Abstract: Antisemitism increasingly circulates through digital networked publics where distant conflicts are reinterpreted as locally meaningful moral dramas. Drawing on qualitative discourse analysis of four influential Telegram channels based in Russia’s regions of Tatarstan and Dagestan, this article examines how Israel-related antisemitic narratives transform the war in Gaza from a remote tragedy into a local meaning-making event. Combining cultural trauma theory, social identity theory, and scapegoating approaches, the study conceptualizes antisemitism not merely as a pre-existing prejudice but as a symbolic repertoire that assigns roles of victims, perpetrators, and witnesses, thereby stabilizing collective identities and establishing moral boundaries. The analysis identifies a hybrid narrative framework in which Soviet and post-Soviet anti-Zionist and conspiratorial tropes, including Nazi analogies and Holocaust inversion, intersect with contemporary anti-Western and pan-Islamic narratives, alongside blood libel, dehumanization, “Jewish privilege,” and self-victimization. Despite stark differences in socioeconomic, demographic, and institutional contexts, Dagestani and Tatar channels reproduce similar binary interpretative schemas. The findings show how networked scapegoating and mediated cultural trauma enable antisemitic discourse to flourish in semi-public, non-extremist spaces, organizing perceptions of global politics and legitimizing hostility toward an out-group while also illuminating broader dynamics of reactive conflict spillover and moralized enemy construction in digital environments.
Abstract: Crisis situations foster the proliferation of various conspiracy beliefs, especially in the current high-choice media environment. Drawing on a national survey (n = 1,000), we show that in Romania, in the context of the current Hamas–Israel conflict, antisemitic attitudes, sourcing news from social media rather than from mainstream media and frequent church attendance correlate with stronger beliefs in conspiracy narratives. Antisemitism is the most powerful predictor, but only in the form of conviction that Israel controls the media, politics, money and power. Additionally, gender and age are also significant correlates, with younger women more prone to such beliefs.
Abstract: In November 2024, violence following a football match in Amsterdam was framed as evidence of migrant men’s failed integration into Dutch society. The frame achieved discursive dominance, anchoring public debate, and was adopted by the government before empirical substantiation. We examine the affective-discursive processes behind the frame’s salience amid conjunctural conditions and heightened collective anxieties. We conceptualize anxiety-fear arrangements as configurations of affective relations between socio-material elements. Frames, as meaning-making devices, organize meanings and orient emotions, shaping relations within arrangements. Through a multimodal discourse analysis of political statements, parliamentary transcripts and media items, we trace how the failed integration frame organized meanings, channeling collective anxieties onto tangible objects of fear: migranticized bodies, objects and places. The frame became salient through precedence, emotional intensity, cultural resonance and moral certainty. Empirically, we illustrate how bodies are ‘migranticized’ through framing. Conceptually, the anxiety-fear arrangement provides an operative template to understand meaning-making in conjunctures.
Abstract: Der 7. Oktober 2023, der brutale Terrorangriff der Hamas auf Israel mit rund 1200 Ermordeten und hunderten Verschleppten und der anschließende Krieg in Gaza markieren auch hierzulande eine Zäsur. Unmittelbar nach Bekanntwerden des Terrorangriffs der Hamas auf Israel am 7. Oktober und des kurz darauf beginnenden
und zum Veröffentlichungszeitpunkt dieser Publikation noch laufenden Krieges in Gaza, erreichte die Bildungsstätte Anne Frank eine Flut an Anfragen. Insbesondere Lehrkräfte und andere an Schule beschäftigte Fachkräfte meldeten sich mit der Bitte nach Beratung und Fortbildung zum Umgang mit Terror, Krieg und den sich daran entzündenden Folgen hierzulande.
Unser Team reagierte schnell mit einer Vielzahl ad hoc durchgeführter digitaler Gesprächsangebote, mit Fortbildungen vor Ort, mit Veranstaltungen, Publikationen und Materialien. Den ersten Jahrestag des
7. Oktobers 2023 nahmen wir zum Anlass, die aktuellen Bedarfe an Schulen systematisch zu erfassen – eine Lücke, die wir mit einer Online-Umfrage unter Lehrkräften schließen. Ziel war es zu erfassen, ob und in welcher Weise der 7. Oktober 2023 und der Gaza-Krieg ein Jahr später noch Thema in den Schulen sind, wie die Lehrkräfte damit umgehen und welche Unterstützung sie sich dabei wünschen.
Zwischen dem 09.09.24 und 23.09.24 haben sich 159 Lehrkräfte aller Schulformen, vor allem aus Gymnasien, Berufs- und Gesamtschulen und mit 98 Prozent überwiegend aus Hessen, an der Umfrage beteiligt. Ihnen und ihren aussagekräftigen Antworten, die wir auf den folgenden Seiten präsentieren, gilt unser ausdrücklicher
Dank. Ihre Antworten zeigen, dass dem Thema große Wichtigkeit beigemessen wird und einzelne Lehrkräfte im Rahmen ihrer Möglichkeiten versuchen, den sogenannten Nahostkonflikt zu thematisieren – dass strukturelle Zwänge, insbesondere mangelnde zeitliche Kapazitäten, einen angemessenen Umgang mit der Thematik
aber erschweren.
Die Umfrage bestätigt uns in unserer Forderung nach einer Bildungsoffensive, die Schulen in all ihrer Heterogenität dazu befähigt und sie mit den entsprechenden zeitlichen und materiellen Ressourcen ausstattet, den Nahostkonflikt und andere komplexe globale Konflikte unserer Zeit, deren Geschichte und gesellschaftspolitische Dimensionen besser verstehen und einordnen zu können.
Ziel muss es sein, dass Lehrkräfte sprechfähig sind zu den Themen, die ihre Schüler*innen und uns als Gesellschaft bewegen – und entsprechend der vielfältigen Identitäten und Positionen im Raum Schule sind Perspektivwechsel dafür unumgänglich. Insbesondere müssen dabei auch der digitale Raum und dessen besondere Dynamiken1
mit adressiert werden – die Umfrageergebnisse zeigen überdeutlich, dass es an Strategien des Umgangs mit den Sozialen Medien mangelt, hier bedarf es einer konsequenten Verzahnung medienpädagogischer Angebote mit Inhalten der politischen Bildung.
Abstract: We provide a comparative analysis of how European radical left parties (RLPs) politicise the Israel – Palestine and Russia – Ukraine conflicts. Examining the positions of 25 RLPs, we test four hypotheses examining variation in Israel-hostility, Russia-related stances, cross-conflict coherence, and the dynamics of war fatigue. Patterns of politicisation are complex and there is no unified party family response. We show that while no RLP is Israel-friendly, levels of Israel-hostility vary substantially and tend to intensify as the Gaza war persists. By contrast, positions on Russia – Ukraine remain deeply divided, with no linear shift towards Russia-friendliness. Ideological subtype shapes, but does not determine, party responses, while broader contextual factors, most notably the ‘Trump effect’, repoliticise questions of European security. However, further politicisation is limited by the weakness of cross-conflict coherence. Several parties express consistent anti-imperialist logic in their response, but most disaggregate their critiques. RLP foreign policy emerges as ideologically-driven but contextually responsive.
Topics: Holocaust: Education, Antisemitism: Education against, Curriculum and Schoolbooks, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Reactions and Consequences Outside Region, Israeli-Arab Conflict: Reactions and Consequences Outside Region, Jewish Relations With Non-Jews: Jewish - Muslim Relations, Islamophobia, Main Topic: Holocaust Legacies and Memorial, Schools: Non-Jewish, Teachers, Teaching and Pedagogy
Abstract: This article examines the impact of the 2023–2025 Israeli–Palestinian conflict—particularly the aftermath of the October 7 Hamas attack, subsequent war in Gaza, and the international public opinion reactions to those events—on Jewish community in Krakow, Poland. While pro-Palestinian protests in Poland were limited compared to those in Western countries, they marked an unprecedented local development, sparking debate within Jewish circles. Using Krakow as a case study, the article explores whether and how these events shifted discourse around Zionism, Israel, and Jewish identity. It employs discourse analysis, supplemented by comparative methodology, the study relies on the data from the semi-structured interviews, and analyses of the official statements and media report as well as the social media discourses. The article addresses two questions: (1) how and why did the Jewish community in Krakow respond to the escalation of the Middle East conflict and the subsequent events, particularly pro-Palestinian activism? (2) do the observed dynamics reflect global trends or local particularities?
Abstract: Der wissenschaftliche Kommentar diskutiert die Verbreitung antisemitischer Einstellungen in der Mitte der deutschen wie auch österreichischen Gesellschaft und leitet aufgrund differenter Studienergebnisse Anforderungen an schulische Antisemitismus-Prävention ab. Die erste zentrale Fragestellung untersucht, ob antisemitische Einstellungen als Randphänomen zu betrachten oder in der Meinung der gesellschaftlichen Mitte zu verorten sind. Anhand von Statistiken und Studien zu antisemitischen Straftaten und Einstellungen wird aufgezeigt, dass der Antisemitismus in Deutschland und Österreich kein Randphänomen darstellt, sondern in Teilen der gesellschaftlichen Mitte verankert ist. Darauf aufbauend ist Untersuchungsgegenstand der zweiten zentralen Fragestellung, ab welcher Klassenstufe schulische Präventionsmaßnahmen gegen Antisemitismus berechtigt sind. Das Potenzial der schulischen Präventionsarbeit als Interventionsmöglichkeit wird dabei analysiert, die Bedeutung der Medienkompetenzförderung im Präventionsansatz erläutert und es werden frühzeitige Präventionsansätze, beginnend ab der ersten Klasse, empfohlen, um antisemitischen Überzeugungen frühestmöglich entgegenzuwirken. Im Fazit werden konkrete Forderungen sowie Handlungsempfehlungen an Schulen, die Gesellschaft und die Politik formuliert, um Antisemitismus durch Präventionsmaßnahmen nachhaltig zu bekämpfen.
Abstract: In den Antworten zu den Faith Development Interviews (FDI), die seit 2003 von der Forschungsstelle zur Biographischen Religionsforschung der Universität Bielefeld durchgeführt werden, finden sich bei den beiden Fragen, die auffordern, das Böse in der Welt zu erklären und nach der Lösung für Konflikte zu suchen, die auf religiöser oder weltanschaulicher Uneinigkeit beruhen, häufig Rekurse auf den Nahostkonflikt. Beiden Fragen ist gemeinsam, dass sie darauf abzielen, anomische Phänomene, in denen die Ordnung des eigenen Lebens nicht mehr sinnvoll erfahren werden kann, zu erklären. Die Forschungsnotiz analysiert, welche Funktion der Bezug auf den Nahostkonflikt für die Welterklärung der Befragten hat und was mit diesen Bezügen plausibel gemacht werden kann: Erstens ermöglicht der Nahostkonflikt als Beispiel für einen unlösbaren Konflikt eine Vielzahl von Projektionen und schützt damit die Widerlegung des eigenen weltanschaulichen Problemlösungsideals. Zweitens unterstreicht die Identifikation der Konfliktpartei Israel mit dem Bösen die Funktion des israelbezogenen Antisemitismus als Welterklärung.
Abstract: In this report:
As the 80th Session of the United Nations General Assembly approaches, and with key statesmen and leaders, including British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, announcing that their countries may recognise a Palestinian state at the summit, this report finds levels of agreement with the contention that “a two-state solution is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours in the Middle East” have fallen to below 50% among British Jews for the first time since records began.
The report is based on over 4,800 responses from members of the JPR Research Panel to the 2025 Jews in Uncertain Times Survey, conducted in June/July 2025.
Some of the key findings in this report:
49% of respondents agree with the two-state solution contention, compared with 54% a year ago, and 78% in 2010.
Despite the reported drop, support for the two-state solution remains the majority opinion among British Jews, as 41% disagree with it and 10% are not sure.
Younger Jews are found to be less likely to believe in the two-state solution than their elders, with over 40% of 16-29-year-olds showing a degree of support for a shared bi-national state.
Attitudes to support for the two-state solution correlate with Jews’ Jewish denominational positions, political allegiances and attitudes to Zionism.
Anti-Zionist Jews, who constitute a small minority of British Jews as a whole, are particularly likely to favour bi-nationalism over the two-state solution. The much larger, mainstream and orthodox communities overwhelmingly reject this position, but show considerable scepticism for the two-state solution, most likely on security grounds.
British Jews overwhelmingly reject the idea that ‘Israel should take over full control of Gaza.’
Abstract: This autoethnographic study explores manifestations of antisemitism on a European university campus, focusing on personal experiences as an Israeli Jewish student at the University of Coimbra. Drawing from firsthand observations, documented incidents, and interactions with protesters, administrative officials, and peers, the research highlights how hate-laden stickers, verbal threats, and institutional inaction shape a hostile academic climate. By weaving together personal narrative and scholarly frameworks on hate speech, higher education policies, and antisemitism, the study reveals a troubling dissonance between the university’s stated commitment to inclusivity and its inadequate responses to overt acts of discrimination. Through detailed descriptions of unfolding events—from the initial appearance of incendiary slogans to meetings with administrators—the analysis illuminates how deeply entrenched biases can circumvent legal and procedural safeguards. In reflecting on emotional responses and the complexities of positionality, the autoethnographic lens underscores the human impact of hostile environments and the gaps in institutional support. The findings urge higher education stakeholders to reevaluate their protocols for handling hate speech and discrimination, calling for comprehensive measures that protect vulnerable groups and encourage critical engagement with contentious geopolitical issues. This work ultimately argues that acknowledging and actively combating antisemitism in academic settings is crucial for fostering genuine inclusivity and upholding the values of open, respectful scholarship.
Abstract: This thesis looks into representations of Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish non-elite civilians in the liberal press
in Britain, namely the Guardian and the Independent newspapers. The period examined in the research
follows the al-Aqsa Intifadah (since September 2000) and the Arab-Israeli conflict during the 2000s (2000-
2010). The research findings look specifically into the coverage of the peace months of July and December
2000. The primary proposition of the thesis follows the burgeoning literature regarding the parallel,
centuries-old histories of the Arab, Jew and the Idea-of-Europe in tandem, in one breath as it may (e.g.,
Anidjar, 2003, 2007; Kalmar and Penslar, 2005; Boyarin, 2009). This theorisation finds the Arab and Jew
as two formational Others to the Idea-of-Europe, with the Jew imagined as the religious and internal enemy
to Europe and the Arab as the political and external enemy (Anidjar, 2003). This research enquires how
liberal-left forms of racialisations (not only extreme right racialisations) towards the Arab and Jew are
contingent upon these centuries-old images and imaginaires, even during moments of peacemaking (not
only times of heightened violence). The main hypothesis of the research is that in the mediated, Manichean
packaging of the Arab-Israeli conflict in both newspapers the Palestinian and Israeli-Jew are reduced to
two sediment polarized identities where no Palestinian exists outside the articulation of being oppositional
to the Israeli-Jew through difference marked by violence, and vice versa. Critical Solidarity is proposed as
a mode of Peace Journalism (e.g., Galtung, 2000; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005; Kempf, 2007) which hopes
to address concerns at the intersection of news reporting about the conflict and race.
Abstract: his chapter primarily focuses on antisemitism in French football since the turn of the new millennium, which has seen an intensification of debates about nationality, diversity, and identity in France, as well as a rise in antisemitism. France has historically had few high-profile Jewish players and lacks a major club that is seen as being ‘Jewish’. However, antisemitism has been a very real issue within professional and amateur levels of men’s football in recent decades, with abuse directed at players, team officials, and fans who are – or are perceived to be – Jewish, taking a variety of forms. The chapter examines the broader history of antisemitism in France and how this has influenced the French state’s relationship with religion today and is linked to both contemporary domestic issues and international matters, such as Israeli–Palestinian tensions. In addition, the chapter argues that French football has struggled to tackle, or sought to minimise, several forms of discrimination.
Topics: Israel: Attitudes to Israel, Attitudes to Jews, History and Historiography: Holocaust, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Reactions and Consequences Outside Region, Israeli-Arab Conflict: Reactions and Consequences Outside Region, Israel: Criticism, Main Topic: Culture and Heritage, Memory, Arts and Culture: Books and Literature, Arts and Culture: Film, Arts and Culture: Television
Abstract: Examines an important relational shift in British and German cultural depictions of Palestine and Israel since 1987
Develops relationality as a critical tool to challenge mainstream ideas about Israeli and Palestinian narratives as separate and not connected to European histories of the Holocaust and colonialism
Argues that Israel and Palestine are used as geopolitical and imaginary spaces to discuss social and political concerns in the United Kingdom and in Germany
Examines works by authors and directors from outside of Israel and Palestine, including those with no direct link to the conflict, thus extending our understanding of Palestine and Israel as signifiers in the contemporary period
Offers a comparative analysis of British and German literature, TV drama, and film which focuses on country-specific case studies to identify common trends in imagining and reimaging Israel and Palestine since the first Palestinian Intifada
Discusses works published since 1987 which depict encounters between (Israeli) Jews and Palestinians since 1947 which depict encounters between (Israeli) Jews and Palestinians and their narratives since 1947
Isabelle Hesse identifies an important relational turn in British and German literature, TV drama, and film published and produced since the First Palestinian Intifada (1987-1993). This turn manifests itself on two levels: one, in representing Israeli and Palestinian histories and narratives as connected rather than separate, and two, by emphasising the links between the current situation in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the roles that the United Kingdom and Germany have played historically, and continue to play, in the region. This relational turn constitutes a significant shift in representations of Israel and Palestine in British and German culture as these depictions move beyond an engagement with the Holocaust and Jewish suffering at the expense of Palestinian suffering and indicate a willingness to represent and acknowledge British and German involvement in Israeli and Palestinian politics.
Abstract: As a consequence of the Holocaust, Israel’s security is officially regarded as part of Germany’s
“reason of state”. Yet the criteria for a responsible relationship between Germany and Israel are by
no means self-evident or without logical or practical contradictions. One of the complications is
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In order to better understand this complication, I examine two
familiar national narratives, one from each side, about possible connections between the Nazi era,
the Holocaust, and this conflict. I also put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a broader historical
context. It turns out that the examined relationships are not as obvious as the familiar narratives
describe them. The origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are older than the Nazi era and the
Holocaust, and they also point to broader European responsibilities more generally, to Europe’s
nationalism, anti-Semitism, colonialism and imperialism – with irresponsibilities towards both
Jews and Arabs. In no way does such a comprehensive perspective affect Germany’s special historical responsibilities resulting from the Holocaust. But it puts the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a
more complete and also more honest framework, with consequences for Germany’s moral and
political position
Abstract: The Gaza War is a watershed moment not only in the Middle East. It has also increased political divisions in Germany, where Israel’s security and the fight against anti-Semitism are part of its historical legacy and political and moral identity. Incidents of anti-Semitism have increased dramatically, as have overdrawn accusations of it. An analysis of controversies about the definition of anti-Semitism, about the use of the term apartheid for the situation in the West Bank, of the BDS movement (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions), and particularly the characterization
of Israel as a settler-colonial state shows how difficult it has become to maintain a fair, honest, and frank discussion considering different points of view. The current crisis should be used as an opportunity for Germany to, on the one hand, face the unavoidable contradictions in its responsibilities stemming from the crimes of its Nazi past and, on the other hand, come to grips not only with Arab and Iranian terrorism and eliminationist rhetoric but also with the deficiencies in Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians. Germany’s new leitmotiv ought to be: ‘Between the River
and the Sea, Jews and Arabs should be free.’
Abstract: This study considers the flying of Palestinian flags by Celtic Football Club supporters in Scotland as an illustration of political activism in sport. Despite being over 4000 kilometres away and holding no ethnic, national or religious connections with any community involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle-East, fans wave these flags to demonstrate backing for Palestinian people. With reference to an historical context of the ethno-religious origins of Celtic FC and its supporting fanbase being significantly composed of members of a multi-generational Irish-Catholic diasporic minority community in Scotland, through utilizing fan writings, self-representations, and the results of a small survey of supporters, this research provides for deeper understanding of the intermittent use of sport as a space for ‘taking sides’ in conflicts that have ethnic, national, religious, and political resonances. Critically, this insight also offers important reflections regarding narratives of antisemitism in football and beyond.
Abstract: Quelques jours après l’attaque du Hamas en Israël, l’IFOP a réalisé pour le Journal du Dimanche, un sondage destiné à comprendre quelles étaient les représentations des Français à l’égard du conflit et de son impact sur une éventuelle importation de violences antisémites en France.
Premier enseignement de cette étude, le conflit au Proche-Orient apparaît comme particulièrement anxiogène. 86% des Français indiquent être inquiets (36% « tout à fait inquiets »), soit un niveau d’inquiétude proche de celui mesuré au début du conflit russo-ukrainien. Le sentiment d’inquiétude atteint son acmé dans certains segments de la population traditionnellement plus favorables à l’Etat Hébreu : les plus de 65 ans (44% de tout à fait inquiets parmi les plus de 65 ans contre 25% parmi les 18-24 ans) ou encore les électeurs de Valérie Pécresse (50% de « tout à fait inquiets »).
Deuxième enseignement de cette étude : les Français établissent clairement un lien entre les évènements au Proche-Orient et l’importation de violences antisémites en France. 48% des sondés estiment ainsi que les Français de confession juive sont plus en danger et 79% se déclarent inquiets que le conflit se traduise par une augmentation des actes antisémites.
Plus globalement, les Français identifient bien les « nouvelles formes d’antisémitisme » comme étant des causes à ce phénomène : 77% citent le rejet et la haine d’Israël, 76% les idées islamistes, soit des niveaux supérieurs à ceux mesurés pour les idées d’extrême droite (66%).
Dernier point, les pouvoirs publics bénéficient d’une certaine mansuétude dans l’opinion : 60% des Français estiment leur faire confiance pour assurer la sécurité des Français de confession juive. Jean-Luc Mélenchon suscite en revanche la défiance sur ce sujet : il apparait comme la personnalité politique qui suscite le moins de confiance pour lutter contre l’antisémitisme (17%), loin derrière Edouard Philippe (46%), Gerald Darmanin (42%), Marine Le Pen (42%) ou encore Emmanuel Macron (41%).
Abstract: This chapter introduces the notion of ‘enabling concepts’: concepts which may or may not themselves constitute a mode of hate speech, but which through their broad social acceptability facilitate or legitimate the articulation of concepts which can be more directly classed as hate speech. We argue that each distinct hate ideology will contain its own, partly overlapping set of ‘enabling concepts.’ In this chapter, we will focus on the enabling role of references to apartheid for the constitution of antisemitism in British online discourse around Israel. This argument does not rest on agreement as to whether the ‘apartheid analogy’—comparisons between contemporary Israel and the former Apartheid regime in South Africa—itself constitutes a form of antisemitism. The chapter draws on qualitative analysis of more than 10,000 user comments posted on social media profiles of mainstream media in the UK, undertaken by the Decoding Antisemitism project in the wake of the May 2021 escalation phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We will show how web commenters frequently use the apartheid analogy to trigger more extreme antisemitic stereotypes, including age-old tropes, intensifying and distorting analogies (such as Nazi comparisons) or calls for Israel’s elimination. The results will be presented in detail based on a pragmalinguistic approach taking into account the immediate context of the comment thread and broader world knowledge. Both of these aspects are relevant preconditions for examining all forms of antisemitic hate speech that can remain undetected when conducting solely statistical analysis. Based on this large dataset, we suggest that—under the cover of its widespread social acceptability—the apartheid analogy thus facilitates the articulation and legitimation of extreme antisemitic concepts that would, without this prior legitimation, be more likely to be rejected or countered.
Topics: Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Discourse and Tropes, Antisemitism: Incident Monitoring, Internet, Internet: Social Media, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Israel: Attitudes to Israel, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Reactions and Consequences Outside Region, Methodology, October 7 2023 Attacks and Aftermath, Hate and Hate Speech, AI, Antisemitism: Online
Abstract: Over the past 3.5 years, the Decoding Antisemitism research project has been analysing antisemitism on the internet in terms of content, structure, and frequency. Over this time, there has been no shortage of flashpoints which have generated antisemitic responses. Yet the online response to the Hamas attacks of 7 October and the subsequent Israeli operations in Gaza has surpassed anything the project has witnessed before. In no preceding escalation phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict has the predominant antisemitic reaction been one of open jubilation and joy over the deaths of Israeli Jews. As demonstrated in the sixth and final Discourse Report, this explicit approval of the Hamas attacks was the primary response from web users. The response to 7 October therefore represents a turning point in antisemitic online discourse, and its repercussions will be felt long into the future.
The report contains analysis of the various stages of online reactions to events in the Middle East, from the immediate aftermath to the Israeli retaliations and subsequent accusations of genocide against Israel. As well as examining online reactions in the project’s core focus—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—this report also, for the first time, extends its view to analyse Israel-related web discourses in six further countries, including those in Southern and Eastern Europe as well as in North Africa. Alongside reactions to the escalation phase, the report also examines online responses to billionaire Elon Musk’s explosive comments about Jewish individuals and institutions.
Additionally, the report provides a retrospective overview of the project’s development over the past 3.5 years, tracking its successes and challenges, particularly regarding the conditions for successful interdisciplinary work and the ability of machine learning to capture the versatility and complexity of authentic web communication.
To mark the publication of the report, we are also sharing our new, interactive data visualisations tool, which lets you examine any two discourse events analysed by our research team between 2021 and 2023. You can compare the frequencies and co-occurrences of antisemitic concepts and speech acts by type and by country, look at frequencies of keywords in antisemitic comments, and plot keyword networks.
Topics: Internet, Internet: Social Media, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Israel: Attitudes to Israel, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Reactions and Consequences Outside Region, Sport: Football, Hate and Hate Speech, AI, Antisemitism: Online, Conspiracy Theories, Antisemitism: Discourse and Tropes
Topics: Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Discourse and Tropes, Antisemitism: Incident Monitoring, Internet, Internet: Social Media, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Terrorism, Israel: Attitudes to Israel, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Reactions and Consequences Outside Region, Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS), Hate and Hate Speech, AI, Antisemitism: Online
Abstract: The initiatives that took place to support Israeli families temporarily in the UK
started within three days after 7th October.
• Key organisations in the Jewish Community came together to help: JAFI, UJIA,
PaJeS, CST.
• They were supported by other organisations in various ways, e.g. JVN, and by
many individuals.
• There was a huge gap between the large number of expressions of interest in
school places and eventual places taken up.
• Each Local Education Authority Admissions process was different from each other,
and LEAs waived usual procedures to be accommodating and speed up the
admissions processes.
• Almost all temporary Israeli families were able to visit their UK school prior to
accepting a place and starting school.
• By November, more than 100 children had been placed in schools, mostly in the
primary sector.
• Whilst each school dealt uniquely with the situation of having temporary families in
their schools, there were many commonalities, e.g. acquiring school uniform,
communication, pairing with other Hebrew speakers.
• Relating to the school system in the UK has been a steep learning curve for these
families.
• PaJeS has been significantly involved in providing support, especially in
admissions advice, Hebrew, wellbeing, funding and resources.
• A concern at the beginning, which was that the regular school population would be
disadvantage by schools accepting these additional families, has not materialised.
• By the beginning of December 2023, although some families are still arriving, the
number of Israelis temporarily in UK schools has already begun to decrease.
• Some families who are leaving, want an option to return and want schools to “save”
their places for them, which challenges the schools.
Abstract: In this report:
Five weeks after the barbaric attack on innocent Israeli civilians by Hamas, this factsheet uses data from recent polling by two major polling agencies, Ipsos and YouGov, alongside historical data on these issues, to shed light on what people in the UK think about the conflict, where their sympathies lie, and what they believe the British government should do in response to the latest events in Israel and Gaza.
Some of the key findings in this report:
Since the 7 October attack, the proportion of British adults sympathising with the Israeli side has doubled from a pre-war level of about 10% to about 20%, whereas sympathy for the Palestinian side has fallen by a few percentage points from 24% to around 15%-21%;
Nevertheless, levels of sympathy for the Palestinian side have been gradually climbing since October 7, and are now approaching their pre-war levels;
Young adults are much more likely to sympathise with the Palestinians than the Israelis; older people hold the opposite view;
British adults are over twice as likely to think that Israel does not try to minimise harm to civilians than it does make such efforts;
British adults are more likely to think the UK should be more critical toward Israel than it has been, as opposed to more supportive. The younger respondents are, the more likely they are to believe the UK should be more critical;
British adults are twice as likely to think the police should be making more arrests at pro-Palestinian demonstrations than less, though there is are clear generational differences of opinion on this issue;
Almost all subgroups think the police should arrest people who openly support Hamas at demonstrations in the UK.
Abstract: Key findings
• Since 7 October, Decoding Antisemitism has analysed more than 11,000 comments
posted on YouTube and Facebook in response to mainstream media reports of the
Hamas terrorist attacks in Israel.
• Our analysis reveals a significant jump in the number of antisemitic comments, even
compared with other violent incidents in the Middle East.
• CELEBRATION, SUPPORT FOR and JUSTIFICATION OF THE HAMAS TERROR ATTACKS make up the
largest proportion of antisemitic comments – ranging between 19 % in German
Facebook comment sections and 53 and 54.7 % in French Facebook and UK YouTube
comment sections, respectively – in contrast to previous studies where direct
affirmation of violence was negligible.
• The number of antisemitic comments CELEBRATING THE ATROCITIES rises in response to
media reports of attacks on Israelis/Jews themselves, compared with reports on the
conflict more generally.
• Beyond affirmation of the Hamas attacks, other frequently expressed antisemitic
concepts across the corpus included DENIALS OF ISRAEL’S RIGHT TO EXIST, attributing SOLE
GUILT to Israel for the entire history of the conflict, describing Israel as a TERRORIST
STATE, CONSPIRACY THEORIES about Jewish POWER, and ideas of inherent Israeli EVIL.
• As with the project’s past research, this analysis reveals a diversity of antisemitic
concepts and communicative strategies. The findings reaffirm that antisemitism
appears as a multifaceted mosaic, as a result of which it is not possible to deal with
all the elements. Only the most prominent tendencies are brought into focus here.
Abstract: This chapter addresses the effects of the German politics of memory and the historical overdetermination of the discourse on antisemitism in the country. German antisemitism discourse builds on an exceptionalist conception of antisemitism as delusional and exterminist, which is derived from the experience of the Holocaust. This conception has proven to be unhelpful in understanding, tackling or fighting contemporary manifestations of antisemitism in all their diversity, varying formative contexts and differing degrees of severity or threat, especially with regard to the overlap between antisemitism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The current debate on BDS, along with the range of legal and quasi-legal efforts to severely restrict the movement, is symptomatic of this discourse. Rather than conceptualising (and criticising) the movement in all its heterogeneous facets and ideological and practical ambivalences and contradictions, the bulk of the German anti-BDS discourse tends to equate BDS with the Nazi boycott against Jews. The IHRA’s Working Definition of Antisemitism, with its blatant weaknesses, gaps, internal contradictions and political bias, is applied as a helpful tool in these efforts. This chapter outlines the German debate on DBS, including various public scandals and tightening administrative measures tied to Germany’s symbolic anti-antisemitism. In doing so, it highlights trends towards the juridification, securitisation and ‘antifa-isation’ of the discourse on antisemitism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
