Abstract: In recent years, Jews, Germans, and Poles have stood at three corners of a triangle, labeled, respectively, as victims, perpetrators, and bystanders by genocide researchers treating the Holocaust. The formulation advanced previous equations, where scholars could only imagine the duality of victim-perpetrator.3 Newrevelations about kinds and layers of complicity, competing claims to victim-hood, and the recognition that individuals may inhabit more than one of the categories, force us to confront the complexity of interrelations. Yet, the rise of attention to public memory in Holocaust studies suggests, rather than a permanent two-dimensional geometry, a different idiom: an active, jockeying troika of nations, yoked together by a difficult history. This new metaphor allows us to anticipate and attend to the ongoing tensions and shifts that occur among members of the team, on whom different memorial burdens may be placed. In this chapter, I address the circumstances of a major, and quite recent, transmogrification of the symbolic Jews-Germans-Poles constellation. Namely, I argue that in the framework of Jewish Holocaust tourism to Poland, Nazi Germany (i.e., the perpetrator) disappears. In its place, Poland has emerged as much more satisfying object of opprobrium, even as—and indeed, I will argue, because—Poland is also beginning to be excavated as a site of more general relevance in Jewish memory-culture.
Abstract: Is criticism of Israel antisemitic? Do anti-Israel views and attitudes constitute a “new antisemitism”? These questions have occupied the minds of many academics and pubic intellectuals – both Jewish and non-Jewish – since the beginning of the twenty-first century. So far, no consensus has emerged. The definitions of antisemitism are many but all have been contested to varying degrees. This paper offers a brief survey of the definitions of antisemitism and the way in which these definitions accommodate anti-Israel and/or anti-Zionist views and attitudes. This is done, however, by way of introduction and without any assessment of the quality of the definitions in scientific terms, or their acceptability in political terms. The overview simply provides the background and the motivation for the main subject of the paper. The Jewish public’s perception of the link between antisemitism and anti-Israel/anti-Zionist attitudes forms the main focus of this paper. This is, to my knowledge, the first time that this subject has been treated in a strictly empirical, quantitative manner using large datasets.
What does the Jewish public, as opposed to the intellectual elite, think about the link between antisemitism and anti-Zionism? This question has so far remained unexplored, and in this paper I attempt to answer it utilising a newly created dataset. In summer 2012, a survey of experiences and perceptions of antisemitism among Jews took place in selected European countries.
Using advanced statistical techniques, it is possible to explore the extent to which the Jewish public makes a distinction between classic antisemitic and anti-Israel/anti-Zionist statements. Are anti-Israel/anti-Zionist statements perceived as antisemitic by Jews? Are they perceived to be antisemitic to the same extent as other, more classic, antisemitic statements? The paper addresses these questions focusing on the British and French samples of Jews, and comparing and contrasting insights produced by these two contexts.
Abstract: Although the Holocaust ended more than fifty years ago, its impact continues to be an enduring trauma in the 21st century. Most of the survivors have passed away, but the second and third generations continue to carry this dark inheritance within their lives. Historians have reflected upon the destruction visited upon the European landscape, and we have come to see that even in America significant changes have taken place within that community. Germany continues to be a puzzle. Immediately after the war, the prevailing attitude saw all Germans as evil, and the occupying forces were forbidden to fraternize. Yet it is not in the nature of soldiers to remain distant from the people around them, and that wall disappeared far quicker than the ‘Wall’ built by the Communists to separate East and West Germany. Later, distinctions began to be made between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Germans, partially through the ‘denazification’ courts and later by the general public. Once business ties were re-established the attitude towards the Germans began to change. Eventually, wealthy German tourists were accepted, even though sly jokes about them continued. But Germany itself had to undergo dramatic changes, which continue to be played out in a country which now holds a commanding position in the European Community.
Abstract: In 1995 the German federal centre for political education published a collection of essays on the problems arising from public representations of the Holocaust. Angela Genger, director of the Dusseldorf Memorial Centre, expressed her worries about developments at the major memorial centres following the unification of Germany. Under the heading ‘Are we facing a roll back?’, she laments that ‘the discursive and process-orientated practice adopted since the early eighties’ has been playing ‘non-principal role’2 in the memorials’ quest for renewal. As president of the working group for memorials in North Rhine-Westfalia, she particularly regrets that the discourse has since become ‘state-based’. In the old federal republic, the protagonists had often met with solid political opposition from the various municipalities, regions and federal states. Passionate and lengthy debates were carried on between so-called ‘barefoot historians’ and history workshops, trade union and church groups (especially ‘Aktion Sühnezeichen’), engaged activists and local politicians, but most of all former inmates and other victims of National Socialism. They eventually succeeded in bringing about a range of vastly different, decentralized memorials. These are seen in strong contrast to the centralized memorials, which are funded by the federal government and the relevant states, were conceived by historians and other experts, and are headed by academics and administrators enjoying a superior level of social security, with pension benefits and even the provision of housing.
Abstract: Soviet historiography ignored the Jewish role in World War II, for reasons shall explore. Yet the topic is very important to Soviet and post-Soviet Jews (as well as to others), in part precisely because it was ignored by the Soviets. This is manifested in the number of articles and books published on the subject in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the Soviet Jewish diaspora, few of them by professional historians. One way of supplementing amateur historiography and filling in gaps in our knowledge is by taking oral testimonies from participants in the war. This has been done successfully by some popular historians in the United States. Oral history has serious limitations, of course. It should probably not be used to establish facts, especially at a distance of more than fifty years and in regard to events fraught with great meanings and emotions. Oral history allows for embellishment, cover-ups, falsifications and distortions. However, it can be most useful in establishing perceptions, that is, not so much what happened — though that should not be dismissed — but what people think happened, or think now happened then.
Abstract: In march 1998, the Vatican released a long-awaited statement on the Catholic Church and the Holocaust. In a preface to the document, entitled We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah, Pope John Paul II expressed his hope that it would ‘help to heal the wounds of past misunderstandings and injustices’. Eighteen months after the publication of the document, it seems now possible to conclude that, however sincere the Vatican’s intentions, the pope’s hopes will almost certainly not be realized. Indeed, far from healing, the document has succeeded largely in re-opening, if not actually deepening, old wounds. Not only did it divide the Catholic intellectual and journalistic communities. More importantly, I think, it bewildered and frustrated many Jewish readers and bitterly disappointed others. It also called forth a literary response from Jewish intellectuals and organizations that, while especially vigorous in the immediate wake of the document’s publication, had force and feeling to last more than a year. Since the energy driving these responses appears to have subsided, it seems possible now to undertake a comprehensive survey of Jewish reaction to We Remember and to attempt to account for its intensity and duration.
Abstract: Recently, the old anti-Semitic myths, both the Aryan and the Khazar, have been revived in Russia and have begun to spread. The Aryan myth, which is rooted in the Nazi propaganda of the 1920s and 1930s, was picked up and developed by the contemporary Russian radical nationalists. It restores to general history the Manichaean and Messianic approaches that reduce all complex historic processes to a struggle between two agents — the ‘Aryans’ (i.e. the ‘Slavic-Russes’) and the ‘World Evil’ (i.e. the Jews). It describes the ‘Slavic-Aryans’, the first humans, who mysteriously appeared at the Northern continent, ‘Hyperborea-Arctida’, and dispersed to become the ancestors of most of the peoples of the world and founders of the principal ancient civilizations. Later, they were forced out from their former lands by an evil agent represented by the ‘savage nomads of Arabia’.1
Abstract: The present study examines Jewish politics in Communist Hungary. As it is widely known, politicians of Jewish origin played an important role in the political life of post-war Hungary as leaders of the Communist party or as officials in the Communist governments. Their activity had a considerable effect, both directly and indirectly, on the life of Hungarian Jews. "Judeo-Bolshevic" rule is still a favorite topic of contemporary antisemitic publiciations. No doubt, the question of whether the Jewish origin of these politicians had an impact on their decisions, and if so, to what extent, could be a relevant subject for historical study. However, this essay deals with a different topic. It is concerned only with those politicians in post-war Hungary who identified themselves publicly as Jews or openly
represented Jewish causes. How did these politicians, who viewed Jews as a collectivity and sought to defend the Jews’ collective interests, act in the troublesome post-war decades?
Abstract: Krakow's Jews, scattered around the world, reminisce about their hometown. The main reasons for returning to Krakow are recurring images of the past and the urge to see their life story as a coherent whole. The returnees rediscover their hometown through their own traces of memory, although there are shared stops on the way. These are the places associated with their childhood and their family history, but also with the heritage of Krakow's Jews and the Holocaust. Such diverse stops on the trail of memories show dual identity of the city – the city of a once glorious past but also stigmatised by blood, murder and loss. The absence of the families of the murdered Jewish community is equivalent to the lack of natural environment of commemoration. Those returning are looking for a new commemorative milieu, and everyone who remembers will also become part of it (e.g. their school friends, teachers, neighbours etc.). Finally, the returnees are coming back home – to the house where they were born, but one that is not home anymore.
Abstract: Many readers may be taken aback by the eponymous question. The “reconstruction”, “renaissance”, or “revitalization” of Jewish life has usually been referred to in the affirmative, not necessarily denoting one and the same notion of that phenomenon in each case. It may be worthwhile setting out to explore this issue by establishing in the first place what “Jewish life” consists of, where “the Jewish” and “the non -Jewish” have their dividing line, and what criteria should be assumed if the choice were between the objective and the subjective ones. More questions arise from such deliberations, pertaining to the definition of Jewish culture, Judaism, Jewish space, and Jewish identity; should these concepts be looked at from the perspective of essentialism or constructivism? or may be a new perspective is to be sought, one that sits somewhere at the junction of these two extremes? Every community obviously faces problems caused by the designata of collective categories; however, the contemporary Jewish community seems to be particularly affected by these in Poland. It is beyond doubt that the principal reason for that situation stems from the Holocaust – the experience and aftermath of that tragic event.
