Topics: Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Discourse, Antisemitism: Monitoring, Internet, Social Media, Main Topic: Antisemitism, War, Terrorism, Attitudes to Israel, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS)
Abstract: From Introduction:
Antisemitism is global and multifaceted. One area in which ADL has seen a growth of antisemitism is within elements of the political left. This often takes the form of anti-Zionism, a movement that rejects the Jewish right to self-determination and of Israel to exist as a Jewish state, and frequently employs antisemitic tropes to attack Israel and its supporters. It also manifests through the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, a campaign that promotes diplomatic, financial, professional, academic and cultural isolation of Israel, Israeli individuals, Israeli institutions, and Jews who support Israel’s right to exist.
Political actors and advocacy movements associated with some left-wing political organizations have engaged in such antisemitism both in the U.S. and in Europe. While antisemitism from individuals associated with left-leaning political organizations is generally less violent than right-wing antisemitism, its penetration into the political mainstream is cause for concern and has in some cases alienated Jews and other supporters of Israel. Concerns are both political and physical. As described in this report, Jews and Jewish institutions have been targeted and have suffered violent attacks, associated with anti-Zionism, often in the wake of fighting between Israel and the Palestinians, most recently in 2021.
The challenges facing Jewish communities in Europe can be a bellwether for what is to come for the U.S. Jewish community, as evidenced for example by the recent rise in violent antisemitism in the U.S., which has plagued European Jewish communities for many years, and the increase in anti-Zionism in U.S. progressive spaces, something that has existed in Europe for some time. To better understand this phenomenon in Europe, ADL asked partners in the UK, France, Germany and Spain to describe some of the expressions of left-wing political antisemitism and anti-Israel bias in their countries. The individual contributors are responsible for the content of those chapters and their positions may differ with standard ADL practice and/or policy.
Our British partner, the Community Security Trust, is the British Jewish community’s security agency, which monitors, reports on, and educates about antisemitism among other vital tasks for the safety and security of the Jewish community.
Our French partner, the politics and culture magazine “K., The Jews, Europe, the 21st Century,” reports on contemporary challenges and opportunities for Jewish life in France and elsewhere in Europe.
Our German partner, Amadeu Antonio Foundation, is one of Germany's foremost independent non-governmental organizations working to strengthen democratic civil society and eliminate extremism, antisemitism, racism and other forms of bigotry and hate.
Our Spanish partner, ACOM, is a non-denominational and independent organization that strengthens the relationship between Spain and Israel, and whose work is inspired by the defense of human rights, democratic societies, civil liberties and the rule of law.
Those European contributions comprise the first sections of this report. Based on those essays, in the subsequent chapter, ADL analyzed common themes and notable differences among the four countries.
The final section adds ADL’s perspective on left-wing antisemitism in the political and advocacy spheres in the U.S. and provides suggested actions that can be taken to address antisemitism. To be sure, while not all antisemitism that has manifested in some elements of the political left in the U.S. is imported from Europe, lessons can be learned from this transatlantic phenomenon to protect against the mainstreaming of such antisemitism in U.S. politics.
Abstract: This chapter addresses the effects of the German politics of memory and the historical overdetermination of the discourse on antisemitism in the country. German antisemitism discourse builds on an exceptionalist conception of antisemitism as delusional and exterminist, which is derived from the experience of the Holocaust. This conception has proven to be unhelpful in understanding, tackling or fighting contemporary manifestations of antisemitism in all their diversity, varying formative contexts and differing degrees of severity or threat, especially with regard to the overlap between antisemitism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The current debate on BDS, along with the range of legal and quasi-legal efforts to severely restrict the movement, is symptomatic of this discourse. Rather than conceptualising (and criticising) the movement in all its heterogeneous facets and ideological and practical ambivalences and contradictions, the bulk of the German anti-BDS discourse tends to equate BDS with the Nazi boycott against Jews. The IHRA’s Working Definition of Antisemitism, with its blatant weaknesses, gaps, internal contradictions and political bias, is applied as a helpful tool in these efforts. This chapter outlines the German debate on DBS, including various public scandals and tightening administrative measures tied to Germany’s symbolic anti-antisemitism. In doing so, it highlights trends towards the juridification, securitisation and ‘antifa-isation’ of the discourse on antisemitism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Abstract: In late 2017, JPR published a major study of attitudes towards Jews and Israel among the population of Great Britain, a project supported by the Community Security Trust and the Department for Communities and Local Government. We regard it as a groundbreaking piece of work - the first study conducted anywhere that empirically demonstrates a clear connection between extreme hostility towards Israel and more traditional forms of antipathy towards Jews.
This report explores this connection yet further, focusing specifically on two particularly prevalent ideas that are often experienced by Jews as antisemitic: the contention that Israel is 'an apartheid state' and that it should be subjected to a boycott.
In the first instance, the study finds that large proportions of people actually have no view at all on these ideas, either because they do not know anything about the issues, or because they are simply unsure of where they stand on them. This is particularly the case for young people and women - knowledge levels improve and opinions sharpen the older people are, and, as has been found in numerous other studies, women tend to be less opinionated than men on these types of political issues.
However, among those who do have a view, 21% agree with the contention that 'Israel is an apartheid state,' 5% strongly so, and 10% endorse the argument that 'people should boycott Israeli goods and products (3% strongly so). About the same proportion (18%) disagrees with the apartheid contention as agree with it, but a much higher proportion disagrees with the boycott one (47%) than agrees with it.
Disagreement with the boycott idea is higher in older age bands than in younger ones, increasingly so among those aged 40-plus, a phenomenon that is not found in relation to the apartheid contention. But the ideas are not particularly sensitive to educational level - both agreement and disagreement with both contentions increase the higher the educational qualification achieved.
However, clear distinctions can be found when looking at the data through the lens of religion, with Muslims much more likely than other groups to support both contentions.
The report goes on to explore the correlations between these views and more traditional anti-Jewish ones, and finds clear links between the two, although this is more the case with the boycott idea than the apartheid one. However, it also notes that the correlation is stronger with other anti-Israel beliefs, particularly those arguing that Israel exploits the Holocaust for its own purposes, and those claiming that Israel is excessively powerful or the primary cause of troubles in the Middle East.
Abstract: The purpose of this document is to catalyze a systemic approach in London. Meeting
the challenge of Israel's delegitimization requires a loosely coordinated and orchestrated
response, sometimes even taking a personal or non-public form. Therefore, all parties
will have to leave their comfort zones: Israel will have to let Jewish communities lead
the counter-attack in places, such as London, that require nuance and cultural
sensitivity; and Jewish institutions will have to allow for innovative thinking, new tools,
and aggressive experimentation that usually takes place outside of the established
community. All parties will have to come to terms with the idea that it takes 'all
instruments in the orchestra' to win this fight. Importantly, critics from the political left,
because they represent liberal values, are also an invaluable voice in delegitimizing
Israel's delegitimization, notwithstanding their common criticism of the Jewish
community's traditional institutions and the policies of the State of Israel.
Abstract: This report summarises the findings of a survey of Jewish students conducted by NUS between November 2016 and February 2017. It aimed to take stock of the experience of Jewish students in higher education at a time when the number of recorded antisemitic incidents has increased, both on and off campus, and because it is critical that NUS, students’ unions, universities and the wider higher education sector understand the needs of Jewish students.
Some 485 self-defining Jewish students responded to the survey. The vast majority of the respondents were in full time education (96 per cent), aged 17-24 (91per cent), studying at undergraduate level (86 per cent) and were UK citizens (87 per cent).
The key findings of the report can be summarised as follows:
Provision:
• A plurality of students reported there was no kosher food on or near campus (42 per cent)
• The majority of students surveyed disagreed or strongly disagreed that their university avoids scheduling classes and exams during Sabbath and Jewish religious festivals (59 per cent).
Academic coverage of Judaism:
A plurality of students surveyed either agreed or strongly agreed that:
• They feel comfortable with the way in which issues relating to Jewish people/Judaism are covered in class (36 per cent).
The majority of students surveyed either agreed or strongly agreed that:
• They have not experienced negative issues in classes related to Judaism (57 per cent).
Engagement with Students’ Unions:
• Respondents showed a high level of engagement with their students’ unions including being members of a society
or a sports club (69 per cent) and voting in student elections (75 per cent)
• Almost half of students felt they were always or usually able to participate in student politics (47 per cent).
A plurality or the majority of students surveyed either disagreed or strongly disagreed that:
• As a Jewish student they felt their SU understands their needs (43 per cent)
• As a Jewish student they feel represented by their SU (51 per cent).
• Their SU policy reflects the views of Jewish students (45 per cent).
Engagement with NUS:
• Almost half of students surveyed either disagreed or strongly disagreed that they would feel comfortable attending NUS events (49 per cent)
• Two fifths either disagreed or strongly disagreed that they would feel comfortable engaging in NUS policymaking processes (42 per cent)
• The majority of students either disagreed or strongly disagreed that NUS would respond appropriately to allegations of antisemitism if they arose (65 per cent).
Israel/Palestine:
• In an academic context, over half of students surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that they felt comfortable engaging in debate on Israel/Palestine (55 per cent).
Either a plurality or the majority of students surveyed disagreed or strongly disagreed that:
• As a Jew they felt confident to voice their opinions on Israel/Palestine in class (45 per cent)
• They felt comfortable engaging in debate on Israel/Palestine in their SUs or in a society context (54 per cent)
• They felt comfortable engaging in debate on Israel/Palestine on campus (50 per cent)
• The vast majority of students whose Students’ Union had a BDS policy or campaign did not feel comfortable or comfortable at all with it (68 per cent).
Hate Crime:
The majority of students surveyed:
• Were not very or not at all worried about being subject to verbal abuse, physical attack, vandalism, property damage or theft because of their Jewish belief (73 per cent)
• Had not experienced any crime whilst they have been students at their current place of study (65 per cent)
• Over a quarter have experienced personal abuse through social media or other communication (28 per cent)
• Of those who had experienced crime the majority believed these incidents were motivated by the perpetrator’s prejudice
towards them based on their Jewish belief (66 per cent).
