Search results

Your search found 1535 items
Previous | Next
Sort: Relevance | Topics | Title | Author | Publication Year
turned off because more than 500 resultsView all
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 > >>
Home  / Search Results
Date: 2023
Abstract: Как, в какой обстановке человек начинает испытывать ксенофобские чувства, в том числе антисемитизм? Следует ли искать корни этого в семейных традициях, в детской дворовой или школьной среде, в чтении соответствующей литературы, во влиянии взрослых наставников, встреченных на жизненном пути, в идейных поисках и стремлении осмыслить окружающую действительность, в определенных контекстах социального общения или пережитых травматических обстоятельствах?

Объектами моего анализа являются люди, зарекомендовавшие себя своими многолетними пространными антисемитскими публикациями. Все они – интеллектуалы, в свое время получившие полное или незаконченное вузовское образование. По этим данным вырисовываются два типажа и две линии, ведущие к антисемитизму. Очевидно, следует различать идеологических антисемитов, перешедших на эту позицию в результате своего жизненного опыта и интеллектуальных размышлений, и почвеннических антисемитов, получивших индоктринацию в своей семье. Первые шли от разума, вторые начали свой путь, опираясь на эмоции. Биографии первых показывают, что в молодости они не раз меняли свою позицию, свое отношение к религии и внешнему миру и свои политические взгляды. Вторые впитывали антисемитские чувства от старших родственников – родителей или дедушек и бабушек. В детские годы они слышали соответствующие разговоры, наблюдали за реакцией или за поступками старших в соответствующих ситуациях. Позднее на это наслаивалась новая информация, которую они тщательно отбирали, стремясь, чтобы она соответствовала их уже сложившимся убеждениям.
Author(s): Stögner, Karin
Date: 2025
Translated Title: Antisemitism
Editor(s): Achour, Sabine
Date: 2024
Abstract: Im Oktober 2019 übte ein bekennender Rechtsextremist am höchsten jüdischen Feiertag – Jom Kippur – in Halle ein Attentat aus, bei dem er explizit betende Jüdinnen und Juden in der Synagoge ermorden wollte. Seit dem Terrorakt der Hamas am 7. Oktober 2023 im Süden Israels und dem darauffolgenden Krieg erleben wir weltweit eine neue und andere Welle des Antisemitismus. Während einige Menschen aus dem linken und dem muslimischen Spektrum Israel das Existenzrecht absprechen, stehen nun rechte und rechtsextreme Politiker:innen vermeintlich an der Seite Israels. Diese Gemengelage kanalisiert sich in antisemitischem Hass und Hetze, sowohl online als auch auf den Straßen. Sie richten sich zwar zunächst augenscheinlich gegen „die Juden“, sind aber vielmehr eine Bedrohung unserer gesamten Demokratie, die die Rechte von Minderheiten schützen und stärken und die das friedliche Zusammenleben aller gewährleisten soll. Die genannten Beispiele des Hasses, die in ihrer Brutalität aus dem in Deutschland nachweislich verbreiteten „Alltagsantisemitismus“ herausstechen, zeugen von der Transformations- und Anschlussfähigkeit des Phänomens Antisemitismus. Nach dem Attentat in Halle schrieb das Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung im Jahr 2020 die Förderlinie „Aktuelle Dynamiken und Herausforderungen des Antisemitismus“ aus. In zehn bundesweit aufgestellten Forschungsverbünden wurden in den vergangenen vier Jahren sowohl grundlegende als auch praxisorientierte Untersuchungen zu unterschiedlichen Dimensionen, Akteur:innen und Adressat:innen bearbeitet. Mit dieser Ausgabe von Politikum werden Ergebnisse aus diesen, aber auch weiteren Forschungen vorgestellt. Dabei wird u. a. den Fragen nachgegangen, welche Vor- und Nachteile die derzeit heftig debattierten Antisemitismusdefinitionen bieten, wie israelbezogener Antisemitismus von legitimer Kritik an der Regierung Israels unterschieden werden kann, wie Deepfakes antisemitische Narrative bedienen und wie man sie dekonstruiert oder auch, ob Graphic Novels als Unterrichtsmaterial in der Antisemitismusprävention geeignet sind. Mit den Einordnungen, Bestandsaufnahmen und Empfehlungen laden wir ein, sich mit unterschiedlichen Aspekten des Phänomens zu befassen, und bieten Einblicke in aktuelle Forschungen und neueste Materialien.

Stefanie Schüler-Springorum
„Der ewige Antisemitismus“

Armin Pfahl-Traughber
Israelbezogener Antisemitismus oder legitime Kritik?
Kursierende Definitionen zur Differenzierung kritisch geprüft

Thomas Haury
Schwierige Gemengelagen
Zur Unterscheidung von israelbezogenem Antisemitismus und nicht-antisemitischen Antizionismen in Geschichte und Gegenwart

Sara Han
Die Verbindung zwischen christlichem Antisemitismus und der Neuen Rechten in Deutschland

Sina Arnold
„Importierter“ Antisemitismus?
Zur Funktionalität eines zweifelhaften Konzepts

Sarah Jadwiga Jahn
„From the river to the sea, Palastine will be free“
Herausforderungen und Perspektiven für den Rechtsstaat

Marcus Scheiber
Antisemitische Deepfakes
Dekonstruktion über Bildwissen

Ursula Hennigfeld
Antisemitismusprävention im Schulunterricht
Kriterien zum Einsatz von Graphic Novels

Projekt RESPOND!
Antisemitismus in den sozialen Medien junger Menschen
Ein Training zur Stärkung der Medien- und Handlungskompetenz

Matthias Springborn
Geldverleiher im Mittelalter?
Herausforderungen bei der Darstellung von Jüdinnen und Juden, vom Judentum und von Israel in Schulbüchern

Philipp Graf und Alexander Weidle
Das Objekt zum Subjekt machen
Jüdische Alltagskultur in Deutschland vermitteln
Date: 2019
Abstract: In this article, we argue that an exclusive focus on the generalized aspect of prejudice limits understanding of the structure and genesis of prejudice towards particular outgroups. In order to conceptualize the specific nature of particular prejudices, we propose the differentiated threat approach. This framework postulates that different outgroups challenge diverse realistic and symbolic interests, and that these outgroup specific threats affect various socioeconomic strata and cultural groups differentially. The differentiated threat approach is applied to analyse majority-group Belgians’ attitudes towards immigrants, Muslims, Jews, and homosexuals. The results show that a common denominator of prejudice can be distinguished, but that the prejudices towards the various outgroups contain substantively relevant unique components that are influenced by socio-demographic and attitudinal predictors in diverging ways. Gender traditionalism is found to reinforce Homonegativity and temper Islamophobia at the same time. Feelings of relative deprivation are more strongly related to Islamophobia than to other forms of prejudice, and are unrelated to homonegativity. Religious involvement plays a more decisive role in the formation of anti-Semitism and Homonegativity than it does in the other forms of prejudice. Anti-immigration attitudes show a class gradient that is absent in attitudes towards other outgroups. Our results evidence that the concrete realization of attitudes towards a specific outgroup cannot be understood without paying attention to structural and contextual factors, such as social positions, the nature of intergroup relations, power balances, and elite discourses.
Date: 2026
Abstract: Dal 1991 la Fondazione CDEC produce un rapporto annuale sull’antisemitismo in Italia. L’ultimo, che analizza i dati raccolti nel corso del 2025, evidenzia un quadro particolarmente allarmante: le manifestazioni di odio antiebraico in Italia continuano a crescere. Anche in termini qualitativi la situazione è nettamente peggiorata, poiché gli atti più gravi hanno conosciuto un aumento maggiore.

Nel corso dell’anno si sono registrati 963 episodi di antisemitismo, a fronte di 1492 segnalazioni ricevute. Questo dato rappresenta una crescita di circa il 10% rispetto allo scorso anno, del 100% rispetto al 2023 e di ben il 400% rispetto al 2022. Si tratta, dunque, di un trend in continua crescita.

Nel corso del 2025 la matrice principale delle manifestazioni di odio è stata legata a Israele. Antichi pregiudizi — come l’accusa del sangue, il mito dell’elezione e l’odio verso il genere umano — sono stati trasferiti sul sionismo e sullo Stato di Israele.

Sebbene le diffamazioni rappresentino la maggior parte degli episodi, seguite dalle minacce, gli incrementi maggiori rispetto allo scorso anno hanno riguardato le discriminazioni (+100%) e le aggressioni fisiche (+225%). In altri termini, gli atti più gravi sono cresciuti maggiormente.

Le manifestazioni di palese antisemitismo online rappresentano oltre il 66% dei casi. Particolarmente diffuso è l’uso di emoji o numeri apparentemente innocui (come il gufo, il polpo, 109, 14/88, le triple parentesi (((cognome))), il triangolo rosso) per veicolare messaggi d’odio nelle subculture digitali.

I mesi estivi, e in particolare giugno e luglio, hanno mostrato picchi particolarmente elevati. Anche le Olimpiadi di Milano-Cortina, all’inizio del 2026, hanno evidenziato vari episodi di antisemitismo. In termini geografici, gli episodi di antisemitismo fisico da noi osservati si sono concentrati in Lombardia e Lazio, seguiti da Toscana, Emilia-Romagna, Piemonte e Veneto.

Forse il dato più inquietante è che il 14% degli italiani concorda con l’ipotesi di espellere gli ebrei dall’Italia. Manifestare la propria identità (ad esempio parlare in ebraico o indossare la kippah) comporta oggi rischi particolarmente elevati di aggressione e marginalizzazione.

Il Rapporto si basa sulla definizione operativa di antisemitismo dell’International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), largamente in uso internazionalmente e analizzata nel contributo scientifico del prof. Sergio Della Pergola.
Date: 2025
Abstract: L’Osservatorio antisemitismo della Fondazione Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea – CDEC produce ogni anno una Relazione su atti e discorsi di odio antisemita in Italia. Grazie a collaborazioni con enti di ricerca e istituzioni nazionali e internazionali il nostro centro di analisi ha messo a punto anche per il 2024 un documento articolato che offriamo a studiosi, istituzioni e mondo della comunicazione.

Il documento è introdotto da un quadro sociologico del contesto italiano con dati statistici sulla percezione di sicurezza e benessere della popolazione; una cornice necessaria a contestualizzare l’antisemitismo, che tiene conto anche delle conseguenze del conflitto in Medio Oriente.

I dati raccolti rilevano un forte aumento degli atti rispetto al 2023, anno che aveva già registrato un’impennata preoccupante di eventi. A seguito di 1.384 segnalazioni, sono 877 gli episodi di antisemitismo selezionati come tali dall’Osservatorio nel corso del 2024. Di questi, 600 riguardano l’antisemitismo in rete e 277 si compongono di atti accaduti materialmente.

Oltre al tradizionale cospirazionismo, principale matrice ideologica che alimenta l’odio contro gli ebrei, registriamo nel 2024 una crescita molto forte in termini assoluti e in percentuale di episodi legati alla guerra.

La Relazione presenta un’analisi approfondita dell’antisemitismo, arricchita da un’ampia antologia commentata di post tratti dal social web e una panoramica delle buone pratiche di contrasto all’odio antisemita intraprese nel corso del 2024. Lo studio si conclude con alcuni suggerimenti bibliografici.

L’Osservatorio viene a conoscenza degli episodi di antisemitismo attraverso i principali mezzi di comunicazione e le segnalazioni all’Antenna antisemitismo, uno strumento di facile accesso sulla piattaforma Web. Segnalazioni sono possibili anche utilizzando il numero WhatsApp 349 4048201 attivo da un anno.
Author(s): Freedman, Rosa
Date: 2024
Abstract: Since 7th October 2023, when Hamas perpetrated the worst single massacre against Jews since the Holocaust, there has been a surge in antisemitism in UK universities. Some of this has tipped over into outright anti-Jewish discrimination and harassment. Jewish students and staff have reported feeling unable to fully participate in university life, for fear of being abused, harassed, or attacked. This report offers a summary of research by the IntraCommunal Professorial Group (ICPG) aimed at understanding free speech on university campuses especially with regard to the approaches to speech concerning Jews, Israel, Zionism, and the Middle East conflict.

This report sets out the key issues, and a series of recommendations based on the research and grouped together under the subheadings of our three key findings. Those key findings are as follows:

1. UK universities have (a) a general legal duty, to protect freedom of expression on campus; (b) a duty to prevent discrimination and harassment based on protected characteristics; (c) a university-specific institutional duty to protect the academic freedoms of research and study. Currently UK universities are meeting neither (b) nor (c) in their response to the menace to Jewish students and academic staff posed by antisemitism, particularly antiIsrael antisemitism. That is, they are neither preventing discrimination and harassment, nor protecting freedom of research or freedom to study.

2. Anti-Israel protests and encampments on campuses, including in online spaces, have exacerbated what was already considered a hostile environment by many Jewish students and staff. Some university departments, trade unions, and student political milieus – inperson and online – have directly and indirectly discriminated against, abused, harassed and/or excluded Jewish students.

3. Traditional antisemitic concepts and tropes are being used by pro-Palestinian and/or antiIsrael staff and students. Israel and Zionism are regularly demonised and delegitimised, often using blood libels or other anti-Jewish hatred, and students or academics labelled as Zionists are routinely viewed as legitimate targets for discrimination, harassment, abuse, and/or attack.
Date: 2026
Abstract: This report finds that the decision to ban away supporters from the fixture was reached through a flawed risk assessment process.

We argue that the prohibition was not justified by the risks as assessed, and it represented an unnecessary departure from ordinary policing practice, which we believe would likely have been sufficient to secure the match.
The Parliamentary Select Committee similarly concludes that the decision-making process was flawed. However, it maintains that the prohibition was proportionate to the level of risk, even if that risk had been more rigorously assessed.

Our analysis considers a further, key point. A central weakness in the decision-making process was the failure clearly to specify the nature and source of the risk.

If the primary risk came from away supporters themselves, then exclusion may have been justified. But if the principal risk derived from anti-Israel protestors, boycott activists, and antizionist actors seeking to disrupt or attack the match, then banning the away supporters risked punishing those who were being threatened and who did not themselves constitute a significant threat.

In such circumstances, the appropriate response would have required consideration beyond technical policing calculations. If there was a significant antisemitic threat, a policy priority might have been to mobilise sufficient police resources to defend the match, the visiting team, and their supporters rather than excluding them.

The decision-making process appears to have overestimated the risk posed by Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters, in part through a misreading of the Amsterdam precedent and perhaps through reliance on politically committed sources of advice. It may have given insufficient weight to risks arising from boycott activism and to the risk of antisemitic violence of the kind that occurred in Amsterdam.

The process did not engage in a serious way with institutions or individuals from the Jewish community either locally or nationally, or with HM Independent Advisor on Antisemitism. Doing so would have given it a better chance of avoiding the mistakes that it made in understanding the precedent, possible alternatives and the predictable impact of the away fans ban on Jewish communities.

If there was a significant antisemitic dimension to the threat environment, the risk assessment process did not identify or articulate it clearly.
Author(s): Pacurar, Anna
Date: 2026
Abstract: This article examines how normative logic embedded in reparations law continues to shape contemporary German criminal law, taking the Luxembourg Agreement of 1952 between the Federal Republic of Germany, the State of Israel and the Jewish Conference on Material Claims against Germany (JCC) as its very conceptual point of departure. Against the backdrop of rising antisemitic criminal offenses in Germany, the article focuses on the amendment of Section 46 (2) of the German Criminal Code (StGB; Strafgesetzbuch), which explicitly includes antisemitic motives among the circumstances relevant for sentencing. While this amendment has been criticized as merely declaratory or even ‘symbolic’, this article argues that such criticism overlooks the deeper legal genealogy of state responsibility that ultimately originates in the Luxembourg Agreement. Antisemitic motives intensify culpability and wrongfulness because they engage the foundational commitments of the post-war legal order that emerged in response to antisemitic state-driven violence. Explicitly naming such motives in sentencing law therefore constitutes a crucial institutional function by shaping investigative practices, judicial reasoning, and normative expectations within the criminal justice system. From a criminal legal perspective, the article develops an account of motives as normative indicators that affect both culpability and wrongfulness. Antisemitic motives, it argues, intensify the Unrechtsgehalt of an offense because they negate the equal moral status of the victim and symbolically attack the legal order that emerged in response to antisemitic state violence. The article concludes that the explicit inclusion of antisemitic motives in Section 46 (2) StGB reflects a coherent and legally grounded response to historically specific injustice and underscores the role of criminal law in stabilizing responsibility within the German legal order.
Date: 2026
Abstract: For this report, the Union of Jewish Students has collated dozens of testimonies from students who have
experienced antisemitism on campus.

The UJS also commissioned polling of 1,000 students, across all faiths and none, to assess the
impact of campus protests and the rise of antisemitism. The findings reveal alarming levels of campus
antisemitism, significant disruption caused by protests, and perceptions of Jewish students marred by
hostility and intolerance.

Key Findings:

1.Antisemitism has become normalised on our campuses.

- One in four students (23%) have seen behaviour that targets Jewish students for their religion/ethnicity.
- One in five (20%) students would be reluctant to, or would never, houseshare with a Jewish student.
- Jewish students have told us they have faced physical and verbal abuse, social ostracisation and
widespread antisemitic attitudes.

2.Glorification of terrorism is prevalent and unpunished.

- Our research has found that student groups have explicitly called for violence against Jews, even justifying the terrorist attack at Bondi Beach in December 2025.
- 49% of students have heard slogans or chants glorifying Hamas, Hezbollah or other proscribed groups on campus.
- 47% have witnessed justification of the October 7th attacks, rising to 77% among those who encounter Israel-Palestine protests regularly.

3. Protests disrupt all students, and universities have a clear mandate from students to take firmer action.

-Protests have disrupted learning for 65% of students, and 40% have altered their journey on campus to avoid disruption.
- Universities where protests are more frequent have seen higher levels of antisemitism, and four in ten (39%) of students who witness regular Israel-Palestine protests have seen Jewish students harassed often.
- 69% of students disapprove of protests blocking access to learning, and 82% deem calls to 'globalise the intifada' to be antisemitic.
Date: 2025
Abstract: I 2024 har AKVAH registreret det højeste antal antisemitiske hændelser nogensinde med i alt 207 antisemitiske hændelser. 1 Det er en stigning på 71 % fra 2023, hvor AKVAH registrerede 121 antisemitiske hændelser.

Terrorangrebet i Israel d. 7. oktober 2023, den efterfølgende krig i Gaza og den bredere konflikt i Mellemøsten dannede bagtæppe for størstedelen af de antisemitiske hændelser i 2024. I 125 (60 %) af de 207 antisemitiske hændelser var indholdet eller konteksten for hændelserne relateret til Israel, krigen i Gaza eller andre udviklinger og begivenheder i Mellemøsten.

Brandattentatet mod en jødisk kvindes hjem i maj 2024 var en ekstrem og personfarlig antisemitisme af en karakter, som AKVAH ikke har registreret siden terrorangrebet mod synagogen i 2015, hvor den frivillige vagt Dan Uzan
blev dræbt. AKVAH registrerede i 2024 hele 9 tilfælde af vold, overfald og anden fysisk chikane mod jøder, heriblandt et knivoverfald mod en jødisk dreng i Slagelse.

I 5 hændelser i 2024 modtog jødiske borgere konkrete og eksplicitte dødstrusler. I yderligere 20 hændelser blev der opfordret til drab på jøder generelt eller udtrykt ønske om jøders død.

Over halvdelen (63 %) af de antisemitiske hændelser i 2024 var rettet mod personer eller institutioner, der tydeligt kunne identificeres som jøder eller jødiske.

Denne tendens var hyppig både offline (49 % af alle hændelserne offline) og i særdeleshed online (90 % af alle hændelserne online).3 AKVAH vurderer på den baggrund, at personer eller institutioner, der er synligt jødiske i det offentlige eller online rum, er i betydeligt forhøjet risiko for at blive udsat for antisemitiske hændelser.

I 2024 var der en udbredt tendens til, at jødiske borgere, institutioner eller organisationer i Danmark blev holdt kollektivt ansvarlige for Israels handlinger (71 hændelser). Denne tendens forekom både offline (56 % af de 71 tilfælde) og online (44 % af de 71 tilfælde).

Antisemitiske hændelser, der involverede børn og unge, var en udtalt og alvorlig problematik i 2024 (26 hændelser). Ligesom i 2023 var størstedelen af de antisemitiske tilfælde af overfald, trusler, chikane og mobning mod jødiske børn og unge i 2024 relateret til begivenheder i Israel, Gaza eller bredere udviklinger i konflikten i Mellemøsten (17 hændelser).

Referencer til Holocaust, 2. verdenskrig eller Hitler, eller eksplicit nazistisk symbolik, retorik og gestik indgik i 97 (47 %) af de antisemitiske hændelser for 2024. Dette forekom både med eksplicit afsæt i den ekstreme højrefløj, men
optrådte også hyppigt med relation til Israel, krigen i Gaza og begivenheder i Mellemøsten. Det vidner om en udbredt tendens til, at både nazismen som ideologi og Holocaust som historisk begivenhed benyttes som midler til
antisemitisk chikane med afsæt i forskellige ideologier, politiske overbevisninger og samfundsmæssige agendaer.
Antisemitiske hændelser offline udgjorde en større andel (66 %) af de registrerede hændelser i 2024 end i 2023 (47 %). Antallet af onlinebaserede antisemitiske hændelser var højere i 2024 (71) end i 2023 (64).

Antisemitiske konspirationsteorier optrådte i 28 % af de antisemitiske hændelser online.
Date: 2024