Abstract: Il serait dramatique, et éminemment regrettable, qu'aucune voix ne s'élève aujourd'hui pour dénoncer « l'antisémitisme », dont les manifestations spectaculaires se sont multipliées au cours des deux dernières années - sans que les médias ne leur accordent la moindre place, à quelques exceptions près, - au moment même où se produit une très forte résurgence. Pierre-André Taguieff nous alerte sur cette seconde vague, post-nazie, ayant pris une forme tout à fait nouvelle : héritière des arguments traditionnels de l'antisémitisme, elle allie antisionisme et processus d'islamisation. Il la nomme nouvelle judéophobie. Ses expressions les plus récentes : en France, la multiplication des actes déliquants contre des synagogues, mais aussi les insultes et menaces adressées à des familles juives installées en banlieue, et tout récemment, un certain match de football France-Algérie ; au niveau international, la conférence de Durban, à la fin du mois d'août 2001, au cours de laquelle se jouèrent des pressions énormes pour stigmatiser et exclure les organisations israéliennes et juives ; et puis, les déclarations d'Oussama ben Laden depuis le 11 septembre. Dans le nouveau contexte géopolitique qui s'est brutalement dessiné, les intellectuels et la presse français restent curieusement muets, comme pétrifiés. Ils sont pris entre les thématiques de la victimisation sociologique des jeunes de banlieue et la dénonciation du fanatisme islamique. Pourtant, il est urgent de refuser intolérance et fanatisme, de décrire une évolution inquiétante très précisément, et de dénoncer toute pensée « amalgamante ». Le livre est né d'une communication donnée par l'auteur au Sénat lors du colloque « Les nouveaux visages de l'antisémitisme », le 14 octobre 2001.
Abstract: In march 1998, the Vatican released a long-awaited statement on the Catholic Church and the Holocaust. In a preface to the document, entitled We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah, Pope John Paul II expressed his hope that it would ‘help to heal the wounds of past misunderstandings and injustices’. Eighteen months after the publication of the document, it seems now possible to conclude that, however sincere the Vatican’s intentions, the pope’s hopes will almost certainly not be realized. Indeed, far from healing, the document has succeeded largely in re-opening, if not actually deepening, old wounds. Not only did it divide the Catholic intellectual and journalistic communities. More importantly, I think, it bewildered and frustrated many Jewish readers and bitterly disappointed others. It also called forth a literary response from Jewish intellectuals and organizations that, while especially vigorous in the immediate wake of the document’s publication, had force and feeling to last more than a year. Since the energy driving these responses appears to have subsided, it seems possible now to undertake a comprehensive survey of Jewish reaction to We Remember and to attempt to account for its intensity and duration.
Abstract: This report presents the main findings of FRA’s second survey on Jewish people’s experiences and perceptions of hate crime, discrimination and antisemitism. It analyses data from the responses of 16,395 selfidentified Jewish people (aged 16 or over) in 12 EU Member States – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These Member States are home to over 96 % of the EU’s estimated Jewish population. In addition to the 12 EU Member States mentioned above, FRA also carried out the survey in Latvia. Due to the low response level to the online dissemination campaign in Latvia, changes in recruitment methodology and data collection were applied. While the survey was able to reach more respondents in this way, the changes in the respondent recruitment and data collection methods limit the scope for comparisons between Latvia and the other survey countries.
Topics: Antisemitism, Fundraising and Philanthropy, Israel Attachment, Jewish Continuity, Religious Denominations, Security, Surveys, Jewish Leadership, Jewish Organisations, Main Topic: Identity and Community, Jewish Identity
Abstract: The Fourth Survey of European Jewish Community Leaders and Professionals, 2018 presents the results of an online survey offered in 10 languages and administered to 893 respondents in 29 countries. Conducted every three years using the same format, the survey seeks to identify trends and their evolution in time.
The survey asked Jewish lay leaders and community professionals questions regarding future community priorities, identifying the main threats to Jewish life, views on the safety and security situation in their cities, including emergency preparedness, and opinions on an array of internal community issues. Examples include conversions, membership criteria policies on intermarriage, and their vision of Europe and Israel.
The respondents were comprised of presidents and chairpersons of nationwide “umbrella organizations” or Federations; presidents and executive directors of private Jewish foundations, charities, and other privately funded initiatives; presidents and main representatives of Jewish communities that are organized at a city level; executive directors and programme coordinators, as well as current and former board members of Jewish organizations; among others.
The JDC International Centre for Community Development established the survey as a means to identify the priorities, sensibilities and concerns of Europe’s top Jewish leaders and professionals working in Jewish institutions, taking into account the changes that European Jewry has gone through since 1989, and the current political challenges and uncertainties in the continent. In a landscape with few mechanisms that can truly gauge these phenomena, the European Jewish Community Leaders Survey is an essential tool for analysis and applied research in the field of community development.
The Survey team was directed by Dr. Barry Kosmin (Trinity College), who has conducted several large national social surveys and opinion polls in Europe, Africa and the U.S., including the CJF 1990 US National Jewish Population Survey.
Abstract: The apparent resurgence of hostility toward Jews has been a prominent theme in recent discussions of Europe; at the same time, the adversities faced by the continent’s Muslim population have received increasing attention. In Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe, Matti Bunzl offers a historical and cultural clarification of the key terms in this debate. Arguing against the common impulse to analogize anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, it instead offers a framework that locates the two phenomena in different projects of exclusion.
According to Bunzl, anti-Semitism was invented in the late nineteenth century to police the ethnically pure nation-state. Islamophobia, by contrast, is a phenomenon of the present, marshaled to safeguard a supranational Europe. With the declining importance of the nation-state, traditional anti-Semitism has run its historical course, while Islamophobia threatens to become the defining condition of the new, unified Europe. By ridding us of misapprehensions, Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia enables us to see these forces anew.
Abstract: In this contribution, I examine the Catholic political practice of “intercessions” (shtadlanut) as a means to control and manage relations between state power and Jewish communities by means of a privileged elite. While governmental techniques or mechanisms of minority management are only part of a broader question of majority–minority power relations, the theological-political roots of such “management” strategies are often overlooked because the problem is assumed to be secular. In my analysis of shtadlanut, I show how Jewish communities were internally divided between “good” and “bad”, “managed” by the ruling powers, and homogenized. It is precisely this type of enforced collaboration with power, in combination with reduced agency and de-politicization, that I claim goes beyond the “Jewish Question”. Rather, we must turn our gaze on Europe and consider how, and why, it continues to make 'others' into problems. By doing so, we can challenge the frame of the contemporary "Muslim Question".
Abstract: Post-communist states today are dealing with conflicting sources of ontological insecurity. They are anxious to be perceived as fully European by “core” European states, a status that remains fleeting. Being fully European, however, means sharing in the cosmopolitan European narratives of the twentieth century, perhaps the strongest being the narrative of the Holocaust. Influencing the European Union’s own memory politics and legislation in the process, post-communist states have attempted to resolve these insecurities by undergoing a radical revision of their respective Holocaust remembrance where the memory, symbols, and imagery of the Holocaust become appropriated to represent crimes of communism. By rejecting the cosmopolitan European narrative of the Holocaust, post-communist states have also removed anti-fascist resistance from the core memory of the Holocaust, allowing for a revival and ideological normalisation of contemporary fascist ideological movements. I illustrate the argument with an overview of contemporary Holocaust remembrance practices in the EU’s youngest member, Croatia.
Abstract: Unwillingly and unwittingly, Jews have become 'icons' in Europe's new commemorative pluralist democracies. They have now set the standard for national commemoration of specific historical wrongs, for victimhood, for public visibility, for community organisation, for the right to multiple loyalties, and for a position that one can call selective national belonging; in brief, for real but also highly symbolic power. The main challenge Jews will be facing in the future will be that of making sure these 'iconic' rights are spread more globally in a setting of greater collective justice. But Jews, more than any other group, can also set the limits to too strong an identity pursuit. I believe there is an urgent need to recast a common belonging inside our respective countries and societies. The pendulum has swung too far in the direction of sanctified specific identities. The time has come to move it back toward a more moderate centre. Commemoration should lead to reconciliation, overcoming of the past, and healing, not to exacerbated identities. And Jews, precisely because of their iconic quality, now hold the keys to such a swing back. Otherwise we should not be surprised if Europe's Muslims follow the Jews in the path of declared victimhood, selective belonging, even disintegration through an implicitly hostile reading of the larger society outside.
Abstract: This paper describes and analyzes the multiple ethnic identities
and identifications among first-generation Jewish Israeli immigrants
in Europe, and specifically in London and Paris, by means of closedend
questionnaires (N=114) and in-depth semi-structured interviews
(N=23).
Israelis who live in Europe are strongly attached to Israel and are
proud to present themselves as Israelis. Despite their place of residence,
these Israelis, particularly those residing in London and over the age
of 35, manage to find ways to preserve their Israeli identity. They also
perceive the need to expose their children to other Israelis as another
means of preventing assimilation. On the other hand, those who are
under the age of 35, and in particular those residing in Paris, have less
opportunity or less need to maintain their Israeli identity in Europe.
The older Israelis in London are also somewhat more integrated with
the proximal host and have a stronger Jewish identity than do younger
Israelis, particularly those residing in Paris. Living in Europe allows
Israelis to flourish economically without having to identify with or
belong to a cultural and social ethnic niche. The ethnic identity of
first-generation Israeli immigrants in Europe is multifaceted. While it
is primarily transnational, it is also dynamic and constantly changing
though various interactions and is, of course, susceptible to current
local and global political and economic events. For younger Israeli
immigrants, assimilation into the non-Jewish population appears to be
a possible form of identity and identification. This assimilation may be
moderated among young adults who build bridges with local Jewish
communities in tandem with their transnational formal connections
with Israel, a process that can benefit both sides. Such a process - the
reconstruction of ethnic Israeli-Jewish identity and collaborative
identification with local Jews - has the potential to strengthen and
enhance the survivability of European Jewry at large.
Abstract: Commemorating the seventy-year anniversary of the Holocaust in Hungary, this book focuses on current practices in teaching the Holocaust.
In June 2014, at a conference co-organised by the Tom Lantos Institute, a group of professors, scholars, museum directors, and activists involved in memorial projects met at Central European University (CEU) in Budapest, Hungary, to discuss the future of Holocaust Studies. This subsequent book publication considers the potential of Holocaust memorialization and memory work to serve as a catalyst for addressing discrimination today by exploring different innovative teaching practices in higher education as well as bold and creative civic and institutional initiatives.
The authors who contributed to this book project come from across Europe and North America and their work showcases new directions in Holocaust education and commemoration.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTIONS
Anna-Mária Bíró
Introduction 6
John Shattuck
Introduction 7
Andrea Pető and Helga Thorson
Introduction: The Future of Holocaust Memorialization 8
PART 1
Institutional Perspectives and Challenges 11
Paul Shapiro
Facing the Facts of the Holocaust: The Challenges and the Cost of Failure 12
Karen Jungblut
The Future of Holocaust Memorialization: Institutional Perspectives
and Challenges 16
Holocaust Discourses Now 21
Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke
Teaching the Holocaust as Part of Local History: The Case of Denmark 22
Klas-Göran Karlsson
Holocaust History and Historical Learning 29
John C. Swanson
Returning to History: Memory and Holocaust Education 35
PART 2
Benefits and Challenges of Digital Resources 41
Helga Dorner, Edit Jeges, and Andrea Pető
New Ways of Seeing: Digital Testimonies, Reflective Inquiry,
and Video Pedagogy in a Graduate Seminar 42
Elizabeth Anthony
The Digital Transformation of the International Tracing Service Digital
Collection 46
Working against Prejudice and Hate 53
Ildikó Barna
Introducing a New Subject in a Challenging Environment among Students of
Military Sciences, Public Administration, and Law Enforcement in Hungary:
A Case Study 54
Heike Radvan
Facing Current Anti-Semitism, Racism, and Neo-Nazism: Talking about the
Holocaust in Local Initiatives in East Germany 60
Charlotte Schallié
The Case of Feincost Adam©: Confronting Antisemitism
through Creative Memory Work 65
Rethinking Pedagogical Practices
Annamaria Orla-Bukowska
Remembering Righteousness: Transnational Touchstones
in the International Classroom 72
Helga Thorson and Andrea van Noord
Stories from the Past, Creative Representations of the Future:
Inter-Cultural Exchange, the Possibility of Inter-Generational Communication,
and the Future of Holocaust Studies 80
Local Initiatives in Commemorating the Holocaust
Barbara Kintaert
Shedding Light on the Past: Digging for Information and
Grassroots Memorialization
88
Borbála Klacsmann
Memory Walk: History through Monuments 100
Gabor Kalman
Filming the Past for the Present 105
About the Authors 1
Abstract: JPR’s report, European Jewish identity: Mosaic or monolith? An empirical assessment of eight European countries, authored by Senior Research Fellow Dr David Graham, asks whether there is such a thing as a European Jewish identity, and, if so, what it looks like.
The question of whether there is a Jewish identity that is at once common to all European Jews but also peculiar to them, has intrigued scholars of contemporary Jewry since the fall of the Berlin Wall. This study contrasts the European picture with the two major centres of world Jewry, the United States and Israel, and examines the nature and content of Jewish identity across Europe, exploring the three core pillars of belief, belonging and behaviour around which Jewish identity is built.
This research was made possible by the advent of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) survey in 2012 examining Jewish people’s experiences and perceptions of antisemitism across nine EU Member States: Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Sweden and the UK. As well as gathering data about antisemitism, the study investigated various aspects of the Jewishness of respondents, in order to ascertain whether different types of Jews perceive and experience antisemitism differently. This study focuses on the data gathered about Jewishness, thereby enabling direct comparisons to be made for the first time across multiple European Jewish communities in a robust and comprehensive way.
The report concludes that there is no monolithic European identity, but it explores in detail the mosaic of Jewish identity in Europe, highlighting some key differences:
• In Belgium, where Jewish parents are most likely to send their children to Jewish schools, there is a unique polarisation between the observant and non-observant;
• In France, Jews exhibit the strongest feelings of being part of the Jewish People, and also have the strongest level of emotional attachment to Israel;
• Germany’s Jewish community has the largest proportion of foreign-born Jews, and, along with Hungary, is the youngest Jewish population;
• In Hungary the greatest relative weight in Jewish identity priorities is placed on 'Combating antisemitism,' and the weakest level of support for Israel is exhibited;
• In Italy, respondents are least likely to report being Jewish by birth or to have two Jewish parents;
• The Jews of Latvia are the oldest population and the most likely to be intermarried;
• The Jews of Sweden attach a very high level of importance to 'Combating antisemitism' despite being relatively unlikely to experience it, and they observe few Jewish practices;
• In the United Kingdom, Jews observe the most religious practices and appear to feel the least threatened by antisemitism. They are the most likely to be Jewish by birth and least likely to be intermarried.
According to report author, Dr David Graham: “This report represents far more than the culmination of an empirical assessment of Jewish identity. Never before has it been possible to examine Jewish identity across Europe in anything approaching a coherent and systematic way. Prior to the FRA’s survey, it was almost inconceivable that an analysis of this kind could be carried out at all. The formidable obstacles of cost, language, political and logistical complexity seemed to present impenetrable barriers to the realisation of any such dream. Yet this is exactly what has been achieved, a report made possible through an FRA initiative into furthering understanding of Jewish peoples' experience of antisemitism. It reveals a European Jewry that is more mosaic than monolith, an array of Jewish communities, each exhibiting unique Jewish personas, yet united by geography and a common cultural heritage."
Abstract: In the discourse surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, extreme criticisms of Israel (e.g., Israel is an apartheid state,theIsrael Defense Forces deliberately target Palestinian civilians),coupled with extreme policy proposals (e.g., boycott of Israeli academics and institutions, divest from companies doing business with Israel), have sparked counterclaims that such criticisms are anti-Semitic (for only Israel is singled out). The research in this article shines a different, statistical light on this question: based on a survey of 500 citizens in each of 10 European countries, the authors ask whether those individuals with extreme anti-Israel views are more likely to be anti-Semitic. Even after controlling for numerous potentially confounding factors, they find that anti-Israel sentiment consistently predicts the probability that an individual is anti-Semitic, with the likelihood of measured anti-Semitism increasing with the extent of anti-Israel sentiment observed.
Abstract: This article seeks to trace how visions of a “Jewish return to Europe” inform contemporary cultural production. I am particularly interested in asking how the presence of Israeli émigrés in Germany, a dramatic instance of such a “return,” challenges the country’s memorial culture due to the “exportation” of dispositions relating to the Holocaust construed in Israel. I view this dislocation of memo-rial practices, a new instance of Hebrew-German exchange, as embedded in a broader discourse on migration, integration and xenophobic violence. At the core of my argument is the 2007–2011 film trilogy
And Europe Will Be Stunned,
directed by Israeli artist Yael Bartana, who is based in Berlin and Amsterdam. The trilogy presents a fictional national movement that advocates the return of 3,300,000 Jews to Poland, with the claim that Poland’s ethnic and religious homogeneity is a deficiency that could be corrected with the renewal of Jewish life in the country. Wearing the form of an enthusiastic political manifesto, the trilogy mirrors early Zionist images and motifs in articulating the vision of the return to the homeland. The trilogy’s end reveals this endeavor as a failure, to which the assassination of the movement’s leader, Slawek, attests.
Abstract: Antisemitism can be expressed in the form of verbal and physical attacks, threats, harassment, property damage and graffiti or other forms of speech or text, including on the internet. Antisemitic incidents and hate crime violate fundamental rights, including the right to human dignity, the right to equality of treatment and the freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
This annual overview compiles the available evidence on antisemitic incidents collected by governmental and non-governmental sources, covering the period 1 January 2006– 31 December 2016, where data are available. In addition, it includes a section that presents evidence from international organisations. No official data on reported antisemitic incidents in 2016 were available for 11 Member States by the time this report was compiled in September 2017.
‘Official data’ are understood here as those collected by law enforcement agencies, other authorities that are part of criminal justice systems and relevant state ministries at the national level. ‘Unofficial data’ refers to data collected by civil society organisations.
Abstract: The status and sustainability of minority/dominated languages in the 21st century are
very much influenced by general and language ideologies of times gone by. Namely,
Eurocentric modernity-driven language policy and planning, which result in the
formation of standard language culture ideologies, are at the core of the cultural,
political and historical frameworks which, since the 19th century, have influenced the
relationship between majority (standardized) languages and minority/dominated
languages spoken in political entities recognized as nation-states in Europe. It is within
this framework of standard language cultures (Milroy, 2001) that the history, the loss,
and the possible revitalization of Judeo-Spanish can and should be understood.
Na status i održivost manjinskih jezika/jezika kojima se dominira u 21. veku
umnogome utiču opšte i jezičke ideologije prošlih vremena. Naime, evrocentrična
modernost koju pokreće jezička politika i jezičko planiranje, koja ima za posledicu
oblikovanje standardnih jezičkih kulturnih ideologija, predstavlja srž kulturnih,
političkih i istorijskih okvira koja je od 19. veka uticala na odnos između većinskih
(standardizovanih) jezika i manjinskih jezika/jezika kojima se dominira kao političke
entitete koji su priznati kao nacionalne države u Evropi. Upravo se u ovom okviru
standardnih jezičkih kultura (Milroy, 2001) mogu i treba razumeti istorija i gubitak, kao
i moguća revitalizacija jevrejsko- španskog.
En relación a las lenguas minoritarias dominadas en el siglo xxi, su estado y subsistencia
están muy influidas por las ideologías generales y también lingüísticas del tiempo que
vivimos. Concretamente, la modernidad eurocéntrica de la política y de la planificación
lingüística que conducen a la formación de ideologías culturales lingüísticas estandarizadas,
están en el núcleo de los marcos históricos, políticos y culturales que, desde el siglo xix,
han influido en la relación entre la mayoría de las lenguas (estandarizadas) y las lenguas
minoritarias dominadas habladas en las entidades políticas reconocidas como son los
Estados nación en Europa. Es dentro de este marco de culturas lingüísticas estándar (Milroy,
2001) que puede y debe ser entendida su historia y su pérdida, así como la revitalización
del judeoespañol.
Abstract: This article analyses how Europe’s ‘Yiddish past’ is presented, commemorated and engaged with in contemporary Europe from a Public History perspective. It investigates the ways in which Yiddish, its culture and its speakers, are inscribed in representations of Jewish history in museums, websites, and other settings. In doing so a distinction is made between Western Europe, where Yiddish-speaking immigrants and their culture formed but a part of local Jewish populations, and Central/Eastern Europe, where Jewish life was to a large extent Yiddish life. The article shows how a growing attention for migration in Western Europe, and the demand for Jewish heritage from abroad in Central and Eastern Europe, drive new and revised versions of Jewish, as well as national, historical narratives. It also contrasts such larger developments and contexts with local, ‘bottom-up’, activities. At the same it moves beyond national contexts and considers the role that European institutions play in preserving Yiddish heritage. The article argues that definitions of Public History, which predominantly focus on how professional historians take history to a broader non-academic public, are insufficient. The case of Yiddish in Europe also highlights the important role of the state in driving public history activities. Key words: Jewish history; Yiddish; Europe; Public History; Representation; Museums.
Abstract: Quelle est la fréquence des actes antisémites violents dans l’Europe d’aujourd’hui et quelles sont les tendances observables ? Dans quelle mesure les membres de la communauté juive sont-ils exposés dans les différents pays ? Qui sont les auteurs de ces crimes ?
Il est évidemment impératif de pouvoir répondre à ces questions aussi précisément que possible si l’on veut combattre efficacement l’antisémitisme, et en particulier l’antisémitisme violent.
Le travail présenté dans cette note tente d’établir une première comparaison des niveaux de violence antisémite dans différents pays en combinant les données relatives aux incidents fondées sur les rapports de police avec les résultats d’une enquête sur l’antisémitisme réalisée en 2012 par l’Agence des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (FRA). Un échantillon de sept pays (Allemagne, Danemark, France, Royaume-Uni, Norvège, Suède et Russie) permet d’esquisser des analyses mais c’est surtout sur la base des données de quatre pays du panel (France, Royaume-Uni, Allemagne et Suède) que l’étude comparative a été rendue possible. C’est en France que l’exposition des Juifs à la violence antisémite semble la plus forte.
Concernant les auteurs d’actes antisémites violents, les données disponibles montrent, en Europe de l’Ouest, la prédominance de personnes de culture musulmane, alors qu’en Russie le profil qui prévaut est celui de militants d’extrême droite.
Les résultats présentés ici constituent une première contribution à une évaluation rigoureuse de l’antisémitisme violent dans les pays européens. Ce travail appelle à la construction d’indicateurs communs. La définition d’une mesure précise de l’antisémitisme est l’outil indispensable d’une lutte efficace contre ce redoutable préjugé, capable d’engendrer des comportements violents, y compris meurtriers.
