Abstract: CLe 10 octobre 2013, lors d’une réunion plénière à Toronto, l’Alliance internationale pour la mémoire de l’Holocauste (IHRA) a marqué un tournant dans la compréhension des manipulations historiques en introduisant l’expression « distorsion de la Shoah ». Cette nouvelle terminologie qui étend la réflexion sur les menaces posées par l’antisémitisme et le négationnisme, dépasse le simple ajout lexical. Elle reflète une prise de conscience accrue face à la complexité des discours visant à remettre en question la réalité historique de la Shoah.
Le « négationnisme », un mot inventé en 1987 par l’historien Henry Rousso dans son ouvrage Le Syndrome de Vichy, désigne les idées de ceux qui minimisent ou nient l’extermination des Juifs durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. À l’époque, l’historien souhaitait rectifier l’usage inapproprié du terme « révisionnisme », souvent confondu avec celui de négationnisme, et rappeler que, dans une démarche scientifique, le révisionnisme se distingue clairement de ce dernier. Il expliquait alors :
Le révisionnisme de l’histoire étant une démarche classique chez les scientifiques, on préférera ici le barbarisme, moins élégant mais plus approprié, de « négationnisme », car il s’agit bien d’un système de pensée, d’une idéologie et non d’une démarche scientifique ou même simplement critique.
Le négationnisme, en tant qu’idéologie, cherche avant tout à effacer ou déformer la réalité de la Shoah. Toutefois, cette définition s’avère insuffisante pour désigner d’autres formes de falsifications historiques qui, plutôt que de nier directement l’événement, le réinterprètent de manière à le banaliser, le déformer ou le trivialiser…
Abstract: To be valid, history must be predicated on absolute, uncompromising truth, not manipulation. Eighty years ago, 48,000 Jews were not deported from Bulgaria — while 11,343 other Jews were cruelly loaded on trains bound for Treblinka where they were murdered. These are two interdependent realities that cannot be and must not be allowed to be uncoupled.
Il suffirait de si peu. Au regard de maints États européens alliés, satellisés ou occupés par l’Allemagne nazie, la politique de la Bulgarie envers les populations juives pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale se prête à une lecture moins sombre. Signataire du Pacte tripartite le 1er mars 1941, le pays ne participa pas à l’offensive allemande de juin 1941 contre l’URSS ; son armée ne prit aucune part à la « Shoah par balles » et ses citoyens n’apportèrent pas de contribution aux exactions des Einsatzgruppen, ces unités mobiles d’extermination du Reich. Le « vieux royaume de Bulgarie » (frontières d’avant avril 1941) ne procéda pas à l’internement systématique et à l’extermination sur son territoire de ses citoyens juifs à la différence, par exemple, de l’État indépendant croate ustaša, né du démantèlement du royaume de Yougoslavie après son invasion par les nazis en avril 1941. La Bulgarie ne connut pas non plus les atrocités des pogroms de Bucarest et de Iaşi perpétrés dans la Roumanie de 1941, cet autre allié du Reich. Enfin, la presque totalité de la communauté juive de Bulgarie, soit environ 48 000 citoyens, survécut à la guerre après que le gouvernement eut reporté, puis renoncé à déporter une partie, sinon de la totalité, de cette communauté…
Abstract: Lors du festival Open City organisé à Lublin, en octobre 2019, l’artiste Dorota Nieznalska a présenté une installation intitulée « Judenfrei (Bûcher numéro 1) ». Cette œuvre présentait un bûcher recouvert de pancartes partiellement brûlées, sur lesquelles figuraient les noms de localités où, entre 1941 et 1946, des pogroms contre les Juifs furent perpétrés par des Polonais. À proximité de l’installation, les organisateurs avaient disposé un panneau explicatif précisant que ces crimes furent commis en toute connaissance de cause par des membres des communautés locales, animés par des instincts bas, la haine, l’antisémitisme et l’appât d’un enrichissement facile. Przemysław Czarnek, alors voïvode de la région de Lublin et futur ministre de l’Éducation et des Sciences au sein du gouvernement du parti Droit et Justice (PiS), a vivement réagi. Il a dénoncé publiquement l’installation de Nieznalska, la qualifiant d’« acte antipolonais », tout en fustigeant le panneau d’information qu’il a accusé de véhiculer un « mensonge ». Il a exigé du maire de Lublin qu’il fasse retirer cette œuvre controversée. Face à cette critique, la chercheuse Joanna Tokarska-Bakir, spécialiste des pogroms, a dénoncé l’ignorance du voïvode et s’en est indignée : « Comment peut-on laisser libre cours à ses intuitions face à des études scientifiques irréfutables qui attestent l’existence des pogroms dénoncés par l’artiste ? »
Malheureusement, les seules intuitions de Przemysław Czarnek ne sont pas le cœur du problème…
Abstract: Depuis les années 1990, l’usage des termes « révisionnisme » et « révisionniste » s’est imposé dans l’espace intellectuel et médiatique pour désigner, au-delà des auteurs d’extrême droite et faux savants niant l’existence des chambres à gaz, qualifiés de « négationnistes », tous ceux qui, d’une manière ou d’une autre, relativisent le génocide des Juifs et la complicité criminelle du gouvernement de Vichy. La négation d’un côté ; la minoration de l’autre. Dès 1990, l’historien Henry Rousso, auquel on doit l’introduction de la notion de « négationnisme » en France, évoquait une « histoire “révisionniste” de Vichy » à propos d’un ouvrage de François-Georges Dreyfus, Histoire de Vichy (Perrin), qui reprenait un certain nombre d’arguments pétainistes.
Mais, étonnamment, cet usage reste rarement explicité, alors qu’il a une histoire. L’objet du présent article vise à établir la généalogie et à retracer les évolutions et les lignes de force du contre-récit historique sur Vichy et les Juifs, de 1945 à nos jours. Pour cela, il se fonde sur l’étude de nombreux écrits et d’archives privées d’auteurs désireux de réhabiliter les dirigeants du régime pétainiste, de proposer une vision « pacifiante » des années noires ou d’aller à l’encontre d’une supposée doxa sur le sujet.Jusqu’à la fin des années 1960, les écrits justifiant la politique de Vichy et niant ou minimisant ses crimes sont d’abord et avant tout le fait d’avocats ou de parents des grandes figures liées à l’État français.
En juillet-août puis en octobre 1945, Philippe Pétain et l’ex-chef du gouvernement de Vichy Pierre Laval ont été jugés et condamnés à mort par la Haute Cour de justice pour trahison – la peine du vieux maréchal a été commuée en détention perpétuelle…
Abstract: « Les mots n’appartiennent pas au ciel des idées. Qu’on le veuille ou non, ils ont des conséquences sur les faits. »
L’archevêque de Paris Jean-Marie Lustiger a offert en 1997 à l’un des plus grands historiens du génocide des Juifs, Saul Friedländer, une méditation sur le mal absolu et sur sa négation toujours répétée : « La Shoah est la noire lumière par laquelle il est possible de nommer par son nom l’horreur commise en Bosnie ou au Rwanda, les crimes de Pol Pot au Cambodge, ceux du génocide arménien. […] Dès lors, le négationnisme qui dénie les faits ou le révisionnisme qui les « trafique » en faisant des Juifs les artisans de leur propre destruction, ne sont pas à inscrire au compte du scepticisme ou de la relativité des opinions humaines. Ils deviennent significatifs d’une tentation universelle. Ils sont des figures du mensonge qui toujours nie pour fuir la vérité. »
Vingt-cinq ans plus tard, le 20 janvier 2022, l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU a adopté par les voix de 193 pays (l’Iran s’étant abstenu) une résolution sur la « négation [denial] et la déformation de l’Holocauste » (Holocaust distorsion) qui s’appuie terme à terme sur la convention de 1948 « sur la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide » : « Notant que le négationnisme fait référence au discours et à la propagande qui nient la réalité historique et l’ampleur de l’extermination des Juifs par les nazis et leurs complices pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, connue sous le nom d’Holocauste ou Shoah…
Abstract: Romania has proved to be no outlier in the ongoing trend of mainstream-ization of far-right and neo-fascist politics and discourses, despite the optimistic outlook that many shared not long ago. AUR marked a historical success, being the first “radical return” political formation to gain seats in Parliament after 1989. As a result, a process of accelerated normalization of the far-right discourse is taking place, moving the political spectrum further to the (extreme) right, while also rehabilitating historical figures that played a significant role in the Holocaust. The present paper draws on Discourse Historical Analysis and concepts such as “calculated ambivalence” and “dog-whistle politics” to unpack the coded meanings and whistles entwined in the discursive provocations and reactions of AUR’s leader, George Simion. Starting from AUR’s press release from January 2022, minimizing the Holocaust, which set in motion the “right-wing populist perpetuum mobile”, I analyze the main discursive strategies, both confrontational and submissive, used by Simion in his effort to “dog-whistle” to AUR’s ultranationalist supporters, while at the same time denying allegations of antisemitism, Holocaust minimization, and fascist sympathies. For a qualitative measure of the success or failure of these strategies, a complementary critical analysis of the reactions of some of the most prominent antisemitic ultranationalist voices in Romania is carried out. Is Simion a skillful “dog-whistler” or a “traitor”? The study shows that there is a thin and fluid line between the two.
Abstract: In this report, we have studied different facets of antisemitism on non-password protected social media outlets with user-generated content. Our results show that antisemitic content exists on all social media platforms. However, the amount of antisemitic content seems to vary with the degree of moderation on each platform. Since 2017, discussions about the ZOG conspiracy narrative have increased, while the Covid-19 pandemic has given rise to new antisemitic conspiracy theories. Conspiracy narratives are closely related to antisemitic stereotypes, which were found in 25% of posts mentioning Jews or Jewishness. The most common stereotypes being that Jews are powerful, deceptive, and manipulative. In our study, almost 35% of all posts mentioning Jews or Jewishness expressed negativity toward Jews. These posts were found mainly on minimally moderated platforms. Jews are also one of the groups that are targeted by toxic language online. Over 4,000 occurrences of explicit Holocaust denial terminology were found during a three-month period. National legislation is difficult to apply to the global internet. A joint effort by governments and platform companies is important to develop techniques that keeps antisemitic content from the internet, while education is necessary to prevent antisemitism before it goes online
Abstract: A la suite de Maurice Bardèche, Paul Rassinier, Robert Faurisson, des hommes, remettant en cause l’authenticité de la Shoah, se sont prévalus du terme de révisionnistes ». Les historiens leur ont opposé – leur travail étant révisionniste par définition – le mot « négationniste ».
Cette histoire est l’histoire d’un délire, mais, comme tout délire, bâti sur une démarche rationnelle. Cependant, derrière cette apparente folie interprétative, un des buts politiques ne tarde pas à se révéler : il s’agit, en France comme dans les autres pays où le négationnisme s’est répandu, de nier les fondements historiques de l’État israélien.
Cet ouvrage retraceavec minutie la genèse d’une idéologie et ses variations dans le temps et dans l’espace. La soutenance d’une thèse d’histoire par l’auteur en est l’origine.
Abstract: This article examines antisemitism and Holocaust denial in contemporary Far-Right German politics with a focus on the party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD). The article argues that the AfD has attempted to ‘tiptoe around Nazism’—a phrase coined by the author, which describes how the party has strategically and haphazardly reacted to scandals as they arise in order to avoid being associated with Nazism and losing moderate voters. The first section investigates how the AfD has reacted to various internal scandals that have damaged its reputation. This analysis encompasses the party’s fraught relationship to the Islamophobic, anti-refugee organization PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamicization of the Occident) as well as the ‘Höcke Affair,’ in which prominent AfD leader Björn Höcke denigrated the Berlin Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe as a ‘monument of shame.’ The second section examines the AfD’s proactive attempts to tiptoe around Nazism by portraying itself as philosemitic and pro-Israel and courting Jewish voters as part of its controversial subgroup Jews in the AfD (Juden in der AfD, JAfD). Here it explains how JAfD members, particularly Jews who immigrated to Germany from the former Soviet Union, have rationalized their paradoxical support for this outwardly antisemitic and denialist party. The conclusion situates the AfD in the broader transatlantic context of Far-Right extremism, highlighting trends that may signal—yet, more likely, will fail to bring about—the party’s demise.
Abstract: Reflecting on the months since the recent October 7 attack, rarely has the theme of Holocaust Memorial Day 2024, ‘The Fragility of Freedom’, felt so poignant. Communities globally experienced the shattering of presumed security, and antisemitic incidents responsively spiked.
Antisemitism rose across both mainstream and fringe social media platforms, and communities resultantly reported a rise in insecurity and fear. CCOA constituent countries have recorded significant rises in antisemitic incidents, including an immediate 240% increase in Germany, a three-fold rise in France, and a marked increase in Italy.
The antisemitism landscape, including Holocaust denial and distortion, had shifted so drastically since October 7 that previous assumptions and understands now demand re-examination. In the run up to Holocaust Memorial Day 2024, this research compilation by members of the Coalition to Counter Online Antisemitism offers a vital contemporary examination of the current and emergent issues facing Holocaust denial and distortion online. As unique forms of antisemitism, denial and distortion are a tool of historical revisionism which specifically targets Jews, eroding Jewish experience and threatening democracy.
Across different geographies and knowledge fields, this compilation unites experts around the central and sustained proliferation of Holocaust denial and distortion on social media.
Abstract: At the “zero hour” of 1945, as they emerged from the ruins of World War II, the ruling élites of what would become Austria's Second Republic were preoccupied with how to cope with the frequently contradictory demands they faced. This included Allied forces that demanded a comprehensive denazification process, a war-weary population that had survived the bombings, displaced persons and survivors of camps returning to their homes and expecting compensation, former Nazis expecting integration, and former Wehrmacht soldiers who also expected to have their sacrifices recognised. Continuities with National Socialism or Austrian fascism (between 1934 and 1938) were (officially) renounced, and the “new” Austrian government announced the rebirth of an Austrian Republic that was morally unburdened by past events or experiences (see Reisigl 2007; Wodak & De Cillia 2007). The first part of the so-called Moscow Declaration of 1943, in which the Allied forces had declared Austria to have been the “first victim of Nazi aggression,” supported this hegemonic narrative (Rathkolb 2009). This definition remained essentially unchallenged until the election of Kurt Wald-heim, a former SA officer, to the Austrian presidency in 1986 (see Wodak et al. 1990; Mitten 1992). The second part of the Moscow Declaration—namely that Austrians were also responsible for Nazi war crimes—was usually swept under the carpet.
Abstract: The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (Claims Conference), commissioned Schoen Cooperman Research to conduct a comprehensive national study of Holocaust Knowledge and Awareness in the United Kingdom
(England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland). Schoen Cooperman Research conducted 2,000 interviews in the United Kingdom with adults aged 18 and over between September 29 – October 17, 2021. The margin of error is two percent.
The United Kingdom study finds that 89 percent say they have definitely heard about the Holocaust, and three quarters (75 percent) know that the Holocaust refers to the extermination of Jewish people. That being said, there are significant gaps in Holocaust Knowledge and Awareness in the United Kingdom.
The majority of UK respondents surveyed (52 percent) do not know that six million Jews were killed in the Holocaust. Further, a majority of UK citizens (57 percent) believe that fewer people seem to care about the Holocaust today than they used to, and 56 percent believe that something like the Holocaust could happen again today.
Abstract: The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (Claims Conference) commissioned Schoen Cooperman Research to conduct a comprehensive national study of Holocaust Knowledge and Awareness in the Netherlands.
Schoen Cooperman Research conducted 2,000 interviews across the Netherlands. The margin of error for the study is 2 percent. This memo presents our key research findings and compares these findings with prior Claims Conference studies, which were conducted in five other countries.
Our latest study finds significant gaps in Holocaust knowledge and awareness in the Netherlands, as well as widespread concern that Holocaust denial and Holocaust distortion are problems in the Netherlands today.
We found that 23 percent of Dutch Millennials and Gen Z respondents believe the Holocaust is a myth, or that it occurred but the number of Jews who died has been greatly exaggerated – the highest percentage among Millennials and Gen Z respondents in all six countries the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against
Germany has previously studied.
Further, 29 percent of Dutch respondents, including 37 percent of Dutch Millennials and Gen Z respondents believe that two million or fewer Jews were killed during the Holocaust. Moreover, despite the fact that more than 70 percent of the Netherlands’ Jewish population perished during the Holocaust, a majority of Dutch respondents (53
percent), including 60 percent of Dutch Millennials and Gen Z, do not cite the Netherlands as a country where the Holocaust took place. Finally, 53 percent of Dutch respondents believe that something like the Holocaust
could happen again today.
Abstract: The historiography and the memory of the Holocaust, of the Romanians, and of Romanian Jews can be understood only through knowledge of the peculiarities of the Holocaust in Romania within the wider context of Holocaust Studies. Certain characteristic features of the history of the modernization of Romania in the twentieth century turned the “Jewish problem” into an ideologically active element, present on a large scale in the public sphere. Unquestionably, the tragedy of the Romanian Jewry was bound up with the European context, but it also had its own manifestations because of the political regime in Romania from 1938 to 1944. Six decades ago, Lucretiu Pătrăşcanu accurately remarked that “anti-Semitism in Romania still remains a Romanian phenomenon, which should be examined in its specific nature, and not only in what it imitates” (1944, 171). Romanians never embraced this research project; instead, they explained the Romanian Holocaust by blaming it on imported Fascism. One of the most frequently invoked reasons for this neglect is the ideology of national Communism; in this view, everything Romanian was good, while the origin of evil was always from outside. According to this preconception, risen to the rank of a “theory” of history, atrocities either did not occur in Romania from 1938 to 1944 or, if they happened, were caused by external forces.
Abstract: In den meisten islamischen Ländern fanden - anders als in Europa - keine gezielten Ermordungen von Jüdinnen und Juden oder Deportationen in Todeslager statt. Dieser Band geht der Frage nach, wie Musliminnen und Muslime als scheinbar "Unbeteiligte" zum Holocaust stehen. Behandelt werden unter anderem die Teilnahme von Muslimen am Holocaustgedenken, die Wahrnehmung der Schoah im arabischen und türkischen Raum sowie unter muslimischen Jugendlichen und die wachsende Verwendung antisemitischer Parolen.
Die Einstellungen von Muslimen zum Holocaust reichen von Mitgefühl und Anteilnahme über Gleichgültigkeit und die Frage "Was hat das mit uns zu tun?" bis zu Verharmlosung oder List es, so das Fazit, in der schulischen und außerschulischen Bildung umfassend über die Geschichte aufzuklären und dabei Perspektiven von Migrantinnen und Migranten stärker zu berücksichtigen.
Mit Beiträgen von Joëlle Allouche-Benayoun, Rifat Bali, Georges Bensoussan, Mehmet Can, Monique Eckmann, Remco Ensel, Evelien Gans, Karoline Georg, Ruth Hatlapa, Günther Jikeli, Philip Spencer, Kim Robin Stoller, Annemarike Stremmelaar, Sara Valentina di Palma, Esther Webman, Juliane Wetzel und Michael Whine
Abstract: This article addresses the persistence of anti-Semitism in Romania, placed in the context of some recent debates concerning the memory of the Holocaust in the country, as well as in the area of Central and Eastern Europe more broadly. It argues that, despite significant improvements in terms of legislation, the memory of the Holocaust remains a highly contested issue in contemporary Romania, torn between the attempts to join in the European memory of the Holocaust and local legacies that on the one hand focus primarily on the suffering of Romanians under the communist regime, and on the other perform a symbolic “denationalisation” of the Jewish minority in the country, whose own suffering is thus excised from national memory. It does so by focusing in particular on the debates surrounding the adoption of Law 217/2015, meant to clarify earlier legislation on Holocaust denial, and comparing them with those prompted by the Ukrainian “memory laws” passed in the same year. Taking into account both the national and international reactions to these very different pieces of legislation, the article shows the still-persisting discrepancy between a (mostly Western) “European” memory of the legacy of the twentieth century and local memory topoi characteristic of the countries that were part of the former socialist bloc.
Abstract: The paper argues that the recent history of Holocaust Studies in Lithuania is characterized by major provision (for research, teaching and publishing) coming from state-sponsored agencies, particularly a state commission on both Nazi and Soviet crimes. Problematically, the commission is itself simultaneously active in revising the narrative per se of the Holocaust, principally according to the ‘Double Genocide’ theories of the 2008 Prague Declaration that insists on ‘equalization’ of Nazi and Soviet crimes. Lithuanian agencies have played a disproportionate role in that declaration, in attempts at legislating some of its components in the European Parliament and other EU bodies, and ‘export’ of the revisionist model to the West. Much international support for solid independent Lithuanian Holocaust researchers and NGOs was cut off as the state commission set out determinedly to dominate the field, which is perceived to have increasing political implications in East-West politics. But this history must not obscure an
impressive list of local accomplishments. A tenaciously devoted group of Holocaust survivors themselves, trained as academics or professionals in other fields, educated themselves to publish books, build a mini-museum (that has defied the revisionists) within the larger state-sponsored Jewish museum, and worked to educate both pupils and the wider public. Second, a continuing stream of non-Jewish Lithuanian scholars, educators, documentary
film makers and others have at various points valiantly defied state pressures and contributed significantly and selflessly. The wider picture is that Holocaust Studies has been built most successfully by older Holocaust survivors and younger non-Jews, in both groups often by those coming to work in it from other specialties out of a passion for justice and truth in history, while lavishly financed state initiatives have been anchored in the inertia of nationalist regional politics.
Abstract: The successful incorporation of Eastern European states into the European Union, NATO and the Western pro-democratic family of nations usually focuses on the import of ideas, governmental and societal structures, and products, from West to East, and of large movements of East European populations westward. Often overlooked in the export of ideas has been the intensive, expensive and industrial-scale effort to rewrite the history of the Holocaust and World War II in the direction of Double Genocide and Holocaust Obfuscation, a trend spurred on dramatically by the decline in East-West relations and the increasingly frightening movement of Russia toward revanchist authoritarianism that threatens its neighbors. The paper argues that no good can or will come from the adaptation of models of bogus nationalist history rooted in far-right, ultranationalist thought in the liberated states of Eastern Europe. Double Genocide and its corollaries as currently practiced and underwritten by state budgets, represent a threat to history, freedom of thought and speech, equal rights and ultimately, a ruse to insert far-right academic revisionism disguised as anti-Russian activity into Western discourse.
Topics: Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Muslim, Antisemitism: Far right, Anti-Zionism, Holocaust Denial, Holocaust Memorials, Holocaust Education, Holocaust Commemoration, Holocaust, Main Topic: Holocaust and Memorial, Jewish - Muslim Relations
Abstract: This article analyzes contemporary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion in Eastern Europe. The main argument is that Brown and Red, Nazism and Communism, respectively are not at all equal. In Eastern Europe, in particular, antisemitic ideology is grounded on the rehabilitation of anticommunist national “heroes.” The history of the Holocaust is thereby distorted. Based on Maurice Halbwachs’s theory of “social frameworks,” the author shows how “competitive martyrdom,” the “Double Genocide” ideology, and “Holocaust obfuscation” are intertwined. Empirically, the paper examines these concepts in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Serbia and Croatia, and Romania.
