Abstract: From Introduction:
Antisemitism is global and multifaceted. One area in which ADL has seen a growth of antisemitism is within elements of the political left. This often takes the form of anti-Zionism, a movement that rejects the Jewish right to self-determination and of Israel to exist as a Jewish state, and frequently employs antisemitic tropes to attack Israel and its supporters. It also manifests through the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, a campaign that promotes diplomatic, financial, professional, academic and cultural isolation of Israel, Israeli individuals, Israeli institutions, and Jews who support Israel’s right to exist.
Political actors and advocacy movements associated with some left-wing political organizations have engaged in such antisemitism both in the U.S. and in Europe. While antisemitism from individuals associated with left-leaning political organizations is generally less violent than right-wing antisemitism, its penetration into the political mainstream is cause for concern and has in some cases alienated Jews and other supporters of Israel. Concerns are both political and physical. As described in this report, Jews and Jewish institutions have been targeted and have suffered violent attacks, associated with anti-Zionism, often in the wake of fighting between Israel and the Palestinians, most recently in 2021.
The challenges facing Jewish communities in Europe can be a bellwether for what is to come for the U.S. Jewish community, as evidenced for example by the recent rise in violent antisemitism in the U.S., which has plagued European Jewish communities for many years, and the increase in anti-Zionism in U.S. progressive spaces, something that has existed in Europe for some time. To better understand this phenomenon in Europe, ADL asked partners in the UK, France, Germany and Spain to describe some of the expressions of left-wing political antisemitism and anti-Israel bias in their countries. The individual contributors are responsible for the content of those chapters and their positions may differ with standard ADL practice and/or policy.
Our British partner, the Community Security Trust, is the British Jewish community’s security agency, which monitors, reports on, and educates about antisemitism among other vital tasks for the safety and security of the Jewish community.
Our French partner, the politics and culture magazine “K., The Jews, Europe, the 21st Century,” reports on contemporary challenges and opportunities for Jewish life in France and elsewhere in Europe.
Our German partner, Amadeu Antonio Foundation, is one of Germany's foremost independent non-governmental organizations working to strengthen democratic civil society and eliminate extremism, antisemitism, racism and other forms of bigotry and hate.
Our Spanish partner, ACOM, is a non-denominational and independent organization that strengthens the relationship between Spain and Israel, and whose work is inspired by the defense of human rights, democratic societies, civil liberties and the rule of law.
Those European contributions comprise the first sections of this report. Based on those essays, in the subsequent chapter, ADL analyzed common themes and notable differences among the four countries.
The final section adds ADL’s perspective on left-wing antisemitism in the political and advocacy spheres in the U.S. and provides suggested actions that can be taken to address antisemitism. To be sure, while not all antisemitism that has manifested in some elements of the political left in the U.S. is imported from Europe, lessons can be learned from this transatlantic phenomenon to protect against the mainstreaming of such antisemitism in U.S. politics.
Abstract: Eine internationale Mobilisierung des israelbezogenen Antisemitismus durch Organisationen, die der islamistischen Muslimbruderschaft und den Terrorgruppen Hamas und PFLP nahestehen oder mit ihnen sympathisieren, bildete den Hintergrund für zahlreiche Gewaltvorfälle und Bedrohungen von Jüdinnen_Juden im vergangenen Mai. Viele antisemitische Vorfälle ereigneten sich im Umfeld antiisraelischer Versammlungen, doch war für jüdische Communities die Bedrohung durch Antisemitismus vielfältig im Alltag spürbar. Dies geht aus dem gemeinsamen Bericht des Bundesverbandes der Recherche- und Informationsstellen Antisemitismus e.V. (Bundesverband RIAS) und des Internationalen Institut für Bildung, Sozial- und Antisemitismusforschung (IIBSA) über antisemitische Vorfälle im Kontext der Eskalation der Gewalt im Nahen Osten im Mai 2021 hervor.
Der Bericht „Mobilisierungen von israelbezogenem Antisemitismus im Bundesgebiet 2021” befasst sich mit der internationalen und bundesweiten Mobilisierung von israelbezogenem Antisemitismus im Mai 2021 sowie mit den zwischen dem 9. und 24. Mai 2021 bekannt gewordenen antisemitischen Vorfällen in Deutschland im Zeitraum des bewaffneten Konflikts zwischen der Hamas und Israel.
Die Analysen des Forschungsinstituts IIBSA zeigen eine breite Mobilisierung des Antisemitismus, die von links/antiimperialistischem Spektrum über die politische Mitte bis hin zu nationalistischen, neonazistischen und islamistischen Milieus reichte. Verschiedene internationale Akteur_innen und ihre Sympathisant_innen waren an der Aufstachelung von antisemitischem Hass, Gewalt oder Terrorismus beteiligt, etwa die Palästinensische Front zur Befreiung Palästinas (PFLP), die Millî Görüş-Bewegung, die Grauen Wölfe und das türkische Präsidium für religiöse Angelegenheiten, Diyanet. Eine besondere Rolle nahmen hierbei bereits im Vorfeld der kriegerischen Auseinandersetzung Organisationen ein, die der islamistischen Muslimbruderschaft und den Terrorgruppen Hamas nahestehen oder mit ihnen sympathisieren, wie etwa die Palästinensische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland (PGD).
Zeitgleich zur Eskalation im israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt zwischen dem 9. und dem 24. Mai 2021 dokumentierte der Bundesverband RIAS deutschlandweit 261 antisemitische Vorfälle mit einem entsprechenden Bezug – im Schnitt mehr als 16 Vorfälle am Tag. Bekannt wurden u.a. 10 Angriffe, 22 gezielte Sachbeschädigungen und 18 Bedrohungen.
Dabei war Antisemitismus nicht nur auf den antiisraelischen Versammlungen zu beobachten, sondern ein alltagsprägendes Phänomen für Jüdinnen_Juden: Er begegnete ihnen am Arbeitsplatz, in Gesprächen und Diskussionen im Bekannten- oder Freundeskreis, im Umfeld von Synagogen, während zufälliger Begegnungen im Supermarkt, im öffentlichen Personennahverkehr, auf der Straße und im eigenen Wohnumfeld.
Abstract: This paper focuses on struggles over how antisemitism is defined. Struggles over definition are themselves part of the wider struggle between those who say that hostility to Israel is important in understanding contemporary antisemitism and those who say that these two phenomena are quite separate. A key question, therefore, is what kinds of hostility to Israel may be understood as, or may lead to, or may be caused by, antisemitism?
In this paper I analyse three case studies of struggles over how antisemitism is defined. First, I trace a genealogy of the EUMC (European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, now the Agency For Fundamental Rights, FRA) Working Definition of Antisemitism. I show how this definition emerged out of a process of splitting between the global antiracist movement on the one hand and Jewish-led opposition to antisemitism on the other. At the Durban ‘World Conference against Racism’ in September 2001, there was a largely successful attempt to construct Zionism as the key form of racism on the planet; this would encourage people to relate to the overwhelming majority of Jews, who refuse to disavow Zionism, as if they were racists. In response, some Jewish NGOs found that they could get a hearing for their concerns within the structures of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union. If Durban is thought of as a non-white global forum and if the OSCE and the European Union are thought of as networks of white states, then the antagonism between non-white antiracism and white anxiety about antisemitism becomes visible and concerning. The clash between anti-Zionism on the one hand and the claim that antizionism is related to antisemitism on the other plays out within the realm of discourse and then it is also mirrored institutionally in these global struggles over the definition of antisemitism.
Second, I go on to look at a case study of alleged antisemitism within the University and College Union (UCU) which was related to the partial success within the union of the campaign to boycott Israel. The explicit disavowal of the EUMC definition during the 2011 UCU Congress can be understood as the climax of a process of struggle within the union over the recognition of a relationship between hostility to Israel and antisemitism.
The third case study is an analysis of two formal processes which were asked to adjudicate whether hostility to Israel had become antisemitic: the UCU v Fraser case at the Employment Tribunal in 2012 and the Shami Chakrabarti Inquiry into Antisemitism and Other Racisms in the Labour Party in 2016. The EUMC definition of antisemitism offers a framework for understanding the potential of certain kinds of hostility to Israel to be antisemitic. The further argument was made within the UCU, as well as to the Employment Tribunal and to the Chakrabarti Inquiry, that cultures of hostility to Israel and of support for boycotts tend to bring with them, into institutions which harbour them, cultures of antisemitism. The structures of the Union, as well as the two inquiries, wholeheartedly rejected both the claims: first, that a politics of hostility to Israel manifests itself in antisemitism in these cases; and second, that a cultural or institutional antisemitism, analogous to institutional racism, could be identified in the UCU or the Labour Party.
This paper asks whether these wholehearted rejections of claims about antisemitism are themselves implicated in the functioning of contemporary antisemitism. Denial of racism is a necessary element of those kinds of racism which do not see themselves as racist. Perhaps the hostility to the EUMC definition and to arguments about cultural or institutional antisemitism is a necessary component of the anti-Zionist discourses and cultures themselves which arguably relate in complex ways to antisemitism.
Abstract: On 12 June 2014, three Israeli teenagers were abducted in the West Bank, against a backdrop of heightened tension between the Israeli state and Palestinian forces, including a renewal of settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The abduction was followed by days of escalating violence, including a massive Israeli policing operation in the West Bank, the murder of a Palestinian teenager after the bodies of the kidnapped Israelis were found, and increasing numbers of rockets fired from Gaza into Israel. A series of Israeli air strikes on targets in Gaza on the night of 30 June'1 July marked the start of sustained Israel’s military engagement, and Operation Protective Edge was launched on 8 July, comprising initially of airstrikes on targets associated with rocket fire (with around 200 people killed in the strikes), followed by ground engagement a week later. De-escalation began on 3 August, with Israel withdrawing ground troops from Gaza, and an open-ended ceasefire concluded this round of the conflict on 26 August. In total, over 2100 Palestinians were killed (with estimates of civilians ranging between 50% and 76% of the losses), along with 66 Israeli combatants, 5 Israeli civilians and 1 Thai national. There were demonstrations against Israel’s prosecution of the conflict across the world, including several in the UK, as well as other manifestations of protest, such as public calls for and acts of boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israel. There were some reports of antisemitic content in some of these demonstrations, against a broader context in which antisemitic incidents spiked dramatically. Over 130 antisemitic were recorded by the Community Security Trust (CST) in July, making it the highest monthly total since January 2009 (a previous period of war in Gaza and Israel’s Operation Cast Lead). This short report examines the 2014 protests, exploring the extent and degree of antisemitism in the anti'Israel protests, as well as the reporting of this antisemitism and its impact on the Jewish community. It focuses in particular on the 50 days of Operation Protective Edge. The research questions which this report attempts to address are: • What were the predominant discourses in the UK protests relating to Operation Protective Edge? • Were antisemitic discourses present? If so, how prevalent were they? • Are UK protests relating to Operation Protective Edge comparable in scale and in discourse to protests relating to other conflicts? • How do these issues relate to mainstream and Jewish media reporting on the conflict and on the demonstrations? • How do these issues and their media representation affect Jewish feelings about antisemitism?
Abstract: Die Autoren setzen sich kritisch mit der Studie »Antisemiten als Koalitionspartner« von Samuel Salzborn und Sebastian Voigt (ZfP 58,3) auseinander. Sie betonen, dass der dort erhobene Vorwurf, die Partei DIE LINKE sei von einem antisemitischen Antizionismus geprägt, aus verschiedenen Gründen unhaltbar ist. Vielmehr wird nachgewiesen, dass der medial sehr wirksame Aufsatz von Salzborn und Voigt methodisch mangelhaft, teilweise nicht nachvollziehbar und logisch inkonsistent ist, hoch selektiv und reduktionistisch mit dem willkürlich ausgewählten Material umgeht sowie Gegenargumente, insbesondere zur Beschlusslage der Partei, und einschlägige Forschungen unterschlägt. Es wird kritisiert, dass somit ein unzutreffendes Zerrbild der Partei DIE LINKE geschaffen wird, welches sich zur politischen Instrumentalisierung eignet und gleichzeitig den gesamtgesellschaftlichen Antisemitismus bagatellisiert. Die Autoren plädieren stattdessen dafür, die Problemfelder der »Israelkritik« als Grauzone zu betrachten, in der die Palästinasolidarität an verschiedenen Stellen anschlussfähig für den oder undeutlich abgegrenzt vom Antisemitismus sein kann. Sie treten dafür ein, die Debatte zu versachlichen, u. a. indem diese Grauzone begrifflich genauer spezifiziert und insbesondere für die Partei DIE LINKE quantitativ untersucht wird.
Abstract: Consists of thematically organized texts by Trigano, previously published in various French on-line newsletters, broadcast on the French Jewish Radio J, and at various conferences. They analyze the phenomenon of the new antisemitism, including accusations in the French press against the Jews and Israel, boycotts against Israel, a typology of anti-Zionists, alter-Juifs (Jews who identify as Jews but define Jews through the hostile view of others), and the deconstruction of Judaism. Exposes the specificities of French antisemitism since 2000, especially in the context of postmodernist thought, which encourages the creation of parallel and diverging interpretations of the past, including World War II. Argues that Holocaust revisionism and denial have enabled Faurisson, inter alia, to attain huge media coverage. Emphasizes the role of the Internet in the politicization of history, and shows how the usurpation of Jewish history and heritage by the Left on behalf of the Palestinians has roots in Christian supersessionist theology. Notes that rejection of the Jews and Israel are also based on the claim that monotheism is the source of phallocracy. Characterizes the European Union as a new imperialist power, which destroys nation states and national identities, and rejects Jewish autonomy. Concludes that present-day antisemitism is a massive phenomenon, which threatens the foundations of modernity and European civilization. The very survival of the Jewish people is at stake.
Abstract: This article deals with antisemitism in Europe and post-Holocaust Sweden and Denmark specifically. The idea that it is always “the same old antisemitism” that pops up and “shows its ugly face” does not find support in this study. Instead, we distinguish between three different kinds of contemporary antisemitisms: Classic antisemitism, Aufklärungsantisemitismus, and Israel-derived antisemitism. Our findings suggest that each of these antisemitisms is inspired by different underlying “philosophies,” and that they are carried by different social groups and manifested in different ways. In the Scandinavian countries today, we find that there is less classic antisemitism, much more Aufklärungsantisemitismus, and a relatively stronger presence of Israel-derived antisemitism. In our analysis this specifically Scandinavian pattern of antisemitisms is closely related to the highly developed processes of modernization in the Scandinavian countries on the one hand and the relatively large numbers of recently arrived immigrants from the Middle East on the other. This appears to imply that antisemitism based on racial prejudices is losing ground, as is antisemitism based on religious convictions. However, according to the European Union Agency For Fundamental Rights (FRA) in Antisemitism: Overview of Data Available in the European Union 2007-2017 (Luxembourg: Luxembourg Publications Office of the European Union, 2018), the incidence of violent antisemitic attacks seems to be on the rise. These typically emanate from small pockets of individuals in the population who share an image of all Jews being accomplices to whatever the State of Israel does. Considering how the processes of modernization operate it is assumed that other countries in Europe will follow a similar trajectory. Rationalization, secularization, and individuation will also come to penetrate these societies and weaken notions of “race” and “religion” as springboards for antisemitism. Thus, tendencies towards Aufklärungsantisemitismus will be strengthened. If integrating and getting rid of the marginalization and condescending treatment of its newly arrived Muslim inhabitants does not succeed, Israel-derived antisemitism can be expected to thrive. The pattern of antisemitisms in Denmark and Sweden might be a preview of what antisemitisms in twenty-first-century Europe could come to look like.
Topics: Anti-Zionism, Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Left-Wing, Internet, Israel Criticism, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Social Media, Language, Linguistics, Newspapers, Magazines and Periodicals
Abstract: In May 2021 Jewish Voice for Labour (“JVL”) published a combative document entitled How the EHRC Got It So Wrong-Antisemitism and the Labour Party. The document criticises the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s October 2020 Report of its investigation into antisemitism in the Labour Party. The Commission found the Labour Party responsible for antisemitic conduct giving rise to several unlawful acts in breach of the Equality Act 2010. In addition to its legal findings, it also made critical factual findings, identifying a culture of acceptance of antisemitism in the Labour Party, which suffered from serious failings in leadership, where the failure to tackle antisemitism more effectively was probably a matter of choice. The essence of JVL’s attack on the Commission’s Report is as follows. First, it is said that the Commission did not and could not lawfully investigate antisemitism as such; to the extent that it purported to do so, its findings of unlawfulness are purportedly meaningless. Secondly, JVL claims that the Commission made no finding of institutional antisemitism. Thirdly, by failing to require production of evidence referred to in a certain leaked report, probably prepared by Labour Party officials loyal to Jeremy Corbyn, the Commission is accused of nullifying at a stroke the value of its own Report as a factual account. Fourthly, JVL claims the Commission’s Report is not just legally untenable, but purportedly a threat to democracy. Finally, JVL claims the Commission’s analysis was not just wrong, but that it exercised its statutory powers in bad faith. This article offers a response to each of the five pillars of JVL’s attack, all of which collapse under scrutiny. As to the first pillar, the article identifies the disappearing of antisemitism as the linchpin of JVL’s argument and shows how JVL’s criticism is underpinned by a political epistemology of antisemitism denialism. As to the second pillar, it shows that the absence of the term “institutional antisemitism” in the Commission’s Report is a semantic quibble. In substance, the Commission found that the conduct under investigation amounted to institutional antisemitism. As to the third, the article demonstrates that JVL’s complaint about the Commission’s failure to call for production of the leaked report is perverse because that report constitutes an admission of the correctness of the complaints put before it. Moreover, the Corbyn-led Labour Party itself decided that it did not want the Commission to consider that material. As to the fourth pillar, the article shows that far from being a threat to democracy, the Commission’s Report grasps the nettle of antisemitism denial. It concludes that continuing to assume and assert that Jews raising concerns about antisemitism are lying for nefarious ends may itself be, and in at least two cases was, a form of unlawful anti-Jewish harassment. As to the fifth, the article rebuts the extraordinary charge that the Commission exercised its powers in bad faith. Rather strikingly, neither JVL nor Jeremy Corbyn was willing to take the Commission on judicial review. The article concludes by considering how the poverty of JVL’s reasoning, coupled with the extravagance of its accusations, invites a symptomatic reading of Antisemitism and the Labour Party as a disappointing illustration of left-wing melancholia.
Abstract: Threats and violence from radicalized Islamists have led to heightened security measures for Jewish organizations in France. French soldiers are protecting Jewish schools, kindergartens, community centers, and other Jewish institutions. In addition to terrorism, there are a number of other factors that have led to increased antisemitism in France. This article discusses data on antisemitic incidents and surveys on antisemitic attitudes in France. While there is a clear rise in antisemitic incidents, the trend in antisemitic attitudes is less clear. Levels of antisemitic attitudes are particularly high among Muslims, the far-right, and also the far-left, but not necessarily among the general French population. However, the rise of antisemitism has hit observant Jews more than non-observant Jews and it has led to changes in behavior, including in the display of religious signs and avoidance of places of worship. Many French Jews today question their future in France.
Abstract: Depuis 1967, le conflit israélo-palestinien a souvent été un facteur de tension au sein de la société française. Racisme, antisémitisme, affrontements communautaires se nourrissent de l’interminable crise du Proche-Orient. Pour quelles raisons particulières la France est-elle plus sensible qu’aucun autre pays occidental aux échos d’un conflit lointain et localisé ? Dans ce livre informé, Denis Sieffert s’efforce de remettre en perspective les relations tumultueuses entre la France et Israël. Plus qu’une simple affaire de politique étrangère, le Proche-Orient agit comme un miroir pour la société française et les communautés qui l’habitent. C’est pourquoi toute prise de position prend un caractère passionnel. Depuis le parrainage d’Israël par la IVe République jusqu’au caillassage du Premier ministre Lionel Jospin à l’université de Bir Zeit, en passant par la fameuse déclaration du général de Gaulle en 1967 à propos du peuple juif « sûr de lui-même et dominateur », et le « sauvetage » de Yasser Arafat par François Mitterrand en 1982, les débats et polémiques ont souvent divisé l’opinion française et ses responsables politiques. Denis Sieffert explore ici le rôle du passé colonial français toujours douloureux, la relation difficile entre le sionisme et la République et, plus largement, le problème que soulèvent les doubles allégeances. Il rappelle les liens que les grandes familles politiques conservent, plus d’un demi-siècle après la naissance d’Israël, avec les protagonistes du conflit. Il montre en particulier que les socialistes, comme leurs ancêtres de la SFIO, restent souvent très liés à Israël, alors que les communistes, l’extrême gauche, les Verts et les altermondialistes sont, eux, engagés dans le soutien des Palestiniens.
Abstract: The purpose of this article is to analyze and confute some of the arguments recently put forward by important Italian intellectuals against Jews and against Israel. Neo anti-Semitism camouflaged as anti-Zionism is spreading in Italy today. Three main examples of this phenomenon are given: Sergio Romano, Alberto Asor Rosa, and Barbara Spinelli. Romano claims that the memory of the Shoah has become an insurance policy and is used by Israel as a diplomatic weapon, while Israel itself is "a war-mongering, imperialist, arrogant nation" and "an unscrupulous liar." Asor Rosa claims that Israel "developed a marvelous army" but at the same time "the tradition and thinking melted away," while Israel affirms, he writes, "the racial superiority of the Jewish people." For Barbara Spinelli: "Israel constitutes a scandal" for the way in which Moses' religion validates "rights which are often meta-historical" and "linked to sacred texts." Spinelli thinks that Israel should express its culpability to Palestinians and Islam. She goes as far as stating that some Israelis dream "of a sort of second holocaust." She also attacks the "double and contradictory loyalty" of the Jews. There is a short analysis of the Italian press and of the stand of the Catholic Church. The lynch in Ramallah is discussed, as well as the declarations of Ambassador Vento. The author also raises the question of school textbooks, the boycott against Israeli universities, and the existence of other voices, very different from the ones mentioned above.
Abstract: Overt state-sponsored antisemitism ended in Europe with the fall of the Soviet Union. Antisemitic attitudes, however, remain prevalent in Europe, and some European political actors have instrumentalized antisemitism for political gain. This report examines both the conscious use of antisemitism in European politics and the calculated tolerance of antisemitism, demonstrating that the oldest hatred remains a modern political tool.
Unlike antisemitic incidents of violence, vandalism, or insults, the political use of antisemitism does not target Jews themselves. Instead, antisemitic propaganda targets domestic or foreign audiences as a means of gaining political support. Demonstrating tolerance for antisemitism is another tactic of attracting political support. Polling data shows that these strategies have a rational basis. ADL’s 2019 Global 100 survey of antisemitic attitudes found that one in four Europeans polled harbored antisemitic beliefs.
Antisemitic propaganda has as its goal to energize and attract followers. Antisemitic propaganda is also used to tarnish political opponents in the eyes of a specific audience by intimating that someone is Jewish, supportive of Jewish causes or of the State of Israel. Other times, political opponents are slandered as antisemites or Nazis to diminish their reputations with specific audiences. Each of these techniques will be covered in this report, which focuses on the conscious choice of instrumentalizing or tolerating antisemitism for political gain. Antisemitic rhetoric by political actors as an indicator of bias is a much broader topic, and this report does not cover those instances.
The broad categories of the politicization of antisemitism include (1) politically motivated accusations of, or uses of, antisemitism against political opponents; (2) political appeals to antisemitic beliefs among the public, including the conspiracy theories about Jewish control of government, economy, media; and (3) tolerance of antisemitism within political movements as a strategy for increasing popular support. This list not exhaustive of the political instrumentalization of antisemitism, but this report provides illustrative examples from recent years in these broad categories.
Why is this report important? While violent antisemitic attacks receive wide publicity – and rightly so – the politicization of antisemitism can also severely impact Jewish communities. The British Jewish community provides a compelling example.
In January 2015, 11% of British Jews were considering emigrating, according to a poll by the UK’s Jewish Chronicle. That survey was conducted before Jeremy Corbyn, widely regarded within the British Jewish community as an antisemite himself, was even a leadership candidate for the Labour party. In September 2018, after antisemitism had become a serious problem in the Labour party under Corbyn, the Jewish Chronicle poll found that 39% of British Jews were considering emigrating. And in an October 2019 poll by the UK’s Jewish Leadership Council, just prior to the UK General Election, 47% of British Jews said they would “seriously consider” leaving the UK if Jeremy Corbyn were to win the election.
Had Jeremy Corbyn won, leading a major party widely recognized as tolerating antisemitism among its members, and had even 30% of British Jews emigrated as a result of that single event, that number of roughly 90,000 Jews would have been similar to the total of all the French Jews who left France over the past 20 years.
The sections below are select examples of the different ways in which antisemitism has been instrumentalized for political gain by various actors. The purposes and tactics vary substantially, but have the common element of politicizing antisemitism:
The Russian government instrumentalized antisemitism in the forms of propaganda and “false flag” operations to influence domestic and foreign public opinion in its conflict with Ukraine.
Polish political campaigns used overt antisemitic rhetoric during elections to win votes.
The Hungarian government used coded antisemitism in political campaigns against EU migration policies.
The UK Labour party consciously tolerated antisemitism to widen its political support from far-left radicals.
Ukrainian nationalists glorified World War II era fighters to promote nationalist narratives, while trivializing their involvement in the Holocaust.
The far-right Alternative for Germany party trivialized the Holocaust as part of their appeal to “Holocaust fatigue” among German voters.
Other political actors have engaged in similar acts of politicization, and their absence from this report is not indicative of any assessment. The cases below are simply the most blatant examples of the types of politicization to be highlighted.
