Abstract: В статье рассматривается культовое поведение горских евреев, частотность соблюдения ими религиозных предписаний и правил иудаизма. Исследование культового поведения горских евреев с применением методики диагностики религиозности Ф.Н. Ильясова, где индикаторами выступают «вера» и «отношение к религиозной (атеистической) деятельности» позволяет классифицировать их как активных и пассивных. Проведенное исследование установило, что горские евреи по показателю участия в религиозной практике показывают поведение присущее типу «убежденно верующих», хотя по совокупности показателей имеет место и поведение характерное типам «колеблющихся», «неверующих» и «убежденно неверующих». При этом опрошенные горские евреи демонстрируют активность культового поведения, выражающаяся в посещении синагоги, тени религиозных текстов, молитве и соблюдении поста. Вместе с тем имеет место и определенная противоречивость между декларируемым горскими евреями религиозным поведением и реальным их культовым поведением. По результатам исследования установлено, что религиозный фактор выполняет ключевую роль в повседневной жизни горских евреев и независимо от мировоззренческих установок (убежденно верующий, верующий, колеблющийся, неверующий, убежденно неверующий) они ориентированы на соблюдение предписаний своей конфессии в семейно-брачной и похоронно-обрядовой сфере
Abstract: “DE KANARIE IN DE KOLENMIJN”
‘Dreiging’ is een moeilijk meetbaar fenomeen. Soms is het evident en expliciet; soms is een dreiging verborgen en sluimerend. Soms is er een duidelijke afzender en is het gericht tegen een duidelijk doelwit, in andere gevallen is het veel minder duidelijk.
Het huidige dreigingsbeeld wordt steeds minder duidelijk : er komen afzenders bij en er komen doelwitten bij. Hierdoor zou men kunnen concluderen dat de specifieke dreiging gericht tegen de Joodse gemeenschap, in vergelijking met voorgaande jaren, afneemt.
De Stichting Bij Leven En Welzijn (BLEW) heeft een dreigingsindex samengesteld, waarmee verschillende factoren zo objectief mogelijk kunnen worden gewogen. Deze index meet op een consistente wijze de dreiging door de jaren heen. Hierdoor ontstaat een objectief beeld van de ontwikkeling van het dreigingsniveau.
In tegenstelling tot wat men zou verwachten geeft de index aan dat het dreigingsniveau de laatste paar jaar toeneemt. Naast deze objectieve weging heeft BLEW een breed opgezet onderzoek naar het veiligheidsgevoel binnen de Joodse gemeenschap uitgevoerd. Ook uit deze kwalitatieve enquête komt het beeld naar voren dat joden zich steeds minder veilig voelen. Het veiligheidsgevoel neemt kortom af. Dit is overigens weer in overeenstemming met de metingen over het toenemende aantal antisemitische incidenten in Nederland en de landen om ons heen.
Ondanks dat men, op basis van de relatieve “rust” in Europa wat betreft aanslagen tegen joodse doelwitten in Europa, zou vermoeden dat de dreiging afneemt, is de conclusie van dit rapport overduidelijk en zorgwekkend :
Alle signalen wijzen op een verslechterde situatie. De toename van de dreigingsindex en de (globale en nationale) toename van het antisemitisme bevestigen het gevoel dat binnen de Joodse gemeenschap leeft dat het minder veilig wordt.
Helaas fungeren Joden al eeuwen als de ‘kanarie in de kolenmijn’. Zo ook in het huidig tijdgewricht, waar de bedreiging van joden en andere minderheden een prelude zal zijn van een probleem dat de gehele Nederlandse samenleving treft. Tenzij we nu gezamenlijk opstaan en alle kennis, kunde en ervaring samenbrengen om te zorgen dat de Dreigingsindex niet alleen een dalende lijn zal vertonen, maar vooral niet meer nodig zal zijn.
Het dreigingsrapport 2019 laat helaas zien dat dit doel nog ver weg is.
Abstract: German Chancellor Angela Merkel's 'open-door' policy towards the recent wave of migrants and refugees to Europe shows promise for expanding the workforce and increasing diversity, yet opens up some significant cultural and religious differences. Although the government has created programs to aid in their transition, little attention has been paid to how school curriculum, particularly education on the Holocaust, is presented to students for whom the event lacks personal, religious, or social relevance or who may have been taught that it is a fabrication. This study focuses on how classroom material presents the rise of National Socialism and the Holocaust through a document analysis of curriculum materials from a Gymnasium in Hamburg, Germany. Results show that even at the highest level of the education system, students are not being presented with the material in a way that draws relevance to the present day nor fosters meaning for recent immigrants. For the Holocaust, which is both a significant historical event and a critical lesson in the importance of universal human rights, effective education is imperative in order to combat present global trends of radicalism and intolerance.
Abstract: Durant quarante ans, l’extrême droite a été l’ennemie officielle des Juifs de France. Or, certains leaders extrémistes ont pu voir dans l’irruption de l’islamisme radical l’opportunité de séduire un électorat jusque-là hostile: l’islamisme n’était-il pas un ennemi commun?
Marine Le Pen a ainsi voulu surfer sur l'inquiétude des Juifs de France face à la montée d’un antisémitisme dont elle prétendait, de surcroît, pouvoir les protéger. D’où ses tentatives, nombreuses et variées, pour les rallier à sa cause.
Le FN, devenu Rassemblement National, serait-il devenu un partenaire respectable? Ou, tout au moins un opposant fréquentable ?
Les auteurs de cette enquête ont sillonné la France à l’écoute des communautés juives présentes dans les villes d'extrême droite, de Fréjus à Hayange, de Béziers aux quartiers-nord de Marseille. Ils ont remonté le fil de l’histoire du Front National et de ses tentatives de séduction, ainsi que celle des réactions des juifs face à cette main tendue. Pour mieux comprendre, ils ont recueilli des confidences d’élus frontistes, de témoins et d'intellectuels.
Et ils racontent les coulisses de cette tentative de hold-up idéologique.
Abstract: This thesis argues that British orthodox Jewish women (BOJW) generate spaces within the British orthodox religious community to practice piety in a non-conformist fashion. The spaces they generate both enable BOJW to perform these interventions, as well as reflect back on the normative practices of the British orthodox community. In this way these pious practices inform, influence and shift what constitutes normative practice going forward. I ask what sort of agency accounts for these practices, and how these particular practices inform wider questions of agency. Some theories of agency have rendered the religious subject as repressed, and religious women as voiceless, sometimes invisible. Many religious subjects reject this traducing of their choices, and, instead celebrate opportunities for personal and communal religious agency and alternative performances. I consider these pious interventions through the ethnographic examination of three crucial areas of orthodox religious life: education, ritual participation and issues of leadership and authority. These three areas of investigation represent the most significant arenas of religious life within which BOJW negotiate their identities. During the eight months of fieldwork, I conducted twenty-one qualitative in-depth interviews; additionally, I examined material from local communal websites, synagogue-community mailings and advertising. My findings suggest that intelligibility, as a function of identity, plays a vital role in the ways in which BOJW navigate their way through their religious lives in their homes, communities and workplaces – such that it functions as sacred edifice, restrictive restraint as well as avenue for creativity. Contemporaneously, some of the BOJW interviewed stated that although there has been some shift in normative religious practice in their local synagogue-community, they also experienced backlash from local religious authorities who construed their performances as meta-acts of communal, political and social transgression, rather than acts of religious piety – precisely because they were pious acts performed by women.
Abstract: Un nombre considérable de juifs a quitté la France dans la dernière décennie, sans que les paroles rassurantes émanant des plus hautes autorités de l’État aient pu arrêter l’hémorragie. Quant à ceux qui restent, ils ne peuvent éviter l’idée de devoir peut-être partir un jour, au regard des événements et d’un climat général dont chacun perçoit le poids.
La sociologie politique, curieusement, n’a que bien peu à dire sur un tel phénomène. Prolixe sur la question de l’immigration, elle est pratiquement muette sur le fait que la France ait pu ainsi devenir une terre d’émigration. Qu’est-il donc arrivé ? Pour le comprendre, l’invocation commode des tensions intercommunautaires et du radicalisme islamiste est bien loin de suffire. C’est une généalogie au long cours de notre situation qui est requise, une restitution des dynamiques complexes où sont intriqués, depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les juifs, l’Europe et l’État d’Israël.
De cette manière, et de cette manière seulement, l’un des points les plus sensibles du malaise politique actuel peut enfin être affronté.
Abstract: Campaigning organisation Avaaz commissioned ICM Unlimited to conduct a nationally representative poll to look into attitudes of the British public towards Jews and Muslims.
Some of the key findings include:
Overall, just under half of British adults say that they have a positive view of Jews (47%), while 7% say that they have a negative view. When it comes to Muslims, the British public’s attitudes are more unfavourable. A quarter say that they have a negative view of Muslims (26%), while a third say that they have a positive view (32%).
2017 Conservative voters are more likely than those who voted Labour to have a negative view of Muslims. Just under four in ten of those who voted Conservative in 2017 say that they have a negative view of Muslims (37%), more than double the proportion of those who voted Labour who have a negative view (16%).
A greater proportion of people agree than disagree for four of the five statements about Muslims/Islam that Avaaz tested. That is, more people agree than disagree that: Islam threatens the British way of life (45% agree vs. 31% disagree), Islamophobia in Britain is a response to the everyday behaviour of Muslims (36% vs. 34%), parts of the UK are under Sharia law (33% vs. 28%), and that there should be a reduction in the number of Muslims entering Britain (41% vs. 25%). The only statement with which more people disagree than agree is: ‘Islamic terrorism reflects the views of the Muslim community in Britain’ (26% agree vs. 49% disagree).
Six in ten 2017 Conservative voters agree that ‘Islam threatens the British way of life’ (62%), compared to 35% of 2017 Labour voters.
When it comes to attitudes towards Jews, just over one in seven of people agree that ‘Jews have disproportionate influence in politics’ (15%). Among 2017 Labour voters, this figure rises to one in five (20%), compared to one in seven 2017 Conservative voters (14%).
Abstract: In March 2017 Salam Shalom Barcelona started as an initiative aimed at enhancing interreligious relations and dialogue between Jews and Muslims living in the city. This initiative followed the steps of a former one that was established in Germany in 2013 called Salam Shalom. Despite Salam Shalom Barcelona’s short history, the promoted activities have shown that it can be a successful project with a high future potential. However, establishing interreligious dialogue is not an easy endeavor. It has to take into account different historical, political and social issues that impact the religious groups and communities. Therefore, this chapter aims to explain the Salam Shalom Barcelona initiative within the historical and social context of Spain, in order to enhance our understanding of its complexities and challenges. On the one hand, it presents a short introduction of the historiographical discussion regarding interreligious relations during the medieval period in Spain, considered by many historians to be exceptional and to serve as a model of culture of tolerance and convivencia. On the other, the chapter describes the main characteristics of the Jewish and Muslim communities in Barcelona. Broadly speaking, the chapter aims to show the importance of analysing and identifying the complexities, difficulties and challenges of the Muslim-Jewish dialogue in the current Catalan context, as well as contributing to future perspectives of this dialogue.
Abstract: Cyprus is not only the island of Aphrodite and love, it is also a meeting place for many people and cultures. There is evidence of a Jewish presence in Cyprus since the Hellenistic period dating back to the third century BCE, when there were trade relations established between Cyprus and the Land of Israel. The Jews had close relationships with many of the other religious groups on the island and were perceived favourably by the first Muslims who arrived here in seventh century CE. This chapter endeavours to present Jewish-Muslim relations, emphasising the past three centuries, including Ottoman and British rule, to the present day. Jews as adherents of a religion revealed by God, possessed a scripture, and were given a better status than those who were non-monotheistic given by Muslim authorities. Conversely, Jews suffered greatly after World War II when they traveled to Palestine via Cyprus, as it became a safe haven, where Jews, aided by Muslim and Christians were kept in refugee camps before being transported to Israel. This study examines historical conditions that led to friendship and intercultural understanding, which has been the foundation of positive modern coexistence, trade, and exchanges of ideas in the present day. In addition, it answers the following questions: Were Jews able to keep their religion and be treated equally? How did Ottoman Muslims treat the Jews and how do Turkish Cypriots, an important population group on the island today treat Jews? How do cultural and religious differences influence interethnic, intercultural and interreligious relations today?
Abstract: The stereotyped content of outgroups denotes intergroup relations. Based on this notion, Susan Fiske and colleagues (2002, https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.878) created the stereotype content model (SCM), which links two dimensions, warmth and competence, with social structure. The structure of intergroup relations is not stable in time, nor is it shaped instantly. Based on the assumptions of SCM we predict that the history of intergroup relations is in part responsible for stereotypes. In order to test the hypothesis we reanalysed five Polish nationwide, representative surveys (total N = 4834). The studies followed a similar procedure for data collection, and each study asked an open-ended question about the traits of two ethnic groups (Jews and Germans). Answers were listed and coded using competent judges. The averages of the judges’ codes were used as indicators of stereotype content and an analysis of regional differences was conducted. Several significant results were obtained and are interpreted in line with warm – competition and competence – status relations. The results show that several historical situations and events, such as pre-WWII social structure or post-war migrations and territorial changes, can be linked to contemporary stereotypes.
Abstract: Selon la tradition, ce n’étaient pas les Juifs qui gardaient le Shabbat, mais c’était le Shabbat, qui gardait les Juifs pendant des milliers des années. Malgré le fait que le contenu et le sens de l’institution du Shabbat est caractérisé par de changements continus, il représente, en effet, un élément de la tradition multicolore et complexe du peuple Juif, contribuant à la construction et à la maintenance de l’identité même au 21ième siècle. Dans mon étude, j’examine l’importance du Shabbat dans les vies des individus, et dans celles des communautés de deux synagogues budapestoises de nos jours. Je m’appuierai sur mes deux études sur le terrain réalisées dans deux synagogues des courants neo-orthodoxe et néologue. En comparant les résultats de ces recherches, je démontrerai comment les interdictions du Shabbat puis les conditions, et les défis du monde moderne – par exemple le renoncement aux outils de la télécommunication ou bien aux moyens du transport public – résultent de stratégies d’harmonisation différentes. Les communautés Juives modernes et postmodernes doivent faire face aux problèmes inconnus auparavant: chaques communautés disposent de réponses officielles aux questions de la circulation, ou du réchauffement du repas pendant Shabbat, de l’usage du smartphone ou l’ordinateur, etc., et entre les murs de la synagogue, les membres de la communauté sont obligés de se comporter selon ces règles. D’après mes expériences les réponses individuelles diffèrent souvent de la résolution officielle, et la communauté peut prendre des sanctions contre les offenseurs d’un comportement impropre – en général ce sont plutôt des avertissements oraux. L’examen de la vie privée est hors contrôle de la communauté, puisque c’est l’individu soi-même qui construit son identité, et qui décide s’il préfère adhérer aux régulations de Shabbat ou acheter une paire de jeans. Toujours est-il, que dans la majorité des cas il y a une contradiction entre la pratique réelle et l’image idéalisé du comportement individuelle. Par de réponses et de réflexions individuelles, je montrerai un aperçu de la vie Juive de Budapest de nos jours. Une des forces organisatrices de cette vie est l’effort fait pour s’identifier dans une société du 21ième siècle déterminée par de règles religieuses, la tradition, mais également par la science et la technique.
Abstract: This article focuses on the management of heritage and cultural tourism related to the complex identity of minority groups, where different components tend to produce different visions and practices. It highlights the impacts of globalized transnational networks and influences on political, cultural and religious identities and affiliations over long distances. In fact, diverse views, approaches, perceptions and representations may lead to disagreement and conflicts even within apparently compact ethnic or religious communities. The issues related to dissonant heritage management strategies and the related authorized heritage discourse, in terms of unbalanced power relations and diverging narratives, are considered. The theme of Jewish heritage tourism (J.H.T) is analysed, with a focus on the case of Syracuse, Italy. This historically cosmopolitan and multicultural city specializes in cultural tourism and tends to develop niche products, including J.H.T, in order to strengthen and diversify its international cultural destination status. Different components of the Jewish world, as well as non-Jewish stakeholders, practice different approaches to heritage tourism. Actors, discourses and reasons behind Jewish culture management and promotion will be highlighted and the reactions, perceptions and suggestions by the various stakeholders and groups involved will be portrayed, with the aim of contributing to the discussion about the complexity of niche heritage tourism processes in a multi-ethnic site.
Abstract: This paper focuses on struggles over how antisemitism is defined. Struggles over definition are themselves part of the wider struggle between those who say that hostility to Israel is important in understanding contemporary antisemitism and those who say that these two phenomena are quite separate. A key question, therefore, is what kinds of hostility to Israel may be understood as, or may lead to, or may be caused by, antisemitism?
In this paper I analyse three case studies of struggles over how antisemitism is defined. First, I trace a genealogy of the EUMC (European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, now the Agency For Fundamental Rights, FRA) Working Definition of Antisemitism. I show how this definition emerged out of a process of splitting between the global antiracist movement on the one hand and Jewish-led opposition to antisemitism on the other. At the Durban ‘World Conference against Racism’ in September 2001, there was a largely successful attempt to construct Zionism as the key form of racism on the planet; this would encourage people to relate to the overwhelming majority of Jews, who refuse to disavow Zionism, as if they were racists. In response, some Jewish NGOs found that they could get a hearing for their concerns within the structures of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union. If Durban is thought of as a non-white global forum and if the OSCE and the European Union are thought of as networks of white states, then the antagonism between non-white antiracism and white anxiety about antisemitism becomes visible and concerning. The clash between anti-Zionism on the one hand and the claim that antizionism is related to antisemitism on the other plays out within the realm of discourse and then it is also mirrored institutionally in these global struggles over the definition of antisemitism.
Second, I go on to look at a case study of alleged antisemitism within the University and College Union (UCU) which was related to the partial success within the union of the campaign to boycott Israel. The explicit disavowal of the EUMC definition during the 2011 UCU Congress can be understood as the climax of a process of struggle within the union over the recognition of a relationship between hostility to Israel and antisemitism.
The third case study is an analysis of two formal processes which were asked to adjudicate whether hostility to Israel had become antisemitic: the UCU v Fraser case at the Employment Tribunal in 2012 and the Shami Chakrabarti Inquiry into Antisemitism and Other Racisms in the Labour Party in 2016. The EUMC definition of antisemitism offers a framework for understanding the potential of certain kinds of hostility to Israel to be antisemitic. The further argument was made within the UCU, as well as to the Employment Tribunal and to the Chakrabarti Inquiry, that cultures of hostility to Israel and of support for boycotts tend to bring with them, into institutions which harbour them, cultures of antisemitism. The structures of the Union, as well as the two inquiries, wholeheartedly rejected both the claims: first, that a politics of hostility to Israel manifests itself in antisemitism in these cases; and second, that a cultural or institutional antisemitism, analogous to institutional racism, could be identified in the UCU or the Labour Party.
This paper asks whether these wholehearted rejections of claims about antisemitism are themselves implicated in the functioning of contemporary antisemitism. Denial of racism is a necessary element of those kinds of racism which do not see themselves as racist. Perhaps the hostility to the EUMC definition and to arguments about cultural or institutional antisemitism is a necessary component of the anti-Zionist discourses and cultures themselves which arguably relate in complex ways to antisemitism.
Abstract: Os Cadernos de Orações Criptojudaicas e Notas Etnográficas de Judeus e Cristãos-Novos de Bragança resultam de uma investigação baseada em trabalho de campo antropológico realizado em Bragança e são uma coletânea de dados que atestam a persistência da cultura judaica, criptojudaica, ou cristã-nova no distrito, até à contemporaneidade Incluem-se nesta obra uma síntese do levantamento histórico e um conjunto de dados etnográficos respeitantes ao património cultural judaico e cristão-novo da região nas suas dimensões imateriais, narrativas ou discursivas, e nas suas dimensões materiais, objetificadas - peças que atestam que se trata de um legado que não só perdura na memória coletiva local, como é ainda no presente um legado estruturante da identidade local, tornando-a multicultural. O leitor encontrará uma parte do que existe deste património judaico e cristão-novo transmontano, pois uma etnografia é sempre algo em construção, um olhar inacabado que carece de constante atualização, dado que a permanente transformação e construção fazem parte da própria essência de todas as culturas. Mas é sobretudo um tributo aos brigantinos que participaram nesta construção e que, vencendo os receios do secretismo, se deixaram motivar pela esperança de se integrarem num judaísmo plural e num Portugal mais intercultural.
Abstract: Mokslininkai sutinka, kad tapatumas yra kintantis pagal situaciją darinys, priklausomas nuo aplinkos. Kai aplinka yra traumuojanti, ji nutraukia stabilią individo gyvenimo tėkmę, pakeičia prisiimtus vaidmenis, nusistovėjusias vertybes, gyvenimo tikslus. Holokaustas buvo trauma, sutrikdžiusi žmonių kasdienį gyvenimą, privertusi iš naujo įvertinti save ir aplinką. Šiame darbe buvo nagrinėjama, kaip Holokausto sukelta trauma skatino keistis išgyvenusiųjų tapatumą karo metu, ir kokios yra ilgalaikės Holokausto pasekmės tapatumui. Atsakymams į šiuos klausimus atrasti buvo pasitelkta kokybinio tyrimo strategija ir teminės analizės metodas. 11 tyrimo dalyvių, išgyvenusių Holokaustą, interviu medžiaga atskleidė tapatumo pokyčius, sukeltus Holokausto karo metu - pakito išgyvenusiųjų savęs kaip visuomenės nario suvokimas dėl atskirties, susijusios su tautybe; pakito savo žydiškos kilmės suvokimas; pakito savo vaidmens šeimoje suvokimas, šeimos narių praradimas sustiprino šeiminius ryšius tarp išlikusiųjų; pakito gyvenimo tikslai, pagrindiniu tikslu tapo išgyvenimas; pakito savęs vertinimas. Holokaustas sukėlė ilgalaikes pasekmes tapatumui: Holokaustas suformavo savęs kaip „išgyvenusiojo“ suvokimą, kuris įgijo skirtingą vertę Lietuvos ir Izraelio visuomenių kontekste; išgyvenusieji save suvokia kaip vertinančius gyvybę, suprantančius materialių vertybių laikinumą; jie suvokia save kaip priimančius Dievą arba kaip neigiančius jo egzistavimą. Išgyvenusieji atskleidžia dvejopą savo santykį su Holokaustu: save suvokia kaip pasisėmusius stiprybės, gyvenimiškos patirties, Holokauste atradusius prasmę arba kaip netekusius gyvenimo tęstinumo, neradusius prasmės trauminiuose išgyvenimuose.
