Abstract: Der 7. Oktober 2023 ist insbesondere für Israel, aber auch für Jüdinnen und Juden in aller Welt eine Zäsur. Nichts ist mehr so, wie es davor war. Das Hamas-Massaker richtete sich nicht nur gegen Israel, nicht nur gegen Jüdinnen und Juden, sondern gegen die gesamte westliche Welt und ihre Idee von Freiheit – es ist Israels 9/11. Antisemitische Straftaten sind seit dem 7. Oktober 2023 weltweit explodiert, vor allem in Europa, in den USA. Und auch in Deutschland befinden sich die jüdischen Gemeinden in einem Ausnahmezustand – seit einem Jahr.
Der Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland hat zum Jahrestag des Hamas-Massakers nach der ersten Analyse vom Dezember 2023 erneut ein Lagebild über die Auswirkungen des Terrors und des Krieges in Israel auf die jüdischen Gemeinden in Deutschland erstellt. Die Grundlage für die Ergebnisse des Lagebilds lieferte eine Umfrage unter den Führungspersönlichkeiten der jüdischen Gemeinden in Deutschland, an der sich über 90 Prozent beteiligt haben. Die Gemeinden bieten in dieser psychischen Extremsituation für Jüdinnen und Juden einen Halt. Zwei Drittel der Führungspersönlichkeiten sprechen jedoch von negativen Auswirkungen des Krieges in Gaza auf ihre Gemeinden – ein konstant hoher Wert. Personell, emotional und organisatorisch sind die Gemeinden am Limit. Das Leben für Jüdinnen und Juden hat sich laut den Angaben stark verändert, jüdisches Leben ist weniger sichtbar und fast die Hälfte der Gemeinden waren im Jahr 2024 von antisemitischen Vorfällen betroffen.
Zentralratspräsident Dr. Josef Schuster sagt zu den Ergebnissen des Lagebilds: „Die Lage der jüdischen Gemeinden ein Jahr nach dem 7. Oktober treibt mich um, sie sollte uns alle aufrütteln. Ja, die Gemeinden sind für die Mitglieder da, das Gemeinschaftsgefühl steigt, es finden wieder mehr Veranstaltungen statt, man passt sich an. Doch auf dieser Gewöhnung an einen Ausnahmezustand liegt ein Schatten. Niemals darf ein solcher Zustand Normalität werden. Für die Gemeinden kann dies nicht Normalität werden. Unsere Gesellschaft darf nicht zulassen, dass jüdisches Leben weniger sichtbar wird; Jüdinnen und Juden weniger sichtbar werden. Sicherheitszäune bieten Schutz, sind aber keine dauerhafte Lösung. Wir sollten uns daran erinnern, wo die Verteidigung unserer offenen Gesellschaft anfängt.“
Abstract: Nach 2023 und 2024 hat der Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland am 1. Mai 2026 zum dritten Mal ein Lagebild der Jüdischen Gemeinden in Deutschland herausgegeben. Das Lagebild basiert auf der Befragung der Führungspersönlichkeiten von 102 Jüdischen Gemeinden und Landesverbänden und hat damit einen repräsentativen Charakter.
Gut zweieinhalb Jahre nach dem Hamas-Massaker vom 7. Oktober in Israel ist der Ausnahmezustand für Jüdinnen und Juden in Deutschland zu einem bedrückenden Dauer-Krisenzustand geworden. „Nach dem explosionsartigen Anstieg des Antisemitismus in Folge des 7. Oktober hat sich eine ‚neue Normalität‘ herausgebildet”, konstatiert Dr. Josef Schuster, Präsident des Zentralrats der Juden in Deutschland. „Eine Lage, in der Jüdische Gemeinden permanent geschützt werden müssen und der Antisemitismus als Teil des öffentlichen Raums eine Normalisierung erfahren hat. Diese Zustände sind unhaltbar.“
Zwei Entwicklungen stechen im Lagebild besonders alarmierend hervor: der drastische Rückgang der gesellschaftlichen Solidarität und die Verdrängung jüdischen Lebens aus der Öffentlichkeit.
Nahmen im Jahr 2023 noch 62 Prozent der Gemeinden eine Solidarität aus der Zivilgesellschaft wahr, ist dieser Wert auf erschütternde 35 Prozent abgefallen. Fühlten sich die Gemeinden anfangs noch von der Mitte der Gesellschaft getragen, sehen sie sich nun zunehmend im Stich gelassen, während Judenhass, oft getarnt als vermeintlich legitime „Israelkritik“, tief in der bürgerlichen Mitte Anschluss findet. Gerade dort, wo jetzt Zivilcourage nötig wäre, verzeichnet das Lagebild der Jüdischen Gemeinden in Deutschland einen massiven Rückgang der gesellschaftlichen Unterstützung.
Die alltägliche Bedrohung führt dazu, dass 68 Prozent der jüdischen Gemeinschaft das Leben in Deutschland verglichen mit der Zeit vor dem 7. Oktober 2023 als unsicherer wahrnehmen. Um sich zu schützen, ziehen sich Jüdinnen und Juden zunehmend aus dem öffentlichen Raum zurück, verheimlichen ihre Identität und verzichten auf das offene Tragen von Symbolen wie dem Davidstern oder der Kippa. Dies betrifft insbesondere Kinder und Jugendliche. In den vergangenen zwölf Monaten mussten zudem 21 Prozent der Gemeinden Veranstaltungen aus Sicherheitsgründen absagen.
Der Waffenstillstand in Gaza brachte für zwei Drittel der Befragten (66 Prozent) keine spürbare Erleichterung der Sicherheitslage. Währenddessen nutzen Extremisten neue Eskalationen wie den Krieg gegen das iranische Mullah-Regime sofort als Vorwand für ausufernden Hass. Dr. Josef Schuster macht deutlich: „Der Krieg im Nahen Osten war immer nur ein Vorwand, niemals ein Grund für antisemitische Übergriffe und Hetze in Deutschland.“
Die andauernde Belastung führt zu einer tiefen Resignation: Nur noch 13 Prozent der Gemeinden schätzen die Zukunft für jüdisches Leben in Deutschland positiv ein. „Die Ergebnisse dieser repräsentativen Erhebung unter den Jüdischen Gemeinden in Deutschland müssen für Entscheidungsträger und die Gesellschaft gleichermaßen Alarmsignal und Ansporn sein. Der Judenhass hat sich in Deutschland normalisiert und nur enorme Kraftanstrengungen können diesen Trend umkehren. In der jüdischen Gemeinschaft schwindet das Vertrauen in diese Trendumkehr zusehends“, stellt Dr. Josef Schuster abschließend fest.
Abstract: Der Beitrag untersucht, inwiefern die Betrachtung von institutionellem Antisemitismus und von Antisemitismus in Institutionen hilfreich ist, um aktuelle antisemitische Dynamiken angemessen zu beschreiben. Er liefert konkrete
empirische Befunde dazu, wie Betroffene Antisemitismus in (ausgewählten) Institutionen erleben: Ausgehend von Interviews und zivilgesellschaftlich dokumentierten Vorfällen wird gezeigt, wie wirkmächtig entsprechende
antisemitische Erfahrungen für die Betroffenen sind. Auf der Grundlage des Forschungsstands und einer Begriffsbestimmung, die zwischen institutionellem Antisemitismus und Antisemitismus in Institutionen unterscheidet, wird die Bedeutung von Institutionen für antisemitische Dynamiken herausgestellt; dafür wird das Konzept der Gelegenheitsstrukturen erläutert und genutzt. Schilderungen aus qualitativen Interviews mit Jüdinnen_Juden verdeutlichen und konkretisieren, wie Betroffene Antisemitismus in Institutionen erleben und welche Rolle institutionelle Routinen, Regeln und Normen spielen. Der Beitrag argumentiert, dass der Blick darauf einen wichtigen Beitrag leistet, um gegenwärtigen Antisemitismus zu verstehen.
Abstract: Pearn Kandola’s Antisemitism and Islamophobia at Work report (2024) is a comprehensive study in which over 1000 Muslim and Jewish employees participated, either through in-depth focus groups or our survey, to shine a light on their experiences of antisemitism and Islamophobia in the workplace since October 7th 2023.
Late last year, we published our groundbreaking Religion At Work (2023) report, the largest of its kind. It explored the experiences of people of faith in the workplace, highlighting the difficulty for employees of any religion to express their faith at work.
Released in November 2023, a question we were increasingly faced with as time went on was the impact on Muslim and Jewish employees, in particular, since October 7th. However, the data for this momentous report was gathered and analysed before the current Israel-Gaza conflict, which could tell us little to answer this question.
As a result, we carried out a new piece of research, designed to look at the:
Extent to which Jewish employees experience antisemitism in the workplace;
Extent to which Muslim employees experience Islamophobia in the workplace;
Impact of the Israel-Gaza conflict on them
Actions that organisations can take to ensure people feel safe and included in workplaces
The research was in two parts:
Firstly, a survey was carried out in June 2024 in which 500 Jewish and 500 Muslim employees participated, followed by in-depth interviews with 20 people, 10 of each faith.
The report closes with key recommendations for employers to better support Muslim and Jewish employees by research author Professor Binna Kandola OBE.
Abstract: Following last week’s horrific antisemitic attack in Golders Green in north London, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer called on the public to “open their eyes to Jewish pain”. Yet our research suggests that the PM and his government might do better to open their own eyes to what underpins the pain many British Jews experience today: the state’s failure to honour its social contract with this minority.
Since the 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel and the subsequent Israel-Gaza war, Jews in Britain have experienced a growing tide of antisemitism. Over the course of 2025, 3,700 instances of antisemitic hate were reported, up 4 per cent from the previous year and 14 per cent lower than the highest ever annual total of 4,298 antisemitic incidents reported in 2023. Incidents include last week’s Golders Green attack, in which two men were stabbed; an arson attack at former synagogue in east London; an attack on the Jewish ambulance service Hatzola; an attempted firebombing at a synagogue in Kenton, London; and a terrorist attack on Manchester’s Heaton Park synagogue in October 2025, which killed two Jewish people and seriously injured three others.
In the wake of this alarming rise in antisemitism, focus groups we conducted between December 2025 and March 2026 with 43 British Jews across the UK revealed severely declining trust in Britain’s major institutions. The oldest non-Christian minority in the country, the Jewish community is less than 0.5 per cent of the UK population and includes both practising and non-practising members from a range of denominational affiliations and political views.
But despite their differences, people repeatedly expressed a similar stark sense of betrayal. Focus group participants stressed that while they were fulfilling their side of the bargain—complying with the law, paying taxes, contributing to civic life—the state increasingly was failing to provide them with protection and treat them fairly. “The pillars in the society we live in”, bemoaned a man in his 70s from Birmingham, “are letting us down”.
Abstract: In this report:
According to new data from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, 742 people emigrated to Israel (‘made aliyah’) from the UK in 2025 – the highest annual count for over 40 years. This report examines the recent migration data in its historical context to assess whether this latest figure represents a genuine shift and if so, whether it is being fuelled by concerns about antisemitism in Britain.
Some of the key findings in the report:
742 people emigrated to Israel (‘made aliyah’) from the UK in 2025 – the highest annual count for over 40 years.
Over the past 20 years, annual counts have remained within a fairly narrow range, from about 400 to about 740.
Taking the past three years together, an average of 566 British Jews made aliyah per annum – close to the annual average over the past two decades.
About 2 Jews per 1,000 in the UK Jewish population currently make aliyah each year, somewhat higher than the equivalent figure for Canada (0.7), but considerably lower than in France (6.4), and orders of magnitude lower than the levels associated with major cases of Jewish flight during 20th Century crises or periods of acute uncertainty.
Since October 7, 2023, British Jews have shown a small but marked increase in their likelihood of making aliyah.
Younger people, orthodox Jews and those most affected by antisemitism are most likely to say they are considering making aliyah in the coming five years.
Aliyah, like all forms of migration, is also informed by socioeconomic conditions; there is clear evidence that factors such as unemployment rates are key determinants in people’s decisions.
Migration is not a one-way street: the number of people living in the UK who were born in Israel rose from 12,229 in 2001 to 23,152 in 2021, a net increase of 10,923 over those 20 years.
Topics: Antisemitism: Right-Wing, Antisemitism: Muslim, Attitudes to Jews, Attitudes to Israel, Islamophobia, Antisemitism: Jewish Perceptions and Experiences, Holocaust Commemoration, Authoritarianism, Main Topic: Holocaust and Memorial, Populism, Politics: Political Parties, Politics
Abstract: In the early 2020s, two seemingly unrelated political developments came to a head in the Netherlands. First, in January 2020, then-Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the center-right VVD party issued an official apology on behalf of the Dutch government for its complicity in the deaths of more than 100,000 Dutch Jews in the Holocaust. Second, in the November 2023 national elections, Geert Wilders’s anti-Muslim, pro-Israel PVV party won the highest percentage of votes, leading to the formation of a far-right cabinet under Prime Minister Dick Schoof in July 2024. In this article, we argue that this double consolidation of the historical legacy of the Holocaust and of racist, right-wing politics has put Dutch Jews in a dangerous bind. On the one hand, the memory of the Holocaust and the contemporary safety of Dutch Jews have been elevated as a paramount concern in Dutch institutional, legal, and political life. On the other hand, Dutch Jews have been positioned as the perennial would-be victims of violent antisemitism—virtually always, it is falsely imagined, at the hands of Dutch Muslims. The historical persecution of the Jews in the Holocaust is now used to underwrite a “proprietary” form of Jewish victimhood in the present: non-Jewish white Dutch people position themselves as the saviors of Jews, and thereby claim ownership over their past, their collective fate, and the political means to secure their safety.
Abstract: This article explores hate crime targeting three specific religious groups in the United Kingdom: Muslims, Jews and Hindus. Drawing on qualitative interviews with victims, the research considers both hate crimes and noncriminal incidents such as bias and discrimination. The central aim is to examine how individuals from these groups perceive and respond to their experiences of victimization. The article presents data from interviews with 30 participants and three focus groups, focusing particularly on the participants’ immediate reactions to incidents of hate crime. The research identifies both similarities and differences in how each group responded at the time of the incident. Participants described their immediate reactions in one of four ways: inaction (outwardly not reacting), seeking some form of recourse, verbally confronting the perpetrator or retaliating with violence. Notably, none of the Jewish or Hindu participants reported responding with verbal confrontation, retaliation or physical aggression; their typical response was inaction. In contrast, Muslim participants exhibited a broader range of immediate responses, including verbal confrontation, physical retaliation and seeking recourse. This article is the first to offer insight into the varied immediate responses to hate crime among these religious communities in the United Kingdom.
Abstract: Die Problematik des politisch-islamischen Antisemitismus (PIA) hat in den letzten Jahren zunehmend Aufmerksamkeit erfahren. In diesem Kapitel gehen wir der oftmals wenig berücksichtigten Frage nach, wie Jüdinnen:Juden die aktuelle Bedrohungslage erleben und ausdeuten. Dies untersuchen wir aus Perspektive einer phänomenologisch orientierten Wissenssoziologie mittels eines Mixed-Methods-Ansatzes. Unsere Studie umfasst die Analyse von 21 problemzentrierten Interviews mit Jüdinnen:Juden sowie die Auswertung eines Online-Surveys mit 295 jüdischen Befragten. Die Interviewanalyse ergab, dass das Erleben von PIA strukturidentisch zu anderen Antisemitismusformen verläuft. Die alltägliche Konfrontation führt zum Erleben dreier Begrenzungen: Im Vorfeld der möglichen Konfrontation ist es problematisch, dass diese nicht immer vollumfänglich antizipiert werden kann. Kommt es zur Konfrontation, sind selbstgewählte Alltagsrelevanzen eingegrenzt. Im weiteren Konfrontationsverlauf kann sich zudem die eigene Handlungsfähigkeit als begrenzt erweisen. Die Auswertung der quantitativen Daten kann hieran anknüpfend zeigen, dass viele Befragte von Begegnungen mit PIA berichten, den sie vor allem durch Aussagen, Sprache und Kontext der Täter:innen identifizieren. 29 % der Befragten gaben an, in den letzten zehn Jahren PIA in Form von Beleidigung, Vandalismus oder physischer Gewalt erlebt zu haben. Bezüglich der Bedrohungs- und Problemwahrnehmung unterscheiden sie deutlich zwischen „Muslimen“ und „radikalen Muslimen“ und sehen PIA als großes gesellschaftliches Problem an, das ihre Sicherheit und alltägliche Lebenswelt beeinflusst.
Abstract: This research paper examines safety perceptions among Jewish minorities at European places of worship (PoWs) between October 2023 and April 2024. The study utilizes PROTONE survey data from Belgium (N = 571), Germany (N = 734), Spain (N = 1198), and Italy (N = 895), specifically comparing 79 Jewish and 3,318 non-Jewish respondents. Qualitative components include 43 interviews with faith leaders (including 16 Rabbis) and five focus groups conducted in Brussels, Berlin, Rome, and Madrid. Grounded in postsecularism, vulnerability assessment models, and securitization theories, the research explores how threats and security measures shape feelings of insecurity. Key findings indicate that violent attacks and property damage strongly predict perceived unsafety. Comparative analysis reveals that Jewish respondents perceive significantly higher levels of anti-Semitic hostility and hate crimes than non-Jewish groups perceive regarding their own communities. While positive community and authority relations marginally mitigate fear, structural vulnerabilities like outdated infrastructure persist. Attitudes toward security vary; CCTV is universally accepted, but armed guards raise concerns about carization. Generational differences appear, with younger Jewish individuals reporting notably higher anxiety and avoidance behaviors. The study contextualizes these findings within broader socio-cultural and political processes, highlighting the dual role of Jewish PoWs as essential and sacred sites for spiritual fulfillment and robust local communal resilience.
Abstract: Antisemitism is still a significant problem in Polish society. This is the conclusion that emerges from the quantitative data from previous years and the statements of our interviewees.
Within the Jewish community, members often report encountering antisemitism in the form of unsavoury jokes and stereotypes rather than overt discrimination. However, conversations around the Holocaust and Polish-Jewish history frequently lead to antisemitic stereotypes and hate speech. Interestingly, the Holocaust is often the subject of jokes. This may be attributable to the perception of Jews as a historical minority who once lived in Poland.
In educational settings, courses on the Jewish community are overwhelmingly historical, primarily focusing on World War II. Almost all respondents, except non-Jewish youth, agree that contemporary Jewish topics are seldom covered in schools. This gap in multicultural education has led to a lack of understanding about nondiscrimination and minority-related issues across various age groups in Polish society.
While younger generations appear to be more tolerant toward minorities and more open to learning about them, the term "Jew" is still reportedly used as an insult among them. Discrimination is not limited to the Jewish community; focus group respondents also identified Ukrainians, Roma, people of colour, and the LGBTQ+ community as other discriminated groups. Despite the majority of focus group participants being women, only one person in each group cited women as a discriminated-against minority.
Abstract: In general, the Jewish population in Hungary has a high level of education and is in a good position socially and financially, according to the available literature and our interviewees. Those who identify as Jews are mostly non-religious and consider themselves predominantly European citizens or equally Jewish and Hungarian. According to research, the level of antisemitism in Hungary increased significantly around 2010, presumably due to the rise in popularity of the far-right Jobbik party. Since 2015, the available data show that the level of antisemitism has not changed significantly. At the same time, most interviewees reported a general increase in antisemitism in the country, citing the internet as the primary cause, as well as the family background, deficiencies of the education system, the polarisation of society, and the government‘s Soros campaign. In Hungary, antisemitism is most often manifested in the form of conspiracy theories, but other forms are also present (e.g. emotional antisemitism, new antisemitism). According to the available data, the most common form of antisemitism is hate speech. The number of hate crimes is negligible. At the political level, antisemitism emerged from the second half of the 2000s in connection with Jobbik and has been one of the tools of far-right parties (currently Mi Hazánk – Our Homeland) ever since, albeit in a less direct form than before, disguised by coded speech and appearing mainly as conspiracy theories. Although the Fidesz government announced zero tolerance towards antisemitism in 2013, it has focused its communication on several issues related to antisemitism in recent years. These include the campaign against George Soros, the glorification of antisemitic politicians (e.g. Miklós Horthy) and artists (e.g. Albert Wass) between the two world wars, the distortion of the memory of the Holocaust, and the fight against the global external enemy. Antisemitism is also present in the sports fan milieu, primarily in the football fan scene and especially in the ultra scene. According to a 2017 survey, half of Hungarian Jews have experienced antisemitism in their lifetime, and all of our Jewish interviewees mentioned such experiences. Many of them highlighted the government‘s antisemitism-related doubletalk’s negative effects on their sense of security. While antisemitism is undoubtedly present in Hungary, research and interviewees also suggest that society is much more prejudiced towards other minorities, especially the Roma, the LGBTQ+, and migrants. According to first-line practitioners, the extent to which antisemitism is present among students depends on the school. When it appears among students, it is primarily present in verbal forms, and often, there are no real antisemitic sentiments in the background. Several interviewees identified education as one of the most important tools to reduce antisemitism.
Abstract: Based on interviews, the purpose of the article is to study how Roma and Jews experience everyday violations and hate crime and how the victims deal with this exposure. The victims’ narratives are analysed using, for example, theories and research on anti-Semitism, anti-Ziganism, everyday racism and power relations. During the post-war period Jews have largely been seen by the majority population as belonging to the white ”Swedishness”, while the Roma belong to one of many deeply despised minorities that often are exposed to everyday violations and hate crime. However, there is anti-Semitism in Sweden that in certain situations and circumstances is explicitly expressed in the form of abuse, threats or violence. The article describes and analyses how the victims of hate crime deal with this exposure and how the crimes affect them. Some Roma and Jews ”are forced” to live a kind of double life because they are afraid of being ”exposed” as a Roma or a Jew. For example, Jewish and Roma symbols are often spontaneously concealed. The damage that hate crime causes is spread beyond the individual to the victim’s entire group, a form of ”message crimes”. The consequences for the individual concerned can be very serious. Roma and Jewish groups as a whole can also be affected by the restrictions imposed on their lives.
Abstract: This article examines the impact of the 2023–2025 Israeli–Palestinian conflict—particularly the aftermath of the October 7 Hamas attack, subsequent war in Gaza, and the international public opinion reactions to those events—on Jewish community in Krakow, Poland. While pro-Palestinian protests in Poland were limited compared to those in Western countries, they marked an unprecedented local development, sparking debate within Jewish circles. Using Krakow as a case study, the article explores whether and how these events shifted discourse around Zionism, Israel, and Jewish identity. It employs discourse analysis, supplemented by comparative methodology, the study relies on the data from the semi-structured interviews, and analyses of the official statements and media report as well as the social media discourses. The article addresses two questions: (1) how and why did the Jewish community in Krakow respond to the escalation of the Middle East conflict and the subsequent events, particularly pro-Palestinian activism? (2) do the observed dynamics reflect global trends or local particularities?
