Abstract: Die antisemitische Protestmobilisierung hat sich seit dem 7.Oktober 2023 von einer akuten, ereignisbezogenen Gelegenheitsstruktur zu einem festen Bestandteil politischer Mobilisierung in Deutschland entwickelt. In den Jahren 2025 und 2026 bildeten sich dauerhafte Akteursnetzwerke und gefestigte Protestmilieus heraus; hier sind zwar rückläufige Teilnehmendenzahlen, aber auch Radikalisierungstendenzen und eine Verschärfung der antisemitischen Rhetorik zu beobachten.
Langjährig aktive, oft PFLP-nahe oder islamistisch geprägte Strukturen beeinflussen Tonlage, Inhalte und Aktionsformen der Proteste maßgeblich. In denselben Protestkontexten treten die antiimperialistische Linke und zunehmend Teile der Klima-, der feministischen und der antimilitaristischen Szene auf; israelbezogene Mobilisierungen haben sie in ihre politische Praxis integriert.
Die Anschlussfähigkeit antisemitischer und israelfeindlicher Narrative wird maßgeblich durch reichweitenstarke InfluencerInnen und Content-CreatorInnen, die auch ohne formale organisatorische Einbindung erhebliche Deutungsmacht entfalten, befördert. So entstehen flexible digitale Allianzen, in denen etablierte politische Trennlinien an Bedeutung verlieren.
Kennzeichnend ist eine Diskursverschiebung, mit der antisemitische Narrative und Deutungsrahmen an gesellschaftlicher Akzeptanz gewinnen. Dazu zählen die Umdeutung von Gewalt in legitimen Widerstand, die Delegitimierung Israels, das Feindbild Zionismus, die Abwehr historischer Verantwortung sowie Verschwörungsdenken.
Die beschriebenen Dynamiken gehen mit einem messbaren Anstieg antisemitischer Bedrohungen im öffentlichen und digitalen Raum einher: Jüdische Personen und Einrichtungen sind verstärkt Anfeindungen, Gewalt und erhöhten Schutzanforderungen ausgesetzt. Jüdische Perspektiven und Erfahrungen werden delegitimiert oder anhand ihrer Haltung zu Israel hierarchisiert – und gegebenenfalls aus öffentlichen Debatten ausgeschlossen.
Topics: Israel: Attitudes to Israel, Israel: Criticism, Israel: Jewish and Israeli Advocacy, Hasbarah and Lobbying, Israel: Jewish Attachment, Israel: Non-Jewish Support, Solidarity and Advocacy, Main Topic: Other, Palestinian Solidarity and Activism, Post-Colonial, National Identity
Abstract: Issued in November 1917 to pledge Britain’s support for the “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,” the Balfour Declaration has had dramatic historical repercussions, paving the way for the founding of Israel in 1948, the Palestinian Nakba, and the persistence of bloodshed. Tracing the complex dynamic of postcolonial guilt, self-exculpation, and amnesia that characterized various British responses to the Declaration over the years, the article examines how this dynamic shaped the numerous events held across the United Kingdom in November 2017 to mark the Declaration’s centenary. These commemorative events – allowing different communities to articulate the relationship between Britain’s historical accountability, Israel’s sovereignty, and Palestinians’ grievances – are read in light of two interrelated “post-postimperial” developments preoccupying Britain in 2017: a new conservative backlash against the seeping British willingness to acknowledge Britain’s colonial crimes, and the Brexit crisis, with its complex resonances of imperial legacies.
Abstract: Wie zeigt sich Antisemitismus auf Versammlungen im öffentlichen Raum? Welche Parolen, Symbole und Narrative treten wiederholt auf? Und was bedeutet es für Jüdinnen und Juden, wenn gewaltverherrlichende und delegitimierende Sprache auf Demonstrationen normalisiert wird? Diesen Fragen geht die neue Veröffentlichung „Lagebild Antisemitismus. Feldbeobachtung im öffentlichen Raum“ nach. Sie bündelt eigene Beobachtungen von 76 Versammlungen aus dem ersten Halbjahr 2026, in dem das JFDA insgesamt 329 antisemitische Vorfälle dokumentiert hat. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei nicht der isolierte Vorfall, sondern die Frage, welche Muster sich über verschiedene Versammlungen hinweg zeigen und fachlich einordnen lassen.
Das Lagebild macht sichtbar, dass die Bewertung einer Versammlung nicht bei der Frage endet, ob sie polizeilich als friedlich gilt. Entscheidend ist vielmehr, welche Inhalte im öffentlichen Raum wiederholt artikuliert werden, welche Feindbilder sie transportieren und welche Wirkung sie auf jüdische Sichtbarkeit, demokratische Öffentlichkeit und zivilgesellschaftliche Beobachtung entfalten. Bei den Feldbeobachtungen zeigten sich dabei vor allem die Dämonisierung und Delegitimierung Israels, entmenschlichende Zuschreibungen, Gewalt- und Vernichtungssemantik, NS-Vergleiche und Umkehrungen der Schoa-Erinnerung sowie verschwörungsideologische Erzählungen. Die Veröffentlichung richtet sich an Öffentlichkeit, Zivilgesellschaft, politische Bildung, Medien und zuständige Stellen. Sie bietet eine Grundlage, um antisemitische Dynamiken auf Versammlungen nicht nur punktuell wahrzunehmen, sondern in ihren wiederkehrenden Formen, Anschlussfähigkeiten und Wirkungen einzuordnen. Zugleich verdeutlicht sie, dass eine kontinuierliche, quellengebundene Feldbeobachtung notwendig bleibt, um solche Entwicklungen nachvollziehbar zu dokumentieren und über einzelne Ereignisse hinaus vergleichbar zu machen.
Abstract: Seit dem 7. Oktober 2023 hat sich die Zahl antisemitischer Vorfälle in Deutschland vervielfacht; an Hochschulen fiel der Anstieg besonders stark aus. Der Beitrag präsentiert die Ergebnisse der dritten Welle einer Schnellbefragungsreihe der AG Hochschulforschung der Universität Konstanz, die deutschlandweite Studierenden- und Bevölkerungsstichproben in Bezug auf israelbezogenen Antisemitismus, Zustimmung zur Boykottbewegung BDS (Boycott, Divestment,
and Sanctions) sowie Einstellungen zum Genozid-Vorwurf gegen Israel und zum Existenzrecht des jüdischen Staates vergleicht. Der israelbezogene Antisemitismus ist unter Studierenden seit 2023 gestiegen, vor allem im Bereich der teilweisen Zustimmung zu antisemitischen Aussagen, liegt aber weiterhin unter dem Vergleichswert der Bevölkerungsstichprobe. Studierende berichten jedoch deutlich häufiger als die Bevölkerung, Antisemitismus selbst beobachtet zu haben – allerdings wird dies selten explizit der Institution Hochschule zugeschrieben, sondern eher informellen Räumen (soziale Medien, Demonstrationen, Peergroups). Dies stützt eine Deutung der Hochschule als
Katalysator, der bestehende Ressentiments sichtbarer und sozial wirksamer macht, statt sie grundlegend neu zu erzeugen. Die Zustimmung zu Boykottforderungen gegenüber Israel hat sich unter Studierenden seit 2023 erhöht, sehr deutlich ebenso die Zustimmung zum Vorwurf, Israel begehe einen Genozid (auf zwei Drittel der Studierenden). Ein experimentelles Info-Treatment zeigt, dass die Bereitstellung der völkerrechtlichen Genozid-Definition diese Einschätzung nicht verändert, was auf eine moralisch-politisch bereits gefestigte statt wissensbasierte Urteilsbildung hindeutet. Ein Discrete-Choice-Experiment zum Existenzrecht Israels zeigt, dass mit steigendem AntisemitismusScore die Präferenz für delegitimierende gegenüber das Existenzrecht anerkennende Positionen unter Studierenden zunimmt, wobei eine historisch aus der NS-Verfolgung begründete Legitimation besonders stark an Zustimmung verliert. Ergänzend werden Befunde zum wahrgenommenen Diskursklima ("Silencing" von Israelkritik, Polarisierung) sowie Implikationen für die antisemitismuskritische Bildungsarbeit an Hochschulen diskutiert.
Abstract: In the aftermath of the October 7, 2023 attacks, reports of anti-Israel expressions at German universities have raised questions about the prevalence and nature of such sentiments in academic environments. Traditional survey-based research on antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiment is often limited by response biases and social desirability bias. This study introduces a novel field-experimental approach to measuring anti-Israel sentiment in a real-world university setting. Using event history analysis, it examines the removal probability of stickers of the Israeli flag compared to German, US, Palestinian, and rainbow flags at a German university. Over a 24-week period, 600 stickers were placed on 50 public notice boards and were monitored for 14-day cycles. The results provide strong evidence of anti-Israel sentiment. The Israeli flag had the highest removal rate, with only 47.5% of the flags remaining at the end of the observation period—significantly lower than the survival rates of the other flags (which range from 68% to 80%). Cox regression analysis confirms that Israeli flags faced the highest removal hazard, being 3.3 to 3.7-times more likely to be removed than the rainbow flag and nearly twice as likely as the German flag. Politically motivated removals, though less frequent, disproportionately targeted Israeli flags as well. Removal rates were highest in hallways of the humanities, shared humanities/social sciences as well as in central facilities hallways. Hallways in the natural sciences, the human- and social sciences and economics had lower removal rates. Areas with higher student traffic exhibited fewer removals. Overall, the findings indicate a pronounced anti-Israel bias on campus, distinct from attitudes toward other nationalities or symbols.
Abstract: In Germany, pro-Palestine protests in the form of camps and institute occupations have occurred and continue to take place at universities. Antisemitic incidents have been reported at many of these protests. Following the initial data collection in December 2023, this report provides a new, focused, up-to-date assessment of the opinion climate in the context of the Middle East conflict and antisemitic attitudes at German universities. Exactly one year after the first report, the results of two recent surveys by the Higher Education Research Unit (AG Hochschulforschung) are summarized here. First, based on a large online survey conducted in December 2024 with over 1,800 students, we report on these students’ assessments of the conflict and antisemitic tendencies among them. This follows
on directly from the previous study mentioned earlier (Hinz et al., 2024), enabling us to describe possible changes compared to last year. In some places, we also examine the assessments and attitudes of students compared to a sample from the general population. Second, we present the results of a simultaneous survey of university rectorates on antisemitic incidents and the universities' reactions to these incidents. At the invitation of the German Rectors’ Conference (HRK), a total of 94 university management teams took part in this separate online survey.
The results indicate that universities have been strongly affected by antisemitic incidents and that antisemitic resentment remains at a constant level. A high level of vigilance is still required, particularly
with regards to Israel-related antisemitism
Abstract: This chapter examines how antisemitism is visually expressed in public space in Europe against the backdrop of the war in Gaza. Drawing upon a qualitative analysis of publicly documented incidents, it focuses on offline, material, and symbolic acts such as graffiti, paint attacks, stickers, and the defacement or removal of memorials. The study analyses these incidents as communicative interventions that embed antisemitic meaning into everyday environments through repetition, placement, and symbolic association. The analysis identifies four recurring visual strategies: red symbolism and implied violence; Nazi symbolism and Holocaust inversion; desecration and overwriting of Jewish memory; and the marking and targeting of Jewish space. Together, these themes demonstrate how contemporary antisemitism operates offline by creating false and dangerous equivalences between European Jews and the actions of the Israeli state, thereby normalising hostility within shared public spaces. Rather than relying on explicit declarations of hatred, these visual practices often function through implication, collapsing distinctions between Jewish identity and geopolitical conflict. By foregrounding these visual strategies and their cumulative effects, the chapter contributes to a broader understanding of antisemitism as a historically adaptive form of political hostility that becomes normalised through everyday visual exposure.
Abstract: This is an ethnographic study of student politics relating to Palestine-Israel within British universities. Palestine-Israel has been a focal issue within British campuses for over four decades, manifesting in intense, high profile conflicts, which have been subject to competing political and media framings. In this thesis, I identify this as a case of what Nancy Fraser (2008) describes as 'abnormal justice', a situation of incommensurable, spiralling conflicts over the 'what', 'how' and 'who' of political community. I show how students' engagement with Palestine-Israel raises spectres of entangled histories of the Holocaust and colonialism, and tensions over the national versus global boundaries of the polity. Moving beyond abstract portrayals of this as a conflict between discrete ethno-religious groups or autonomous moral actors, I attend to students' complex personal experiences of these political dynamics. My central argument is that PalestineIsrael exerts discomforting, at times irreconcilable, claims over participating students, arising out of violent histories, ongoing racisms, complex transnational attachments and " the rationalism of post-imperial British universities. I trace how unsettling ambiguities and a desire for moral coher.,e nce are enacted within this campus politics, analysing how institutional practices of containment and shaming lead to 'tragic' moments of passionate aggression, which then circulate in the media. Contributing to a cross-disciplinary turn towards affect, aesthetics and ethics in the study of public spheres, I stake a claim for responsive ethnography with ethical ambitions. I do so by drawing our attention beyond spectacular political conflicts, showing how students cultivate reflexive practices and express uncertainty, care and commitment within overlooked, 'ordinary' spaces of the campus. In these ways, I show how attending to intersubjective political experience provides vital insights into the motivations and desires at stake in justice conflicts, and operis up expansive possibilities for reflexivity and creativity within the public institutions of democratic societies
Abstract: The 7 October 2023 attacks on the Jewish state by Hamas and other terrorist groups devastated Israel
and unleashed an unprecedented rise in antisemitism worldwide which – despite a ceasefire being in
place in Gaza for a year – has not abated.
The nature of antisemitism also changed following the attacks with antisemitic incidents – which began
surging exponentially even before Israel’s operations in Gaza – now increasingly anti-Zionist in nature.
Anti-Zionist antisemitism – first promulgated by the Soviet Union and now a major feature of far-left and
Islamist extremism – denies the Jewish right to national self-determination. The Islamist terrorist who
attacked the Heaton Park synagogue in Manchester on the Jewish high holidays last October directly
referred to Israel; other terrorists targeting Jews have also done so.
Antisemitism begets antisemitism, with massive spikes in antisemitic attacks following the Heaton Park
attack as well as the slew of Iran-orchestrated attacks against the Jewish community in the spring.
As this report details, anti-Zionist antisemitism is now institutionally embedded across the UK,
especially in the public sector – with many Jewish students and NHS staff and patients unable to visibly
identify as Jews and facing regular antisemitic harassment. An obsession with Israel – which detracts
from threats to Britain’s national security and increases the threat to the Jewish community –
increasingly dominates our politics. As Hamas sought to isolate Israel from the world, so too are Jews
being frozen out of society in their own country.
Following the Manchester attack, the government has implemented a range of commendable steps to
protect the Jewish community – from increased support for security to creating new powers to curb
intimidation at anti-Israel protests.
However, Jewish life in Britain is still facing an existential threat today. Higher and thicker walls are not
the answer to a social ill which requires structural realignment, including addressing the manner in
which anti-Zionism sits at the heart of the antisemitism crisis facing the country.
LFI is recommending a series of new measures – many drawn from courageous Jewish communal
groups who are at the forefront of defending British values – including:
Require all public bodies to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance
definition of antisemitism in full and without amendment.
Establish an independent reviewer of antisemitism in the public sector, who will produce and
publish an annual report, and ensure all public bodies collect data and report on antisemitic
incidents and complaints.
Work to increase awareness of the threat posed by anti-Zionist antisemitism, especially in
areas like higher education. Establish a statutory framework for the investigation and
disciplinary handling of hate crime incidents in higher education and universities; the Charity
Commission, Office for Students and other regulatory bodies should be empowered to ensure
proper conduct and strengthen students’ union accountability, implementing sanctions where
unions fail to address antisemitism; higher education should be designated a priority area for
the Protecting What Matters social cohesion action plan; formalised taskforces should be
established to better coordinate action by the police, universities and government to combat
criminality and extremist activity on campuses, including the provision of clear public order
guidance for universities and the police to strengthen enforcement of new and existing powers.
Develop a dedicated strategy to address the role of algorithms, gaming platforms, encrypted
online networks and generative AI systems in facilitating the spread of antisemitic conspiracy
theories, extremist narratives and online-to-offline radicalisation.
Adopt a new counter-extremism strategy to address the culture of impunity surrounding
“hateful extremism” identified by the Commission for Countering Extremism in 2021; follow the
lead of Australia’s Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism Act and introduce a
new legal framework to allow organisations to be designated as “prohibited hate groups” with
a range of accompanying offences; permanently ban Tehran’s annual Al Quds’ Day march; and
create an aggravated offence for “hate preachers” – religious, spiritual or other leaders who
advocate or threaten violence.
Establish a cross-departmental task force to tackle the Iranian domestic threat and identify
and dismantle soft influence networks that advance the regime’s objectives under the cover of
cultural, academic, charitable or media activity. This would include imposing sanctions
against Press TV, Tasnim News, Fars News and other platforms linked to the Iranian regime.
Conduct a thorough review of links between Iran and the charitable and NGO sector akin to
previous reviews of espionage and abuse in the sector carried out with regards to China.
Using new tools under the National Security Act, designate Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence
Services which, alongside the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has planned
kidnappings and assassinations against British citizens. Identify and sanction Iranian regime
oligarchs, elites and proxies in the UK, including expelling the supreme leader’s representative
in the UK. As Australia and other states have now done, the UK should also expel the Islamic
Republic’s ambassador.
