Abstract: Идущий в России очередной виток дискуссии о ликвидации ряда «дотационных» национальных автономий путем их слияния с более состоятельными в хозяйственном и бюджетном смысле соседними регионами страны, напрямую касается и возможного изменения статуса основанной в мае 1934 года Еврейской автономной области. Хотя мотивы данного шага преимущественно финансово-экономические, лишение ЕАО, единственного оставшегося в мире примера, пусть на декларативном уровне, реализации «территориалистской» модели национального самоопределения еврейского народа, нанесет немалый символический и содержательный ущерб российской еврейской общине и стране в целом. Особенно, если принять во внимание идущий в последние десятилетия в области процесс возрождения еврейской культурной жизни и то, что сама по себе ЕАО, как бренд, может в долгосрочной перспективе оказаться экономически эффективен.
Abstract: В конце прошлого, 2018го и начале этого 2019 года были опубликованы очередные доклады израильских, российских и украинских организаций, вовлеченных в процесс мониторинга появлений антисемитизма и ксенофобии на просторах бывшего СССР, и прежде всего – в России и Украине. Факты и выводы этих документов стали богатым информационным поводом и предметом оживленной дискуссии представителей политических кругов этих стран и различных фракций постсоветских еврейских элит. Основные разногласия связаны с темой классификации тех или иных событий в качестве антисемитских проявлений. Точкой соприкосновения сторонников разных подходов является стремление уделять особое внимание не только прямым физическими преступлениями или вандализма на почве ненависти к евреям, но и таким сюжетам как подстрекательство, попытки диффамации евреев и Израиля, отрицание Катастрофы, и антисемитизм, замаскированный под «антисионизм».
В конце прошлого, 2018-го и начале этого 2019 года вниманию общественности были представлены очередные доклады организаций, вовлеченных в процесс мониторинга появлений антисемитизма и ксенофобии на просторах бывшего СССР, и прежде всего – в России и Украине. Где тема отношения властей и общества к евреям стала заметным элементом психологической, дипломатической и информационной активности, сопровождающей уже более чем четырехлетний тяжелый конфликт между двумя странами. Не случайно, что факты и выводы документов, представленных в нынешней – как и прошлогодней серии докладов, стали богатым информационным поводом и предметом оживленной дискуссии представителей политических кругов этих стран и различных фракций постсоветских еврейских элит
Abstract: Катастрофа европейского еврейства привела к почти полному исчезновению еврейской общины Германии. Чудо случилось в 1990-х годах, когда русскоязычные евреи стали тысячами прибывать в эту страну. Для местных евреев неожиданная иммиграция казалась удачным шансом, выпавшим еврейским сообществам и обществу в целом. Однако первое поколение русско-еврейских иммигрантов столкнулось с большим числом социальных проблем и трудностей интеграции на рынок труда. К этому следует добавить культурное отчуждение от немецкого общества и серьезные различия в культуре, ментальности и идентичности с местными еврейскими общинами. А также конфликты между старожилами и новоприбывшими относительно желаемых моделей организации еврейской жизни – в силу чего и через тридцать лет после начала иммиграции русские евреи все еще мало представлены в общенациональном еврейском руководстве. И все же, впервые после окончания Второй мировой войны у еврейских общин Германии появился шанс построить плюралистическую модель религиозных, культурных, образовательных и политических проектов. Второе поколение русских евреев Германии не сталкивается с проблемами интеграции, подобные проблемам родителей, и большинство из этого поколения вольется в немецкий средний класс и профессиональную элиту страны – или уже находятся там. Но при этом совершенно непонятно пока, до какой степени второе поколение русских евреев будет искать собственные корни, интересоваться еврейским наследием и участвовать в жизни еврейских общин.
Abstract: Концепция «двойной лояльности» в еврейском случае подразумевает, что еврей стоит на стороне Израиля вне зависимости от страны своего проживания, а принцип Талмуда, известный как «Закон государства обязателен для исполнения евреями» (Дина де-мальхута дина) часто рассматривается как требование к еврею придерживаться лояльности тому государству, где он живет. Попытка многих советских евреев, на разных этапах послевоенной истории этой страны, совмещать патриотизм в отношении страны проживания и преданность Израилю, воспринимался властями СССР как вызов и повод для репрессивных кампаний. Нынешняя ситуация в постсоветских странах в целом иная, и ближе к подходу современных демократических государств, признающих феномен «поли-лояльности» и двойного гражданства, закрепленного межправительственными соглашениями и программами о развитии культурных, научных, деловых и других связей.
Abstract: Dr. Zvi Feine served the Jewish communities of Romania and Poland as country director for the Joint Distribution Community during those two countries respective transitions from Communist rule. This memoir of his work under the constraints of communism, through the violent December 1989 revolution in Romania and the more peaceful transition in Poland, and in the aftermath of transition to democracy describes the challenges of effective communal service in turbulent times. The mission of the JDC was to support and partner with the Jewish communities that remained after the devastation of the Holocaust, sustaining the Jews of Eastern Europe with material and communal assistance. Dr. Feine relates poignant and harrowing memories of working under the constant surveillance of the Securitate secret service agency and dealing with the aftermath of the revolution and the resistance to change, all the while navigating a complex and delicate web of history, religious and cultural mores, personalities, ideals, and hopes. Illustrated here are numerous principles of communal work, including the importance of understanding the cultural context, resource and leadership development, and the crucial role that lay leaders can play. Communal workers in the Jewish community and beyond will benefit from Dr. Feine's accumulated wisdom over a lifetime of community service in positions all over the globe.
Abstract: Is criticism of Israel antisemitic? Do anti-Israel views and attitudes constitute a “new antisemitism”? These questions have occupied the minds of many academics and pubic intellectuals – both Jewish and non-Jewish – since the beginning of the twenty-first century. So far, no consensus has emerged. The definitions of antisemitism are many but all have been contested to varying degrees. This paper offers a brief survey of the definitions of antisemitism and the way in which these definitions accommodate anti-Israel and/or anti-Zionist views and attitudes. This is done, however, by way of introduction and without any assessment of the quality of the definitions in scientific terms, or their acceptability in political terms. The overview simply provides the background and the motivation for the main subject of the paper. The Jewish public’s perception of the link between antisemitism and anti-Israel/anti-Zionist attitudes forms the main focus of this paper. This is, to my knowledge, the first time that this subject has been treated in a strictly empirical, quantitative manner using large datasets.
What does the Jewish public, as opposed to the intellectual elite, think about the link between antisemitism and anti-Zionism? This question has so far remained unexplored, and in this paper I attempt to answer it utilising a newly created dataset. In summer 2012, a survey of experiences and perceptions of antisemitism among Jews took place in selected European countries.
Using advanced statistical techniques, it is possible to explore the extent to which the Jewish public makes a distinction between classic antisemitic and anti-Israel/anti-Zionist statements. Are anti-Israel/anti-Zionist statements perceived as antisemitic by Jews? Are they perceived to be antisemitic to the same extent as other, more classic, antisemitic statements? The paper addresses these questions focusing on the British and French samples of Jews, and comparing and contrasting insights produced by these two contexts.
Abstract: Стало почти привычным, что, если речь идет о событиях, связанных с проявлениями антисемитизма и иных форм выраженной, в том числе, насильственной ксенофобии, в последние два десятилетия чаще всего в этом контексте упоминается Западная Европа, США и особенно мусульманский мир. Эти же страны регионы продолжали поставлять заголовки такого рода и в 2017-2018 гг. В свою очередь, бывший Советский Союз – некогда едва ли не главный «ньюсмейкер» сюжетов, связанных с юдофобией и дискриминацией евреев, после распада СССР и мировой коммунистической системы, в этом смысле ушел на периферию мировой повестки дня.
Abstract: The relationship between food and religion is a lived activity formed by the dynamics of both tradition and adaption. Religious commitments to food are influenced by various factors, ranging from personal spirituality and experiences to social patterns of belonging, ethical, political and doctrinal convictions. Challah, gefilte fish, blintzes – these are just a few of the traditional Finnish Jewish meals that are still prepared by members of the community. The originally Eastern European dishes are one of the last living links that connect assimilated Finnish Jews with their Orthodox Jewish ancestors mainly from Russia, Poland, Belarus, and Lithuania. The current paper aims to present the conceptions and reflections relating to boundaries of identity connected with the multi-ethnic culinary traditions of Jews living in Finland as well as their ways of coping with the requirements of kashrut (meaning fit, proper, correct; a set of dietary laws prescribed for Jews). The article is based on ethnographic data from interviews (2015–16) as well as personal encounters, informal conversations and home visits.
Abstract: In this article, I examine how contemporary Finnish Jewish women understand their roles and identities as women in a small Orthodox Jewish community, on the one hand, and as members of a tiny minority in largely secular and predominantly Lutheran/Christian Finland, on the other. How do Finnish Jewish women negotiate their identities in relation to their community, strongly organised along gender lines, and in relation to Finnish society and especially its equality ideals and norms? I divide my article into four sections. First, I give a short overview of the theory of intersectionality, concentrating on its possibilities and limitations for the study of religion and gender in general, and for the study of Judaism, specifically. Second, I focus on my informants’ views of the gendered practices of their Orthodox Jewish community, which, by many standards, is a very specific form of Orthodoxy, which could be called ‘Finnish Orthodoxy’. Third, I analyse my informants’ views on how they perceive being Jewish women in contemporary Finland. The intersection of the last two broad themes will highlight the realities of Finnish Jewish women in contemporary Finland. Fourth, I discuss possibilities and limitations of intersectional theorising in the light of my data.
Topics: Main Topic: Other, Circumcision / Brit Milah, Newspapers, Magazines and Periodicals, Media, National Identity, Islam, Islamophobia, Antisemitism, Jewish - Non - Jewish Relations, Body
Abstract: Communal anxieties about the possibility of an inadequate supply of secondary school places in Jewish schools in London have, on occasion, run high, and have occurred against a context of demographic changes and an increase in preference for Jewish schooling. These seemingly unpredictable dynamics have made planning very difficult and this new study helps to bring some empiricism to the table.
This statistical study, authored by JPR Senior Research Fellow, Dr Daniel Staetsky, and supported by Partnerships for Jewish Schools (PaJeS), uses an empirical approach to predict future levels of demand for mainstream Jewish secondary schools in and around London. Using Local Authority data to examine applications and admissions from 2011 to 2018, it projects forward to the academic year 2022/23 in order to support future planning.
It is a follow-up to previous work in this area, and it draws on observations from the field that allow us to assess the accuracy of that work and to extend our projections further into the future.
The study concludes that current levels of provision will be sufficient if the demand in the next four years remains at today’s levels. Whilst this is a possibility, two of three possible scenarios presented in the report suggest an increase in demand, at a level in which about fifty additional places will be required across the entire Jewish secondary school system in London. Given this projected scale of increase, the report recommends that schools should develop some flexibility in capacity to satisfy the increasing demand. That might mean preparedness to open an extra class, as and when required, rather than to open an entirely new school.
Abstract: Jewish charities are a subgroup of about two thousand, five hundred organizations, accounting for 1.5% of the total number of main charities in England and Wales. The increasing total income of general charities has prompted considerable debate about the perceived concentration of income and the perceived dominance of bigger charities over smaller ones. Meanwhile, the implications of competition for charitable behavior have remained underappreciated. Building on these assumptions and aiming to test how far the results of research carried out in the charitable sector in general apply to the Jewish charitable sector in particular, the research investigates the trends in concentration of income of a sample of 1301 Jewish charities operating between 1995 and 2015, using common measures of concentration to describe the competitiveness of the Jewish charitable sector in England and Wales. The findings suggest that the sector, in line with the wider UK charitable sector, experienced high levels of growth in terms of both aggregate total income and the number of charities operating, along with decreasing levels of income concentration. These findings allow one to hypothesize that, other things being constant, the increasing numbers of entrant charities may well have increased the size distribution of charities providing the same products or services, therefore exacerbating the competition for charitable funding in the Jewish charitable sector. This, in turn, on the one hand is likely to have exacerbated the competition for donations especially among charities pursuing similar causes, reducing the total amount of charitable money devoted to particular causes. On the other hand, the increasing numbers of charities providing the same products or services and the resultant increasing competition for funding may have impacted on the costs and efforts Jewish charities were able to divert to fundraising at the expense of resources that could be devoted, instead, to service provision.
Abstract: CST recorded a record high total of 1,652 antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2018. 2018 was the third year in a row that CST has recorded a record high incident total and means the problem of rising antisemitism in our country continues to grow.
The 1,652 antisemitic incidents CST recorded in 2018 represent a 16 per cent rise from the 1,420 incidents recorded in 2017. These 1,652 incidents were spread throughout the year, with over 100 incidents recorded in every month for the first time in any calendar year; indicating that a general atmosphere of intolerance and prejudice is sustaining the high incident totals, rather than a one-off specific ‘trigger’ event. In addition to more general background factors, the highest monthly totals in 2018 came when the problem of antisemitism in the Labour Party was the subject of intense discussion and activity, or when violence surged temporarily on the border between Israel and Gaza; suggesting that these events, and reactions to them, also played a role in 2018’s record total.
The highest monthly totals in 2018 came in May, with 182 incidents; April, with 151 incidents; August, with 150 incidents; and September, with 148 incidents. It is likely that these higher monthly totals were partly caused by reactions to political events in the UK and overseas, involving the Labour Party and violence on the border of Israel and Gaza, during those months.
CST recorded 148 antisemitic incidents in 2018 that were examples of, or took place in the immediate context of, arguments over alleged antisemitism in the Labour Party. Of these 148 incidents, 49 occurred in August, 16 in September and 15 in April. These were all months in which allegations of antisemitism in the Labour Party attracted significant media and political attention. Also in April and May, several Palestinians were killed and many injured in violence connected to protests at the border between Israel and Gaza. CST recorded 173 antisemitic incidents in 2018 that showed anti-Israel motivation alongside antisemitism, of which 47 incidents – over a quarter – occurred in April and May. In 2018 as a whole, CST recorded 84 antisemitic incidents that showed far right motivation, and 13 that showed Islamist motivation.
The 182 incidents recorded by CST in May is the highest monthly total CST has recorded since August 2014, when Israel and Hamas last fought a sustained conflict over Gaza, and is the fourth-highest monthly total CST has ever recorded.
2018 saw an increase in the number and proportion of antisemitic incidents that used political or extremist language and imagery. Forty-five per cent of the incidents recorded by CST in 2018 involved the use of extremist language or imagery alongside antisemitism, compared to 30 per cent of incidents recorded in 2017. Not all of these incidents revealed a clear, single ideological motivation: many involved the varied and confused use of different extremist motifs, drawn from a broad reservoir of antisemitic sources. Of the 1,652 antisemitic incidents recorded during 2018, 456 involved language or imagery relating to the far right or the Nazi period; 254 involved references to Israel and the Palestinians, alongside antisemitism; and 29 involved references to Islam and Muslims. In 285 incidents, more than one type of extremist discourse was used.
Abstract: In late 2017, JPR published a major study of attitudes towards Jews and Israel among the population of Great Britain, a project supported by the Community Security Trust and the Department for Communities and Local Government. We regard it as a groundbreaking piece of work - the first study conducted anywhere that empirically demonstrates a clear connection between extreme hostility towards Israel and more traditional forms of antipathy towards Jews.
This report explores this connection yet further, focusing specifically on two particularly prevalent ideas that are often experienced by Jews as antisemitic: the contention that Israel is 'an apartheid state' and that it should be subjected to a boycott.
In the first instance, the study finds that large proportions of people actually have no view at all on these ideas, either because they do not know anything about the issues, or because they are simply unsure of where they stand on them. This is particularly the case for young people and women - knowledge levels improve and opinions sharpen the older people are, and, as has been found in numerous other studies, women tend to be less opinionated than men on these types of political issues.
However, among those who do have a view, 21% agree with the contention that 'Israel is an apartheid state,' 5% strongly so, and 10% endorse the argument that 'people should boycott Israeli goods and products (3% strongly so). About the same proportion (18%) disagrees with the apartheid contention as agree with it, but a much higher proportion disagrees with the boycott one (47%) than agrees with it.
Disagreement with the boycott idea is higher in older age bands than in younger ones, increasingly so among those aged 40-plus, a phenomenon that is not found in relation to the apartheid contention. But the ideas are not particularly sensitive to educational level - both agreement and disagreement with both contentions increase the higher the educational qualification achieved.
However, clear distinctions can be found when looking at the data through the lens of religion, with Muslims much more likely than other groups to support both contentions.
The report goes on to explore the correlations between these views and more traditional anti-Jewish ones, and finds clear links between the two, although this is more the case with the boycott idea than the apartheid one. However, it also notes that the correlation is stronger with other anti-Israel beliefs, particularly those arguing that Israel exploits the Holocaust for its own purposes, and those claiming that Israel is excessively powerful or the primary cause of troubles in the Middle East.
Abstract: What can the internet tell us about antisemitism in the United Kingdom? It has been shown that people are remarkably honest when they search for information online. Their Google searches and queries reveal interests, prejudices and hatreds that they might keep hidden from friends, family members, neighbours, surveys and even from themselves. They have been shown to share their health secrets, sexual preferences, and hostility towards other groups.
We decided to put this to the test to see what the Google searches made by people in the United Kingdom could tell us about attitudes
towards Jewish people in this country and in general towards Jews. Unsurprisingly perhaps, we found that, every year, people in this
country express antisemitic thoughts through their internet searches. People make some Google searches that are disturbing, including searches such as “I hate Jews,” and “Why are Jews evil?”, along with other searches expressing violent intentions towards Jews. Others post on anonymous hate sites such as the far right Stormfront website, expressing their antisemitic feelings about various Jewish Members of Parliament and celebrities.
By analysing this data, we can get a better sense of the where, when, who and what of antisemitism in Britain today. For example,we looked at whether the voting patterns of towns and cities affect the number of antisemitic searches in those places. We found that searches looking for information on the Holocaust being a hoax rise about 30 per cent every year on Holocaust Memorial Day. We learnt that Jewish women in public life or positions of power are the subject of more antisemitic searches than Jewish men in similar positions. We found evidence of the rise in popularity of antisemitic conspiracy theories, such as the discredited myth relating to the role of the Rothschild family in running the world. And we found that sometimes heightened media focus on Jews or Israel, even if it is positive, can still lead to an increase in online searches for antisemitic content.
We also found strategies that technology companies and civil society organisations can use to fight hatred. For example, our research shows that, when Google changed its autocomplete formula to eliminate antisemitic search suggestions, this lowered the number of people searching for antisemitic material (which also means that, before removing those antisemitic search prompts, Google was directing people to make antisemitic searches
who might otherwise not have done so).
This is the story of the hidden hate that our report reveals.
Abstract: Produced by JPR on behalf of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, and authored by JPR Executive Director, Dr Jonathan Boyd, this statistical bulletin contains data on Jewish school enrolment in the UK for the academic years 2015/16 to 2017/18. It is intended to help community educators and policy makers monitor changing trends over time and to inform thinking about the development of the field.
The report confirms and adds to our existing understanding of enrolment, demonstrating again that more and more Jewish children are going to Jewish schools. The actual number has risen from about 5,000 in the 1950s to close to 35,000 today, a period which, by contrast, has also seen the UK Jewish population as a whole decline by about 30%. The most acute numerical increase has occurred over the past twenty years or so, with the total more or less doubling from about 17,000 in the mid-1990s to the level found today.
Amongst the key findings in the paper:
There were 34,547 Jewish children studying in Jewish schools in the academic year 2017/18.
This represents an increase of 3,633 children, or 11.8% since the last figures were published for the academic year 2014/2015.
This increase can be observed in both the mainstream and strictly Orthodox sectors: the mainstream sector had 1,666 more Jewish children in 2017/18 compared to 2014/15; the strictly Orthodox sector had an additional 2,367 children over the same period.
58% of Jewish children in Jewish schools are in strictly Orthodox schools; 42% in non-strictly Orthodox or ‘mainstream’ Jewish schools.
Three quarters of all Jewish children in Jewish schools are in the Greater London area or South Hertfordshire.
Enrolment in strictly Orthodox schools continues to increase dramatically over time, increasing by an estimated 166%, or over 12,000 children, since the mid-1990s.
The annual growth rate of the strictly Orthodox sector is estimated to be about 4.3%, compared to 3.1% in the mainstream sector.
The growth of the Jewish school sector is a reflection both of high fertility levels in the strictly Orthodox part of the Jewish community, and a growing interest in Jewish schooling within the more mainstream part of it. UK Jewish community leaders have focused considerable attention on Jewish schooling in recent years out of concerns about declining levels of Jewish knowledge and engagement. However, as these schools have developed, considerable attention has focused on general academic quality which has helped to attract higher numbers of pupils. In turn, as the choice of Jewish schooling has become more common, it has also grown in acceptability, pushing up numbers still further.
