Abstract: Our point of departure being that free speech by all sides must be protected and that pro-Palestinian speech is not antisemitic by definition, this chapter examines the extent to which Greek political parties’ critique of Israeli policies diachronically might implicitly or explicitly contribute to the dissemination of antisemitic mythopoesis. Moving beyond the conventional focus on far-right rhetoric, this analysis explores how antisemitic tropes are reproduced within the discourses of mainstream political actors, including the conservative party New Democracy and the socialist PASOK. Particular emphasis is placed on the Greek left, a heterogeneous political formation encompassing a broad spectrum of ideologies that ostensibly uphold human rights and progressive values. The presence of discriminatory discourse within such frameworks reveals the deep entrenchment of antisemitic attitudes in Greek society, where they function as a form of ideological common sense. By examining periods such as the Greek debt crisis and the War in Gaza starting in 2023, we argue that this latent antisemitism tends to resurface during periods of socio-political crisis and permeates the entire political spectrum, challenging assumptions about its marginality or exclusivity to far right politics and rhetoric. At this point, and in light of the turbulent historical moment we are witnessing—marked by an ongoing humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, the endless suffering of the Palestinean people and the widespread instability throughout the Middle East—we deem it necessary to clarify that it is not our intention to intervene in the broader debate surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In contrast, our objective is to examine the phenomenon of antisemitism through a historical, cultural, and political lens, with a specific focus on how public opinion is shaped with regard to Greek Jewish citizens—and Jews more broadly—within the discourse articulated by Greek political actors. We would like to explicitly state that antisemitism, in this context, is not to be understood solely as a contemporary political manifestation, but as a multidimensional and diachronic phenomenon. With reference to the events of October 7th and their aftermath, we align ourselves with the position articulated by Gabor Maté, who, discussing the trauma and Palestinian suffering, emphatically stated that: “Any colonial power does precisely what Israel is doing and has been doing. (…) So, there is nothing specifically ‘Jewish’ about this. It also goes along with the colonial trajectory
Topics: Antisemitism: Far right, Antisemitism: Muslim, Attitudes to Jews, Attitudes to Israel, Islamophobia, Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism, Holocaust Commemoration, Authoritarianism, Main Topic: Holocaust and Memorial, Populism, Political Parties, Politics
Abstract: In the early 2020s, two seemingly unrelated political developments came to a head in the Netherlands. First, in January 2020, then-Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the center-right VVD party issued an official apology on behalf of the Dutch government for its complicity in the deaths of more than 100,000 Dutch Jews in the Holocaust. Second, in the November 2023 national elections, Geert Wilders’s anti-Muslim, pro-Israel PVV party won the highest percentage of votes, leading to the formation of a far-right cabinet under Prime Minister Dick Schoof in July 2024. In this article, we argue that this double consolidation of the historical legacy of the Holocaust and of racist, right-wing politics has put Dutch Jews in a dangerous bind. On the one hand, the memory of the Holocaust and the contemporary safety of Dutch Jews have been elevated as a paramount concern in Dutch institutional, legal, and political life. On the other hand, Dutch Jews have been positioned as the perennial would-be victims of violent antisemitism—virtually always, it is falsely imagined, at the hands of Dutch Muslims. The historical persecution of the Jews in the Holocaust is now used to underwrite a “proprietary” form of Jewish victimhood in the present: non-Jewish white Dutch people position themselves as the saviors of Jews, and thereby claim ownership over their past, their collective fate, and the political means to secure their safety.
Abstract: With the now-established visibility and electoral success of the contemporary populist radical right (PRR) in Western Europe, existing literature has examined these parties’ refutation of antisemitism in parallel to their continued allusion to antisemitic tropes, to greater and lesser extents. This PhD thesis brings these two strands of literature together in a three-country, three-party, and two-platform analysis of the Facebook and X posts of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), the National Rally (RN) in France, and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) between 2017 and early 2023. First, this thesis applies elements of discourse-historical analysis and of populist “style” to social media data in a novel way to contribute a framework of when Jewish inclusion and exclusion are acceptable to the parties. It demonstrates that the parties construct their ingroups as “victims”, and that Jews are included when this is strategically conducive or when Jewish victimhood does not threaten that of the non-Jewish majority. Second, while existing literature on the PRR’s framing of Jews, Israel, and antisemitism has predominantly focused on party output, this thesis uses mixed methods, Natural Language Processing (NLP) tools and inductive qualitative analysis, to analyse the comments by users who engage with the parties’ posts. It contributes a novel framework of user victimhood, showing that users are not able to form a common identity with Jews when they see Jews as an Other (rejective), see Jewish victimhood as competing with their own (competitive), and perceive Jewish victimhood as an accusation of antisemitism (defensive). Despite this, a third contribution of this research is an examination of user responses to antisemitic code words, such as “globalists”, and a conclusion that only rarely are these overtly understood and escalated by users. The thesis thus provides both empirical and methodological contributions to scholarship on the PRR: combining influences from psychology, political science, and history, and applying mixed methods in an original way to deepen and widen understanding of both the parties and users, and examining how the strategy of (anti-)antisemitism fits into broader processes of PRR mainstreaming.
Abstract: Golden Dawn (GD), Greece’s most prominent far-right political organization, strategically utilized antisemitism as its core ideological principle rather than a marginal prejudice or rhetorical device. This article argues that antisemitism served primarily as an epistemological conspiratorial framework central to GD’s ideological worldview, providing a coherent interpretive lens through which all political, economic, and social phenomena were explained as elements of a singular Jewish-orchestrated plot. Drawing on qualitative discourse analysis of over 10,300 GD publications spanning 1993 to 2020, the study illustrates how this epistemological master frame enabled the party to unify diverse domestic and international issues, from foreign policy tensions and immigration debates to economic crises, under a consistent antisemitic narrative. Additionally, by explicitly employing Holocaust denial, endorsing Nazi symbolism, and openly propagating antisemitic conspiracies, GD deliberately violated post-Holocaust European norms. This normative transgression was integral to the party’s identity, positioning it in overt defiance of mainstream moral and political boundaries. The article thus demonstrates how GD’s antisemitism functioned not merely as a rhetorical provocation but as the foundation of a comprehensive ideological system that consciously challenged established European taboos. These findings also suggest broader implications for understanding the role and adaptability of conspiratorial antisemitism and normative transgression in other extremist ideologies beyond the Greek context.
Abstract: In general, the Jewish population in Hungary has a high level of education and is in a good position socially and financially, according to the available literature and our interviewees. Those who identify as Jews are mostly non-religious and consider themselves predominantly European citizens or equally Jewish and Hungarian. According to research, the level of antisemitism in Hungary increased significantly around 2010, presumably due to the rise in popularity of the far-right Jobbik party. Since 2015, the available data show that the level of antisemitism has not changed significantly. At the same time, most interviewees reported a general increase in antisemitism in the country, citing the internet as the primary cause, as well as the family background, deficiencies of the education system, the polarisation of society, and the government‘s Soros campaign. In Hungary, antisemitism is most often manifested in the form of conspiracy theories, but other forms are also present (e.g. emotional antisemitism, new antisemitism). According to the available data, the most common form of antisemitism is hate speech. The number of hate crimes is negligible. At the political level, antisemitism emerged from the second half of the 2000s in connection with Jobbik and has been one of the tools of far-right parties (currently Mi Hazánk – Our Homeland) ever since, albeit in a less direct form than before, disguised by coded speech and appearing mainly as conspiracy theories. Although the Fidesz government announced zero tolerance towards antisemitism in 2013, it has focused its communication on several issues related to antisemitism in recent years. These include the campaign against George Soros, the glorification of antisemitic politicians (e.g. Miklós Horthy) and artists (e.g. Albert Wass) between the two world wars, the distortion of the memory of the Holocaust, and the fight against the global external enemy. Antisemitism is also present in the sports fan milieu, primarily in the football fan scene and especially in the ultra scene. According to a 2017 survey, half of Hungarian Jews have experienced antisemitism in their lifetime, and all of our Jewish interviewees mentioned such experiences. Many of them highlighted the government‘s antisemitism-related doubletalk’s negative effects on their sense of security. While antisemitism is undoubtedly present in Hungary, research and interviewees also suggest that society is much more prejudiced towards other minorities, especially the Roma, the LGBTQ+, and migrants. According to first-line practitioners, the extent to which antisemitism is present among students depends on the school. When it appears among students, it is primarily present in verbal forms, and often, there are no real antisemitic sentiments in the background. Several interviewees identified education as one of the most important tools to reduce antisemitism.
Abstract: This document was prepared based on the analysis of materials found through documentary research, in particular on materials and sources made available by the CDEC Foundation and the Union of Italian Jewish Communities (UCEI) portal, and on the analysis of data acquired through the responses of the interviewees intended to provide structured and documented information on the phenomenon of antisemitism in Italy today. In particular, the report focuses on the situation of Italian Jewish communities and Jewish life in its social, political, economic, cultural and religious dimensions.
The most substantial part of the report concerns the level of antisemitism in Italian society, its prevalent forms and the areas in which it manifests itself. With reference to the different manifestations of antisemitism, it’s pointed out which stereotypes are present in society and which are the most prevalent. From this analysis, it’s clear that the forms and areas in which antisemitism manifests itself differ according to the degree of schooling, cultural formation and socio-economic background of the perpetrators of antisemitic acts. Hence, it is difficult to identify the profile of the antisemite rigidly. The areas where acts of hatred and hate crimes are most prevalent are social media and sports, particularly soccer. Still, even in the political debate, it is evident that more or less latent forms of antisemitism related to Nazi-fascist ideology are present for far-right movements and anti-Zionism for the extreme left wing.
The report also aims to highlight which other minorities are most discriminated against in Italy and what stereotypes and prejudices associated with them, as well as what are the intersections between antisemitism and other forms of racism and intolerance. Considerable space is, finally, devoted to the educational strategies implemented in schools to counter and prevent antisemitism as the direction of the Italian Ministry of Education and Merit (IMPE) points to the dissemination and implementation of the Guidelines for Countering Antisemitism (2019) in public schools and the promotion of a culture of dialogue and peace.
Abstract: This chapter seeks to analyse the entanglement of exclusionist ideas in antisemitic and anti-feminist thought in Poland and Europe from the late nineteenth century to the present day. It will consider discriminatory politics, practices, and violence against women, Jews, and other groups that were perceived as ‘Other’, drawing on cases from Germany, Poland, and Hungary in a comparative approach. Since connections between exclusion, sexuality, and violence during the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries are currently undergoing reinterpretation, the chapter will also examine developments and examples of anti-gender ideology and right-wing populism in contemporary Poland and Europe and discuss the dangers such shared forms of ressentiment pose to democracy.
Abstract: Romania has proved to be no outlier in the ongoing trend of mainstream-ization of far-right and neo-fascist politics and discourses, despite the optimistic outlook that many shared not long ago. AUR marked a historical success, being the first “radical return” political formation to gain seats in Parliament after 1989. As a result, a process of accelerated normalization of the far-right discourse is taking place, moving the political spectrum further to the (extreme) right, while also rehabilitating historical figures that played a significant role in the Holocaust. The present paper draws on Discourse Historical Analysis and concepts such as “calculated ambivalence” and “dog-whistle politics” to unpack the coded meanings and whistles entwined in the discursive provocations and reactions of AUR’s leader, George Simion. Starting from AUR’s press release from January 2022, minimizing the Holocaust, which set in motion the “right-wing populist perpetuum mobile”, I analyze the main discursive strategies, both confrontational and submissive, used by Simion in his effort to “dog-whistle” to AUR’s ultranationalist supporters, while at the same time denying allegations of antisemitism, Holocaust minimization, and fascist sympathies. For a qualitative measure of the success or failure of these strategies, a complementary critical analysis of the reactions of some of the most prominent antisemitic ultranationalist voices in Romania is carried out. Is Simion a skillful “dog-whistler” or a “traitor”? The study shows that there is a thin and fluid line between the two.
Abstract: Durant quarante ans, l’extrême droite a été l’ennemie officielle des Juifs de France. Or, certains leaders extrémistes ont pu voir dans l’irruption de l’islamisme radical l’opportunité de séduire un électorat jusque-là hostile: l’islamisme n’était-il pas un ennemi commun?
Marine Le Pen a ainsi voulu surfer sur l'inquiétude des Juifs de France face à la montée d’un antisémitisme dont elle prétendait, de surcroît, pouvoir les protéger. D’où ses tentatives, nombreuses et variées, pour les rallier à sa cause.
Le FN, devenu Rassemblement National, serait-il devenu un partenaire respectable? Ou, tout au moins un opposant fréquentable ?
Les auteurs de cette enquête ont sillonné la France à l’écoute des communautés juives présentes dans les villes d'extrême droite, de Fréjus à Hayange, de Béziers aux quartiers-nord de Marseille. Ils ont remonté le fil de l’histoire du Front National et de ses tentatives de séduction, ainsi que celle des réactions des juifs face à cette main tendue. Pour mieux comprendre, ils ont recueilli des confidences d’élus frontistes, de témoins et d'intellectuels.
Et ils racontent les coulisses de cette tentative de hold-up idéologique.
Abstract: L’adjectif « résiduel » a été récemment utilisé par le ministre de l’Intérieur Bruno Retailleau pour qualifier l’antisémitisme d’extrême droite, en considérant que désormais la haine des Juifs était l’affaire de l’islamisme et de l’extrême gauche. Il reprenait ainsi le qualificatif de Jean-Luc Mélenchon, qui avait écrit quelques mois auparavant que « Contrairement à ce que dit la propagande de l’officialité, l’antisémitisme reste résiduel en France. » Durant les campagnes électorales de 2024 en France, le Rassemblement national (RN) s’est présenté comme le bouclier des Français juifs. L’actualité paraît ainsi renfoncer le storytelling entretenu depuis une quinzaine d’années, selon lequel l’extrême droite ne serait plus antisémite, voire deviendrait solidaire des Français juifs. Autour de ce sujet sont souvent mis en avant des déclarations philosémites de ténors nationaux-populistes. D’autre part, les révélations publiques de prétendus « dérapages » antisémites de candidats malheureux du RN sont monnaie courante. Pour circonscrire le phénomène, il faut distinguer les modes d’expression de cet antisémitisme. Les questions des violences, de la place accordée aux marqueurs antisémites dans la communication des partis, et de l’expression culturelle sont trois dimensions qui se recoupent pour distinguer la place de l’objet au sein de ce champ politique.
Topics: Antisemitism: Definitions, Antisemitism: Christian, Antisemitism: Discourse, Antisemitism: Education against, Antisemitism: Far right, Antisemitism: Institutional, Antisemitism: Israel-Related, Antisemitism: Left-Wing, Antisemitism: Monitoring, Antisemitism: Muslim, Antisemitism: New Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Online, Philosemitism, Main Topic: Antisemitism
Abstract: Reports have indicated an increase in anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitic incidents following the Hamas terrorist attack in Israel on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war in Gaza. In two studies (NStudy1 = 354 and NStudy2 = 490), we experimentally investigated the impact of priming with material referring to the war in Gaza on hostility toward Jews, and on antisemitism as well as other various ethnic groups (to determine whether this exposure specifically affected attitudes toward Jews or had a broader impact on ethnic attitudes in general). We also examined the indirect relationship between political orientation and anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism, through sociopolitical factors such as global identification, out-group identity fusion, social dominance orientation, and misanthropy. Our results showed an experimental effect of increased negative attitudes toward Jews, as well as toward Britons and Scandinavians, but did not reveal an increase in antisemitism. This effect was not replicated in Study 2, possibly due to reduced media attention. The indirect effects suggested that political orientation (left vs. right-wing) was positively associated with anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism through social dominance orientation. In contrast, conservative political orientation was negatively associated with antisemitism through out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people. Our findings imply two distinct political pathways to antisemitism: one linked with classical political right-wing orientation and the other to a complex identity-based conflation of attitudes toward Israel with prejudice toward the Jewish ethnic group.
Abstract: For many people, the coronavirus pandemic meant an enormous and existential loss of control. At the same time, an increase in right-wing extremist attitudes like xenophobia could be observed in Germany. In this study, we hypothesize that the loss of control caused by the pandemic has contributed to the rise in xenophobic and anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany. We propose that this occurs through an attempt to restore control via elements of a revised authoritarian syndrome understood as both the classic authoritarian dynamic of aggression, submission and conventionalism on the one hand, and a general belief in conspiracy theories on the other. In a representative, probability-based study, N = 2522 participants were surveyed on locus of control, right-wing authoritarianism, conspiracy mentality, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. It was found that right-wing authoritarianism and conspiracy mentality mediated the relationship between external locus of control and xenophobia (partial mediation) and anti-Semitism (full mediation). Surprisingly, internal control beliefs had a direct effect on right-wing authoritarianism—an effect that also leads to increased resentment. We conclude that social crises make people particularly vulnerable to regaining control via conspiracy theories and authoritarianism, which harbors dangers such as right-wing extremism as a consequence. Limitations are discussed.
Abstract: This article examines antisemitism and Holocaust denial in contemporary Far-Right German politics with a focus on the party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD). The article argues that the AfD has attempted to ‘tiptoe around Nazism’—a phrase coined by the author, which describes how the party has strategically and haphazardly reacted to scandals as they arise in order to avoid being associated with Nazism and losing moderate voters. The first section investigates how the AfD has reacted to various internal scandals that have damaged its reputation. This analysis encompasses the party’s fraught relationship to the Islamophobic, anti-refugee organization PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamicization of the Occident) as well as the ‘Höcke Affair,’ in which prominent AfD leader Björn Höcke denigrated the Berlin Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe as a ‘monument of shame.’ The second section examines the AfD’s proactive attempts to tiptoe around Nazism by portraying itself as philosemitic and pro-Israel and courting Jewish voters as part of its controversial subgroup Jews in the AfD (Juden in der AfD, JAfD). Here it explains how JAfD members, particularly Jews who immigrated to Germany from the former Soviet Union, have rationalized their paradoxical support for this outwardly antisemitic and denialist party. The conclusion situates the AfD in the broader transatlantic context of Far-Right extremism, highlighting trends that may signal—yet, more likely, will fail to bring about—the party’s demise.
Abstract: Racism and more specifically prejudice against the Jewish community have been consistent throughout Italy’s complex socio-political history, underpinned by the Catholic Church’s marginalisation and fascist persecution of ‘Jewishness’. While Italian antisemitism is mainly ‘low intensity’, it is pervasive and enduring in the way it normalises prejudices and conspiracy theories that portray Jews as avaricious, controlling, and powerful, which prevail in contemporary political discourse. The localised nature of Italian fandom, which encourages the abuse of others based on traits deemed feminine, foreign, or weak – has historically reproduced and arguably reinforced dominant ideas on race and antisemitic prejudices that prevail in Italian society, as this chapter will explain. Despite many prominent antisemitic instances involving owners, administrators and especially fans, the Italian Football Federation has been slow to tackle the issue. Drawing upon empirical research on Italian ultras – a fan culture centred around neo-fascist and neo-Nazi symbols and ideologies – this chapter situates Jewish communities within Italy and explains the nature of antisemitism within Italian football, as well as failures to combat it and other forms of discrimination.
Abstract: Despite efforts by clubs, fans, and officials to combat discrimination and hate speech, antisemitism in German football and fan cultures still persists today. Antisemitism is expressed by supporters, players, coaches, club and league officials, security personal, and others. In most cases, no Jews need to be present to stimulate antisemitic behaviour. This chapter argues that contemporary antisemitism in and around German football is manifest in five different forms, which are explained with illustrative examples: far-right antisemitism; classical antisemitism; secondary antisemitism; antisemitism against Jewish Makkabi clubs; and antisemitic ressentiment-communication. This chapter also questions who does what against antisemitism in German football. By looking at each actor individually – football’s governing bodies; professional clubs; social pedagogical fan projects; stadium security and police; third sector organisations; and fans – it is evident that neither a common nor a long-term strategy exists, although a broad range of activities and actions take place, often initiated by, or implemented after, the pressure of fan groups.
