Abstract: In this chapter I intend to present what happens when contemporary Western activist and academic anti-Zionism falls on the fertile soil of a country which is, firstly, semi-peripheral and, secondly, burdened with a history of antisemitism that is as intense as it is specific. Its specificity entails three postwar waves of Jewish emigration caused by antisemitic violence, primarily to Israel. The first two happened in 1946–9 and 1956–60, respectively. The third of these waves was triggered by what in Poland is generally referred to as ‘March’. The repression of student youth protesting against censorship intensified in March 1968, but the antisemitic campaign with which the state authorities cracked down on opposition within the party and on the streets lingered on for much longer. It was unleashed under the banner of ‘anti-Zionism’. I will first briefly outline the events of that period, since knowledge of them is essential to understanding the meanings with which the term ‘Zionism’ is imbued in Poland. Next I will outline the contemporary politics of remembrance of ‘March’ and, more broadly, the stakes of Polish historical politics, which are related to the collective manifestations of Poles’ attitudes towards Jews. These three phenomena – March 1968, the management of its memory and contemporary historical politics reproducing antisemitic clichés – form, so I would like to suggest, the first context against which the functioning of anti-Zionism in Poland today should be considered.
Abstract: Проаналізовано значення поняття «культура історичної пам’яті», розглянуто історію її формування у Західній Європі, особливості ландшафту пам’яті у Східній Європі та Україні, визначено ключові питання історичної політики України, які мають потенціал перешкодити європейській інтеграції України. Внаслідок проведеного дослідження встановлено, що Україна належить до східноєвропейського регіону історичної пам’яті, якому притаманні етатизм, єдність та героїчність, віктимність, сек’юритизація. На шляху до європейської інтеграції перед Україною поставатимуть проблеми піднесення ролі Голокосту в історичній пам’яті та визнання часткової відповідальності за злочини колаборантів, обмеження регулювання з боку держави історичної сфери, українсько-польських історичних конфліктів. Водночас може відбуватися дифузія західноєвропейської та східноєвропейської моделей пам’яті.
Abstract: At the time of writing, one consequence of Israel’s response to the massacre that took place in Israel by Hamas on 7 October 2023 is an unprecedented surge in global antisemitism. This massacre was the largest mass murder of Jewish civilians since the Holocaust; its scale, brutality and sadism have led to comparisons with the Holocaust, and to more and deeper sensitivities and controversies in Holocaust Education. In an attempt to address this, the proposed chapter will discuss the relationship between Holocaust Education and Antisemitism Education, and its relevance to Religious Education (RE) in schools.
Holocaust Education comprises learning about and from the Holocaust (Cowan and Maitles, Understanding and teaching Holocaust education. Sage, 2017). The former focuses on the historical narrative; the latter focuses on moral issues related to active citizenship. Research findings in England (Foster, Pettigrew and Pearce et al., What do students know and understand about the Holocaust? Evidence from English secondary schools. Centre for Holocaust Education, UCL Institute of Education, 2016, p. 1) were that 68% of students (n = 7952 students) were “unaware of what ‘antisemitism’ meant”. Similarly, during a group interview, following their return from a visit to Auschwitz-Birkenau organised by the Archdiocese of Glasgow, Scotland, each of the four students indicated that they did not understand the term “antisemitism” (Cowan & Maitles, 2017, p. 139). Further, Short’s discussion of the failings of learning from the Holocaust included the lack of reference to “the key role played by Christian antisemitism in preparing the groundwork for the Holocaust” (Short, Learning from genocide? A study in the failure of Holocaust education. Intercultural Education, 16(4), 367-380, 2005; Failing to learn from the Holocaust. In As the Witnesses Fall Silent: 21st Century Holocaust Education in Curriculum, Policy and Practice (pp. 455–468), 2015). Cowan and Maitles (2017, p. 56) further assert that historical antisemitism contributes to understanding present-day antisemitism.
Topics: Jewish Identity, Jewish Community, Denominations, Main Topic: Identity and Community, Jewish History, Reform/Liberal/Progressive Judaism, Conservative / Masorti Judaism, Orthodox Judaism, Chabad-Lubavitch, Haredi / Strictly Orthodox Jews, Israel-Diaspora Relations
Abstract: This chapter analyzes developments that profoundly transformed French Judaism over decades. The former paradigm of French Judaism, dating back to the nineteenth century, was of Judaism united and unified under the auspices of the Consistory, the central religious institution Napoleon created. In this model of "Israelitism," the symbiosis between Jewish and French affiliations was based on Judaism as a faith and French citizenship. International links were established towards the end of the 19th century, notably through the Alliance israélite universelle and intellectuals supporting the Zionist project, but it was the post-1945 world that witnessed a gradual departure from this confessional model. A new Franco-Judaism emerged in the 1970s-1980s, combining Jewish and French identities in new ways: solidarity with Israel, an attachment to diasporic Jewish cultures, an increasingly public affirmation of Jewishness, and advocacy against forms of Holocaust denial. It marked a definitive rupture with the older paradigm of Israelitism. This chapter also focuses on the development of religious pluralism and the increasing internationalization of French Judaism. It examines the four branches of French Jewish Orthodoxy (ultra-Orthodoxy, Chabad, Religious Zionism, and Modern Orthodoxy), as well as the more liberal Reform and Massorti movements. It provides a broad overview of the environments and actors constituting this reconfiguration of a new French Judaism, henceforth anchored in pluralism and internationalization.
Abstract: Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, anti-Semitism (in both public discourse and policies and as manifested in the infrequency of anti-Semitic incidents) was at a historical low, and simultaneously Russia’s relationship with Israel was on the rise. Officially, the Kremlin denounced xenophobia and made a crucial distinction between the isolationist ethnic nationalism that it condemned and the broader Russian imperial nationalism that has become Putinism’s dominant framework, especially after 2014. T he war against Ukraine, which Russia conceptualises as the continuation of its “struggle against the Nazis,” is waged in the actual space where the Holocaust took place, and also, semantically, in the historical “bloodlands,” following Timothy Snyder’s term, that intersect with and evoke issues of Jewishness and Anti-Semitism, reactivating all manner of revisionist discourses about war-time collaboration, the Holocaust, and Ukrainian Jewish history. The Russian regime and its propagandists spin various conspiratorial narratives about the war and Ukraine’s leadership that both reactivate dormant Soviet-era prejudices and create new ones (e.g., “sects,” “global Satanism,” “Western elites,” “liberals as the fifth column,” etc.) that are linked to Jewishness. Russian anti-Semitism is an inherently dynamic phenomenon that is shaped by and is included in the escalation in the Middle East, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and Russia’s hostile relations with the “collective West” and as such should be considered within international, domestic, and historical contexts.
Abstract: Dem Staat Israel kommt in Deutschland regelmäßig eine im internationalen Vergleich große Aufmerksamkeit zu. Fast immer geht es hierbei um dessen Rolle im Nahostkonflikt, also in den jahrzehntelang bestehenden politischen Auseinandersetzungen mit den palästinensischen Akteur*innen, arabischen sowie weiteren Staaten der Region (wie etwa dem Iran). Diese Aufmerksamkeit verläuft konjunkturell und folgt dem Verlauf von Eskalationsphasen des Nahostkonflikts. In den letzten Jahre wurde der (mögliche) antisemitische Gehalt "israelkritischer" Positionen zunehmend diskutiert: "Debatten um Fragen des aktuellen Antisemitismus sind immer öfter zugleich Debatten um Wahrnehmungen Israels und des Nahostkonflikts" (Niehoff 2021, 73). Beide Themen werden häufig und zunehmend miteinander assoziiert. Gleichzeitig sind Unklarheiten und Unsicherheiten weit verbreitet, welche Positionierungen gegenüber dem Staat Israel, der sich als Nationalstaat des jüdischen Volkes versteht, als antisemitisch zu bewerten sind (und, so die Konsequenz, moralisch geächtet werden sollten) und welche Haltungen demgegenüber als "kritische" 1 einzustufen sind (und als solche legitimer Teil der kontroversen politischen Auseinandersetzung seien). Zu einer entsprechenden Sensibilisierung haben insbesondere Studien und Berichte mit dem Fokus auf Perspektiven von Betroffenen von Antisemitismus (Zick u.a. 2017a; Bernstein 2020; Chernivsky u.a. 2020) sowie die professionelle zivilgesellschaftliche Arbeit etwa von Monitoringstellen antisemitischer Vorfälle (Bundesverband RIAS/Internationales Institut für Bildung, Sozial-und Antisemitismusforschung 2021) beigetragen. Auch wissenschaftliche Forschung widmet sich verstärkt der Problematik. Deutlich sichtbar wurde diese insbesondere im Mai 2021, als anlässlich von militärischen Auseinandersetzung zwischen der palästinensischen Hamas und der israelischen Armee antiisraelische Demonstrationen in Deutschland stattfanden, in deren Kontext (vermeintliche) jüdische Personen, Synagogen sowie der Staat Israel bedroht und attackiert wurden (vgl. ebd., 14, 51-65). 1 Irritationen entstehen regelmäßig u.a. deswegen, da völlig unterschiedliche Nutzungen von "kritisch" in diesem Zusammenhang existieren (vgl. z.B. Schwarz-Friesel/Reinharz 2013, 194-209). Die Bandbreite reicht von Begriffsverständnissen, die alle nicht-antisemitischen negativen Positionierungen unter "kritisch" subsummieren, andere Verständnisse grenzen den "kritischen" Bereich eng(er) ein.
Abstract: This chapter explains contemporary manifestations of antisemitism in Southeast European football by analysing football fan cultures of three post-Yugoslav states: Croatia, Serbia, and especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, where several antisemitic incidents have occurred during the last decade. The geographic scope is determined by the cultural proximity of these fan cultures, allowing for a comparative analysis of region’s forms of antisemitism, as well as socialist (dis-)continuities of political antisemitism. Whilst international football governing bodies and international media readily condemned the incidents in Bosnia-Herzegovina, social media discussions amongst their football fans proved to be diametrically opposed, especially in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The chapter examines the nature of anti-Jewish, anti-Israel, anti-Zionist, and antisemitic fan (and non-fan) practices and narratives, to extrapolate their inherent political nuances and to illustrate their transformations over the last two decades. By evaluating their significance for the wider public discourse, the chapter provides a more nuanced reflection of the issues at stake, within football and beyond.
Abstract: his chapter primarily focuses on antisemitism in French football since the turn of the new millennium, which has seen an intensification of debates about nationality, diversity, and identity in France, as well as a rise in antisemitism. France has historically had few high-profile Jewish players and lacks a major club that is seen as being ‘Jewish’. However, antisemitism has been a very real issue within professional and amateur levels of men’s football in recent decades, with abuse directed at players, team officials, and fans who are – or are perceived to be – Jewish, taking a variety of forms. The chapter examines the broader history of antisemitism in France and how this has influenced the French state’s relationship with religion today and is linked to both contemporary domestic issues and international matters, such as Israeli–Palestinian tensions. In addition, the chapter argues that French football has struggled to tackle, or sought to minimise, several forms of discrimination.
Abstract: Racism and more specifically prejudice against the Jewish community have been consistent throughout Italy’s complex socio-political history, underpinned by the Catholic Church’s marginalisation and fascist persecution of ‘Jewishness’. While Italian antisemitism is mainly ‘low intensity’, it is pervasive and enduring in the way it normalises prejudices and conspiracy theories that portray Jews as avaricious, controlling, and powerful, which prevail in contemporary political discourse. The localised nature of Italian fandom, which encourages the abuse of others based on traits deemed feminine, foreign, or weak – has historically reproduced and arguably reinforced dominant ideas on race and antisemitic prejudices that prevail in Italian society, as this chapter will explain. Despite many prominent antisemitic instances involving owners, administrators and especially fans, the Italian Football Federation has been slow to tackle the issue. Drawing upon empirical research on Italian ultras – a fan culture centred around neo-fascist and neo-Nazi symbols and ideologies – this chapter situates Jewish communities within Italy and explains the nature of antisemitism within Italian football, as well as failures to combat it and other forms of discrimination.
Abstract: Despite efforts by clubs, fans, and officials to combat discrimination and hate speech, antisemitism in German football and fan cultures still persists today. Antisemitism is expressed by supporters, players, coaches, club and league officials, security personal, and others. In most cases, no Jews need to be present to stimulate antisemitic behaviour. This chapter argues that contemporary antisemitism in and around German football is manifest in five different forms, which are explained with illustrative examples: far-right antisemitism; classical antisemitism; secondary antisemitism; antisemitism against Jewish Makkabi clubs; and antisemitic ressentiment-communication. This chapter also questions who does what against antisemitism in German football. By looking at each actor individually – football’s governing bodies; professional clubs; social pedagogical fan projects; stadium security and police; third sector organisations; and fans – it is evident that neither a common nor a long-term strategy exists, although a broad range of activities and actions take place, often initiated by, or implemented after, the pressure of fan groups.
Abstract: Today, Hungary’s Jewish population, that was decimated by the Holocaust, totals about 47,200, the largest in East Central Europe. This chapter provides an historical overview of the complex political and socio-cultural conditions, key events, and regime changes since the end of the 19th century to explain the Jewish community’s experience and how antisemitism has manifested in Hungarian society and how this, in turn, is reflected in Hungary’s football culture. Antisemitism has found expression in contemporary Hungary in extreme right-wing nationalist ideology through enduring stereotypes and allegations of Jewish conspiracy, wealth, and power, epitomised by the treatment of the Hungarian-born, Jewish-American philanthropist George Soros. The chapter explains how football has been used by successive Hungarian regimes for political purposes, including by the current long-serving leader Viktor Orbán, who has dismissed accusations of antisemitism and enjoys cordial relations with Israel. It considers the pre-1945 anti-Jewish legislation of the state and Hungarian Football Federation (MLSZ), as well as the verbal and physical atrocities suffered by Jews, mostly notably MTK Budapest by rivals Ferencváros Torna Club (FTC or Fradi), because of their Jewishness. Finally, the chapter looks at attempts to challenge antisemitism in Hungarian football.
Abstract: This chapter outlines the character, causes and extent of antisemitism within English football. This has included several high-profile incidents within English men’s football involving professional players, coaches, officials, and especially supporters. The chapter begins with a short historical background to the presence of Jews and antisemitism in England before moving onto the current situation and then considering how antisemitism is manifest within English football. The chapter expounds why Tottenham historically developed a quasi-Jewish identity that serves as a catalyst for antisemitic abuse from rival supporters. In doing so, the chapter examines the different subcultural meanings and intentions behind the controversial uses of the word ‘Yid’ within the context of English football supporter culture, which has been re-appropriated by Tottenham fans. Finally, the chapter critically reviews the responses to antisemitism in English football by governing bodies within the sport, Jewish community organisations, campaign groups, the criminal justice system, and professional football clubs.
Abstract: In recent decades, comedy studies have displayed a concern with understanding the power dynamics and cultural norms shaping the ‘marginal’ and ‘mainstream’ in comedy. Rarely, however, have intersecting norms concerning religion, gender and race been taken as a point of departure in this field. Through a qualitative analysis of Creeger’s 2022 set Pray It Forward! and of a semi-structured interview conducted with the comedian in August 2022, this chapter explores precisely these issues. Stand-up comedian Rachel Creeger, whose work is the central focus of this chapter, experiences particular intersecting forms of marginalization as an Orthodox Jewish woman on the normatively secular British comedy circuit. She experiences both covert misogyny and anti-Semitism, and more subtle forms of exclusion. At the same time, the frame of marginality is not always experienced by Creeger as a straightforwardly ‘negative’ thing. Instead, Creeger’s comedy complicates the frame of ‘marginality’ through an emphasis on the advantages of having a ‘unique voice’ and on the relatability of her material. Specifically, a repertoire of popular culture references in Creeger’s material blurs the imagined binary between the categories of ‘religion’ and ‘the secular’ and implicitly disrupts norms concerning religion and gender entangled with this binary frame.
Abstract: Cette contribution tente d’approcher les sentiments nourris par le souvenir du Yiddishland à la fin du XXe siècle et au début du XXIe siècle. Elle cherche, afin d’aborder cette sphère habitée par l’ancrage familial, traversée par des antagonismes idéologiques, hantée par le souvenir de l’émigration et de l’intégration ainsi que celui de souffrances inouïes et longtemps indicibles, à suivre les représentations idéales d’un monde perdu, dans le domaine de la culture et dans celui des utopies politiques, en s’intéressant d’une part à des aspects du renouveau de l’expression culturelle yiddish en France au cours des trois dernières décennies, en particulier dans la chanson (Jacques Grober, Violette Szmajer, Batia Baum, Michèle Tauber et le groupe du Paon doré) ; d’autre part aux survivances des motifs d’utopie politique trouvant leur source dans l’épopée idéologique et historique du Yiddishland (Charles Melman, Mojsze Zalcman) ; enfin à la réappropriation de la mémoire véhiculée par le yiddish telle qu’elle peut être perçue dans les interviews réalisées par Max Kohn entre 2006 et 2016. Cette recherche, tentative d’exploration d’un cheminement affectif vers le yiddish de la part d’un enfant né à cette époque en Israël et ayant grandi en France dans une famille non yiddishophone, se limitera à certaines expressions de cette mémoire et de ces motifs d’espérance en France, sans s’interdire de les mettre en rapport avec des expressions analogues dans d’autres pays de la diaspora juive ou en Israël.
Abstract: Aujourd’hui, le djudyó (judéo-espagnol) n’est plus transmis en France. Des associations, comme Aki Estamos, offrent aux personnes qui le parlent ou le comprennent la possibilité de suivre des cours de langue. Les participants, sans être des locuteurs à part entière, ne sont pas non plus des apprenants stricto sensu, puisqu’ils possèdent des compétences linguistiques acquises dans leur enfance. Dans leur cas, la dichotomie entre acquisition et apprentissage est inopérante. Il convient d’identifier les objectifs de ces locuteurs-apprenants, qui suivent les cours sans développer de nouvelles compétences langagières. Ce sont les mots et leurs sonorités qui montent alors sur le devant de la scène, délaissant la grammaire. Le cadre des cours constitue un prétexte pour retrouver une langue et un monde disparus. M’appuyant sur l’observation participante, j’esquisserai les profils linguistiques de ces participants pour tenter d’en comprendre la démarche.
Abstract: Since the unification of the two German states in 1990, antisemitic attitudes have been repeatedly polled in cross-sectional or longitudinal national surveys (e.g., the long-term GFE surveys). So far, comparative studies analyzing the development of antisemitism in East and West Germany over a longer time period are scarce. The study covers a time span of 30 years to investigate two forms of antisemitism (classical and secondary), especially with respect to inner-German differences. Applying model-based age-period-cohort analyses (APC) with a total of 19 available representative surveys (maximal period: 1991–2021), theory-driven hypotheses are tested. The statistical approach and respective findings are discussed with emphasis on several challenges accompanying the utilized heterogenous data and different survey modes. Findings reveal that life-cycle effects play a decisive role in the attitudinal development and distribution of antisemitic attitudes. Moreover, approval of antisemitism is to some extent cohort related in both East and West Germany, while disentangling period effects empirically poses challenges due to data limitations. Furthermore, the observed APC structures differ for classical and secondary antisemitism. The chapter concludes with a critical discussion of the results, limitations, and some further thoughts on the open science philosophy in applied social science research.
Abstract: As elsewhere in eastern and southern Europe, many Jewish communities in Greece were almost completely destroyed during the Holocaust, which resulted in the near erasure of many distinctive religious and cultural practices. Among these erased communities were the Romaniote Jews, an Indigenous Judeo-Greek population distinct from the Sephardic Jews who arrived in Greece following the Spanish Inquisition. The cultural losses included their musical practices, which were largely orally transmitted. A few Romaniote leaders and practitioners continue the musical-liturgical traditions today in Greece, as well as in the United States and Israel. The living practice of this musical liturgy that is ever-changing in the typical manner of orally transmitted repertoires arguably embodies a process of remembering destruction. This process is shown by the imprint of gaps in memory caused by rupture embedded in the repertoire. While remembering destruction is an intrinsically Jewish practice, it is of specific importance to the Jews of Ioannina (a city that once was, and arguably still is, the spiritual center of Romaniote Jews) and their descendants. In the past decade, an annual pilgrimage to Ioannina to attend a Romaniote Yom Kippur service has become a pivotal experience for both Romaniote Jews and others, enabling them to remember and mourn the pre-Holocaust community. This annual pilgrimage, at the epicenter of Romaniote religious and social significance, generates a new Jewish collective based on Romaniote identity and history that includes the restoration of distinct musical practices.
