Abstract: The article analyzes the newest survey results on antisemitic prejudices, antisemitic political discourses, and political antisemitism in present-day Hungary. According to the research findings, during the first decade and a half after the fall of communism, 10%-15% of the Hungarian adult population held a strong antisemitic prejudice. Surveys conducted after 2006 show not only an increase in the absolute percentage of antisemites, but also an increase in the proportion of antisemites who embed their antisemitism in the political context. This phenomenon is linked with the appearance on the political scene of Jobbik, a more or less openly antisemitic party. When examining the causes of antisemitism, the most interesting finding was that the strength of antisemitic feelings is regionally different and that these differences correlate with the strength of Jobbik’s support in the various regions. Accordingly, we hypothesized that support for a far-right party is not a consequence of antisemitism, but conversely should be regarded as a factor that mobilizes attitudes leading to antisemitism. Thus, antisemitism is—at least in large part—a consequence of an attraction to the far right rather than an explanation for it. While analyzing antisemitic discourse, we found that the primary function of the discourse is not to formulate anti-Jewish political demands but
to establish a common identity for groups that, for various reasons and motives, have turned against the liberal parliamentary system that replaced communism.
Abstract: After the demise of state socialism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, over 1.6 million Jews and their non-Jewish family members from Russia, Ukraine, and other parts of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) emigrated to Israel, the United States, Canada, Germany, and other Western countries. Large communities of former Soviets found themselves in the diverse national contexts of the receiving countries as either refugees or independent migrants.1 Soon after establishing an initial economic and social foothold, former Soviet immigrants started rebuilding their social networks, both within each new homeland and across national borders. These networks, spanning four continents, based on common language, culture, and historic legacies, mainly come to the fore as informal social spaces, although there are also some examples of successful civic associations representing common interests of Russian immigrants or Russian Jewry at large. This introduction examines the roots of Russian Jewish identity in the Former Soviet Union and presents an overview of some major trends in late twentieth century Russian Jewish migration to the West.
Abstract: Technically, Israel is not the only official Jewish homeland in the world. In the Far East of Russian Siberia there still exists the Jewish Autonomous Region (JAR) of Birobidzhan. Beginning in 1928 the Soviet Union set aside a territory larger than Belgium and Holland combined and considerably bigger than Israel, for Jewish settlement, located some five thousands miles east of Moscow along the Soviet-Chinese border, between the 48th and 49th parallels north latitude, where the climate and conditions are similar to Ontario and Michigan. Believing that Soviet Jewish people, like other national minorities, deserved a territorial homeland, the Soviet regime decided to settle a territorythat in 1934 would become the Jewish Autonomous Region. The idea was to create a new Zion–in a move to counterweight to Palestine – where a “proletarian Jewish culture” based on Yiddish language could be developed. In fact, the establishment of the JAR was the first instance of an officially acknowledged Jewish national territory since ancient times: the “First Israel”. But the history of the Region was tragic and the ex-periment failed. Nevertheless, Birobidzhan’s renewed existence of today and the revival of Jewish life in the post-Soviet JAR are not only a curious legacy of Soviet national policy, but after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the worldwide religious rebirth represent an interesting case-study in order to studysome challenging geographic pro-blems, and interethnic relations.
Abstract: It would be a mistake to assume that ethnopolitics is only a matter of confrontation between different ethnic groups. On the contrary, there is a range of examples where it is pursued in a spirit of compromise and co-operation. One of them is the case of the Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan, in Post-Soviet Russia. Often ethnic groups realize that co-operation and cultural coexistence are more profitable than conflict. Beginning in 1928 the Soviet Union set aside a territory the size of Belgium for Jewish settlement, located some five thousands miles east of Moscow along the Soviet-Chinese border. Believing that Soviet Jewish people, like other national minorities, deserved a territorial homeland, the regime decided to settle an enclave that would become the Jewish Autonomous Region in 1934. In fact, the establishment of the JAR was the first instance of an officially acknowledged Jewish national territory since ancient times. But the history of the Region was tragic and the experiment failed dismally. Nevertheless, Birobidzhan’s renewed existence of today is not only a curious legacy of Soviet national policy, but after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the definite religious rebirth, represents an interesting case-study in respect to interethnic relations.
Abstract: Law on Property Restitution and Compensation stipulates that its
provisions apply to confi scated property provided that the owner of
that property is rehabilitated. In this case, the request for the return of
property must be accompanied by a court decision on the rehabilitation
or proof that the application for rehabilitation was submitted. Th e fi rst
Serbian Rehabilitation Act was passed in 2006. According to the Law on
Rehabilitation, from December 2011, persons who have been deprived of
a right (to life, to freedom of movement, to property...) because of political
activism, ideological or religious beliefs and national origin before the entry
into force of this Act can be rehabilitated. However, the question is how the
provisions of this law are applied to the victims of the Holocaust and other
victims of Nazi terror. Does this law take into account the victims, does it
provide any satisfaction to the victims of the Holocaust and other victims
of the occupiers and various quisling formations? What consequences the
implementation of the Rehabilitation Act may have on the property rights
of persons who, in the course of World War II, acquired property that was
previously forcibly taken away (factual and legal violence) from their
rightful owners? What consequences the implementation of this law may
have on the rights of the victims of the Holocaust and their heirs and what
consequences the implementation of this law may have on the rights of the
victims of the Holocaust who have no heirs?
Abstract: Following on the overview presented at the first annual Holocaust and Restitution Conference concerning what is known about the expropriation of cultural property in Serbia during World War II and where that cultural property is presently located, ways in which restitution of art, Judaica, and other cultural property might best be implemented are discussed.
Serbia is encouraged to do historical research on the history of cultural plunder during World War II and on what was restituted to Serbia and within Serbia after the War, and to create a listing or database on the internet of what was taken in Serbia, noting what was subsequently returned and what is still missing. An entity should be responsible for provenance research in the country, either one that actually does the research as in Austria or one that oversees the research carried out by museums, libraries, and archives as in the Netherlands. Information should be made public over the internet of the results of such provenance research. A separate entity, as neutral and independent as possible, should be responsible for restitution decisions based on the provenance research. Serbia should pass legislation covering the return of private movable cultural property that is applicable to both Serbian and foreign citizens. Preferably there should be no deadline for claims for cultural property, whether individual or communal, since such cultural property is often not immediately identifi able. A non-bureaucratic process for filing claims should be established. Cultural property for which original owners and heirs are not identifi ed (heirless property) should be listed on an internet site so that potential claimants can come forward. Such
items should not necessarily move from their current location, but their provenance history should be publicly noted.
Abstract: Following on the overview presented at the first annual Holocaust and Restitution Conference concerning what is known about the expropriation of cultural property in Serbia during World War II and where that cultural property is presently located, ways in which restitution of art, Judaica, and other cultural property might best be implemented are discussed.
Serbia is encouraged to do historical research on the history of cultural plunder during World War II and on what was restituted to Serbia and within Serbia after the War, and to create a listing or database on the internet of what was taken in Serbia, noting what was subsequently returned and what is still missing. An entity should be responsible for provenance research in the country, either one that actually does the research as in Austria or one that oversees the research carried out by museums, libraries, and archives as in the Netherlands. Information should be made public over the internet of the results of such provenance research. A separate entity, as neutral and independent as possible, should be responsible for restitution decisions based on the provenance research. Serbia should pass legislation covering the return of private movable cultural property that is applicable to both Serbian and foreign citizens. Preferably there should be no deadline for claims for cultural property, whether individual or communal, since such cultural property is often not immediately identifi able. A non-bureaucratic process for filing claims should be established. Cultural property for which original owners and heirs are not identifi ed (heirless property) should be listed on an internet site so that potential claimants can come forward. Such
items should not necessarily move from their current location, but their provenance history should be publicly noted.
Abstract: This paper discusses the restitution of Jewish property in Croatia from 1990 on, having in mind that the question has not yet been resolved and that progress towards this has been very slow due to sketchy laws which are being implemented only partially. Th is issue usually receives more attention only when a Croatian government fi gure meets someone from Israel or the US Administration. Current legislature enables restitution only of Jewish property seized after 1945, while property seized during the NDH (Independent state of Croatia) remained intact, " protected " by laws passed at the time of Yugoslavia. Current restitution of seized property is performed according to the Law on Restitution/Compensation of Property Taken during the Time of the Yugoslav Communist Government, which came into eff ect in 1997, so the right to restitution or compensation applies only to Croatian citizens of the fi rst order of succession. Th at property seized between 1941 and 1945 is not restituted is still an accepted practice, despite the fact that it is in this period when the majority of Jewish property was seized. Th e right to restitution is still limited to the fi rst order of succession, while the deadline for applications remains too short. Towards the end of mandate of the Jadranka Kosor government there were some attempts to change that and enact a new law, but the proposal for that law got stuck somewhere in parliamentary procedure so it is not yet clear when it will be passed. Until now, judging by unoffi cial data, less than 30 percent of Jewish families of those who perished in the NDH have achieved the return of immobile property, so the government of Prime Minister Zoran Milanović donated a building in the centre of Zagreb to the Jewish municipality, as a kind of compensation for property seized during Ustasha regime.
Abstract: Once one of the most numerous and prosperous minorities in Yugoslavia, the number of Jews declined from over 80,000 to 15,000 in the years aer WW2. is number further decreased due to migration to Israel in the first post-war years, and further impoverishment took place because of confiscation and restitution of the majority of private and communal Jewish property, and enforced renouncing of Yugoslav citizenship. e first multi-party elections in Yugoslavia brought to power nationalist elements in all republics, which was followed by civil war, and the breaking of socialist Yugoslavia. Jews of Yugoslavia found themselves on different warring sides. Fragmentation on all confronted sides made the Jewish community even more vulnerable. A huge majority of former Warsaw Pact members aer the Berlin wall fell passed laws for restitution of property taken by the state in post WW2 period. Jews of Yugoslavia, in several new states, had promises from state offi cials that their property would be restituted and errors made half a century ago would be rectified. e only case where such a promise came true was Serbia. In 2011 Serbia passed General Restitution Law concerning individuals, therefore also Jews. In 2006 Serbia passed Law on property of the religious communities that also included Jewish community and that helped restitution of the Jewish communal property. e state of Serbia is the only state in the region that passed the Jewish Lex Specialis that concerns on Jewish property with no successor but also unclaimed Jewish property in February 2016. Croatia passed a General Restitution Law in 1996, and amended it in 2002, but it only affects property nationalized aer May 1945. at Law is limited to direct successors who are Croatian citizens or citizens of countries which have bilateral agreements with Croatia. Due to very high taxes, in some cases reaching 25% of property value, a lot of Jewish requests remained unsolved. Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the rare European countries that did not pass such a law. Moreover, the BIH constitution declares three constituent nations: Serbs, Croats and Bosnians, while others as minorities cannot be nominated for state positions, according to chapters IV and V of the BIH constitution (Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina). is paper aims to give insight into the economic power of Jews just before the breakdown of Yugoslavia, and the current economic situation of Jewish communities in Serbia, Croatia and BIH, with a special emphasis on their economic, legal and social position in the last two decades. is restitution issue is very important for it shows how much goodwill states have for helping their local Jewish communities. e research material is obtained from local Jewish communities, periodicals, reports, interviews, conferences, scientific journals and statistical data of all three states and various Jewish organization. Facing the past, admitting and rectifying remain open issues in those countries, and they are excellent indicators of the progress achieved in the last 25 years.
Abstract: After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Jewish community within Yugoslavia was also split up, and now various Jewish communities exist in the seven post-Yugoslav countries. Although all of these communities are relatively small, their size, influence, and activity vary. The political and legal status of Jewish communities, normatively speaking, differs across the former Yugoslav republics. Sometimes Jews or Jewish communities are mentioned in constitutions, signed agreements with governments, or are recognized in laws that regulate religious communities. Despite normative differences, they share most of the same problems – a slow process of return of property, diminishing numbers due to emigration and assimilation, and, although on a much lower scale than in many other countries, creeping anti-Semitism. They also share the same opportunities – a push for more minority rights as part of ‘Europeanization’ and the perception of Jewish communities as a link to influential investors and politicians from the Jewish diaspora and Israel.
Abstract: Jewish charities are a subgroup of about two thousand, five hundred organizations, accounting for 1.5% of the total number of main charities in England and Wales. The increasing total income of general charities has prompted considerable debate about the perceived concentration of income and the perceived dominance of bigger charities over smaller ones. Meanwhile, the implications of competition for charitable behavior have remained underappreciated. Building on these assumptions and aiming to test how far the results of research carried out in the charitable sector in general apply to the Jewish charitable sector in particular, the research investigates the trends in concentration of income of a sample of 1301 Jewish charities operating between 1995 and 2015, using common measures of concentration to describe the competitiveness of the Jewish charitable sector in England and Wales. The findings suggest that the sector, in line with the wider UK charitable sector, experienced high levels of growth in terms of both aggregate total income and the number of charities operating, along with decreasing levels of income concentration. These findings allow one to hypothesize that, other things being constant, the increasing numbers of entrant charities may well have increased the size distribution of charities providing the same products or services, therefore exacerbating the competition for charitable funding in the Jewish charitable sector. This, in turn, on the one hand is likely to have exacerbated the competition for donations especially among charities pursuing similar causes, reducing the total amount of charitable money devoted to particular causes. On the other hand, the increasing numbers of charities providing the same products or services and the resultant increasing competition for funding may have impacted on the costs and efforts Jewish charities were able to divert to fundraising at the expense of resources that could be devoted, instead, to service provision.
Abstract: Los instrumentos y técnicas docentes, tanto en estudios primarios y secundarios como en el ámbito universitario, se adaptan a los nuevos métodos desarrollados por la ciencia de la didáctica para un mejor entendimiento y asimilación. Este hecho encuen-tra también formas en las nuevas tecnologías (TIC) que sirven como refuerzo para el aprendizaje. Sin embargo, herramientas clásicas tales como el uso del teatro aún siguen teniendo resultados destacables. El objetivo de estas páginas es el de ofrecer el modo en que se articula el género dramático en la adquisición de elementos lingüísticos, culturales e histórico-sociales y su practicidad en los estudiantes de grado en la Uni-versidad de Granada a través de dos ejemplos prácticos, el teatro en lengua hebrea y en judeoespañol o sefardí. 1. El género teatral en el contexto pedagógico: técnicas y aprendizaje de idiomas La enseñanza de técnicas teatrales no está programada en las guías docentes ni for-ma parte de ellas como una materia optativa, en nuestro caso, en el grado de Lenguas Modernas y sus Literaturas de la Universidad de Granada. Esta tarea, aunque requiere importante consideración y queda en manos de los responsables del taller, docentes que actúan como los directores del mismo. Las claves que se aplican en esta actividad, destinada a alumnos de idioma y cultura, tienen que ver con las formas de comuni-cación y la construcción de un conocimiento intercultural. El espacio teatral genera un lugar en el cual el alumno/actor puede discutir su personalidad y confrontarla con
Abstract: To date, scholars have rarely talked about contemporary antisemitism and Islamophobia in France as part of a single story. When they have, it has typically been as part of a framework for analyzing racism that is essentially competitive: some depict Islamophobia as less a real problem than a frequent excuse to ignore antisemitism; others minimize antisemitism as an unfortunate but marginal phenomenon by comparison with the pervasive nature of anti-Muslim racism in French society. This article argues that the two are inseparable, and it focuses on a hitherto overlooked set of connections: in the era since the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher in January 2015, at key flash points that question Muslim belonging in France, the position of Jews has repeatedly been invoked in ambiguous, contradictory ways. Participants in these public debates have sometimes forcefully maintained that Jews are unlike Muslims, since they have long been fully integrated French citizens. At other moments, these discussions have raised the specter of Jewish ethnic and religious difference. By emphasizing Jewish particularity, such debates evoke, perforce, the past twenty-five years of controversies about the allegedly problematic attire, food, and beliefs of France’s Muslims. The article focuses on several key moments, from the speech of Prime Minister Manuel Valls before the French parliament in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks, to the kippah and burkini affairs of 2016, to the provocative comments of candidates in the 2017 presidential elections concerning Muslim and Jewish religious and ethnic markers of difference.
Abstract: A large share of Russian/Soviet Jews, especially among younger cohorts, are descendants of intermarriage. In this essay, I reflect on the implications of the built-in ambivalence of these mixed ethnics, comparing their identity qualms and social strategies in their native Russia and after migration to Israel. My analysis draws upon participant observation and interviews conducted in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and across Israel over the last 20 years. My theoretical anchors are recent discussions on the evolving nature of Jewish identity, formed at the intersection of religion, ethnicity, and culture, in the context of ongoing intermarriage and assimilation. The comparison between the (ex-)Soviet and Israeli context underscores the role of local social constructions of ethno-religious belonging, nationalism, and citizenship as synergistic forces in shaping social locations of mixed ethnics. It also sheds light on the tactics of adjustment and “passing” among individuals with ambivalent ethnic identities who experience rapid social transformation or migration.
Abstract: Not only Swedish studies, but also several international studies, claim an increase in anti-Semitic attitudes in recent decades. As prejudice is acquired in the early years of socialization, and/or is innate and fairly stable over the life cycle, examining adolescents’ attitudes is vitally important. Hence, by controlling for individual demographic and socio-economic background factors, we study two interrelated questions: Has anti-Semitism among Swedish secondary school-age youths changed between 2003 and 2009? Are changes equal across groups, with a specific focus on religious groups? Using two unique cross-section surveys of secondary school-age students in Sweden for the years 2003 and 2009, we try to address the above questions. Our analysis shows, in contrast to the views of the general public and other related studies, that anti-Semitism has decreased slightly during the examined period. Moreover, the study finds a variation in anti-Semitism by religious affiliation: it has increased among Muslim youth, but remains stable in other groups.
