Abstract: This thesis presents an investigation into the population geography of Jewish residents of England and Wales in the twenty-first century. The aims of the study are to understand the spatial distribution of the group; identify whether there are distinct differences between groupings in different parts of the country; identify whether the demographics and nature of these groups is changing over time; and to examine whether the pattern for Jews is similar to those for other minority groups of comparable size. Most importantly, the thesis theorises what the patterns found may mean for the demographic future of Anglo-Jewry. The results provide a clearer foundation for organisations responsible for the social welfare of Jewish groups in various parts of the country. In addition, as Jews have been present in Britain in significant numbers for longer than other minority groups, it provides useful insights into future trajectories for more-recently arrived groups. Thus, the findings provide an improved basis for policy formulation by the public authorities with wider responsibilities for combating disadvantage and improving social cohesion. Building on an understanding of the history of Jewish settlement in Britain, and existing demographic studies, the analysis presented takes advantage of the inclusion of a question on religion in the 2001 and 2011 censuses. The principal data sources are census outputs, including Special Migration Statistics, individual microdata, and the Longitudinal Study. The analysis investigates the heterogeneity of the group through the development of a novel geodemographic classification methodology that addresses weaknesses in other approaches and the particular needs of small, unevenly distributed sub-populations. It finds evidence of seven distinct classes, with a strong spatial clustering to their distribution. The spatial distribution of Anglo-Jewry is examined in the context of other minority groups, including previously under-studied Arabs and Sikhs; that analysis finds a strong commonality to the pattern for Jews and some other small groups – their trajectories demonstrating a tension between the benefits of group congregation (apparently driven by religion, even in sub-populations defined by ethnic group) and a desire for suburbanisation. It also identifies the strong impact of geographic scale when drawing conclusions based on distribution indices. The underlying drivers of internal migration, an important contributor to changes in spatial distribution, are examined using logistic regression, having first legitimated the use of (post-move) census-derived characteristics in migration analysis. The assessment finds a broad consistency in underlying determinants of migration and, for the Jewish group, an absence of a group penalty inhibiting the propensity to move home, present for other small groups. The patterns of recent internal migration are analysed using spatial interaction modelling and multi-nominal logistic regression; longer term (1971 onwards) patterns are also examined. Based on these analyses, and allowing for potential future patterns of births and longevity, population trends found through an innovative application of the 2011-based geodemographic analysis to 2001 census data are extrapolated to produce estimates of the Jewish population of England and Wales for future decades. The novel approach used takes account of group heterogeneity and absence of group-specific fertility and mortality data. The projection demonstrates an increasing Jewish population, in contrast to the reduction seen during the second half of the twentieth century, but with a growing proportion being found in strictly orthodox enclaves, which gives rise to a number of societal and policy implications.
Abstract: This study examined cognitive aspects of coping with stress, how these related to religiosity, and how they related to outcomes (positive mood and distress). Participants (n=126) were of Protestant or Jewish background, and had all experienced recent major stress. They were assessed on measures of religiosity, religious coping, perception of the consequences of the stressful event, attributions for its occurrence, and distress, intrusive unpleasant thoughts, and positive affect. Religiosity affected ways of thinking about the stressful situation, namely: Belief that G-d is enabling the individual to bear their troubles (religious/spiritual support), belief that it was all for the best, and (more weakly) belief that all is ultimately controlled by G-d. Religiosity affected neither the proportion of positive consequences perceived as outcomes of the event, nor the causal attributions examined. Religious background (Protestant vs. Jewish) had negligible effects on the cognitions measures. Causal pathway analysis suggested that religion-related cognitions might directly affect positive affect, but not distress. Problems of design and interpretation are discussed. The study suggests some cognitively mediated means by which religion may have comforting effects.
Abstract: How effective is religious activity believed to be in coping with depression? This study assessed the perceived effectiveness of different religious activities — previously identified as important in coping — among 282 people in the UK. The mean age was 25 years, and participants were either Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, other religion, or no religion. Relative to other kinds of help for depression, religious activity was not seen as particularly helpful for depression. Religious activity was seen as less helpful by the ever‐depressed than by the never‐depressed and as less helpful by women than by men. Among religious activities, faith and prayer were seen as the most helpful. Muslims believed more strongly than other groups in the efficacy of religious coping methods for depression, were most likely to say they would use religious coping behaviour, and were least likely to say they would seek social support or professional help for depression. Other differences between groups were also observed, and comparisons with qualitative material obtained in an earlier study were made. The implications of these findings for help‐seeking are considered.
Abstract: An in‐depth qualitative interview study is reported, with respondents (N = 52; all female) from the following urban‐dwelling religious groups: White Christian, Pakistani Muslim, Indian Hindu, Orthodox Jewish and Afro‐Caribbean Christian. Qualitative thematic analysis of open‐ended interview responses revealed that the degree to which religious coping strategies were perceived to be effective in the face of depressive and schizophrenic symptoms, varied across the groups, with prayer being perceived as particularly effective among Afro‐Caribbean Christian and Pakistani Muslim groups. Across all non‐white groups, and also for the Jewish group, there was fear of being misunderstood by outgroup health professionals, and among Afro‐Caribbean Christian and Pakistani Muslim participants, evidence of a community stigma associated with mental illness, leading to a preference for private coping strategies. The results lend further support to recent calls for ethnic‐specific mental health service provision and highlight the utility of qualitative methodology for exploring the link between religion and lay beliefs about mental illness.
Abstract: This paper examined stress among two groups of orthodox Jews suggested to differ in the strength of the boundary of their religious group. Comparisons were made between the two groups, and with urban and rural groups studied by other researchers. Proportions of boundary-maintenance events (events whose threat had been caused or exacerbated by Jewishness) and of severe events, and proportions and rates of regular, irregular and disruptive events were examined. Boundary-maintenance events were higher among the more religiously orthodox affiliated group, and among whom religious observance was indeed reported to be higher. It was suggested that conditions of higher boundary maintenance would be associated with higher rates and proportions of regular events and with lower rates and proportions of irregular and disruptive events. Generally, the analyses supported this expectation. Boundary-maintenance events themselves were somewhat less severe, though not less likely to be irregular or disruptive than other events. Depression was shown to be unrelated to boundary-maintenance events and (surprisingly) unrelated to contextual threat when the effects of irregularity-disruption were controlled. Depression was, however, strongly related to irregular and disruptive events. The results are compared with those of related work, and suggest that the general lowering effect of affiliation to a religious group may be partly explained by the effects of boundary maintenance, which involves stress, but of a less depressogenic kind than the disruptive stress associated with conditions of low/no boundary maintenance. The findings have implications for understanding the relations between culture and mental disorder.
Abstract: In June 2015, the Anne Frank House organised an international conference in Amsterdam in order to compare the situations in four different European countries. Relevant representatives of government authorities, football associations, football clubs, anti-discrimination organisations and supporters from Engeland, Germany, Poland and the Netherlands were invited to join the event.In each of these countries, football-related antisemitism is a well-known phenomenon, yet the incidents vary with regard to background, context and scope. The primary objective of the Anne Frank House was to come to a mutual cross-fertilisation of know-how and experiences with regard to this topic.
This report is based on this two-day conference, and discusses the most significant and illuminating aspects of the expert lectures and additional seminars. The most significant and insightful results from the two-day conference in Amsterdam will form a starting point for future developments in the fight against football-related antisemitism in the aforementioned countries.
Abstract: Is criticism of Israel antisemitic? Do anti-Israel views and attitudes constitute a “new antisemitism”? These questions have occupied the minds of many academics and pubic intellectuals – both Jewish and non-Jewish – since the beginning of the twenty-first century. So far, no consensus has emerged. The definitions of antisemitism are many but all have been contested to varying degrees. This paper offers a brief survey of the definitions of antisemitism and the way in which these definitions accommodate anti-Israel and/or anti-Zionist views and attitudes. This is done, however, by way of introduction and without any assessment of the quality of the definitions in scientific terms, or their acceptability in political terms. The overview simply provides the background and the motivation for the main subject of the paper. The Jewish public’s perception of the link between antisemitism and anti-Israel/anti-Zionist attitudes forms the main focus of this paper. This is, to my knowledge, the first time that this subject has been treated in a strictly empirical, quantitative manner using large datasets.
What does the Jewish public, as opposed to the intellectual elite, think about the link between antisemitism and anti-Zionism? This question has so far remained unexplored, and in this paper I attempt to answer it utilising a newly created dataset. In summer 2012, a survey of experiences and perceptions of antisemitism among Jews took place in selected European countries.
Using advanced statistical techniques, it is possible to explore the extent to which the Jewish public makes a distinction between classic antisemitic and anti-Israel/anti-Zionist statements. Are anti-Israel/anti-Zionist statements perceived as antisemitic by Jews? Are they perceived to be antisemitic to the same extent as other, more classic, antisemitic statements? The paper addresses these questions focusing on the British and French samples of Jews, and comparing and contrasting insights produced by these two contexts.
Abstract: The Representative Council’s demographics officer analyses data to assist various bodies to plan for the
future needs of the Jewish community in Liverpool, Wirral, Chester, and adjoining areas. These needs include
the scale of Jewish educational and social facilities for children, synagogue provision, welfare and social
provision for adults, residential care and, ultimately, burial needs. As with all Jewish demographic studies, the
question of who should be included arises. The government’s 2011 National Census used self-identification
as its definition of a member of a religion; for our purposes we ‘simply’ need to estimate the numbers of
people who might, now or in the future, wish to avail themselves of the services of the community – we might
call these ‘community affiliatable’ people, or simply ‘our community’. The work of the demographics officer
does NOT in any way seek to identify our community by name; indeed almost all data sources used exclude
any means of identifying individuals. The approach adopted merely seeks to quantify our population by
gender and age, with some analysis of the geographic spread across our community area.
The analysis falls into three elements:
• An annual ‘snapshot’ of population elements - the main sources for which are data provided by the
shuls, the King David & Harold House Foundation, MJCC (on certain burials) and Greenbank Drive
Limited. My thanks to the administrators and honorary officers of those organisations for their
patience in completing the various forms.
• An assessment of the current overall size and age breakdown of the community, which builds on the
‘snapshot’, and makes use of information from both the 2011 National Census, and our own local
census also undertaken in that year.
• A projection of the future size and shape of the community. This is key to delivering the aims of the
work of the demographics officer, and is explained later in this report.
Abstract: Communal anxieties about the possibility of an inadequate supply of secondary school places in Jewish schools in London have, on occasion, run high, and have occurred against a context of demographic changes and an increase in preference for Jewish schooling. These seemingly unpredictable dynamics have made planning very difficult and this new study helps to bring some empiricism to the table.
This statistical study, authored by JPR Senior Research Fellow, Dr Daniel Staetsky, and supported by Partnerships for Jewish Schools (PaJeS), uses an empirical approach to predict future levels of demand for mainstream Jewish secondary schools in and around London. Using Local Authority data to examine applications and admissions from 2011 to 2018, it projects forward to the academic year 2022/23 in order to support future planning.
It is a follow-up to previous work in this area, and it draws on observations from the field that allow us to assess the accuracy of that work and to extend our projections further into the future.
The study concludes that current levels of provision will be sufficient if the demand in the next four years remains at today’s levels. Whilst this is a possibility, two of three possible scenarios presented in the report suggest an increase in demand, at a level in which about fifty additional places will be required across the entire Jewish secondary school system in London. Given this projected scale of increase, the report recommends that schools should develop some flexibility in capacity to satisfy the increasing demand. That might mean preparedness to open an extra class, as and when required, rather than to open an entirely new school.
Abstract: Jewish charities are a subgroup of about two thousand, five hundred organizations, accounting for 1.5% of the total number of main charities in England and Wales. The increasing total income of general charities has prompted considerable debate about the perceived concentration of income and the perceived dominance of bigger charities over smaller ones. Meanwhile, the implications of competition for charitable behavior have remained underappreciated. Building on these assumptions and aiming to test how far the results of research carried out in the charitable sector in general apply to the Jewish charitable sector in particular, the research investigates the trends in concentration of income of a sample of 1301 Jewish charities operating between 1995 and 2015, using common measures of concentration to describe the competitiveness of the Jewish charitable sector in England and Wales. The findings suggest that the sector, in line with the wider UK charitable sector, experienced high levels of growth in terms of both aggregate total income and the number of charities operating, along with decreasing levels of income concentration. These findings allow one to hypothesize that, other things being constant, the increasing numbers of entrant charities may well have increased the size distribution of charities providing the same products or services, therefore exacerbating the competition for charitable funding in the Jewish charitable sector. This, in turn, on the one hand is likely to have exacerbated the competition for donations especially among charities pursuing similar causes, reducing the total amount of charitable money devoted to particular causes. On the other hand, the increasing numbers of charities providing the same products or services and the resultant increasing competition for funding may have impacted on the costs and efforts Jewish charities were able to divert to fundraising at the expense of resources that could be devoted, instead, to service provision.
Abstract: CST recorded a record high total of 1,652 antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2018. 2018 was the third year in a row that CST has recorded a record high incident total and means the problem of rising antisemitism in our country continues to grow.
The 1,652 antisemitic incidents CST recorded in 2018 represent a 16 per cent rise from the 1,420 incidents recorded in 2017. These 1,652 incidents were spread throughout the year, with over 100 incidents recorded in every month for the first time in any calendar year; indicating that a general atmosphere of intolerance and prejudice is sustaining the high incident totals, rather than a one-off specific ‘trigger’ event. In addition to more general background factors, the highest monthly totals in 2018 came when the problem of antisemitism in the Labour Party was the subject of intense discussion and activity, or when violence surged temporarily on the border between Israel and Gaza; suggesting that these events, and reactions to them, also played a role in 2018’s record total.
The highest monthly totals in 2018 came in May, with 182 incidents; April, with 151 incidents; August, with 150 incidents; and September, with 148 incidents. It is likely that these higher monthly totals were partly caused by reactions to political events in the UK and overseas, involving the Labour Party and violence on the border of Israel and Gaza, during those months.
CST recorded 148 antisemitic incidents in 2018 that were examples of, or took place in the immediate context of, arguments over alleged antisemitism in the Labour Party. Of these 148 incidents, 49 occurred in August, 16 in September and 15 in April. These were all months in which allegations of antisemitism in the Labour Party attracted significant media and political attention. Also in April and May, several Palestinians were killed and many injured in violence connected to protests at the border between Israel and Gaza. CST recorded 173 antisemitic incidents in 2018 that showed anti-Israel motivation alongside antisemitism, of which 47 incidents – over a quarter – occurred in April and May. In 2018 as a whole, CST recorded 84 antisemitic incidents that showed far right motivation, and 13 that showed Islamist motivation.
The 182 incidents recorded by CST in May is the highest monthly total CST has recorded since August 2014, when Israel and Hamas last fought a sustained conflict over Gaza, and is the fourth-highest monthly total CST has ever recorded.
2018 saw an increase in the number and proportion of antisemitic incidents that used political or extremist language and imagery. Forty-five per cent of the incidents recorded by CST in 2018 involved the use of extremist language or imagery alongside antisemitism, compared to 30 per cent of incidents recorded in 2017. Not all of these incidents revealed a clear, single ideological motivation: many involved the varied and confused use of different extremist motifs, drawn from a broad reservoir of antisemitic sources. Of the 1,652 antisemitic incidents recorded during 2018, 456 involved language or imagery relating to the far right or the Nazi period; 254 involved references to Israel and the Palestinians, alongside antisemitism; and 29 involved references to Islam and Muslims. In 285 incidents, more than one type of extremist discourse was used.
Abstract: Antisemitism and anti-Zionism are complex, delineable, yet inter-related social-psychological phenomena. While antisemitism has been described as an irrational, age-old prejudice, anti-Zionism is often represented as a legitimate response to a ’rogue state’. Drawing upon media and visual sources and rich interview data from Iran, Britain and Israel, Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism: Representation, Cognition and Everyday Talk examines the concepts of antisemitism and anti-Zionism, tracing their evolution and inter-relations, and considering the distinct ways in which they are manifested, and responded to, by Muslim and Jewish communities in Iran, Britain and Israel. Providing insights from social psychology, sociology and history, this interdisciplinary analysis sheds light on the pivotal role of the media, social representations and identity processes in shaping antisemitism and anti-Zionism. As such, this provocative book will be of interest to social scientists working on antisemitism, race and ethnicity, political sociology and political science, media studies and Middle Eastern politics.
Abstract: With contributions from a dozen American and European scholars, this volume presents an overview of Jewish writing in post–World War II Europe. Striking a balance between close readings of individual texts and general surveys of larger movements and underlying themes, the essays portray Jewish authors across Europe as writers and intellectuals of multiple affiliations and hybrid identities. Aimed at a general readership and guided by the idea of constructing bridges across national cultures, this book maps for English-speaking readers the productivity and diversity of Jewish writers and writing that has marked a revitalization of Jewish culture in France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, and Russia.
Introduction Thomas Nolden and Vivian Liska
1. Secret Affinities: Contemporary Jewish Writing in Austria Vivian Liska
2. Writing against Reconciliation: Contemporary Jewish Writing in Germany Stephan Braese
3. Remembering or Inventing the Past: Second-Generation Jewish Writers in the Netherlands Elrud Ibsch
4. Bonds with a Vanished Past: Contemporary Jewish Writing in Scandinavia Eva Ekselius
5. Imagined Communities: Contemporary Jewish Writing in Great Britain Bryan Cheyette
6. A la recherche du Judaïsme perdu: Contemporary Jewish Writing in France Thomas Nolden
7. Ital'Yah Letteraria: Contemporary Jewish Writing in Italy Christoph Miething
8. Writing along Borders: Contemporary Jewish Writing in Hungary Péter Varga with Thomas Nolden
9. Making Up for Lost Time: Contemporary Jewish Writing in Poland Monika Adamczyk-Garbowska
10. De-Centered Writing: Aspects of Contemporary Jewish Writing in Russia Rainer Grübel and Vladimir Novikov
Abstract: This study provides an analysis of the attitudes of a minority faith in the UK, the Jews, to interfaith engagement, to the Council of Christians and Jews and other monotheistic religions. It is based on oral testimonies of interviewees who were all members of the Oxford Jewish Congregation, a unique community which has three Jewish groupings of Orthodox, Masorti and Liberal all under one roof. The objectives are to determine the influence of upbringing and life experiences on resultant interfaith attitudes, and link these with the religious denomination of the respondents. Thereafter these attitudes are considered in relation to Israel; to membership of the Council of Christian and Jews; to the attitudes of Jews entering into the sacred space of the ‘Other’ in situations of increasing intensity. Finally this thesis explores attitudes of Jews welcoming non-Jews to attending services in synagogues.
The thesis firstly highlights that the participants’ attitudes towards those of other religions were dependent upon upbringing, background and life experiences, irrespective of whether these resultant attitudes were positive, ambivalent or negative. Secondly, the most significant result found was that all the respondents were involved in dialogue with the Other irrespective of whether they had positive, ambivalent or negative attitudes towards interfaith and despite which Jewish denomination they belonged to. Thirdly, with regard to Israel, each had their own view and opinion which was not dependent on religious affiliation. Fourthly, with regard to the space of the Other, there is more complexity from whether the respondents would enter a church, attend, then participate in an interfaith service held in a church, and finally if they would take part in a service in a church involving a friend or colleague. The responses were divided by the Jewish grouping of the interviewees and demonstrated a new paradigm. There were personal interfaith boundaries beyond which responders would not pass. There was no correlation between background or religious affiliation, revealing an underlying level of unpredictability within the interviewees. Fifthly, this study demonstrated that half of the Orthodox responders were engaged in interfaith activity. Anecdotally, without previous evidence, it has been assumed that Orthodox Jews were less likely to engage in interfaith work. Within this research this was not the case.
Abstract: In late 2017, JPR published a major study of attitudes towards Jews and Israel among the population of Great Britain, a project supported by the Community Security Trust and the Department for Communities and Local Government. We regard it as a groundbreaking piece of work - the first study conducted anywhere that empirically demonstrates a clear connection between extreme hostility towards Israel and more traditional forms of antipathy towards Jews.
This report explores this connection yet further, focusing specifically on two particularly prevalent ideas that are often experienced by Jews as antisemitic: the contention that Israel is 'an apartheid state' and that it should be subjected to a boycott.
In the first instance, the study finds that large proportions of people actually have no view at all on these ideas, either because they do not know anything about the issues, or because they are simply unsure of where they stand on them. This is particularly the case for young people and women - knowledge levels improve and opinions sharpen the older people are, and, as has been found in numerous other studies, women tend to be less opinionated than men on these types of political issues.
However, among those who do have a view, 21% agree with the contention that 'Israel is an apartheid state,' 5% strongly so, and 10% endorse the argument that 'people should boycott Israeli goods and products (3% strongly so). About the same proportion (18%) disagrees with the apartheid contention as agree with it, but a much higher proportion disagrees with the boycott one (47%) than agrees with it.
Disagreement with the boycott idea is higher in older age bands than in younger ones, increasingly so among those aged 40-plus, a phenomenon that is not found in relation to the apartheid contention. But the ideas are not particularly sensitive to educational level - both agreement and disagreement with both contentions increase the higher the educational qualification achieved.
However, clear distinctions can be found when looking at the data through the lens of religion, with Muslims much more likely than other groups to support both contentions.
The report goes on to explore the correlations between these views and more traditional anti-Jewish ones, and finds clear links between the two, although this is more the case with the boycott idea than the apartheid one. However, it also notes that the correlation is stronger with other anti-Israel beliefs, particularly those arguing that Israel exploits the Holocaust for its own purposes, and those claiming that Israel is excessively powerful or the primary cause of troubles in the Middle East.
Abstract: What can the internet tell us about antisemitism in the United Kingdom? It has been shown that people are remarkably honest when they search for information online. Their Google searches and queries reveal interests, prejudices and hatreds that they might keep hidden from friends, family members, neighbours, surveys and even from themselves. They have been shown to share their health secrets, sexual preferences, and hostility towards other groups.
We decided to put this to the test to see what the Google searches made by people in the United Kingdom could tell us about attitudes
towards Jewish people in this country and in general towards Jews. Unsurprisingly perhaps, we found that, every year, people in this
country express antisemitic thoughts through their internet searches. People make some Google searches that are disturbing, including searches such as “I hate Jews,” and “Why are Jews evil?”, along with other searches expressing violent intentions towards Jews. Others post on anonymous hate sites such as the far right Stormfront website, expressing their antisemitic feelings about various Jewish Members of Parliament and celebrities.
By analysing this data, we can get a better sense of the where, when, who and what of antisemitism in Britain today. For example,we looked at whether the voting patterns of towns and cities affect the number of antisemitic searches in those places. We found that searches looking for information on the Holocaust being a hoax rise about 30 per cent every year on Holocaust Memorial Day. We learnt that Jewish women in public life or positions of power are the subject of more antisemitic searches than Jewish men in similar positions. We found evidence of the rise in popularity of antisemitic conspiracy theories, such as the discredited myth relating to the role of the Rothschild family in running the world. And we found that sometimes heightened media focus on Jews or Israel, even if it is positive, can still lead to an increase in online searches for antisemitic content.
We also found strategies that technology companies and civil society organisations can use to fight hatred. For example, our research shows that, when Google changed its autocomplete formula to eliminate antisemitic search suggestions, this lowered the number of people searching for antisemitic material (which also means that, before removing those antisemitic search prompts, Google was directing people to make antisemitic searches
who might otherwise not have done so).
This is the story of the hidden hate that our report reveals.
