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Author(s): Staetsky, L. Daniel
Date: 2022
Abstract: Capitalising on new resources and advances made in the methods of estimation, this report is the first time that the global Haredi (strictly Orthodox) population size has been estimated and calculated, revealing that about 2,100,000 Haredi Jews live worldwide, out of a total global Jewish population of 15 million. The report projects that the Haredi population could double in size by the year 2040, rising to over a fifth of the total by that time.

Some of the key findings in this report:

• The global Haredi population is estimated at 2,100,000, constituting about 14% of the total Jewish population in the world.
• Together, Israel and the USA account for about 92% of all Haredi Jews. Europe hosts 5% of the global Haredi population, while the rest live mainly in Latin America, South Africa, Canada and Australia.
• Outside of Israel and the USA, the three largest Haredi populations are located in the UK (about 75,000, or 25% of all British Jews), Canada (30,000, 8%) and France (12,000, 3%).
• While the world Jewish population has been growing by approximately 0.7% per year over the past decade, the Haredi population is currently growing by about 3.5%-4.0% annually.
• Today, a large part of the growth of the global Jewish population as a whole is due to the Haredi population: perhaps as much as 70%-80% of the total growth worldwide.
• Haredi rates of growth are very high not simply due to high fertility, but rather to the combined effects of very high fertility and very low mortality.
Date: 2020
Abstract: Як видно із зібраного впродовж майже 20 років фактичного матеріалу, пік пов’язаних з насильством злочинів на ґрунті антисемітизму припадає на 2005 р. Починаючи із 2006 р. спостерігається помітний спад, а після 2009 р. кількість подібних інцидентів залишається на стабільно низькому рівні. Крім кількісних характеристик, варто зазначити, що саме на 2005–2007 рр. припадає хвиля найжорстокіших вуличних нападів, які реально загрожували життю постраждалих. Настільки серйозних випадків не фіксується вже давно.

Якщо ж взяти статистику за останні роки, то можна зазначити, що після певного зростання кількості нападів в 2012–2014 рр., в 2015–2016 рр. показники знову знизилися до мінімальних, в 2017–2019 рр. антисемітського
насильства в Україні не було зафіксовано в принципі. В цьому контексті чотири випадки в 2020 р. привертають на себе увагу. Чим можна пояснити таке порівняно помітне зростання, навіть якщо воно в абсолютних числах воно незначне?
Date: 2022
Abstract: Depuis les étoiles jaunes portées par des manifestants opposés au passe sanitaire jusqu’à l’usage par
certains du pronom « qui » utilisé pour dénoncer la supposée mainmise des Juifs sur les principaux médias,
sans oublier la notion de complot juif remis au goût du jour pour expliquer la pandémie du coronavirus,
l’année 2021 a été marquée par la multiplication d’incidents antisémites. Si de tels faits sont venus
rappeler la persistance des préjugés sur les Juifs au sein de la société française, l’histoire enseigne
que l’antisémitisme prospère dans les périodes de crise. Ainsi, près de deux ans après le début de la
crise sanitaire, il nous a semblé essentiel de réaliser une vaste étude pour dresser un diagnostic fin et
dépassionné de ce phénomène.
Quel est le poids des préjugés à l’égard des Juifs dans la société française en 2021 ? La crise sanitaire
s’accompagne-t-elle d’une poussée de l’antisémitisme dans l’opinion publique? Quel regard portent les
Français sur ce phénomène? Dans quelle mesure les Français juifs s’inquiètent-ils des violences les visant ?
Comment ces violences se déroulent-elles ? Pour tenter de répondre à ces interrogations, nous avons
construit un dispositif d’enquête exceptionnel. Exceptionnel par sa taille : nous avons conduit l’enquête
parallèlement auprès de deux échantillons spécifiques – personnes de confession juive, personnes de
confession musulmane – et auprès d’un échantillon global, représentatif de la population française
dans son ensemble, ce dernier permettant de se pencher également sur d’autres sous-catégories de
la population : les Français catholiques, les jeunes, des groupes de Français classés en fonction de leur
zone géographique, de critères socio-économiques, d’affinités politiques ou encore en fonction de leurs
sources privilégiées d’information. Exceptionnel également par la diversité des thématiques abordées :
exposition et observations d’actes violents, opinions à l’égard d’Israël, de la Shoah, préjugés à l’égard des
Juifs… autant de sujets clés à examiner pour tenter d’apporter de nouveaux éclairages sur l’antisémitisme1
.
Date: 2021
Abstract: Throughout 2021, JPR researchers Professor Sergio DellaPergola and Dr Daniel Staetsky analysed the responses of over 16,000 European Jews in 12 European countries who participated in the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights survey conducted by JPR and Ipsos in 2018. The result of their hard work and innovative approach is ‘The Jewish identities of European Jews’, a study into the what, why and how of Jewish identity.

The report finds some extraordinary differences and similarities between Jews across Europe, including:

European Jews are much more likely to see themselves as a religious minority than an ethnic one, yet fewer than half of all Jewish adults across Europe light candles most Friday nights;
Jewish identity is strongest in Belgium, the UK, France, Austria, Spain and Italy, and weakest in Hungary and Poland;
The memory of the Holocaust and combating antisemitism played a more important part in people’s Jewish identity than support for Israel, belief in God or charitable giving. Rising perceptions of antisemitism may have stimulated a stronger bond with Jewish peoplehood;
Only about half of all Jews in Europe identify with a particular denomination, although there are significant differences at the national level;
Higher proportions of younger Jews are religiously observant than older Jews;
Belgium has the largest proportion of Jews identifying as Orthodox in its Jewish population, followed by the UK, Italy, France and Austria;
Spain has the largest proportion of Jews identifying as Reform/Progressive, followed by Germany and the Netherlands;
Levels of attachment to the European Union among European Jews are higher than, or very similar to, levels of attachment among their fellow citizens in the countries in which they live
Date: 2021
Abstract: The 3-year pilot project presented here aims at analyzing antisemitic hate speech and imagery on mainstream news websites and social media platforms in different European contexts. Current forms of antisemitism will be examined in various ways by three international research teams from Germany, France, and the UK.

First, the datasets will be studied in detail (qualitative analysis based on pragmalinguistic, image analytical and historical approaches), taking into account explicit as well as implicit forms of communication (TU Berlin).

The resulting annotated datasets will provide training, validation, and test data for supervised machine learning techniques (King’s College London).

Eventually, all studied phenomena will be measured over time through statistical/quantitative analysis (TU Berlin and King’s College London).

The project stands in contrast to previous quantitative research on antisemitism online due to a) its awareness of verbal and visual complexity in the respective cultural and situational contexts, and b) its detailed, multimodal approach. Thus, it will provide the most accurate picture yet of the full extent of Jew-hatred on the interactive web.

The focus of the pilot project will be on German, English and French websites and their respective social media platforms. After the initial three year period, the focus will broaden out to investigate other European language communities.

The project will make a major contribution to the study of viral hate in different cultural contexts. Moreover, the researchers will engage in an ongoing dialogue not only with academia, but also with political, media and pedagogical institutions. An additional output will be an open source tool that will help to identify the full extent of antisemitism in various web milieus.

The half-yearly discourse reports share central insights of the ongoing research outcomes of the project "Decoding Antisemitism" and review unfolding trends.

The second discourse report presents the definitional basis of our analyses and for the first time provides comprehensive insights into our corpus analyses relating to Great Britain, France and Germany.
Date: 2021
Abstract: The 3-year pilot project presented here aims at analyzing antisemitic hate speech and imagery on mainstream news websites and social media platforms in different European contexts. Current forms of antisemitism will be examined in various ways by three international research teams from Germany, France, and the UK.

First, the datasets will be studied in detail (qualitative analysis based on pragmalinguistic, image analytical and historical approaches), taking into account explicit as well as implicit forms of communication (TU Berlin).

The resulting annotated datasets will provide training, validation, and test data for supervised machine learning techniques (King’s College London).

Eventually, all studied phenomena will be measured over time through statistical/quantitative analysis (TU Berlin and King’s College London).

The project stands in contrast to previous quantitative research on antisemitism online due to a) its awareness of verbal and visual complexity in the respective cultural and situational contexts, and b) its detailed, multimodal approach. Thus, it will provide the most accurate picture yet of the full extent of Jew-hatred on the interactive web.

The focus of the pilot project will be on German, English and French websites and their respective social media platforms. After the initial three year period, the focus will broaden out to investigate other European language communities.

The project will make a major contribution to the study of viral hate in different cultural contexts. Moreover, the researchers will engage in an ongoing dialogue not only with academia, but also with political, media and pedagogical institutions. An additional output will be an open source tool that will help to identify the full extent of antisemitism in various web milieus.

The half-yearly discourse reports share central insights of the ongoing research outcomes of the project "Decoding Antisemitism" and review unfolding trends.

The first discourse report provides insight into the methodological approaches and the nature of antisemitic hate speech in selected discourse spaces.
Date: 2021
Abstract: The number of Jewish pupils enrolled in Jewish schools has been climbing consistently for several decades and has increased significantly since the mid-1990s. This rise, described in previous JPR Jewish schools bulletins, has taken place in both the ‘mainstream’ and the ‘strictly Orthodox’ sectors. However, JPR’s new schools bulletin reports that, while the number of registered pupils in 2021/21 shows an overall increase of 1,612 pupils on three years previously, the growth rate has moderated in recent years, nearly flattening within the mainstream sector.

“These new findings are already playing an important role in helping community leaders to plan the future of Jewish education in this country”, says Dr Jonathan Boyd, Executive Director of JPR. “The clear slowdown in growth in the mainstream sector, particularly at primary level, urgently needs to be understood to ensure that all Jewish children who wish to be educated within the Jewish school system can continue to be offered that opportunity.”

Some of the key findings in this report:

35,825 Jewish pupils were studying in 133 Jewish schools in the academic year 2020/21. This represents an increase of 1,612 pupils, or 4.7%, since 2017/18.
60% of Jewish pupils in Jewish schools are in strictly Orthodox schools; 40% are in non-strictly Orthodox or ‘mainstream’ Jewish schools, a slight shift from 58% to 42% three years previously.
Almost three-quarters of all Jewish pupils in Jewish schools are in schools in Greater London or South Hertfordshire (73.3%) – a drop from 74.6% in the 2017/18 academic year that is influenced by a shift towards Manchester (27% to 29%) and away from London (67% to 65%) in the strictly Orthodox sector.
The geographical distinction between London and elsewhere is most pronounced in the mainstream Jewish sector, where 86% attend schools in London or the surrounding area.
Overall, there has been growth in the numbers of both primary and secondary school pupils since 2017/18, but this conceals a fall in primary pupil numbers for the mainstream Jewish sector over the last two academic years.
Date: 2021
Abstract: The Fifth Survey of European Jewish Community Leaders and Professionals, 2021 presents the results of an online survey offered in 10 languages and administered to 1054 respondents in 31 countries. Conducted every three years using the same format, the survey seeks to identify trends and their evolution in time.

Even if European Jewish leaders and community professionals rank antisemitism and combatting it among their first concerns and priorities, they are similarly committed to expanding Jewish communities and fostering future sustainability by engaging more young people and unaffiliated Jews.

The survey covers a wide variety of topics including the toll of COVID-19 on European Jewish communities and a widening generational gap around pivotal issues. Conducted every three years since 2008, the study is part of JDC’s wider work in Europe, which includes its partnerships with local Jewish communities and programs aiding needy Jews, fostering Jewish life and leaders, resilience training.

The respondents were comprised of presidents and chairpersons of nationwide “umbrella organizations” or Federations; presidents and executive directors of private Jewish foundations, charities, and other privately funded initiatives; presidents and main representatives of Jewish communities that are organized at a city level; executive directors and programme coordinators, as well as current and former board members of Jewish organizations; among others.

The JDC International Centre for Community Development established the survey as a means to identify the priorities, sensibilities and concerns of Europe’s top Jewish leaders and professionals working in Jewish institutions, taking into account the changes that European Jewry has gone through since 1989, and the current political challenges and uncertainties in the continent. In a landscape with few mechanisms that can truly gauge these phenomena, the European Jewish Community Leaders Survey is an essential tool for analysis and applied research in the field of community development.
Date: 2021
Abstract: Many in Europe today are concerned about the rise in violence against Jews, which clearly raises fears in Jewish communities on the Continent. Neither Jewish communities nor individual Jews can be protected unless there is data on antisemitic incidents and scientifically thorough situation analysis. We need to know and analyze the current social attitudes related to antisemitism, to the coexistence with Jews, mutually held prejudices, related taboos in a representative sample of the European countries’ population.

This is the reason why we have launched the largest European antisemitism survey. The research, initiated by the Action and Protection League and carried out by the polling companies Ipsos and Inspira, aims to provide a comprehensive picture of antisemitic prejudice in 16 countries in the European Union.

Data were collected between December 2019 and January 2020 in 16 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 1000 people were surveyed in each country.

We used a total of 24 questions to measure antisemitism. We measured the cognitive and conative dimensions of prejudice with 10 questions, and three additional questions for the affective dimension of antisemitism, that is, to measure the emotional charge of antisemitic prejudice. We mapped secondary antisemitism relativizing the Holocaust with seven questions and antisemitic hostility against Israel with four questions. We used two and three questions, respectively, to measure sympathy for Jews and for Israel.

With the exception of questions about affective antisemitism, all questions were asked in the same form: Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point scale how much they agreed with the statements in the question (strongly agree; tend to agree; neither agree nor disagree; tend to disagree; strongly disagree).
Date: 2021
Abstract: Many in Europe today are concerned about the rise in violence against Jews, which clearly raises fears in Jewish communities on the Continent. Neither Jewish communities nor individual Jews can be protected unless there is data on antisemitic incidents and scientifically thorough situation analysis. We need to know and analyze the current social attitudes related to antisemitism, to the coexistence with Jews, mutually held prejudices, related taboos in a representative sample of the European countries’ population.

This is the reason why we have launched the largest European antisemitism survey. The research, initiated by the Action and Protection League and carried out by the polling companies Ipsos and Inspira, aims to provide a comprehensive picture of antisemitic prejudice in 16 countries in the European Union.

Data were collected between December 2019 and January 2020 in 16 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 1000 people were surveyed in each country.

We used a total of 24 questions to measure antisemitism. We measured the cognitive and conative dimensions of prejudice with 10 questions, and three additional questions for the affective dimension of antisemitism, that is, to measure the emotional charge of antisemitic prejudice. We mapped secondary antisemitism relativizing the Holocaust with seven questions and antisemitic hostility against Israel with four questions. We used two and three questions, respectively, to measure sympathy for Jews and for Israel.

With the exception of questions about affective antisemitism, all questions were asked in the same form: Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point scale how much they agreed with the statements in the question (strongly agree; tend to agree; neither agree nor disagree; tend to disagree; strongly disagree).
Date: 2007
Abstract: Målet för den svenska minoritetspolitiken är att ge skydd för de nationella minoriteterna och stärka deras möjligheter till inflytande samt stödja de historiska minoritetsspråken så att de hålls levande. Ett av dessa minoritetsspråk är jiddisch. Inför regeringens arbete med att ta fram en minoritetspolitisk proposition behöver befintligt beredningsunderlag kompletteras med underlag som rör den nuvarande situationen för jiddisch och dess förutsättningar för att bevaras som ett levande språk i Sverige.För uppdraget svarar Susanne Sznajderman-Rytz, sakkunnig i jiddisch och minoritetsfrågor för Judiska Centralrådet i Sverige sedan 26 mars 1997. Uppdraget är utfört i samråd med företrädare för Judiska Centralrådet. Denna studie ska läsas med beaktande av att tiden och de resurser som ställts till förfogande varit begränsande. Det är nödvändigt att påpeka att jiddisch i jämförelse med övriga minoritetsspråk inte har samma ställning och inte heller fått motsvarande resurser för att kartlägga och på djupet studera de faktiska förhållandena för jiddisch i Sverige idag. För att kunna studera och beskriva situationen för jiddisch och de jiddischtalande har Judiska Centralrådet i Sverige ställt medel till förfogande. Med dessa medel genomfördes en enkätundersökning. I samband härmed vill jag uttrycka ett stort tack till alla som villigt medverkat i enkäten för att ge en bättre förankring till studien.Eftersom tiden varit starkt begränsad har professorerna Lars-Gunnar Andersson vid Göteborgs universitet, Kenneth Hyltenstam vid Stockholms universitet och Olle Josefsson vid Institutet för språk och folkminnenvarit välvilligt behjälpliga med sakkunskap och synpunkter. Under arbetet med studien har det framkommit aspekter kring de talandes relation till jiddisch som starkt berör andra områden än det rent lingvistiska. Med en jiddischkultur som marginaliserats och underordnats en majoritetskultur har de talande övergivit sina egna traditioner, undertryckt den egna identiteten och avstått från att uttrycka sig på sitt eget språk. Flera generationer uppvuxna i Sverige har känt ett starkt krav på assimilation och raderat ut sitt eget kultur- och språkarv i övertygelsen om att på så vis vinna acceptens både på ett personligt och samhälleligt plan. Detta har skapat en blandad och ibland kluven relation till den egna kulturen, det judiska levnadssättet och den icke-judiska omvärlden. För många har det inneburit utanförskap, kränkning och känsla av mindervärdighet. Vår studie visar att många judar i Sverige idag önskar att mer aktivt utveckla den egna kulturen, återta sina språk och praktisera sina traditioner. De flesta vuxna bär på minnen från sin barndom som påtagligt markerade känslan av utanförskap. Vi är många som minnsden obligatoriska morgonsamlingen, som innebar att knäppa sina händer och be icke-judiska böner, stå i korridoren under kristendomsund ervisningen, visa upp intyg för att få ledigt under judiska helger, gå hem på lunchrasten för att kunna äta en måltid som är koscher. Dessa händelser har präglat många generationer judar i Sverige. På det personliga planet och även i samhälle t finns det nu ett behov av upprättelse, försoning och rätt att på lika villkor med övriga grupper få del av det som är genuint för den judiska minoriteten. Vårt bidrag har varit en stor villighet att solidarisera och underordna oss samhället och majoriteten. Priset har varit på gränsen till utplåning av egna språk, identitetsmarkörer och den judiska kulturella särarten.Med språk- och ramkonventionen blir rätten till det judiska en väg att stärka och bekräfta värdet av att flera kulturer. I Sverige har judarna levt samman med majoritetsbefolkningen och bidragit till en dynamisk mångfald till gagn för kultur, ekonomi, forskning och utveckling. På många plan har minoriteten och majoriteten befruktat varandra.
Date: 2021
Abstract: What do Jews in the UK think about climate change, and how do their views compare with the rest of the population of the UK on this issue? What role does one’s Jewish identity play in attitudes towards climate change?

Some key findings include:

Virtually all respondents (92%) agree that the world’s climate is ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ changing, with almost seven out of 10 (69%) Jewish people saying it is definitely changing;
Almost two-thirds of Jews in the UK acknowledge humanity’s role in climate change, saying climate change is caused either ‘mainly’ (50%) or ‘entirely’ (13%) by human activity;
Two out of five (40%) respondents say they are either ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ worried about climate change, and a further 37% say they were ‘somewhat’ worried;
Based on the data available, UK Jews appear to be more climate change aware than the UK population as a whole, with 66% of Jews saying that climate change is ‘mainly’ or ‘entirely’ caused by humans, compared with 54% of the general UK population;
Nevertheless, there are significant differences in attitude within the Jewish population, influenced by people’s denomination, politics, education, religiosity, economics and demographics. Progressive Jews and those on the political left are found to be considerably more climate change conscious than Orthodox Jews and those on the political right.

The data on the attitudes of UK Jews are drawn from JPR’s UK Jewish research panel and were collected in July and August 2021. The panel is designed to explore the attitudes and experiences of Jews in the UK on a variety of issues. The sample size is 4,152 for UK residents aged 16 who self-identify as being Jewish. The data were weighted for age, sex and Jewish identity and are representative of the self-identifying Jewish population of the UK.
Author(s): Ehsan, Rakib
Date: 2020
Abstract: he Government needs to step up efforts to address attempts by the far-right to blame the COVID-19 pandemic on Jews, according to a think tank report.

The conspiracies are said to have permeated every corner of the internet, including encrypted apps like Telegram and everyday digital tools like podcasts. Despite much of the recent political and media focus being on mainstream platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, the report finds the most ardent forms of hatred circulate on peripheral so-called ‘alt-tech’ platforms.

The study — by the Henry Jackson Society — comes as it was revealed that Facebook has taken robust action in banning adverts by extremist group, which have attempted to sow the seeds of division amidst the COVID-19 crisis.

Among the online messages spread by the far-right identified within the report, are that:

Jews are using global lockdowns to “steal everything”.
“Satan in human form”, or Jewish people, are throwing dance parties to celebrate the spread of the coronavirus.
Jewish public leaders are using the COVID-19 crisis to “test the populations [sic] willingness to comply” with authoritarian restrictions on their civil liberties.
COVID-19 is being used as part of a plot to replace the ‘white’ population of Europe.
Those infected with the coronavirus should visit their local synagogue and mosque, and more broadly ethnically-diverse neighbourhoods, in order to spread the disease.
Jews spread the bubonic plague through Europe in the Middle Ages and demonstrate an inherent tendency for killing large numbers of non-Jews through efficient methods.
In response, the author recommends the introduction of stronger forms of internet regulation for alt-tech social media platforms, including a review by the Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE) and extensive training for law enforcement officers on the full scope of alt-tech platforms. The report also recommends that the Home Office establish a new counter-disinformation unit to tackle online conspiracy theories head-on by “exposing their fundamental lack of credibility, through well-organised social media campaigns”.

This material is said to be circulating on both sides of the Atlantic with extremist messaging from the British National Socialist Movement in the UK and the National Socialist Movement in the United States. The similarities between the content across the Atlantic is identified by the author as an area of particular concern
Date: 2021
Abstract: Executive summary
• Three of the four ‘alternative media’ platforms analysed were found to promote a
negative view of Jews
• The fourth was found to promote a negative view of Muslims, but not of Jews
(although it sometimes made use of arguments and images that are in other
contexts used to stigmatise Jews)
• A significant relationship was found between holding antisemitic views and having a
positive opinion of each of the three platforms that were found to promote a
negative view of Jews
• A significant relationship was also found between holding antisemitic views and
having a positive opinion of the Russian state-owned propaganda broadcaster, RT
(formerly Russia Today)
• By contrast, there was no relationship, or a substantially weaker and more conflicted
relationship, between antisemitism and evaluation of named ‘mainstream media’
sources
• Moreover, drawing on the ‘mainstream media’ in general for political information
was associated with lower levels of antisemitism
• In the interests of reducing prejudice, it would appear desirable to encourage use of
high quality, reputable sources of information at the expense of low quality fringe
sources
• Partial solutions to the problem could include:
- Demonetisation of problematic websites (for example, through withdrawal of
advertising)
- De-prioritisation of content from such websites in social media news feeds
and search algorithms
- Guidelines for members or employees of organisations such as political
parties, voluntary sector organisations, trade unions, and media companies,
both against sharing content or repeating claims from such websites and
against providing them with content in the form of interviews, quotations, or
stories
- In extreme cases, legal or regulatory sanctions against the owners of the
websites themselves
• However, it is at least as important for government, individual consumers, and other
stakeholders (including social media companies) to play their part in ensuring that
reputable media-producing organisations are able to remain viable as businesses
that can both invest in and promote high-quality content within a democratic
regulatory framework
Date: 2021
Abstract: „Zionisten“, „Satanisten“, „Transhumanisten“ und die „Pharmamafia“ würden durch „Sterilisation und Mord per Todesspritze“ […] „die absolute Kontrolle jedes Einzelnen und die Auslöschung weiterer Teile der Bevölkerung“ herbeiführen. Denn hinter Corona stecke „der feuchte Traum von einer kommunistischen Weltmacht“, nämlich der Zweck der „Umstrukturierung der Welt in eine neue Ordnung, kurz NWO (New World Order, Anm. RIAS Bayern. Vgl. Glossar, → NWO)“.

Dies sagte eine Rednerin auf einer Kundgebung sogenannter Coronarebellen in Nürnberg am 27. Juni 2020. Der Frau zufolge sollen durch Impfungen Menschen weltweit mit Nanochips überwacht, sterilisiert und getötet werden. Abschließend befand sie: „Ja, das muss man auch mal ganz klar benennen dürfen, oder?“

Zwar mögen solche Erzählungen meist abstrus und verrückt wirken, sie sind jedoch in ihren potentiellen Konsequenzen ernst zu nehmen. Selbstverständlich existierten auch vor der Coronapandemie Verschwörungserzählungen. Jedoch haben sie sich auch in Bayern verstärkt verbreitet, nachdem im Frühjahr 2020 Menschen, die sich als Coronarebellen oder Querdenker bezeichnen, begannen, gegen tatsächliche und imaginierte
staatliche Maßnahmen im Zuge der Coronakrise zu protestieren.

Nicht zuletzt in den sozialen Medien verbreiten sich Verschwörungserzählungen in Wort und Bild zunehmend rasanter und erreichen im Zuge der „Corona-Proteste” auch immer mehr Menschen, die vor der Pandemie wenig verschwörungsideologisch geprägt waren. Laut einer repräsentativen Umfrage der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung vom Juli 2020 glauben 16 Prozent der Einwohner:innen in Deutschland, dass Bill Gates allen Menschen Mikrochips einpflanzen wollen würde. Antisemitische Einstellungen sind in Deutschland weit verbreitet. Laut einer repräsentativen Umfrage des Jüdischen Weltkongresses (WJC) von 2019 behaupten 28 Prozent
der sogenannten Elite (laut Studie Hochschulabsolvent:innen mit einem Jahreseinkommen von mindestens 100.000 Euro), Juden hätten zu viel Macht in der Wirtschaft. 26 Prozent attestieren Juden „zu viel Macht in der Weltpolitik“. Fast die Hälfte von ihnen (48 Prozent) behauptet, Juden verhielten sich loyaler zu Israel als zu Deutschland. Der
WJC ließ dafür zweieinhalb Monate vor dem Anschlag auf die Synagoge in Halle an Yom Kippur 2019 1300 Menschen befragen.

Diese Broschüre der Recherche- und Informationsstelle Antisemitismus (RIAS) Bayern soll über Verschwörungserzählungen im Zusammenhang mit Antisemitismus aufklären. Was sind Verschwörungserzählungen und was haben sie mit Antisemitismus zu tun? Warum sind sie für bestimmte Menschen attraktiv? Wie kann man ihnen begegnen? Ab Seite 18 findet sich ein ausführliches Glossar zu gängigen Verschwörungserzählungen mit von
RIAS Bayern dokumentierten Beispielen.
Date: 2021
Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic hit the British Jewish community hard. According to data gathered by JPR in July 2020, 25% of British Jews had already contracted the virus by that time and Jewish mortality rates in London in April 2020 – the peak of the first wave – were almost three times as high as usual. In Manchester, the picture was even worse.

Building on our previous studies on this topic, this paper looks at Jewish mortality over the first year of the pandemic, taking in both the first wave (March to May 2020) and the second wave (December 2020 to February 2021).

Whilst it confirms that excess mortality among Jews during the first wave was considerably higher than among comparative non-Jews (280% higher compared to 188%), it reveals that the second wave saw the opposite picture: 69% higher than expected levels of mortality for that period among Jews, compared to 77% among the non-Jewish comparative group. This second wave picture is exactly what one might expect to see given that Jews typically enjoy relatively good health and longevity, so it forces us to ask again: what happened during the first wave to cause such devastation across the Jewish community?

Whilst not yet definitive about their conclusions, the authors point towards the ‘religious sociability’ hypothesis – that notion that close interaction between Jews, prior to the first lockdown, caused the devastating spike in Jewish deaths early on. The paper also demonstrates that the ‘Jewish penalty’ at this time was greater among Orthodox Jews than Progressive ones which further strengthens the hypothesis, as much higher proportions of Orthodox Jews gather regularly for religious reasons than Progressive Jews (even though Progressive Jews do so more regularly than British society as a whole).

The fact that the picture of extremely high excess mortality among British Jews was not repeated during the second wave (on the contrary, excess mortality among Jews was very slightly lower than among the comparator non-Jewish population, and slightly higher among Progressive Jews than Orthodox ones), suggests that the religious sociability theory was no longer a major factor at this time. With many synagogues closed or complying closely with the social distancing policies established by government, Jews were affected by coronavirus in much the same way as others.

The findings in this paper should be taken seriously by at least two key groups. Epidemiologists and public health experts should explore the impact of religious sociability more carefully, as currently, socioeconomic factors tend to dominate analysis. And Jewish community leaders must also reflect on the findings and, in the event of a similar pandemic in the future, consider instituting protective measures much more quickly than occurred in early 2020.

Author(s): Katzin, Mirjam
Date: 2021
Abstract: Malmö stad har under hösten 2020 undersökt förekomsten av antisemitism och förutsättningarna för judiskt liv i Malmös förskolor, skolor, gymnasier och vuxenutbildning. Resultatet presenteras nu i en rapport tillsammans med en forskningsöversikt och förslag på åtgärder framåt. Undersökningen och rapporten är en del av Malmö stad och Judiska Församlingen Malmös samverkansöverenskommelse.

Rapporten handlar om att motarbeta antisemitism och stärka förutsättningarna för judiskt liv i Malmös förskolor, skolor, gymnasier och vuxenutbildning. Studien består av intervjuer med skolpersonal och judiska barn och unga i Malmö, vilket kompletteras med en skolpersonalenkät utförd i några av Malmös grundskolor och gymnasier, samt en forskningsöversikt.

- Antisemitismen i Malmö är ett verkligt problem med tydliga offer, men frågan är mer mångbottnad än vad den ibland beskrivs som. Målsättningen med det här arbetet är att, utifrån kunskap och forskning, identifiera problem och behov i Malmös skolor för att skapa förutsättningar för att arbeta systematiskt med dessa frågor i utbildningen, säger Mirjam Katzin, samordnare för arbetet mot antisemitism och författare till rapporten.

Resultatet visar att det ofta saknas tillräckliga förutsättningar och förkunskaper hos skolpersonal för att arbeta mot antisemitism. För att förebygga rasism och antisemitism är en ökad kunskapsnivå central. Detta gäller i första hand lärare och annan skolpersonal och i andra hand eleverna. Slutsatsen är att det behövs kunskap och utbildning i demokrati, rättigheter, antirasism och specifikt frågor om antisemitism, konspirationsteorier, Israel/Palestina och de nationella minoriteterna.