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Date: 2023
Abstract: Seit dem 07. Oktober 2023 ist nichts mehr, wie es war. An diesem Tag griffen Hamas-Terroristen aus dem Gazastreifen Israel an und töteten in mehreren Massakern an der Zivilbevölkerung mehr als 1.200 Menschen. Über 240 Personen wurden in den Gazastreifen verschleppt. Tausende Raketen wurden auf Israel abgeschossen. Seitdem gehen die Angriffe ununterbrochen weiter. Am 28. Oktober startete die israelische Armee eine Bodenoffensive in Gaza mit dem Ziel, die Infrastruktur der Hamas zu zerstören und die Geiseln zu befreien. Seitdem verschob sich die mediale Aufmerksamkeit auf die Ereignisse in Gaza, wodurch die den Krieg auslösenden Massaker an der israelischen Zivilbevölkerung zunehmend in den Hintergrund traten. In Deutschland kam es vor allem zu Beginn zu Solidaritätsbekundungen mit Israel, aber auch direkt zu antisemitischen und terrorverherrlichenden Reaktionen. So wurden bereits am Abend des 07. Oktobers in Berlin „From the River to the Sea, Palestine will be free“ Rufe dokumentiert. Die sprunghaft gestiegene Anzahl antisemitischer Vorfälle seit dem 07. Oktober bleibt seither auf einem hohen Niveau. Für Jüdinnen_Juden hat das Aushandeln zwischen Sichtbarkeit und Sicherheit mit der Zäsur vom 07. Oktober eine neue Qualität erreicht. Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland ist seither weniger sichtbar. In ihrem Alltag sind Jüdinnen_Juden verstärkt mit Empathielosigkeit und Antisemitismus konfrontiert. Zudem berichten Jüdinnen_Juden vermehrt von antisemitischen Vorfällen durch Bekannte, aus der Nachbarschaft, an ihrem Arbeitsplatz oder an den Universitäten. Die Wirkung konkreter antisemitischer Erfahrungen verstärkt sich mit dem Schock und der Trauer nach dem 07. Oktober. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser angespannten Lage in Deutschland und weltweit veröffentlicht der Bundesverband RIAS den vorliegenden zweiten Monitoringbericht, der die antisemitischen Vorfälle zwischen dem 07. Oktober und 09. November 2023 in den Blick nimmt.
Date: 2023
Abstract: Настоящото проучване е възложено от Дипломатическия институт към Министерство на външните работи и е проведено от социологическа агенция Алфа Рисърч. То е част от проекта „Стратегическо сътрудничество между България и Норвегия в подкрепа на международните ангажименти на България за борба с антисемитизма и опазването на еврейското наследство“, финансиран по Финансовия механизъм на Европейското икономическо пространство и Норвежкия финансов механизъм. Проучването има за цел
да регистрира и анализира обществените оценки за отношенията между отделните етнически и религиозни общности, нагласите към езика на омразата и антисемитизма, ролята на познанието и на историческата памет като превенция срещу тези явления. Резултатите трябва да послужат като надеждна отправна точка за изготвяне и прилагане на първия Национален план за действие за борба с антисемитизма в България.
Основните задачи пред изследването са:
• Да опише видовете антисемитски нагласи и източниците на тяхното активиране и тиражиране.
• Да регистрира силата на привързаност към изразявани антисемитски тези.
• Да открои източниците на антисемитски послания и тяхната резултатност.
• Да открои потенциала за радикализация на антисемитските настроения.
• Да открои готовността за поведенчески прояви, провокирани от антисемитски нагласи.
• Да открои работещите форми на превенция срещу разпространение и доверие на антисемитски послания.
• Да опише възрастовите и социално-структурни динамики на възприемчивост към антисемитски послания и прояви.
• Да идентифицира равнището на познаване на еврейската общност.
• Да идентифицира нуждите от запознаване на масовата общественост с еврейската общност.
• Да идентифицира равнището на познание за Холокоста в Европа по времето на Втората световна война.
• Да идентифицира равнището на познание за събитията в България, свързани с еврейската общност по време на Втората световна война.
• Да идентифицира нуждите и възможностите за подобряване на информираността на българската общественост относно Холокоста в Европа и положението на еврейската общност в България по време на Втората световна война.
Date: 2024
Abstract: This landmark study provides a detailed and updated profile of how British Jews understand and live their Jewish lives. It is based on JPR’s National Jewish Identity Survey, conducted in November-December 2022 among nearly 5,000 members of the JPR research panel. It is the largest survey of its kind and the most comprehensive study of Jewish identity to date.

The report, written by Dr David Graham and Dr Jonathan Boyd, covers a variety of key themes in contemporary Jewish life, including religious belief and affiliation, Jewish education and cultural consumption, Jewish ethnicity, Zionism and attachment to Israel, antisemitism, charitable giving and volunteering, and the relationship between community engagement and happiness.

Some of the key findings in this report:

Just 34% of British Jews believe in God ‘as described in the Bible’. However, over half of British Jewish adults belong to a synagogue and many more practice aspects of Jewish religious culture.
94% of Jews in the UK say that moral and ethical behaviour is an important part of their Jewish identities. Nearly 9 out of 10 British Jews reported making at least one charitable donation yearly.
88% of British Jews have been to Israel at least once, and 73% say that they feel very or somewhat attached to the country. However, the proportion identifying as ‘Zionists’ has fallen from 72% to 63% over the past decade.
Close to a third of all British Jewish adults personally experienced some kind of antisemitic incident in the year before the survey, a much higher number than that recorded in police or community incident counts.
Author(s): Miller, Helena
Date: 2023
Abstract: The initiatives that took place to support Israeli families temporarily in the UK
started within three days after 7th October.
• Key organisations in the Jewish Community came together to help: JAFI, UJIA,
• They were supported by other organisations in various ways, e.g. JVN, and by
many individuals.
• There was a huge gap between the large number of expressions of interest in
school places and eventual places taken up.
• Each Local Education Authority Admissions process was different from each other,
and LEAs waived usual procedures to be accommodating and speed up the
admissions processes.
• Almost all temporary Israeli families were able to visit their UK school prior to
accepting a place and starting school.
• By November, more than 100 children had been placed in schools, mostly in the
primary sector.
• Whilst each school dealt uniquely with the situation of having temporary families in
their schools, there were many commonalities, e.g. acquiring school uniform,
communication, pairing with other Hebrew speakers.
• Relating to the school system in the UK has been a steep learning curve for these
• PaJeS has been significantly involved in providing support, especially in
admissions advice, Hebrew, wellbeing, funding and resources.
• A concern at the beginning, which was that the regular school population would be
disadvantage by schools accepting these additional families, has not materialised.
• By the beginning of December 2023, although some families are still arriving, the
number of Israelis temporarily in UK schools has already begun to decrease.
• Some families who are leaving, want an option to return and want schools to “save”
their places for them, which challenges the schools.
Author(s): Boyd, Jonathan
Date: 2023
Abstract: In this report:
Five weeks after the barbaric attack on innocent Israeli civilians by Hamas, this factsheet uses data from recent polling by two major polling agencies, Ipsos and YouGov, alongside historical data on these issues, to shed light on what people in the UK think about the conflict, where their sympathies lie, and what they believe the British government should do in response to the latest events in Israel and Gaza.

Some of the key findings in this report:

Since the 7 October attack, the proportion of British adults sympathising with the Israeli side has doubled from a pre-war level of about 10% to about 20%, whereas sympathy for the Palestinian side has fallen by a few percentage points from 24% to around 15%-21%;
Nevertheless, levels of sympathy for the Palestinian side have been gradually climbing since October 7, and are now approaching their pre-war levels;
Young adults are much more likely to sympathise with the Palestinians than the Israelis; older people hold the opposite view;
British adults are over twice as likely to think that Israel does not try to minimise harm to civilians than it does make such efforts;
British adults are more likely to think the UK should be more critical toward Israel than it has been, as opposed to more supportive. The younger respondents are, the more likely they are to believe the UK should be more critical;
British adults are twice as likely to think the police should be making more arrests at pro-Palestinian demonstrations than less, though there is are clear generational differences of opinion on this issue;
Almost all subgroups think the police should arrest people who openly support Hamas at demonstrations in the UK.
Date: 2023
Abstract: Key findings
• Since 7 October, Decoding Antisemitism has analysed more than 11,000 comments
posted on YouTube and Facebook in response to mainstream media reports of the
Hamas terrorist attacks in Israel.
• Our analysis reveals a significant jump in the number of antisemitic comments, even
compared with other violent incidents in the Middle East.
largest proportion of antisemitic comments – ranging between 19 % in German
Facebook comment sections and 53 and 54.7 % in French Facebook and UK YouTube
comment sections, respectively – in contrast to previous studies where direct
affirmation of violence was negligible.
• The number of antisemitic comments CELEBRATING THE ATROCITIES rises in response to
media reports of attacks on Israelis/Jews themselves, compared with reports on the
conflict more generally.
• Beyond affirmation of the Hamas attacks, other frequently expressed antisemitic
concepts across the corpus included DENIALS OF ISRAEL’S RIGHT TO EXIST, attributing SOLE
GUILT to Israel for the entire history of the conflict, describing Israel as a TERRORIST
STATE, CONSPIRACY THEORIES about Jewish POWER, and ideas of inherent Israeli EVIL.
• As with the project’s past research, this analysis reveals a diversity of antisemitic
concepts and communicative strategies. The findings reaffirm that antisemitism
appears as a multifaceted mosaic, as a result of which it is not possible to deal with
all the elements. Only the most prominent tendencies are brought into focus here.
Author(s): Arnold, Sina
Date: 2023
Abstract: Demonstrationen zum Nahostkonflikt, Übergriffe von Geflüchteten auf Jüdinnen und Juden – bei solchen Ereignissen steht oft die Frage im Mittelpunkt: Ist Antisemitismus unter Muslim*innen oder unter Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund besonders stark verbreitet? Gibt es einen „importierten Antisemitismus“?

In der gesamten Gesellschaft ist Antisemitismus weit verbreitet – dazu liegen zahlreiche wissenschaftliche Studien vor. Weniger Forschungsergebnisse gibt es hingegen zur Frage, wie verbreitet Antisemitismus unter der Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund ist. Das Gleiche gilt für die über fünf Millionen Muslim*innen in Deutschland.

In einer MEDIENDIENST-Expertise stellt die Antisemitismusforscherin Dr. Sina Arnold die wichtigsten wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse zum Thema vor und leitet daraus Handlungsempfehlungen für Journalist*innen ab.

Antisemitische Einstellungen: Gemischte Ergebnisse aus der Forschung
Die Forschung kommt insgesamt zu einem gemischten Ergebnis: Je nachdem, um welche Ausprägungen des Antisemitismus es geht, weisen Personen mit Migrationshintergrund und Muslim*innen höhere oder geringere antisemitische Einstellungen auf als Personen ohne Migrationshintergrund und Nicht-Muslim*innen:

Beim klassischen Antisemitismus ist die Forschungslage bezüglich Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund widersprüchlich: Manche Studien finden höhere, manche niedrigere und manche gleiche Werte im Vergleich zu Menschen ohne Migrationshintergrund. Unter Muslim*innen ist die Forschungslage klarer: Sie weisen allgemein höhere Zustimmungswerte zu klassischem Antisemitismus auf als Nicht-Muslim*innen.
Sekundärer Antisemitismus ist unter Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund weniger weit verbreitet als unter Menschen ohne Migrationshintergrund. Zwischen Muslim*innen und Nicht-Muslim*innen gibt es kaum Unterschiede.
Israelbezogener Antisemitismus ist unter Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund und Muslim*innen weiter verbreitet als unter Menschen ohne Migrationshintergrund. Dasselbe gilt für Muslim*innen im Vergleich zu Nicht-Muslim*innen.
Die Forschung zeigt außerdem: Die Kategorie "Migrationshintergrund" ist nur bedingt aussagekräftig. Ein wichtiger Faktor für antisemitische Einstellungen ist die Aufenthaltsdauer: Die Zustimmung zu antisemitischen Aussagen schwindet, je länger Personen in Deutschland leben. Laut Arnold erlernen sie eine "soziale Norm gegen Antisemitismus" und kommen an Schulen mit der Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus in Kontakt, was sie möglicherweise für das Thema sensibilisiere. Eine weitere Rolle spielt, ob Personen eingebürgert wurden und aus welchem Herkunftsland und welcher Region sie kommen.
Antisemitischen Handlungen: Meistens rechte oder rechtsextreme Tatmotivation
Antisemitismus zeigt sich nicht nur in Einstellungen, sondern findet auch Ausdruck in Handlungen, etwa in Angriffen auf Juden und Jüdinnen oder jüdische Einrichtungen. Die Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik (PKS) unterschiedet bei der Erfassung antisemitischer Straftaten grundsätzlich nicht nach Migrationshintergrund oder Glaubenszugehörigkeit, sondern nur nach der politischen Einstellung. Die Polizei geht dabei zum Großteil von rechtsextremen Täter*innen aus – bei den rund 3.000 erfassten antisemitischen Straftaten 2021 von rund 84,3 Prozent rechtsextremen Täter*innen. An der Einordnung gibt es aber Kritik. Bei 4,2 Prozent der Vorfälle wird "ausländische Ideologie" als Motiv vermutet. Rund 1,9 Prozent der Vorfälle werden dem Bereich "religiöse Ideologie" zugeordnet, was vor allem auf „islamistisch motivierten Terrorismus/Extremismus“ verweist.Quelle

Zudem gibt es die Jahresübersicht des Bundesverbands der Recherche- und Informationsstellen Antisemitismus (RIAS e.V.). Sie sammelt antisemitische Vorfälle unterhalb der Strafbarkeitsgrenze. Sie enthält zwar nicht die Staatsbürgerschaft möglicher Täter*innen, aber wenn möglich deren politisch-weltanschaulichen Hintergrund. Von den 2.738 im Jahr 2021 registrierten Fällen wurden 17 Prozent als "rechtsextrem/rechtspopulistisch" eingestuft, 16 Prozent als "verschwörungsideologisch", 9 Prozent der Fälle dem antiisraelischen Aktivismus zugeordnet und 1 Prozent dem "islamisch/islamistischen" Milieu.Quelle

Auch die Wahrnehmung der Betroffenen, also Juden und Jüdinnen in Deutschland, kann einen Hinweis darauf geben, von wem antisemitische Handlungen ausgehen.

In einer Umfrage der Agentur der Europäischen Union für Grundrechte von 2018 nahmen in Deutschland 41 Prozent der befragten Juden und Jüdinnen, die persönliche Diskriminierungserfahrungen gemacht hatten, bei Täter*innen einen "extremist Muslim view" an. Unklar ist hier, aufgrund welcher Eigenschaften diese Einordnung vorgenommen wurde, und ob Stereotype eine Rolle gespielt haben könnten.Quelle
Eine weitere Umfrage unter 553 Jüdinnen und Juden in Deutschland zeigte 2017, dass 70 Prozent Sorge hatten, "dass der Antisemitismus in Deutschland zunehmen wird, weil viele Flüchtlinge antisemitisch eingestellt sind". 58 Prozent fühlen sich "in Deutschland als jüdische Person zunehmend unsicher aufgrund der derzeitigen Zuwanderung nach Deutschland". Stärkere Sorgen bereiten rechtspopulistische Strömungen (75 Prozent) und der Alltagsantisemitismus. 84 Prozent der Befragten finden, dass "der Antisemitismus auch ohne Flüchtlinge ein Problem in Deutschland ist."Quelle
Date: 2023
Abstract: The report examines how the conflict in Israel and Gaza in May 2021 affected Jewish people living in the UK, by asking the JPR Research Panel members to mark their levels of agreement with two contentions: "Because I am Jewish, I felt I was being held responsible by non-Jews for the actions of Israel’s government during the conflict” and “Public and media criticism of Israel during the conflict made me feel Jews are not welcome in the UK".

This is JPR's second report looking into the May 2021 conflict: the first report on the conflict, published in March 2023, focused on the attitudes of Jewish people in the UK towards the conflict; the new report now looks into how the conflict affected Jews' feeling of security living in the UK.

Some of the key findings in this report:

Nearly three-quarters (73%) of all UK Jews felt that, as Jews, they were being held responsible in some way by non-Jews for the actions of Israel's government during the conflict
Almost one in five (19%) of respondents marked the highest score of agreement (10) to the contention that they felt they were being held responsible by non-Jews
56% of respondents said they felt public and media criticism during the conflict made them feel Jews were unwelcome in the UK
Jewish people's perceptions of these issues are significantly informed by their assessments of the state of antisemitism in the UK and by the degree to which they feel emotionally attached to Israel
Jewish people's political stances or levels of religiosity have little bearing on their feelings of anxiety or vulnerability, particularly concerning non-Jews holding them responsible for Israel's actions at that time
Author(s): Graham, David
Date: 2023
Author(s): Staetsky, Daniel
Date: 2023
Abstract: Intermarriage is a key concern of Jewish leaders and policymakers worldwide, with many claiming that it leads to assimilation - and thus acts as a threat to the existence of Jewish communities across the globe. This report dives into global Jewish intermarriage rates, analysing the driving factors behind it, and compares the prevalence of intermarriage in countries covering more than 95% of the Jewish population today, while determining how significant a threat intermarriage is to the sustainability of Jewish communities across the globe by locating intermarriage as a in the context of Jewish fertility rates and traditionalism.

Some of the key findings in this report:

The global prevalence of intermarriage is 26%, but there’s a huge distinction between the situation in Israel (5%) and the Diaspora (42%)
Jewish populations with the lowest levels of intermarriage are those with the highest levels of traditionalism.
In Europe and the USA, intermarriage is most prevalent among Jews identifying as secular or ‘Just Jewish’: nearly 70% of secular Jews in the USA and almost 50% in Europe are married to non-Jews.
The impact of factors such as the availability of suitable Jewish partners is inferior to that of traditionalism when comparing intermarriage rates in different countries.
There is no singular European pattern of intermarriage found across all countries. The highest (Poland) and lowest (Belgium) poles of intermarriage found in the Diaspora communities investigated are in Europe.
American Jews, sometimes perceived as a community with high levels of intermarriage, actually occupy a place around the middle of the spectrum.
The rising prevalence of intermarriage over time can be seen in the USA but is offset somewhat by the growing Haredi and Orthodox populations. Europe presents a more stable situation over time.
Intermarriage is less significant than fertility when considering Jewish population trends today.
Date: 2023
Abstract: From Introduction:

Antisemitism is global and multifaceted. One area in which ADL has seen a growth of antisemitism is within elements of the political left. This often takes the form of anti-Zionism, a movement that rejects the Jewish right to self-determination and of Israel to exist as a Jewish state, and frequently employs antisemitic tropes to attack Israel and its supporters. It also manifests through the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, a campaign that promotes diplomatic, financial, professional, academic and cultural isolation of Israel, Israeli individuals, Israeli institutions, and Jews who support Israel’s right to exist.

Political actors and advocacy movements associated with some left-wing political organizations have engaged in such antisemitism both in the U.S. and in Europe. While antisemitism from individuals associated with left-leaning political organizations is generally less violent than right-wing antisemitism, its penetration into the political mainstream is cause for concern and has in some cases alienated Jews and other supporters of Israel. Concerns are both political and physical. As described in this report, Jews and Jewish institutions have been targeted and have suffered violent attacks, associated with anti-Zionism, often in the wake of fighting between Israel and the Palestinians, most recently in 2021.

The challenges facing Jewish communities in Europe can be a bellwether for what is to come for the U.S. Jewish community, as evidenced for example by the recent rise in violent antisemitism in the U.S., which has plagued European Jewish communities for many years, and the increase in anti-Zionism in U.S. progressive spaces, something that has existed in Europe for some time. To better understand this phenomenon in Europe, ADL asked partners in the UK, France, Germany and Spain to describe some of the expressions of left-wing political antisemitism and anti-Israel bias in their countries. The individual contributors are responsible for the content of those chapters and their positions may differ with standard ADL practice and/or policy.

Our British partner, the Community Security Trust, is the British Jewish community’s security agency, which monitors, reports on, and educates about antisemitism among other vital tasks for the safety and security of the Jewish community.

Our French partner, the politics and culture magazine “K., The Jews, Europe, the 21st Century,” reports on contemporary challenges and opportunities for Jewish life in France and elsewhere in Europe.

Our German partner, Amadeu Antonio Foundation, is one of Germany's foremost independent non-governmental organizations working to strengthen democratic civil society and eliminate extremism, antisemitism, racism and other forms of bigotry and hate.

Our Spanish partner, ACOM, is a non-denominational and independent organization that strengthens the relationship between Spain and Israel, and whose work is inspired by the defense of human rights, democratic societies, civil liberties and the rule of law.

Those European contributions comprise the first sections of this report. Based on those essays, in the subsequent chapter, ADL analyzed common themes and notable differences among the four countries.

The final section adds ADL’s perspective on left-wing antisemitism in the political and advocacy spheres in the U.S. and provides suggested actions that can be taken to address antisemitism. To be sure, while not all antisemitism that has manifested in some elements of the political left in the U.S. is imported from Europe, lessons can be learned from this transatlantic phenomenon to protect against the mainstreaming of such antisemitism in U.S. politics.
Date: 2022
Abstract: Im Jahr 2021 wurden in Deutschland 3.028 antisemitische Straftaten erfasst. Dies ist der höchste jemals gemessene Wert seit Beginn der Erfassung in der polizeilichen Kriminalstatistik im Jahr 2001. Allerdings handelt es sich bei dieser Zahl nur um einen Ausschnitt, da sich das Problem des Antisemitismus in der deutschen Gesellschaft nicht allein auf Straftaten reduzieren lässt. So wichtig es natürlich ist, dass jede antisemitische Straftat entschlossen und mit allen rechtsstaatlichen Möglichkeiten verfolgt wird, muss der Kampf gegen Judenhass in einem breiten Kontext verstanden und adressiert werden. Denn die antisemitischen Vorfälle sind Ausdruck und Ergebnis eines gesamtgesellschaftlichen Klimas, in welchem antisemitische Stereotype und Ressentiments weit verbreitet und akzeptiert sind. Neben den Straftaten kommt eine große Zahl antisemitischer Vorfälle unterhalb der Strafbarkeitsgrenze hinzu, wie sie der Bundesverband der Recherche- und Informationsstelle Antisemitismus (RIAS) jährlich in seinem Bericht dokumentiert. Zudem gilt es zu bedenken, dass sowohl die Straftaten als auch die von RIAS dokumentierten Vorfälle nur jene sind, die zur Anzeige gebracht beziehungsweise gemeldet wurden. Die European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) kam im Jahr 2018 im Rahmen einer Befragung von Jüdinnen und Juden in zwölf europäischen Ländern zu dem Ergebnis, dass überhaupt nur 20 Prozent der Betroffenen antisemitische Straftaten zur Anzeige bringen oder anderweitig melden. Es ist also davon auszugehen, dass die Dunkelziffer nochmals erheblich höher ist.

Aufgrund dieser Erkenntnisse hat das American Jewish Committee (AJC) das Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach (IFD) mit der vorliegenden repräsentativen Umfrage beauftragt.

Und die Ergebnisse sind erneut ein Grund zur Sorge. Zwar zeigen die Daten nicht, dass antisemitische Einstellungen in der Bevölkerung stark zugenommen haben, dennoch bestätigen sie, dass ein beachtlicher Teil der deutschen Bevölkerung antisemitische Stereotype und Ressentiments teilen, wie es seit Jahren konstant in anderen Umfragen nachgewiesen wurde. Dabei haben wir auch untersuchen lassen, wie verbreitet diese Einstellungen unter den Wählerinnen und Wählern der sechs im Bundestag vertretenen Parteien sind. Die Ergebnisse verdeutlichen abermals, dass Antisemitismus nicht allein ein Problem der politischen Ränder ist, sondern in der Mitte der Gesellschaft tief verankert ist. Hier sind deshalb ausnahmslos alle demokratischen Parteien gefordert, diese Realität anzuerkennen und entsprechend zu handeln. Auch deswegen können wir nur davor warnen, dass das Thema Antisemitismus als Gegenstand parteipolitischer Auseinandersetzungen genutzt wird. Die demokratischen Parteien sollten es vielmehr als ihre Aufgabe begreifen, über sonstige politische Differenzen hinaus zusammenzustehen und Antisemitismus gemeinsam entschlossen zu bekämpfen.

Im Gegensatz zu vielen bisherigen Studien haben wir im Rahmen dieser Untersuchung auch die Einstellungen von Musliminnen und Muslimen in Deutschland abgefragt. Ausschlaggebend waren hierbei nicht zuletzt die antisemitischen Ausschreitungen hierzulande im Mai 2021 während der israelischen Selbstverteidigungsmaßnahmen gegen den Raketenbeschuss der islamistischen Terrororganisation Hamas. Wenngleich es in der Vergangenheit immer wieder zu antisemitischen Ausschreitungen vor dem Hintergrund derartiger Auseinandersetzungen gekommen ist, so waren jene im vergangenen Jahr nicht nur erheblich gewalttätiger, sondern es zogen zum ersten Mal anti-israelische Demonstrationen in verschiedenen Städten gezielt vor Synagogen. Nur das Eingreifen der Polizei, wenn auch zum Teil verspätet, konnte Schlimmeres verhindern. Im Zuge dieser Proteste kam es zu zahlreichen antisemitischen Vorfällen, Bedrohungen und körperlichen Angriffen. Allerdings hat sich die quantitative Sozialforschung, zumindest in Deutschland, diesem Phänomen bisher nur unzureichend gewidmet. Dies ist umso überraschender, da in der bereits erwähnten Studie der FRA befragte Jüdinnen und Juden in Deutschland auf die Frage, welchem Spektrum sie den schlimmsten antisemitischen Vorfall, der ihnen in den letzten 5 Jahren widerfahren ist, zuordnen, mit 41 Prozent die Täterinnen und Täter als „Someone with a Muslim extremist view“ angaben. Unter den zwölf befragten Ländern war dies der höchste Wert in dieser Kategorie. Und die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Umfrage bestätigen, dass antisemitische Stereotype und Ressentiments in dieser Bevölkerungsgruppe durchgängig deutlich stärker vertreten sind als im Bevölkerungsdurchschnitt. Wie die Umfrage aber auch belegt, bedeutet dies selbstredend nicht, dass Antisemitismus allein ein Problem der muslimischen Community ist. Allerdings kann dieses immense Problem auch nicht ausgeblendet werden, wenn der Kampf gegen Antisemitismus erfolgreich sein soll.

Date: 2019
Abstract: Campaigning organisation Avaaz commissioned ICM Unlimited to conduct a nationally representative poll to look into attitudes of the British public towards Jews and Muslims.

Some of the key findings include:

Overall, just under half of British adults say that they have a positive view of Jews (47%), while 7% say that they have a negative view. When it comes to Muslims, the British public’s attitudes are more unfavourable. A quarter say that they have a negative view of Muslims (26%), while a third say that they have a positive view (32%).
2017 Conservative voters are more likely than those who voted Labour to have a negative view of Muslims. Just under four in ten of those who voted Conservative in 2017 say that they have a negative view of Muslims (37%), more than double the proportion of those who voted Labour who have a negative view (16%).
A greater proportion of people agree than disagree for four of the five statements about Muslims/Islam that Avaaz tested. That is, more people agree than disagree that: Islam threatens the British way of life (45% agree vs. 31% disagree), Islamophobia in Britain is a response to the everyday behaviour of Muslims (36% vs. 34%), parts of the UK are under Sharia law (33% vs. 28%), and that there should be a reduction in the number of Muslims entering Britain (41% vs. 25%). The only statement with which more people disagree than agree is: ‘Islamic terrorism reflects the views of the Muslim community in Britain’ (26% agree vs. 49% disagree).
Six in ten 2017 Conservative voters agree that ‘Islam threatens the British way of life’ (62%), compared to 35% of 2017 Labour voters.
When it comes to attitudes towards Jews, just over one in seven of people agree that ‘Jews have disproportionate influence in politics’ (15%). Among 2017 Labour voters, this figure rises to one in five (20%), compared to one in seven 2017 Conservative voters (14%).
Date: 2022
Abstract: From Foreword:

The events of 2021 have left their mark on Britain’s Jews.

For several weeks in May and June, during the conflict between Hamas and Israel thousands of miles away, antisemitism surged on British streets and campuses, online, in workplaces, schools and hospitals and in other institutions. Reported incidents broke records, with some making national headlines and prompting intervention by the Prime Minister.

Among the incidents were demonstrations that featured antisemitic speakers, chants and banners — some of which were endorsed, promoted and addressed by politicians, trade unionists and other luminaires — and convoys that saw allegations of the most despicable antisemitic incitement and violence in Jewish neighbourhoods.

These events weighed on British Jews, with almost eight in ten disclosing in our research that the various demonstrations, processions and convoys during the conflict caused them to feel intimidated as a Jew.

Consequently, there is a noticeable reversal this year in the optimism reflected in polling a year ago. Fewer British Jews believe that their community has a long-term future in the UK, and a record number — nearing half — have disclosed that they avoid displaying outward signs of their Judaism in public due to antisemitism.

Not only do perpetrators of antisemitism give the Jewish community reason for concern, but so does the criminal justice system. The Crown Prosecution Service has always performed poorly in our polling, but for the first time ever, a majority of British Jews do not believe that the police or the courts do enough to protect them either.

Antisemitism this year has also affected how British Jews view wider society. For the first time ever, a majority do not believe that their non-Jewish neighbours do enough to protect them, with many respondents deeply concerned about apathy towards Jews amongst the British public.

As our polling of the British public shows, there is reason for discomfort: almost one quarter of British adults believe that “Israel treats the Palestinians like the Nazis treated the Jews,” which is antisemitic under the International Definition of Antisemitism, and more than one in ten Britons have entrenched antisemitic views.

There are more specific incubators of antisemitism as well. Over eight in ten British Jews still feel that Labour is too tolerant of racism against Jews, belying Sir Keir Starmer’s claim to have “shut the door” on antisemitism in his Party. Almost all British Jews also believe that antisemitism in British universities and on social media is a problem — the first time these issues have been polled — underlining the need for action.

Britain cannot be content when almost half of a long-established minority community avoids disclosing identifying signs in public, or when a broad majority considers one of the two major political parties to be too tolerant of racism. It is not too late to make the right changes in politics, at universities, online and to criminal justice, but the time for action is now.
Author(s): Staetsky, Daniel
Date: 2023
Abstract: In this report:
We look into Jewish migration from 15 European countries - representing 94% of Jews living in Europe - comparing data from recent years to previous periods over the last century, and focusing on the signal that the current levels of Jewish migration from Europe send about the political realities perceived and experienced by European Jews.

Some of the key findings in this report:

Peak periods of Jewish migration in the past century – from Germany in the 1930s, North Africa in the 1960s and the Former Soviet Union in the 1990s, saw 50%-75% of national Jewish populations migrate in no more than a decade;
No European Jewish population has shown signs of migration at anywhere near that level for several decades, although recent patterns from Russia and Ukraine point to that possibility over the coming years;
France, Belgium, Italy and Spain saw strong surges in Jewish emigration in the first half of the 2010s, which declined subsequently, but not as far as pre-surge levels;
However, the higher levels of migration measured in these counties during the last decade have not reached the critical values indicating any serious Jewish ‘exodus’ from them;
For Russian and Ukrainian Jews, 2022 was a watershed year: if migration from these countries continues for seven years at the levels seen in 2022 and early 2023, 80%-90% of the 2021 Jewish population of Ukraine and 50%-60% of the 2021 Jewish population of Russia will have emigrated;
Jewish emigration from the UK, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark has mainly been stable or declining since the mid-1980s;
In Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, there has been some decline in Jewish migration over the observed period, with migration eventually settling at a new, lower level.
Date: 2023
Abstract: Federace židovských obcí v České republice (FŽO) zaznamenala v roce 2022 celkem 2 277 antisemitských incidentů. Konstantní trend skokového nárůstu počtu projevů antisemitismu, který byl jasně patrný v předchozích sledovaných obdobích, tak zůstal zachován i v loňském roce. Ve srovnání s rokem 2021, kdy bylo zaznamenáno 1128 antisemitských incidentů, lze tento trend navíc označit přívlastkem dramatický.

Drtivá většina všech zaznamenaných antisemitských incidentů, celkem 97 %, tvoří projevy nenávisti na internetu. Vedle článků, grafických materiálů, anonymních komentářů a diskusních příspěvků šlo především o sociální sítě, na nichž bylo zachyceno přes 74% všech on-line incidentů. V dlouhodobé perspektivě jsou právě sociální sítě dominantní hostitelskou platformou produkce a šíření antisemitismu i nenávisti obecně a významnou měrou přispívají k narůstající polarizaci společnosti.

Navzdory skutečnosti, že počet registrovaných incidentů meziročně vzrostl o více než 100 %, stejně jako v uplynulých letech platí konstatování, že případy otevřeně antisemitsky motivovaného násilí jsou v České republice nadále zaznamenávány jen výjimečně. V roce 2022 nebyl FŽO nahlášen žádný případ fyzického napadení. Dále byly v roce 2022 zaznamenány 2 případy vandalismu na židovských objektech, což odpovídá předchozím rokům. Naopak 10 zaznamenaných případů vyhrožování představuje dvojnásobný nárůst oproti roku 2021. V této souvislosti je však nutné znovu připomenout, že oběti či svědkové projevů antisemitsky motivované předsudečné nenávisti se mnohdy rozhodnou tyto činy nenahlásit příslušným orgánům nebo si z různých důvodů nepřejí sdělovat detaily svých negativních zkušeností. Ačkoliv tedy FŽO od roku 2018 ve svých statistikách pracuje s pouhými jednotkami protižidovsky zaměřených násilných činů, je pravděpodobné, že skutečný počet podobných případů bývá každoročně vyšší.

Obsah registrovaných protižidovských incidentů neprošel v roce 2022 ve srovnání s předchozími lety zásadní proměnou. Projevy předsudečné nenávisti vždy korelují s celkovou atmosférou ve společnosti, kterou formují lokální události i globální geopolitické a ekonomické faktory. Obsah, formu i množství antisemitských narativů tak v loňském roce vedle doznívající pandemie onemocnění covid-19 ovlivňovala zejména ruská agrese vůči Ukrajině, včetně související ekonomické, energetické a surovinové krize, a v neposlední řadě i přetrvávající napětí na Blízkém východě v kontextu izraelsko-palestinského konfliktu.

Z analýzy dosavadních útoků motivovaných předsudečnou nenávistí jednoznačně vyplývá, že internet a zejména virtuální komunikační platformy hrají dominantní roli v procesu radikalizace jednotlivců i skupin a současně usnadňují potenciálním útočníkům plánování a přípravu násilných trestných činů. Platnost tohoto pozorování potvrdil střelecký útok, k němuž došlo 12. října 2022 u baru Tepláreň v Bratislavě, a který si vyžádal dvě oběti. Pachatel se na svůj čin podle vlastních slov systematicky a dlouhodobě připravoval a na sociálních sítích sdílel velké množství nenávistných a konspirativních příspěvků. Ačkoliv v ČR nebyl v roce 2022 zaznamenán žádný srovnatelný incident, globální kontext přetrvávajících obav z radikalizace v on-line prostředí zůstává nadále vysoce aktuální.

Více než třetina z celkového počtu incidentů, s nimiž FŽO v roce 2022 pracovala, pocházela z ideologických pozic krajní pravice. U druhé třetiny projevů antisemitismu nebylo možné jednoznačně určit ideologické pozadí, neboť autoři či šiřitelé těchto incidentů nedeklarují žádné extrémní politické postoje. Nárůst celkového objemu zaznamenaných dat se však z hlediska ideologie nejvýrazněji projevil v případě dezinformačních platforem. Už v předchozích čtyřech sledovaných obdobích docházelo v této oblasti ke kontinuálnímu nárůstu, v roce 2022 je však doložen více než 200% skokový výkyv. Zatímco v roce 2021 pocházelo z dezinformačních platforem 14,4 % všech registrovaných incidentů, v roce 2022 tyto platformy zveřejnily 24,5 % všech evidovaných projevů antisemitismu. Vzhledem ke vzrůstající aktivitě a popularitě dezinformačních médií a masivní akceleraci šíření konspiračních obsahů jde o nepřekvapivé, přesto však mimořádně znepokojivé zjištění. Dezinformační hnutí přispívají k polarizaci společnosti a mají potenciál destruktivně působit na základní demokratické ústavní principy.

Přes závažnost některých závěrů je možné opět konstatovat, že Česká republika představuje pro židovskou komunitu bezpečnou zemi. Projevy antisemitismu ventilované v internetovém prostředí však představují z dlouhodobého hlediska trend, kterému je nezbytné věnovat zvýšenou pozornost.
Date: 2023
Abstract: The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (Claims Conference) commissioned Schoen Cooperman Research to conduct a comprehensive national study of Holocaust Knowledge and Awareness in the Netherlands.

Schoen Cooperman Research conducted 2,000 interviews across the Netherlands. The margin of error for the study is 2 percent. This memo presents our key research findings and compares these findings with prior Claims Conference studies, which were conducted in five other countries.

Our latest study finds significant gaps in Holocaust knowledge and awareness in the Netherlands, as well as widespread concern that Holocaust denial and Holocaust distortion are problems in the Netherlands today.
We found that 23 percent of Dutch Millennials and Gen Z respondents believe the Holocaust is a myth, or that it occurred but the number of Jews who died has been greatly exaggerated – the highest percentage among Millennials and Gen Z respondents in all six countries the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against
Germany has previously studied.

Further, 29 percent of Dutch respondents, including 37 percent of Dutch Millennials and Gen Z respondents believe that two million or fewer Jews were killed during the Holocaust. Moreover, despite the fact that more than 70 percent of the Netherlands’ Jewish population perished during the Holocaust, a majority of Dutch respondents (53
percent), including 60 percent of Dutch Millennials and Gen Z, do not cite the Netherlands as a country where the Holocaust took place. Finally, 53 percent of Dutch respondents believe that something like the Holocaust
could happen again today.
Date: 2023
Editor(s): Moe, Vibeke
Date: 2022
Date: 2023
Abstract: Holocaust memory in Europe is shifting and diversifying, often in conflicting ways. This report is the culmination of a comparative and multidisciplinary study aimed at exploring these contemporary shifts in Holocaust memory in five European countries that played very different roles during the Holocaust, and whose post-WWII histories differed too: Poland, Hungary, Germany, England and Spain.

The study took place from 2019-2022 and offers a snapshot of Holocaust memory at the start of the 21st century. In addition to the rise of far-right political parties, antisemitic incidents and crises around immigration and refugees, this period was also overshadowed by the Covid pandemic and its ensuing economic instability. Our central guiding question was: How do experiences of the present relate to the memory of the Holocaust? Do they supersede it, leading to the gradual fading from memory of the mass-murder that shook the twentieth century? Do they reshape it, shedding new light on its lessons? Is the meaning assigned to present-day events shaped by its metaphors and symbols, or perhaps the present and the past engage in multidirectional dialogue over diverse memory platforms?

To explore this question and other questions about the extent to which Holocaust memory is present in European public discourses, the circumstances in which it surfaces, and the differences in its expressions in the countries we examined, we focused on three complementary domains that serve as memory sites: the public-political, Holocaust education and social media.

We used a between/within analysis matrix of the countries and the domains, to understand how Holocaust memory is expressed in these countries. We found that while the memory of the Holocaust remains alive, in some places
it is struggling for relevance. A common memory practice that surfaced across domains was “relationing the Holocaust,” a variant of multidirectional memory. We also found that a distinguishing aspect of Holocaust memory relates to the political left-right identification of subgroups within countries. There were also interactions
between domains and countries, for example, in the countries we explored in Western Europe, teachers’ attitudes about the Holocaust corresponded to those of their political establishment, but this was not the case in Central and Eastern Europe.

This report is intended for Holocaust and memory scholars, educators, commemorators, policymakers, journalists and anyone interested in deciphering the complex intersections of past and present. The report culminates with a series of recommendations for various policymakers, NGOs, educational organizations and social media moderators.
Author(s): Zielińska, Anna
Date: 2023
Date: 2021
Abstract: Eine internationale Mobilisierung des israelbezogenen Antisemitismus durch Organisationen, die der islamistischen Muslimbruderschaft und den Terrorgruppen Hamas und PFLP nahestehen oder mit ihnen sympathisieren, bildete den Hintergrund für zahlreiche Gewaltvorfälle und Bedrohungen von Jüdinnen_Juden im vergangenen Mai. Viele antisemitische Vorfälle ereigneten sich im Umfeld antiisraelischer Versammlungen, doch war für jüdische Communities die Bedrohung durch Antisemitismus vielfältig im Alltag spürbar. Dies geht aus dem gemeinsamen Bericht des Bundesverbandes der Recherche- und Informationsstellen Antisemitismus e.V. (Bundesverband RIAS) und des Internationalen Institut für Bildung, Sozial- und Antisemitismusforschung (IIBSA) über antisemitische Vorfälle im Kontext der Eskalation der Gewalt im Nahen Osten im Mai 2021 hervor.

Der Bericht „Mobilisierungen von israelbezogenem Antisemitismus im Bundesgebiet 2021” befasst sich mit der internationalen und bundesweiten Mobilisierung von israelbezogenem Antisemitismus im Mai 2021 sowie mit den zwischen dem 9. und 24. Mai 2021 bekannt gewordenen antisemitischen Vorfällen in Deutschland im Zeitraum des bewaffneten Konflikts zwischen der Hamas und Israel.

Die Analysen des Forschungsinstituts IIBSA zeigen eine breite Mobilisierung des Antisemitismus, die von links/antiimperialistischem Spektrum über die politische Mitte bis hin zu nationalistischen, neonazistischen und islamistischen Milieus reichte. Verschiedene internationale Akteur_innen und ihre Sympathisant_innen waren an der Aufstachelung von antisemitischem Hass, Gewalt oder Terrorismus beteiligt, etwa die Palästinensische Front zur Befreiung Palästinas (PFLP), die Millî Görüş-Bewegung, die Grauen Wölfe und das türkische Präsidium für religiöse Angelegenheiten, Diyanet. Eine besondere Rolle nahmen hierbei bereits im Vorfeld der kriegerischen Auseinandersetzung Organisationen ein, die der islamistischen Muslimbruderschaft und den Terrorgruppen Hamas nahestehen oder mit ihnen sympathisieren, wie etwa die Palästinensische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland (PGD).

Zeitgleich zur Eskalation im israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt zwischen dem 9. und dem 24. Mai 2021 dokumentierte der Bundesverband RIAS deutschlandweit 261 antisemitische Vorfälle mit einem entsprechenden Bezug – im Schnitt mehr als 16 Vorfälle am Tag. Bekannt wurden u.a. 10 Angriffe, 22 gezielte Sachbeschädigungen und 18 Bedrohungen.

Dabei war Antisemitismus nicht nur auf den antiisraelischen Versammlungen zu beobachten, sondern ein alltagsprägendes Phänomen für Jüdinnen_Juden: Er begegnete ihnen am Arbeitsplatz, in Gesprächen und Diskussionen im Bekannten- oder Freundeskreis, im Umfeld von Synagogen, während zufälliger Begegnungen im Supermarkt, im öffentlichen Personennahverkehr, auf der Straße und im eigenen Wohnumfeld.
Date: 2023
Abstract: The ADL Global 100: An Index of AntisemitismTM is the most extensive poll on antisemitic attitudes ever conducted, involving 102 countries and territories. The ADL Global 100: An Index of Antisemitism has provided crucial insights into national and regional attitudes toward Jews around the world, the levels of acceptance of antisemitic stereotypes and knowledge of the Holocaust.

In 2023, ADL released a focused survey that included 10 European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Spain, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.

First conducted in 2014, with follow up surveys in select countries since that time, this data is utilized by policy makers, researchers, Jewish communities, NGOs and journalists around the globe. The findings allow understanding of the magnitude of antisemitic attitudes around the world, and exactly which anti-Jewish beliefs are the most seriously entrenched.

The 2023 survey found that roughly one out of every four residents of the European countries polled for the 2023 survey harbored antisemitic attitudes. This result is consistent with the survey’s 2019 findings, showing that antisemitism continues to be entrenched across Europe. At least one in three respondents in Western European countries believe that Jews are more loyal to Israel than the countries they reside in. In Eastern Europe, the most commonly held stereotypes is that of Jewish economic control and the perception of Jews as clannish.

Among the questions asked of respondents, 11 questions measuring general acceptance of various negative Jewish stereotypes were used to compile an index that has served as a benchmark for ADL polling around the world since 1964. Survey respondents who said at least 6 out of the 11 statements are “probably true” are considered to harbor antisemitic attitudes.

The survey was fielded between November 2022 and January 2023 with 500 nationally representative samples in each of the eight European countries and 1,000 nationally representative samples in Russia and Ukraine, respectively.
Date: 2023
Date: 2023
Abstract: What do Jews in the UK think in regard to Israel’s military conflict with Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza? This report looks into the opinions of over 4,000 of JPR’s Research Panel members, following the May 2021 conflict between the sides. Respondents were asked to state how much they agree or disagree with two different statements: “Israel’s government handled the military aspects of the conflict appropriately” and “Israel’s government engaged in the conflict primarily for political rather than military reasons”.

The report finds that overall, Jews support Israel’s right to defend itself militarily but that this support is not uncritical. Moreover, Jews in the UK do not hold uniform views on Israel: levels of attachment to Israel, support for Britain’s Labour Party and holding a degree level qualification were found to be the key predictors of attitudes.

Some of the key findings in this report:
57% of the respondents agreed that Israel’s government handled the military aspects of the conflict appropriately, while 33% disagreed.
42% of the respondents agreed that Israel’s government engaged in the conflict primarily for political rather than military reasons, while 47% disagreed.
The main predictor of attitudes about this conflict is a person’s level of emotional attachment to Israel. Those with stronger feeling of attachment are more willing to give Israel the benefit of the doubt, independent of other variables such as political stance, religiosity and education.
In general, respondents who felt more weakly attached to Israel, or who were younger or more secular, or politically leftist, or university educated, were more likely to hold a more critical stance than those who were older, or more religious, or politically rightist, or non-university educated
Date: 2023
Abstract: At 28,075 Jewish people, Greater Manchester recorded the largest Jewish population in the UK
outside of London and adjacent Hertfordshire. At first sight, it appears to have grown by 12%
between 2011 and 2021, most likely driven largely by high birth-rates among the strictly Orthodox
community. Similarly, if the data eventually proves to be accurate, this constitutes a growth of 29%
over the twenty years between 2001 and 2021. Provisional estimates of the Haredi community
based on other data sources (such as Manchester Connections) suggest that the Haredi community
could be as large as 22,778 but, again, further analysis is needed before any firm conclusions can be
drawn. Whatever the final numbers, it is clear that Greater Manchester, which includes the largest
Eruv in the UK with a perimeter of more than 13 miles, covering parts of Prestwich, Crumpsall and
Higher Broughton, is an important and growing centre of Jewish life.

This report was commissioned by Jewish Representative Council of Greater Manchester & Regions
(GMJRC) to research and analyse community strengths and provide a mapping of Jewish
organisations in the Greater Manchester area. It was overseen by the GMJRC strategic group – a
group that was formed of Councils and organisations across the Jewish religious spectrum as a
response to the pandemic. It reviews services in seven themes: Children & Young People; Adult
Services; Older People; Health; Employment; Emergency Response; and Housing. As well as looking
at delivery, governance, leadership, and building assets, it also tries to understand where the gaps
and support needs are. As the demographics and relative sizes of the mainstream and strictly
Orthodox Jewish populations continue to change, this study represents an important examination
of both the challenges and opportunities of how the respective communities work together. As
these populations change across the UK, and beyond, the study will have significance to other cities
where these Jewish communities exist side by side.

The Institute of Jewish Policy Research (JPR) used a variety of data sources to identify organisations
delivering in each theme and built maps of that data which can be seen throughout this report.
Mobilise Public Ltd use several methods to gather data from these organisations in each theme.
The main approach was qualitative, using stakeholder interviews and focus group discussions with a
purposely selected sample of these organisations, and the evidence collected was supplemented
with a short survey which was issued to a larger number of organisations. The research was
coproduced with a subset of the strategic group through a series of facilitated sessions and was
designed to build a good understanding of delivery in each theme as well as an understanding of
challenges and opportunities in readiness for the strategic group to develop a more integrated
strategy for the Greater Manchester Jewish community
Date: 2023
Abstract: How attached do European Jews feel to the countries in which they live? Or to the European Union? And are their loyalties ‘divided’ in some way – between their home country and Israel? Answering these types of questions helps us to see how integrated European Jews feel today, and brings some empiricism to the antisemitic claim that Jews don’t fully ‘belong.’

This mini-report, based on JPR's groundbreaking report ‘The Jewish identities of European Jews’, explores European Jews’ levels of attachment to the countries in which they live, to Israel, and to the European Union, and compares them with those of wider society and other minority groups across Europe. Some of the key findings in this study written by Professor Sergio DellaPergola and Dr Daniel Staetsky of JPR’s European Jewish Demography Unit include:

European Jews tend to feel somewhat less strongly attached to the countries in which they live than the general population of those countries, but more strongly attached than other minority groups and people of no religion.
That said, levels of strong attachment to country vary significantly from one country to another, both among Jews and others.
European Jews tend to feel somewhat more strongly attached to the European Union than the general populations of their countries, although in many cases, the distinctions are small.
Some European Jewish populations feel more strongly attached to Israel than to the countries in which they live, and some do not. The Jewish populations that tend to feel more attached to Israel than the countries in which they live often have high proportions of recent Jewish immigrants.
Having a strong attachment to Israel has no bearing on Jewish people's attachments to the EU or the countries in which they live, and vice versa: one attachment does not come at the expense of another. They are neither competitive nor complementary; they are rather completely unrelated.
Jews of different denominations show very similar levels of attachment to the countries in which they live, but rather different levels of attachment to Israel and the EU.
Date: 2023
Abstract: Come ogni anno, l’Osservatorio antisemitismo della Fondazione Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea-CDEC ha elaborato una relazione sugli episodi di antisemitismo sul territorio italiano nel corso del 2022 per fornire a studiosi e istituzioni un documento di analisi della situazione nel nostro Paese.

Lo studio è introdotto da una presentazione di dati statistici sulle condizioni economiche, sociali, di sicurezza e benessere della popolazione che contestualizzano le rilevazioni di episodi di matrice antisemita. Gli studiosi hanno ritenuto importante fornire tale preambolo perché, se in condizioni di latenza l’antisemitismo occupa territori sociali e culturali circoscritti, una situazione di crisi economica e disagio diffuso è soggetta a favorire il riemergere di attitudini razziste, xenofobe e antisemite

I dati presentati su atti e discorsi antisemiti, con un’ analisi approfondita dell’antisemitismo sui social media, rilevano un lieve aumento di atti e discorsi contro gli ebrei principalmente nel web, trend non solo italiano ma globale. A seguito di 327 segnalazioni, nel 2022 l’Osservatorio ha individuato 241 episodi di antisemitismo, dato in leggera crescita rispetto ai 226 episodi rilevati nel 2021. Di questi, 164 episodi concernono l’antisemitismo in rete, 77 riguardano episodi accaduti materialmente, di cui 2 aggressioni, 10 casi di minacce e un grave atto di vandalismo ai danni della sinagoga di Trieste. La principale matrice ideologica che alimenta l’odio contro gli ebrei continua ad essere quella cospiratoria basata sui vecchi miti di un presunto potere ebraico, che vengono modernizzati e adattati alla realtà contingente come la pandemia da coronavirus, la guerra contro l’Ucraina o la crisi energetica.

Lo studio si conclude con una panoramica delle azioni di contrasto, attività didattiche, buone pratiche e dichiarazioni pubbliche contro l’antisemitismo, con menzione della promozione su tutto il territorio nazionale di seminari sulle linee guida per il contrasto all’antisemitismo a scuola a cura del Coordinamento nazionale per la lotta contro l’antisemitismo.
Date: 2023
Abstract: CST’s Antisemitic Incidents Report 2022, shows 1,652 anti-Jewish hate incidents recorded nationwide in 2022. This is the fifth-highest annual total ever reported to CST, and a 27% decrease from the 2,261 antisemitic incidents in 2021, which was a record high sparked by antisemitic reactions to the conflict in the Middle East that year. CST recorded 1,684 incidents in 2020, 1,813 in 2019 and 1,690 in 2018. CST has been recording antisemitic incidents since 1984.

An additional 615 reports of potential incidents were received by CST in 2022 but were not deemed to be antisemitic and are not included in this total of 1,652 incidents. Many of these 615 potential incidents involved suspicious activity or possible hostile reconnaissance at Jewish locations; criminal activity affecting Jewish people and buildings; and anti-Israel activity that did not include antisemitic language, motivation or targeting.

The fall in reported incidents serves to illustrate the unprecedented volume of anti-Jewish hate recorded by CST in May and June 2021, during and following the escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas. In 2022, there was no similar external circumstance to have such an impact on the content or scale of antisemitic incidents in the UK. While the relative drop was predictable, the overall figure remains significant. Over 100 cases of antisemitism were reported each month, and the average monthly total was 138 incidents. For comparison, barring May and June – when incident figures were affected by the war-related surge in reports - the average monthly total in 2021 was 116 incidents. Without any relevant trigger event, the 1,652 instances of anti-Jewish hate recorded in 2022 can be considered a ‘new normal’ for antisemitism in the country, far exceeding what was typically observed prior to 2016.
Date: 2022