatable charge of intellectual antisemitism elicited widespread rejection; 2) how an official attempt to partially displace the West European “Holocaust paradigm” during the 2014 Holocaust commemoration led to a recoding of an older anti-fascist narrative in a right-wing key; and, 3) how new discourses on ethnic homogeneity and the Hungarian mainstream's partial convergence with the Western far-right have yielded an odd combination of anti-Jewish, anti-Muslim, and pro-Israel attitudes today. The article argues that antisemitism in Hungary grew substantially from 2006 to 2011, but has not exploded into a major political or social force under the authoritarian and xenophobic shift of the country since 2010. Hungarian Jews have not found themselves at the center of conflicts beyond their making, as in the past, but they are no longer able to enjoy the kind of security they experienced under Hungarian liberal democracy either—the situation in the country has become volatile and unpredictable.
Abstract: he Government needs to step up efforts to address attempts by the far-right to blame the COVID-19 pandemic on Jews, according to a think tank report.
The conspiracies are said to have permeated every corner of the internet, including encrypted apps like Telegram and everyday digital tools like podcasts. Despite much of the recent political and media focus being on mainstream platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, the report finds the most ardent forms of hatred circulate on peripheral so-called ‘alt-tech’ platforms.
The study — by the Henry Jackson Society — comes as it was revealed that Facebook has taken robust action in banning adverts by extremist group, which have attempted to sow the seeds of division amidst the COVID-19 crisis.
Among the online messages spread by the far-right identified within the report, are that:
Jews are using global lockdowns to “steal everything”.
“Satan in human form”, or Jewish people, are throwing dance parties to celebrate the spread of the coronavirus.
Jewish public leaders are using the COVID-19 crisis to “test the populations [sic] willingness to comply” with authoritarian restrictions on their civil liberties.
COVID-19 is being used as part of a plot to replace the ‘white’ population of Europe.
Those infected with the coronavirus should visit their local synagogue and mosque, and more broadly ethnically-diverse neighbourhoods, in order to spread the disease.
Jews spread the bubonic plague through Europe in the Middle Ages and demonstrate an inherent tendency for killing large numbers of non-Jews through efficient methods.
In response, the author recommends the introduction of stronger forms of internet regulation for alt-tech social media platforms, including a review by the Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE) and extensive training for law enforcement officers on the full scope of alt-tech platforms. The report also recommends that the Home Office establish a new counter-disinformation unit to tackle online conspiracy theories head-on by “exposing their fundamental lack of credibility, through well-organised social media campaigns”.
This material is said to be circulating on both sides of the Atlantic with extremist messaging from the British National Socialist Movement in the UK and the National Socialist Movement in the United States. The similarities between the content across the Atlantic is identified by the author as an area of particular concern
