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Date: 2018
Abstract: This article analyses the results of a study conducted for the Russian Jewish Congress in 2018. 517 people over the age of 16, living in 21 towns in the Russian Federation and identifying as Jews were interviewed. The goal of the study was to establish the scale of modern day anti-Semitism in Russia and to put it into all-European context. With this goal in mind the scientists used a considerable part of the questions from the all-European survey conducted
by the European Union agency for Fundamental Rights in 8 EU countries in 2012. The use of the same questions allowed to compare the views and evaluations of Russian Jews with those of Jews from other countries, that is to evaluate the modern scale of anti-Semitism in Russia in a European context. Anti-Semitism in Europe and in Russia is similar in several ways. It’s most often demonstrated in the form of offences, threats and publishing
of anti-Semite materials in the media. The main platform for expression of anti-Semite views today
is the Internet. Nevertheless, Russia differs from European countries in several important aspects.

Firstly, the origins and nature of anti-Semitism are different. In Russia anti-Semitism is built into xenophobia and is most often expressed on a mundane level. Its carriers are average citizens and not members of certain (neo-nazi) organizations. Xenophobia in Russia is, in turn, oriented against the “ethnically different” and not Jews who are
after all considered ‘insiders”. Secondly, there’s no anti-Zionist component in Russian anti-Semitism,
unlike European countries, where waves of antiSemitism are closely tied with Israel’s policies in the
Middle East.
Date: 2018
Abstract: This article is about new identities experienced by Russian Jews and the construction of the Jewish community. Jewish identity in the Soviet Union was based solely on ethnicity. Soviet passports contained the graph of ethnicity and Jews were considered to be a nationality. It is important to stress on the fact that Jewish identity in the Soviet Union can be characterised as a negative one. It was through the State antisemitism that Jews were defined, being suppressed and discriminated in the social field. With the collapse of The Soviet Union, the situation changed dramatically: those who had been discriminated obtained a rare opportunity to reconstruct their Jewish identity through religion, the rebirth of Jewish
tradition and equal rights with the rest of the population. With all that, the auto-definition through ethnicity still persist, among the young generation as well as among the older ones. The quantitative part of my research shows that around 50% of respondents suppose that it is one’s parentage that defines one’s jewishness. In this work I also pay attention to family
transmission and collective memory and their contribution to the construction of new types of identities. I show that the identity the young generation obtained from their parents needed to be developed in the new post-soviet reality. So, they have transformed the “passive”, negative
Soviet-time identity into new ones, religious or secular, - the principal point is that they are “active”. The construction of active identity demands the construction of the environment, the community. In the second part of the article I demonstrate the way this community functions in social, cultural and political spheres. I take the president elections of 2018 in Russia as an example of community act, following the possible trajectories of vote as well as problematizing the existence of community vote among Jews on contemporary Russia. Within the framework of the research I took 20 interviews with Jews from different types of communities: the orthodox communities, the reformist one, as well as from so called “secular Jews” attending events in various Jewish clubs and organisations. I also distributed a questionnaire (100 answers) containing questions on the two basic topics of the research: the construction of Jewish identities and the political identity of the respondents.
Author(s): Hazan, Katy
Date: 2002
Abstract: This paper shows how from the start of the modern era to today, Jewish education always depended on the successive identity types to which the Jewish minority in France chose to belong. Following the heder of Jewish groups under the Ancien Régime, the consistorial schools followed Emancipation in the face of a concomitant and difficult challenge, namely promoting Jewish individuals in the community while acknowledging each individual’s religious specificity. Primarily a favorite means of regeneration for the poor and immigrants, this means of improvement reached the end of the 1930s in an unhappily weakened state as a result of the success of assimilation and the social secularization of society in general. Between the two world wars but mainly on the eve of World War Two, weaknesses began to appear in French Judaism as a whole along with yearnings for a more religious dimension of Jewish identity as well as a more favorable perspective on Zionism, even if many remained convinced Israelites. These yearnings were manifested in the emerging youth movements, mostly the French Israelite Boy Scouts, and the creation of the Maimonides College in Paris, which during the Occupation, experienced favorable conditions for their growth and the birth of new structures. However, this renewal was transient. Not until the 1960s and even more so in the 1970s did the development of Jewish educational opportunities flourish. The collapse of the French Israelite model was the fundamental cause of this new growth.
Author(s): Kovács, András
Date: 2012
Abstract: The article analyzes the newest survey results on antisemitic prejudices, antisemitic political discourses, and political antisemitism in present-day Hungary. According to the research findings, during the first decade and a half after the fall of communism, 10%-15% of the Hungarian adult population held a strong antisemitic prejudice. Surveys conducted after 2006 show not only an increase in the absolute percentage of antisemites, but also an increase in the proportion of antisemites who embed their antisemitism in the political context. This phenomenon is linked with the appearance on the political scene of Jobbik, a more or less openly antisemitic party. When examining the causes of antisemitism, the most interesting finding was that the strength of antisemitic feelings is regionally different and that these differences correlate with the strength of Jobbik’s support in the various regions. Accordingly, we hypothesized that support for a far-right party is not a consequence of antisemitism, but conversely should be regarded as a factor that mobilizes attitudes leading to antisemitism. Thus, antisemitism is—at least in large part—a consequence of an attraction to the far right rather than an explanation for it. While analyzing antisemitic discourse, we found that the primary function of the discourse is not to formulate anti-Jewish political demands but
to establish a common identity for groups that, for various reasons and motives, have turned against the liberal parliamentary system that replaced communism.
Author(s): Vitale, Alessandro
Date: 2014
Abstract: Technically, Israel is not the only official Jewish homeland in the world. In the Far East of Russian Siberia there still exists the Jewish Autonomous Region (JAR) of Birobidzhan. Beginning in 1928 the Soviet Union set aside a territory larger than Belgium and Holland combined and considerably bigger than Israel, for Jewish settlement, located some five thousands miles east of Moscow along the Soviet-Chinese border, between the 48th and 49th parallels north latitude, where the climate and conditions are similar to Ontario and Michigan. Believing that Soviet Jewish people, like other national minorities, deserved a territorial homeland, the Soviet regime decided to settle a territorythat in 1934 would become the Jewish Autonomous Region. The idea was to create a new Zion–in a move to counterweight to Palestine – where a “proletarian Jewish culture” based on Yiddish language could be developed. In fact, the establishment of the JAR was the first instance of an officially acknowledged Jewish national territory since ancient times: the “First Israel”. But the history of the Region was tragic and the ex-periment failed. Nevertheless, Birobidzhan’s renewed existence of today and the revival of Jewish life in the post-Soviet JAR are not only a curious legacy of Soviet national policy, but after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the worldwide religious rebirth represent an interesting case-study in order to studysome challenging geographic pro-blems, and interethnic relations.
Author(s): Vitale, Alessandro
Date: 2015
Author(s): Krstić, Jovan
Date: 2015
Abstract: One of the clear examples of the existence of legal gaps in the legislation of the Republic of Serbia is the problem of restitution of property of Holocaust victims, which is shown as a separate problem that remains unregulated. The academic community of experts deserves serious scientific criticism for tolerating legal gaps in the legal system. Criminological phenomena of hate crime and hate speech which in the past resulted in the adoption of racial laws, civil rights and confi scation of property and physical liquidation – Holocaust –are such unique instances of evil that they exceede the limits of one life span and affect generations to come, unprepared to deal with them due to the unwillingness of our generation to act preventively regulating social relations based on modern principles and standards in order to prevent recurrence of the past. This is considered to be the essential (symbolic) inadequacy of the security systems from the perspective of knowledge management and diplomacy. Wrong attitude of the academic community towards the problem of increasing the capacity within the security system to protect the public interest and towards the reform of the security system can be critically assessed through present profiling of the security community outside of executive power – in the judiciary, in the status of law enforcement agencies, although the nature of their work and the principle of secrecy is incompatible with the principle of transparency in the work of law enforcement agencies. Unfortunately, it is likely that all these problems will be crashing down on the future generations.
Author(s): Lazić, Radovan
Date: 2015
Abstract: Law on Property Restitution and Compensation stipulates that its provisions apply to confiscated property provided that the owner of that property is rehabilitated. In this case, the request for the return of property must be accompanied by a court decision on the rehabilitation or proof that the application for rehabilitation was submitted. The first Serbian Rehabilitation Act was passed in 2006. According to the Law on Rehabilitation, from December 2011, persons who have been deprived of a right (to life, to freedom of movement, to property...) because of political activism, ideological or religious beliefs and national origin before the entry into force of this Act can be rehabilitated. However, the question is how the provisions of this law are applied to the victims of the Holocaust and other victims of Nazi terror. Does this law take into account the victims, does it provide any satisfaction to the victims of the Holocaust and other victims of the occupiers and various quisling formations? What consequences the
implementation of the Rehabilitation Act may have on the property rights of persons who, in the course of World War II, acquired property that was previously forcibly taken away (factual and legal violence) from their
rightful owners? What consequences the implementation of this law may have on the rights of the victims of the Holocaust and their heirs and what consequences the implementation of this law may have on the rights of the
victims of the Holocaust who have no heirs?
Author(s): Samardžić, Nikola
Date: 2015
Abstract: Following on the overview presented at the first annual Holocaust and Restitution Conference concerning what is known about the expropriation of cultural property in Serbia during World War II and where that cultural property is presently located, ways in which restitution of art, Judaica, and other cultural property might best be implemented are discussed.

Serbia is encouraged to do historical research on the history of cultural plunder during World War II and on what was restituted to Serbia and within Serbia after the War, and to create a listing or database on the internet of what was taken in Serbia, noting what was subsequently returned and what is still missing. An entity should be responsible for provenance research in the country, either one that actually does the research as in Austria or one that oversees the research carried out by museums, libraries, and archives as in the Netherlands. Information should be made public over the internet of the results of such provenance research. A separate entity, as neutral and independent as possible, should be responsible for restitution decisions based on the provenance research. Serbia should pass legislation covering the return of private movable cultural property that is applicable to both Serbian and foreign citizens. Preferably there should be no deadline for claims for cultural property, whether individual or communal, since such cultural property is often not immediately identifiable. A non-bureaucratic process for filing claims should be established. Cultural property for which original owners and heirs are not identified (heirless property) should be listed on an internet site so that potential claimants can come forward. Such
items should not necessarily move from their current location, but their provenance history should be publicly noted.
Author(s): Fisher, Wesley A.
Date: 2015
Abstract: Following on the overview presented at the first annual Holocaust and Restitution Conference concerning what is known about the expropriation of cultural property in Serbia during World War II and where that cultural property is presently located, ways in which restitution of art, Judaica, and other cultural property might best be implemented are discussed.
Serbia is encouraged to do historical research on the history of cultural plunder during World War II and on what was restituted to Serbia and within Serbia after the War, and to create a listing or database on the internet of what was taken in Serbia, noting what was subsequently returned and what is still missing. An entity should be responsible for provenance research in the country, either one that actually does the research as in Austria or one that oversees the research carried out by museums, libraries, and archives as in the Netherlands. Information should be made public over the internet of the results of such provenance research. A separate entity, as neutral and independent as possible, should be responsible for restitution decisions based on the provenance research. Serbia should pass legislation covering the return of private movable cultural property that is applicable to both Serbian and foreign citizens. Preferably there should be no deadline for claims for cultural property, whether individual or communal, since such cultural property is often not immediately identifi able. A non-bureaucratic process for filing claims should be established. Cultural property for which original owners and heirs are not identifi ed (heirless property) should be listed on an internet site so that potential claimants can come forward. Such
items should not necessarily move from their current location, but their provenance history should be publicly noted.
Date: 2015
Abstract: This paper discusses the restitution of Jewish property in Croatia from 1990 on, having in mind that the question has not yet been resolved and that progress towards this has been very slow due to sketchy laws which are being implemented only partially. Th is issue usually receives more attention only when a Croatian government fi gure meets someone from Israel or the US Administration. Current legislature enables restitution only of Jewish property seized after 1945, while property seized during the NDH (Independent state of Croatia) remained intact, " protected " by laws passed at the time of Yugoslavia. Current restitution of seized property is performed according to the Law on Restitution/Compensation of Property Taken during the Time of the Yugoslav Communist Government, which came into eff ect in 1997, so the right to restitution or compensation applies only to Croatian citizens of the fi rst order of succession. Th at property seized between 1941 and 1945 is not restituted is still an accepted practice, despite the fact that it is in this period when the majority of Jewish property was seized. Th e right to restitution is still limited to the fi rst order of succession, while the deadline for applications remains too short. Towards the end of mandate of the Jadranka Kosor government there were some attempts to change that and enact a new law, but the proposal for that law got stuck somewhere in parliamentary procedure so it is not yet clear when it will be passed. Until now, judging by unoffi cial data, less than 30 percent of Jewish families of those who perished in the NDH have achieved the return of immobile property, so the government of Prime Minister Zoran Milanović donated a building in the centre of Zagreb to the Jewish municipality, as a kind of compensation for property seized during Ustasha regime.
Author(s): Salner, Peter
Date: 2015