Abstract: This paper aims at providing a new systemic contribution to research about perceptions of antisemitism/Judeophobia by contemporary Jews in 12 European Union countries. The perspective – the viewpoint of the offended side – has been less prominent relatively in research literature on antisemitism. The data analysis demonstrates the potential power of Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA) as a better theoretical and empirical tool to describe and conceptualize the contents of chosen research issues. After a brief review of some methodological problems in the study of antisemitism, this paper will re-elaborate data first published in the report of the 2018 FRA study Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism – Second survey on Discrimination and Hate Crimes against Jews in the EU (FRA 2018a). Topics include the perceived importance of antisemitism as a societal issue, the contents of anti-Jewish prejudice and discrimination, channels of transmission, perpetrators of offenses, regional differences within Europe, and the role of antisemitism perceptions as a component of Jewish identification. Special attention is paid to the distinction between cognitive and experiential perceptions of antisemitism, and to the typology of practical, populist, political, and narrative antisemitism.
Abstract: In this contribution, Topolski argues that the erasure and denial of Europe’s race–religion constellation can help us understand how it has been possible to resurrect the divisive, exclusionary and problematic myth of a ‘Judaeo-Christian’ tradition in Europe. While this term can be, and has been, used in diverse and contradictory ways in the past few decades, Topolski is most interested in how it masks Islamophobia. To do this, she turns to Europe’s denied race–religion constellation. She contends that we cannot understand European racism, past or present, without making the race–religion constellation visible, and that its invisibility today is not accidental. Next, Topolski wants to show how the current resurrection of the term ‘Judaeo-Christian’ serves to mask and conceal the race–religion constellation. The focus is thus on the exclusion of religions that have not assimilated to the accepted secularized norms of white Christianity, particularly its Aryan/Protestant form, and how this exclusion is connected to the race–religion constellation. In the final part, Topolski explains how the latter might serve the collapsing European project, as well as struggling nation-states, as a scapegoat mechanism to blame Europe’s Others for problems Europe has itself created. This leads to their further exclusion and a lack of tolerance in terms of practice and rituals (which might be connected). For these reasons, Topolski argues we need to reject the use of the term ‘Judaeo-Christian’ and make visible the hidden race–religion constellation.
Abstract: In this article, Jansen attempts to demonstrate that addressing the religious practices of Jews and Muslims from the perspective of a religio-secular framework in today’s European context underestimates the complexity of semiotic relations between Muslims, Jews and other Europeans. She discusses this complexity in terms of ‘intercultural semiotics’ between the three groups. In particular, she focuses on what she calls ‘mirroring relations’, drawing on an expression from Yirmiyahu Yovel about a ‘crooked, passion-laden mirror’ characterizing the ways in which modern Europeans imagined their Jewish neighbours in early twentieth-century Europe. In order to further explain this, Jansen analyses a passage from Marcel Proust’s novel In Search of Lost Time, which concerns a group of people in late nineteenth-century France, following the Dreyfus Affair, who are perceived by the narrator as Jewish. Thereafter, drawing on Gil Hochberg’s notion of the ‘re-membering’ of the Semite, Jansen analyses semiotic mirroring in the work Projet Deburkanisation (2017) by the Belgian author Rachida Lamrabet, which she reads as a contemporary meta-reflection, involving Muslims, on the mirroring relations between Jews and other Europeans first discussed via her reading of Proust.
Abstract: In the improvised Paris memorials to the murdered Charlie Hebdo cartoonists in 2015, Jewishness was largely occluded, Christianity was naturalized (and denigrated in so far as it overlapped with ‘religion’) and Islam functioned as the icon of acute religious sensitivity and zealotry: the religion that cannot tolerate blasphemy, specifically the Muhammad cartoons, for which the martyrs of free speech were killed. In this study Sherwood looks at the Paris memorials (blasphemy ACH = after Charlie Hebdo) alongside two far less well-known cases of blasphemous cartoons from the period that I term BSV (=before The Satanic Verses). The latter include Bible cartoons from the 1880s, for which the freethinker George Foote was prosecuted for blasphemy, and the (as far as I know) first accidentally blasphemous Muhammad cartoon in Europe from 1925. In both cases, the spectral figures of ‘the Jew’ and ‘the Muslim’ are differently tangential, and are used to divert controversy away from the Christian. The deeper history of blasphemy controversies BSV helps us to articulate a darker history of the ‘secular’, secular freedoms and religion/race. Islam and Judaism continue to suffer from the old symbolic disabilities, and the disabilities of minority, whereas a certain deference to Christianity, and an ongoing use of Christian structures, is assumed.
Abstract: The question as posed is a challenge, not only to those who assigned it as a theme to be explored, and not only to those who expect to answer it, but also to all of Europe in which anti-Semitism persistently continues to show its face half a century after the closing of the Death Camps. Five decades separate us from the last days of the Gas Chambers and of the Crematoria, and still the embers of hatred for Jews, for "The Despised Other", smoulder beneath the surface of post-World War II Europe, erupting spasmodically from Madrid to Moscow. The question as phrased is a direct challenge to all of European heritage precisely because it contains its own answer, an answer no one desires to express or hear, for it embodies a confession of a fundamental flaw in the fraying tapestry that is Europe today after Bosnia. To give voice to the answer, however circuitously, would be to confront head on the centrifugal danger that, if not neutralised, could unravel the process of European unification and integration. The question as put is a classic example of a rhetorical query of a combined question and answer: thus "Why is it so?" implies, at the same time, "Hatred for Jews did not die in Auschwitz; it was not even mortally wounded". The only question remaining is: "How forthright will the attempt to examine the answer be?" Not how accurate, but how honest? Unavoidably it will be accusatory and, quite possibly, offensive. As one performs cultural vivisection of that which was, still is, and, most probably, will continue to be an attribute of a Europe chronically infected by the virus of continuing anti-Semitism, there has to be, of necessity, a shocked response. Hence the underlying tension of the topic for which the messenger is all too often blamed.
Topics: Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Muslim, Antisemitism: Far right, Anti-Zionism, Holocaust Denial, Holocaust Memorials, Holocaust Education, Holocaust Commemoration, Holocaust, Main Topic: Holocaust and Memorial, Jewish - Muslim Relations
Topics: Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Education against, Antisemitism: Far right, Antisemitism: Left-Wing, Antisemitism: Muslim, Antisemitism: New Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Monitoring, Antisemitism: Discourse, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Terrorism, European Union, Integration
Abstract: Antisemitism can be expressed in the form of verbal and physical attacks, threats, harassment, discrimination and unequal treatment, property damage and graffiti or other forms of speech or text, including on the internet. Antisemitic incidents and hate crime violate fundamental rights, especially the right to human dignity, the right to equality of treatment and the freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
The present report provides an overview of data on antisemitism as recorded by international organisations and by official and unofficial sources in the 28 European Union (EU) Member States, based on their own definitions and categorisations. ‘Official data’ are understood here as those collected by law enforcement agencies, other authorities that are part of criminal justice systems and relevant state ministries at the national level. ‘Unofficial data’ refers to data collected by civil society organisations.
This is the 15th edition of FRA’s report on the situation of data collection on antisemitism in the EU (including reports published by FRA’s predecessor, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia).
Abstract: Mit der im Jahr 2016 von der International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) anerkannten «Arbeitsdefinition Antisemitismus» liegt ein Instrument für die notwendige Erfassung und Bekämpfung von Antisemitismus vor, das weite Verbreitung gefunden hat. In einem Handlungsfeld, das durch hochgradige begriffliche Verunsicherung gekennzeichnet ist, verspricht die Definition als praktische Arbeitsgrundlage begriffliche Orientierung. Tatsächlich stellt die «Arbeitsdefinition» mit ihrer konkreten, ohne Fachterminologie auskommenden Sprache sowie mit anschaulichen Beispielen, die den Begriff Antisemitismus anhand typischer, immer wieder auftretender Phänomene verdeutlichen, inzwischen eine Grundlage für die Arbeit verschiedener Nutzer*innengruppen dar. Zudem erfolgte mit der Aufnahme bis dato nur wenig beleuchteter (israelbezogener) Aspekte von Antisemitismus eine zum Zeitpunkt der Formulierung der Definition (Anfang der 2000er Jahre) notwendige Aktualisierung der Diskussion.
Bei einer näheren Untersuchung offenbaren sich jedoch auch gravierende Mängel. Insbesondere ist die «Arbeitsdefinition» inkonsistent, widersprüchlich und ausgesprochen vage formuliert; mithin erfüllt sie nicht die Anforderungen guten Definierens. Die Kerndefinition des Antisemitismus ist zudem reduktionistisch. Sie hebt einige antisemitische Phänomene und Analyseebenen hervor, spart aber andere, wesentliche, sehr weitgehend aus. Dies gilt insbesondere für ideologische und diskursive Aspekte, beispielsweise den Antisemitismus als verschwörungstheoretisches Weltbild. Ebenso fehlt eine Erwähnung organisationssoziologischer Aspekte der Mobilisierung in Bewegungen und Parteien sowie deren Niederschlag in diskriminierenden institutionellen Regelungen und Praxen. Zudem können manche israelbezogenen Beispiele, die der Kerndefinition hinzugefügt sind, nur mithilfe weiterer Informationen über den Kontext als antisemitisch klassifiziert werden, da das Beschriebene mehrdeutig ist. Es tritt in komplexen, sich überlagernden Konfliktkonstellationen auf, bei denen eine Zuordnung zu einem spezifischen Problemkreis wie Antisemitismus oft nicht einfach möglich ist. Ein Beispiel sind die sogenannten doppelten Standards. Sie sind kein hinreichendes Kriterium, um eine antisemitische Fokussierung auf Israel von einer solchen zu unterscheiden, die mit den Spezifika israelischer Politik und ihrer weltpolitischen Bedeutung zusammenhängen.
In der Folge begünstigt die «Arbeitsdefinition» eine widersprüchliche und fehleranfällige Anwendungs praxis und führt zu Einschätzungen von Vorfällen oder Sachverhalten, die nicht auf klaren Kriterien basieren, sondern eher auf Vorverständnissen derer, die sie anwenden, oder auf unreflektiert übernommenen verbreiteten Deutungen. Die Anwendung der «Arbeitsdefinition» produziert die Fiktion eines kriteriengeleiteten, objektiven Beurteilens. Die Definition stellt prozedurale Legitimität für Entscheidungen zur Verfügung, die faktisch auf der Grundlage anderer, implizit bleibender Kriterien getroffen werden, welche weder in der Definition noch in den Beispielen festgelegt sind.
Die Schwächen der «Arbeitsdefinition» sind das Einfallstor für ihre politische Instrumentalisierung, etwa um gegnerische Positionen im Nahostkonflikt durch den Vorwurf des Antisemitismus moralisch zu diskreditieren. Dies hat relevante grundrechtliche Implikationen. Die zunehmende Implementierung der «Arbeitsdefinition» als quasi-rechtliche Grundlage von Verwaltungshandeln suggeriert Orientierung. Stattdessen ist sie faktisch ein zu Willkür geradezu einladendes Instrument. Dieses kann genutzt werden, um Grundrechte, insbesondere die Meinungsfreiheit, in Bezug auf missliebige israelbezogene Positionen zu beschneiden. Anders als die Bezeichnung «Arbeitsdefinition» suggeriert, findet auch keine Weiterentwicklung der Definition statt, um diese Schwächen zu beheben.
Fazit: Der Versuch, Probleme allgemeiner begrifflicher Klärung und universeller praktischer Einsetzbarkeit mithilfe der «Arbeitsdefinition Antisemitismus» zu lösen, muss insgesamt als gescheitert angesehen werden. Vor allem aufgrund ihrer handwerklichen Schwächen, ihrer defizitären Anwendungspraxis, ihres trotzdem teilweise verbindlichen rechtlichen Status und ihrer politischen Instrumentalisierbarkeit mit problematischen Implikationen für die Meinungsfreiheit kann die Verwendung der «Arbeitsdefinition Antisemitismus» nicht empfohlen werden. Eine mögliche Ausnahme könnten lediglich eng umgrenzte pädagogische Kontexte darstellen.
Wie die Entstehungsgeschichte der «Arbeitsdefinition Antisemitismus» und ihre weite Verbreitung deutlich machen, gibt es – auch angesichts einer weiter bestehenden Bedrohung durch gegenwärtigen Antisemitismus – einen großen Bedarf vonseiten verschiedener Institutionen nach in der Praxis anwendbaren Kriterien zur Identifikation antisemitischer Phänomene. Folglich ist die Entwicklung von klaren und kontextspezifischen Instrumenten für die Praxis dringend zu empfehlen.
Abstract: This paper is the first output of the new European Jewish Demography Unit, set up by JPR in January 2019 with the generous support of the Rothschild Foundation Hanadiv Europe, to undertake demographic research about Jewish populations across Europe.
Demography provides answers to questions such as how many Jews exist in the world? Or in Europe? Or in any particular country of Europe? And where will European Jewry go from here?
The objective of the Unit is to create demographic profiles of European Jewish populations at a country level, documenting their size, structure, composition, patterns of Jewish identity, factors of growth and decline and past and projected trajectories over time. The foundational paper demonstrates the practical sides and uses of demography, with the focus on its use by the Jewish community.
The paper is written in three parts. Part 1 describes what Jewish demography is, as a subject area, and its purpose and value, with specific reference to Jews in Europe. Part 2 explores some of the critiques of demography from the past and present and responds to these by outlining how the data should be used and have been used for highly constructive purposes. Part 3 outlines what the European Jewish Demography Unit will do, and the methods and approach it will take.
Abstract: Damit hatte niemand gerechnet, jedenfalls nicht so schnell: Auf europäischen Straßen werden wieder Juden beleidigt, angegriffen oder sogar getötet. Auch in Deutschland häufen sich seit Jahren die Negativerfahrungen. Hassmails, Beschimpfungen, Vandalismus und die Bedrohung jüdischer Kinder an öffentlichen Schulen verunsichern die jüdische Gemeinschaft, mit fatalen Folgen: Ein Teil der Menschen zieht sich ins Private zurück und möchte nicht mehr als jüdisch wahrgenommen werden. Andere denken sogar an Auswanderung. Das neue Unbehagen sitzt tief, auch wenn manche Politiker sich für solidarisch erklären.
Was hat den Hass und die Abneigung gegenüber Juden in Deutschland so spürbar verstärkt? Zwölf Experten und Akteure gehen in diesem Band Ursachen für den Wiederanstieg des Antisemitismus nach. Sie scheuen sich nicht, kontroverse Themen aufzugreifen und antisemitische Potentiale zu benennen –egal ob in rechtsextremen, linksradikalen oder islamistischen Milieus, oder in von entsprechenden Weltanschauungen beeinflussten Personenkreisen, die weit in die Mitte der Gesellschaft reichen.
Abstract: Il serait dramatique, et éminemment regrettable, qu'aucune voix ne s'élève aujourd'hui pour dénoncer « l'antisémitisme », dont les manifestations spectaculaires se sont multipliées au cours des deux dernières années - sans que les médias ne leur accordent la moindre place, à quelques exceptions près, - au moment même où se produit une très forte résurgence. Pierre-André Taguieff nous alerte sur cette seconde vague, post-nazie, ayant pris une forme tout à fait nouvelle : héritière des arguments traditionnels de l'antisémitisme, elle allie antisionisme et processus d'islamisation. Il la nomme nouvelle judéophobie. Ses expressions les plus récentes : en France, la multiplication des actes déliquants contre des synagogues, mais aussi les insultes et menaces adressées à des familles juives installées en banlieue, et tout récemment, un certain match de football France-Algérie ; au niveau international, la conférence de Durban, à la fin du mois d'août 2001, au cours de laquelle se jouèrent des pressions énormes pour stigmatiser et exclure les organisations israéliennes et juives ; et puis, les déclarations d'Oussama ben Laden depuis le 11 septembre. Dans le nouveau contexte géopolitique qui s'est brutalement dessiné, les intellectuels et la presse français restent curieusement muets, comme pétrifiés. Ils sont pris entre les thématiques de la victimisation sociologique des jeunes de banlieue et la dénonciation du fanatisme islamique. Pourtant, il est urgent de refuser intolérance et fanatisme, de décrire une évolution inquiétante très précisément, et de dénoncer toute pensée « amalgamante ». Le livre est né d'une communication donnée par l'auteur au Sénat lors du colloque « Les nouveaux visages de l'antisémitisme », le 14 octobre 2001.
Abstract: In march 1998, the Vatican released a long-awaited statement on the Catholic Church and the Holocaust. In a preface to the document, entitled We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah, Pope John Paul II expressed his hope that it would ‘help to heal the wounds of past misunderstandings and injustices’. Eighteen months after the publication of the document, it seems now possible to conclude that, however sincere the Vatican’s intentions, the pope’s hopes will almost certainly not be realized. Indeed, far from healing, the document has succeeded largely in re-opening, if not actually deepening, old wounds. Not only did it divide the Catholic intellectual and journalistic communities. More importantly, I think, it bewildered and frustrated many Jewish readers and bitterly disappointed others. It also called forth a literary response from Jewish intellectuals and organizations that, while especially vigorous in the immediate wake of the document’s publication, had force and feeling to last more than a year. Since the energy driving these responses appears to have subsided, it seems possible now to undertake a comprehensive survey of Jewish reaction to We Remember and to attempt to account for its intensity and duration.
Abstract: This report presents the main findings of FRA’s second survey on Jewish people’s experiences and perceptions of hate crime, discrimination and antisemitism. It analyses data from the responses of 16,395 selfidentified Jewish people (aged 16 or over) in 12 EU Member States – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These Member States are home to over 96 % of the EU’s estimated Jewish population. In addition to the 12 EU Member States mentioned above, FRA also carried out the survey in Latvia. Due to the low response level to the online dissemination campaign in Latvia, changes in recruitment methodology and data collection were applied. While the survey was able to reach more respondents in this way, the changes in the respondent recruitment and data collection methods limit the scope for comparisons between Latvia and the other survey countries.
Topics: Antisemitism, Fundraising and Philanthropy, Israel Attachment, Jewish Continuity, Religious Denominations, Security, Surveys, Jewish Leadership, Jewish Organisations, Main Topic: Identity and Community, Jewish Identity
Abstract: The Fourth Survey of European Jewish Community Leaders and Professionals, 2018 presents the results of an online survey offered in 10 languages and administered to 893 respondents in 29 countries. Conducted every three years using the same format, the survey seeks to identify trends and their evolution in time.
The survey asked Jewish lay leaders and community professionals questions regarding future community priorities, identifying the main threats to Jewish life, views on the safety and security situation in their cities, including emergency preparedness, and opinions on an array of internal community issues. Examples include conversions, membership criteria policies on intermarriage, and their vision of Europe and Israel.
The respondents were comprised of presidents and chairpersons of nationwide “umbrella organizations” or Federations; presidents and executive directors of private Jewish foundations, charities, and other privately funded initiatives; presidents and main representatives of Jewish communities that are organized at a city level; executive directors and programme coordinators, as well as current and former board members of Jewish organizations; among others.
The JDC International Centre for Community Development established the survey as a means to identify the priorities, sensibilities and concerns of Europe’s top Jewish leaders and professionals working in Jewish institutions, taking into account the changes that European Jewry has gone through since 1989, and the current political challenges and uncertainties in the continent. In a landscape with few mechanisms that can truly gauge these phenomena, the European Jewish Community Leaders Survey is an essential tool for analysis and applied research in the field of community development.
The Survey team was directed by Dr. Barry Kosmin (Trinity College), who has conducted several large national social surveys and opinion polls in Europe, Africa and the U.S., including the CJF 1990 US National Jewish Population Survey.
Abstract: The apparent resurgence of hostility toward Jews has been a prominent theme in recent discussions of Europe; at the same time, the adversities faced by the continent’s Muslim population have received increasing attention. In Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe, Matti Bunzl offers a historical and cultural clarification of the key terms in this debate. Arguing against the common impulse to analogize anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, it instead offers a framework that locates the two phenomena in different projects of exclusion.
According to Bunzl, anti-Semitism was invented in the late nineteenth century to police the ethnically pure nation-state. Islamophobia, by contrast, is a phenomenon of the present, marshaled to safeguard a supranational Europe. With the declining importance of the nation-state, traditional anti-Semitism has run its historical course, while Islamophobia threatens to become the defining condition of the new, unified Europe. By ridding us of misapprehensions, Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia enables us to see these forces anew.
Abstract: In this contribution, I examine the Catholic political practice of “intercessions” (shtadlanut) as a means to control and manage relations between state power and Jewish communities by means of a privileged elite. While governmental techniques or mechanisms of minority management are only part of a broader question of majority–minority power relations, the theological-political roots of such “management” strategies are often overlooked because the problem is assumed to be secular. In my analysis of shtadlanut, I show how Jewish communities were internally divided between “good” and “bad”, “managed” by the ruling powers, and homogenized. It is precisely this type of enforced collaboration with power, in combination with reduced agency and de-politicization, that I claim goes beyond the “Jewish Question”. Rather, we must turn our gaze on Europe and consider how, and why, it continues to make 'others' into problems. By doing so, we can challenge the frame of the contemporary "Muslim Question".
Abstract: Post-communist states today are dealing with conflicting sources of ontological insecurity. They are anxious to be perceived as fully European by “core” European states, a status that remains fleeting. Being fully European, however, means sharing in the cosmopolitan European narratives of the twentieth century, perhaps the strongest being the narrative of the Holocaust. Influencing the European Union’s own memory politics and legislation in the process, post-communist states have attempted to resolve these insecurities by undergoing a radical revision of their respective Holocaust remembrance where the memory, symbols, and imagery of the Holocaust become appropriated to represent crimes of communism. By rejecting the cosmopolitan European narrative of the Holocaust, post-communist states have also removed anti-fascist resistance from the core memory of the Holocaust, allowing for a revival and ideological normalisation of contemporary fascist ideological movements. I illustrate the argument with an overview of contemporary Holocaust remembrance practices in the EU’s youngest member, Croatia.
