Abstract: The spread of hate speech and anti-Semitic content has become endemic to social media. Faced
with a torrent of violent and offensive content, nations in Europe have begun to take measures to
remove such content from social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. However, these
measures have failed to curtail the spread, and possible impact of anti-Semitic content. Notably,
violence breeds violence and calls for action against Jewish minorities soon lead to calls for
violence against other ethnic or racial minorities. Online anti-Semitism thus drives social tensions
and harms social cohesion. Yet the spread of online anti-Semitism also has international
ramifications as conspiracy theories and disinformation campaigns now often focus on WWII and
the Holocaust.
On Nov 29, 2019, the Oxford Digital Diplomacy Research Group (DigDiploROx) held a one-day
symposium at the European Commission in Brussels. The symposium brought together diplomats,
EU officials, academics and civil society organizations in order to search for new ways to combat
the rise in online anti-Semitism. This policy brief offers an overview of the day’s discussions, the
challenges identified and a set of solutions that may aid nations looking to stem the flow of antiSemitic content online. Notably, these solutions, or recommendations, are not limited to the realm
of anti-Semitism and can to help combat all forms of discrimination, hate and bigotry online.
Chief among these recommendations is the need for a multi-stakeholder solution that brings
together governments, multilateral organisations, academic institutions, tech companies and
NGOs. For the EU itself, there is a need to increase collaborations between units dedicated to
fighting online crime, terrorism and anti-Semitism. This would enable the EU to share skills,
resources and working procedures. Moreover, the EU must adopt technological solutions, such as
automation, to identify, flag and remove hateful content in the quickest way possible. The EU
could also redefine its main activities - rather than combat incitement to violence online, it may
attempt to tackle incitement to hate, given that hate metastases online to calls for violence.
Finally, the EU should deepen its awareness to the potential harm of search engines. These offer
access to content that has already been removed by social media companies. Moreover, search
engines serve as a gateway to hateful content. The EU should thus deepen is collaborations with
companies such as Google and Yahoo, and not just Facebook or Twitter. It should be noted that
social media companies opted not to take part in the symposium demonstrating that the solution
to hate speech and rising anti-Semitism may be in legislation and not just in collaboration.
The rest of this brief consists of five parts. The first offers an up-to-date analysis of the prevalence
of anti-Semitic content online. The second, discuss the national and international implications of
this prevalence. The third part stresses the need for a multi-stakeholder solution while the fourth
offers an overview of the presentations made at the symposium. The final section includes a set
of policy recommendations that should be adopted by the EU and its members states.
Abstract: Amidst the Covid-19 pandemic, antisemitic scapegoating has surfaced, giving ammunition to antisemites and extremists looking for someone to blame. Online, memes have been circulating espousing antisemitism, whilst offline, several public figures and others in the public eye have alluded to Jews being the cause of the pandemic. Blame and scapegoating of Jews is not new, and it didn’t take long for antisemitism to mutate. Concerning coronavirus, Jews have not been the primary target for hatred. Anti-Chinese messages are being shared online, with references to the “Chinese flu”, the “Wuhan virus” and the “kung flu”. This collective blame leading to denigration
of, and attacks on, people of Chinese descendent, is reminiscent the collective blame in antisemitic conspiracy theories. This briefing highlights several examples of scapegoating of Jews for earlier global pandemics and addresses Covid related antisemitism in the United Kingdom and globally.
Abstract: Basierend auf Daten des Jahres 2018 der Fundamental Rights Agency der Europäischen Union ermittelt der vorliegende Beitrag Ausmaß und Faktoren antisemitischer Vorurteilskriminalität in Deutschland. Zum einen werden die Erfahrungen von in Deutschland lebenden Jüdinnen und Juden mit persönlichen Belästigungen und Beleidigungen, Vandalismus und körperlicher Gewalt innerhalb eines Zeitraumes von fünf Jahren vor dem Erhebungszeitpunkt beleuchtet. Zum anderen beschäftigen wir uns mit der geäußerten Furcht, zukünftig Opfer antisemitischer Übergriffe zu werden. Erfahrungen mit Gewalt und Vandalismus berichten 7 % der 1225 Befragten, und 44 % wurden in den letzten fünf Jahren belästigt, weil sie jüdisch sind. Vor allem Personen, die aufgrund des Tragens von Symbolen als Juden erkennbar sind, waren betroffen und vermeiden gelegentlich oder öfter Plätze in der lokalen Umgebung, weil sie sich dort unsicher fühlen. Wenn die Befragten hingegen in einer mehrheitlich jüdischen Nachbarschaft lebten, sank die Wahrscheinlichkeit Opfer von Belästigungen und Gewalttaten zu werden. Belästigt und beleidigt wurden zudem besonders religiöse Menschen und Personen, die die Unterstützung von Israel als sehr wichtig für ihre jüdische Identität erachten. Diese Personen fühlen sich, ebenso wie jene, die dem Erinnern an den Holocaust eine hohe Bedeutung beimessen, zudem stärker bedroht – eine Bestätigung der Vermutung, dass sekundärer und israelbezogener Antisemitismus ein großes Bedrohungspotential in der aktuellen gesellschaftlichen Situation darstellen. Als Reaktion auf die empfundene Bedrohung verzichten die Befragten zwar laut der vorliegenden Befragung nicht auf das Tragen von jüdischen Symbolen, aber stärkere Bedrohungswahrnehmungen korrelieren mit dem Vermeiden von als gefährlich eingeschätzten Plätzen sowie von jüdischen Veranstaltungen.
Abstract: The present report provides an overview of data on antisemitism as recorded by international organisations and by official and unofficial sources in the European Union (EU) Member States. Furthermore, the report includes data concerning the United Kingdom, which in 2019 was still a Member State of the EU. For the first time, the report also presents available statistics and other information with respect to North Macedonia and Serbia, as countries with an observer status to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). All data presented in the report are based on the respective countries’ own definitions and categorisations of antisemitic behaviour. At the same time, an increasing number of countries are using the working definition of antisemitism developed by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), and there are efforts to further improve hate crime data collection in the EU, including through the work of the Working Group on hate crime recording, data collection and encouraging reporting (2019–2021), which FRA facilitates. ‘Official data’ are understood in the context of this report as those collected by law enforcement agencies, other authorities that are part of criminal justice systems and relevant state ministries at national level. ‘Unofficial data’ refers to data collected by civil society organisations.
This annual overview provides an update on the most recent figures on antisemitic incidents, covering the period 1 January 2009 – 31 December 2019, across the EU Member States, where data are available. It includes a section that presents the legal framework and evidence from international organisations. The report also provides an overview of national action plans and other measures to prevent and combat antisemitism, as well as information on how countries have adopted or endorsed the non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) (2016) as well as how they use or intend to use it.
This is the 16th edition of FRA’s report on the situation of data collection on antisemitism in the EU (including reports published by FRA’s predecessor, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia).
Abstract: This article sets out to discuss the emergence of (anti) ‘new antisemitism’ as a transnational field of governance, and particularly as a field of racial governance. Romeyn’s interest is not so much in the ‘facts’ of antisemitism or ‘new’ antisemitism, but in the ways in which it functions as a ‘power-knowledge’ field in which a cast of actors—global governance actors, such as the United Nations, UNESCO, the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, the European Commission, non-governmental organizations, experts and scholars, and politicians—set out to define, invent measuring tools and technologies, analyse, formulate policy statements and programmes, and develop ‘interventions’ to address and redress (‘fight’) the ‘problem’. Embedded in the new antisemitism as a field of governance are the assumptions that, ideologically, it is imbricated in the universalist anti-racism of the liberal left, and that, culturally, it emanates to a significant extent from within ethnocultural or ethno-religious attitudes peculiar to populations originating from Northern Africa, the Maghreb or, more specifically, from majority Islamic countries. With respect to the latter groups, global governance actors concerned with the fight against the ‘new antisemitism’ instate a ‘regime’ that performatively enacts boundaries of belonging. This regime erects an interior frontier around culture/religion that effectively externalizes and racializes antisemitism.
Abstract: Kristallnacht, 1938, was a defining moment, changing the course of history. Can the Jewish heritage destroyed before and during World War II be reconstructed? This paper will link eschatological thought and the relevant Mishnaic texts, in particular the value of holiness and its attributes both in time and place. Can a synagogue be de-sanctified? Is the value in the material or the use?
Reviewing these tragic events, the possible criteria for reconstructing the architectural components of Jewish life should be considered, through the evidence of history, the record of events, values of the past, and the new realities of the future. Another significant concern is not so much in understanding the changing and diverse values of a community but the approaches toward the interpretations of these values. In this debate, where existential or historical models play a major role, Judaism tends toward the former, recalling events over time and the allegory in the facts.
What remained in Europe were the ruins, the memory of places and events, and the resilience of the human spirit. However, there are compounded memories and multiple voices, ever changing, challenging the identities of real and virtual communities. How do we evaluate the facts and the extended contexts over time that demand renegotiation of their meaning and interpretation?
On current projections, the Jews may become an insignificant number in European society over the course of the twenty-first century. Can these buildings, as reconstructed, live without the spirit of the people; can new people inhabit the reconstructions, or is the ruin the true manifestation of the course of history? The divergent case studies of the three ShUM cities, Speyer, Worms, and Mainz, in Germany provide a glimpse into the debate and an appraisal of the moment in time.
There are common attitudes facing recovery and reconstructions for uprooted communities after tragedies that leave scars on history. The case studies of Jewish heritage reconstruction and the considerations of impermanence provide another perspective to the restorations of the Bamiyan Buddhas and together a chilling evidence to the consequences of racism.
Abstract: Belief in conspiracy theories about Jews is a prototypical example of how a naïve theory can serve as a universal explanation of “all the bad things happening in society.” Such a theory often arises in times of political unrest that tend to breed feelings of uncertainty in politics and a lack of control over politics. As both uncertainty (a sense-making deficit) and lack of control (an agency deficit) can relate to conspiracy-based antisemitism, this research examines which of the two processes plays a pivotal role in the belief in Jewish conspiracy. Specifically, we hypothesize that political uncontrollability, rather than political uncertainty, is a critical factor in triggering conspiracy theories about groups. In Study 1 (N = 812) we found that lack of control, but not uncertainty, in the political domain predicted belief in Jewish conspiracy, and subsequently led to increased discriminatory attitudes toward Jews. The results of longitudinal Study 2 (N = 476) revealed that only political uncontrollability led to an increase in conspiracy-related stereotypes of Jews. In Study 3 (N = 172) we found that experimental induction of political uncontrollability increased belief in Jewish, German, and Russian conspiracy, whereas induction of political uncertainty did not. Finally, Study 4 (N = 370) replicated this pattern in another cultural context with more general measures of uncontrollability and uncertainty. It was lack of personal control, rather than uncertainty, that increased belief in Jewish conspiracy—and indirectly predicted other conspiracy theories. Our findings consistently support the critical role of political uncontrollability, not uncertainty, in triggering a conspiracy theory of Jews.
Abstract: For more than a decade, there has been a discussion about the scope and character of a “Muslim antisemitism” in Europe, spurred on by anti-Jewish harassment and terrorist attacks by Muslims in some European countries.* However, there are only a few major studies on the attitudes of Muslims towards Jews in Europe, while larger studies on the attitude of Jews towards Muslims have so far been missing completely. Based on the data from the 2017 survey, “Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway. Population Survey and Minority Study” (CHM), it is now possible to investigate how Jews and Muslims in Norway perceive each other, whether they see opportunities for cooperation as minorities and have common experiences of discrimination, what their positioning in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict looks like, and whether it influences their mutual perception. While the focus is on the relationship between Muslims and Jews, in some cases the results for the general Norwegian population are included as a tertium comparationis, since Jews and Muslims form part of Norwegian society.
Abstract: The book "Survival of the Identity of Holocaust Survivors" was prepared on the basis of a doctoral dissertation. It examines how the trauma of the Holocaust led to a shift in identity among survivors during the war, and the long-term consequences of the Holocaust for identity.
The interview material of 11 research participants who survived the Holocaust revealed identity changes caused during the Holocaust war - the survivors' self-perception as a member of society changed due to the exclusion related to nationality; the perception of one's Jewish origin has changed; the perception of one's role in the family has changed, the loss of family members has strengthened family ties among the survivors; life goals changed, survival became the main goal; self-esteem has changed.
The Holocaust caused long-term consequences for identity: the Holocaust shaped the perception of oneself as a "survivor", which acquired a different value in the context of Lithuanian and Israeli societies; survivors perceive themselves as valuing life, understanding the transience of material values; they perceive themselves as accepting God or as denying his existence. Survivors reveals his dual relationship with the Holocaust: he perceives himself as having gained strength, life experience, having found meaning in the Holocaust, or as having lost the continuity of life.
The book has important lasting value because the research participants interviewed in the book were 80 years old or older at the time of the study, and now, several years after the study, some of them are no longer alive.
Abstract: ο ανά χείρας βιβλίο συνιστά μια απόπειρα διερεύνησης της ελληνο-εβραϊκής ταυτοτικής αναφοράς στο πλαίσιο της σύγχρονης ελληνικής κοινωνίας, αφού η μοντέρνα εκδοχή της εβραϊκότητας ξεδιπλώνεται με ορόσημο την νεωτερικότητα. Μέσα από την εκπόνηση μιας επιτόπιας εμπειρικής έρευνας επιδιώκεται η διερεύνηση, αφενός του τρόπου με τον οποίο οι Έλληνες/δες Εβραίοι/ες αυτο-προσδιορίζονται, όσον αφορά την ατομική και συλλογική διάσταση της εθνικής, εθνοτικής και θρησκευτικής τους ταυτότητας, αφετέρου του τρόπου με τον οποίο διακλαδώνονται και συμπλέκονται οι μεταλλαγές και οι μεταμορφώσεις αυτής της ταυτότητας με ορόσημο το Β' Παγκόσμιο πόλεμο.
Η έρευνα εστιάζει συγκριτικά, στις Ισραηλιτικές Κοινότητες των Αθηνών, της Θεσσαλονίκης, της Λάρισας και του Βόλου, και επιχειρεί να απαντήσει στα ακόλουθα ερωτήματα. Πως βλέπουν τον εαυτό τους οι Έλληνες/δες Εβραίοι/ες: ως θρησκευτική μειονότητα, ως εθνοτική ομάδα ή απλώς ως κανονικά και πλήρη μέλη της ελληνικής κοινωνίας; Πως αντιλαμβάνονται την ιουδαϊκή τους ταυτότητα: ως θρησκευτική πίστη ή ένταξη, ως τήρηση των ιουδαϊκών τελετουργικών και εθίμων ή ως εθνο-πολιτισμική παράδοση; Ποιες είναι οι επιρροές της μεταβαλλόμενης (εκκοσμικευόμενης) ελληνικής κοινωνίας στην ελληνο-εβραϊκή ταυτότητα; Ποιο ρόλο παίζει το Ισραήλ στην ταυτοτική τους αναφορά; Πως βλέπουν τους μη Εβραίους, Έλληνες συμπολίτες; Με τη χρήση ποιοτικών και ποσοτικών μεθοδολογικών εργαλείων, μέσα από μια συγκριτική προοπτική τριών γενεών από το τραυματικό γεγονός του Ολοκαυτώματος, εξετάζονται οι εκφράσεις και οι συνιστώσες, οι υποδηλώσεις και οι συνισταμένες, οι διαφοροποιήσεις και οι περιδινήσεις του ταυτοτικού αυτο-προσδιορισμού των Ελλήνων/δων Εβραίων, στη συνεχώς μεταβαλλόμενη και κατά επίπεδα εκκοσμικευμένη, ελληνική κοινωνική πραγματικότητα. (Από την παρουσίαση στο οπισθόφυλλο του βιβλίου)
