Abstract: Ashkenazic Hebrew is a unique language variety with a centuries-long history of written use among Central and Eastern European Jews. It has distinct phonological and grammatical features attested in texts composed by Ashkenazic Jews (e.g. adherents of the Hasidic and Maskilic movements) in Europe prior to the twentieth century. While Ashkenazic Hebrew is commonly believed to have been replaced by Israeli Hebrew in the twentieth century, this traditional written variety of the language actually continues to thrive in contemporary Diaspora Haredi (strictly Orthodox) communities, chiefly the Hasidic centres of New York, London, Montreal and Antwerp. This fascinating and understudied form of Hebrew is used widely and productively in the composition of a rich variety of original documents for a Hasidic audience (about e.g. Covid transmission, United States educational stipulations, Zoom schooling, lockdown rules, etc.). In this article we demonstrate that contemporary Ashkenazic Hebrew has many shared orthographic, phonological, grammatical and lexical features with its Eastern European antecedent. These include: orthography of loanwords based on Yiddish conventions (e.g. חולי הקאראנא xóylay ha-koróna ‘those ill with coronavirus’); morphology of plural loan nouns (בקאלידזשעס be-kóleǧes‘in colleges’, הפראגראמע״ן haprográmen ‘the programmes’); retention of the definite article with inseparable prepositions (בהשכונה be-ha-šxíne‘in the neighbourhood’);
Abstract: In this article, I focus on Antwerp’s Hasidic male immigrants, who must not only apprentice themselves to a new language (Flemish) and career, but also accustom themselves to an unfamiliar country and governmental bureaucracy. They must learn the local habits and social mores of Antwerp’s Hasidic community. Moreover, they must contend with the afterlife of a classed association – wherein Jewish male workers actively tethered their classed identities and subjectivities to the diamond and to its status as a “luxury” commodity. In the wake of the diamond industry’s decline for the vast majority of Antwerp’s Jewish male workforce, I attend to this space of displacement, in which the diamond industry continues to exert itself, despite its diminished capacity, over these men. Drawing upon fieldwork conducted between 2015-2019 in Antwerp, in cooperation with a Hasidic non-profit focused on the economic revitalization of Antwerp’s Hasidic male workforce, I examine the intersection between class, masculinity, and piety, through an initiative within Antwerp to recreate a new Hasidic man and worker-citizen. In this space of reinvention, Hasidic men must contend with the spectral presence of the diamond industry and its association with Jews, as they seek integration into the local Flemish labor force and legitimacy in the eyes of Antwerp’s Hasidic community.
Abstract: Despite many cultural and theological similarities and frequent social interaction between both groups, a one-sided negative, unqualified and polarized image of the relations between Jews and Muslims prevails. This book aims to break through this negative image, which is continuously fed and reinforced by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Particularly in the Low Countries, where large groups of Jews and Muslims live as religious minorities.
On the one hand , Jews and Muslims at the Start outlines the contours of the various historical and geographical contexts within which Jewish-Islamic relations can be situated: from the violent confrontation between the Jews in and around Medina and the prophet Mohammed via the so-called 'Golden Ages' in Andalusia to the explosive situation in the Middle East today. On the other hand, it delves deeper into the complex interaction between Islam and Judaism, which is expressed, among other things, in the attitude of the Koran towards Jews. Finally, both the mutual influence of texts and traditions are examined, as well as parallels and differences in the practice of religious life and the position of women and the LGBTQIA+ community.
Abstract: The Sixth Survey of European Jewish Community Leaders and Professionals, 2024, presents the results of an online survey offered in 10 languages and administered to 879 respondents in 31 countries. Conducted every three years using the same format, the survey seeks to identify trends and their evolution over time.
The 2024 survey came during a historically fraught moment for the Jewish people globally. The impact of the horrific October 7th attacks and the subsequent war in Israel cannot be understated. How is this affecting Jewish leadership and Jewish communal life? Therefore, in addition to the regular topics covered by the survey (community priorities, threats, security concerns, attitudes towards Europe and Israel), this edition included a special section designed to understand the impact of October 7th on Jewish life in Europe.
That October 7th has profoundly affected Jewish Europe is evident across multiple sections throughout the survey. Concern about antisemitism and the threat of physical attack has intensified. A large majority of 78% feel less safe living as Jews in their cities than they did before the Hamas attack, and respondents are more cautious about how they identify themselves as Jews. They are also more distant from their wider environments, with 38% reporting they have become more distant from non-Jewish friends.
The respondents were comprised of presidents and chairpersons of nationwide “umbrella organizations” or Federations; presidents and executive directors of private Jewish foundations, charities, and other privately funded initiatives; presidents and main representatives of Jewish communities that are organized at a city level; executive directors and programme coordinators, as well as current and former board members of Jewish organizations; among others
Abstract: FRA’s third survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU reveals their experiences and perceptions of antisemitism, and shows the obstacles they face in living an openly Jewish life.
The survey pre-dates the Hamas attacks on 7 October 2023 and Israel’s military response in Gaza. But the report includes information about antisemitism collected from 12 Jewish community organisations more recently. Jewish people have experienced more antisemitic incidents since October 2023, with some organisations reporting an increase of more than 400%.
The survey results point to:
Rising antisemitism: 80% of respondents feel that antisemitism has grown in their country in the five years before the survey.
High levels of antisemitism online: 90% of respondents encountered antisemitism online in the year before the survey.
Antisemitism in the public sphere: in the year before the survey, 56% of respondents encountered offline antisemitism from people they know and 51% in the media.
Harassment: 37% say they were harassed because they are Jewish in the year before the survey. Most of them experienced harassment multiple times. Antisemitic harassment and violence mostly take place in streets, parks, or shops.
Safety and security concerns: Most respondents continue to worry for their own (53%) and their family’s (60%) safety and security. Over the years, FRA research has shown that antisemitism tends to increase in times of tension in the Middle East. In this survey, 75% feel that people hold them responsible for the Israeli government’s actions because they are Jewish.
Hidden lives: 76% hide their Jewish identity at least occasionally and 34% avoid Jewish events or sites because they do not feel safe. As a reaction to online antisemitism, 24% avoid posting content that would identify them as Jewish, 23% say that they limited their participation in online discussions, and 16% reduced their use of certain platforms, websites or services.
The EU and its Member States have put in place measures against antisemitism, which have led to some progress. These include the EU’s first ever strategy on combating antisemitism and action plans in some EU countries. The report suggests concrete ways for building on that progress:
Monitoring and adequately funding antisemitism strategies and action plans: This includes adopting plans in those EU countries which do not have them and developing indicators to monitor progress.
Securing the safety and security of Jewish communities: Countries need to invest more in protecting Jewish people, working closely with the affected communities.
Tackling antisemitism online: Online platforms need to address and remove antisemitic content online, to adhere tothe EU’s Digital Services Act. They also need to better investigate and prosecute illegal antisemitic content online.
Encouraging reporting and improving recording of antisemitism: National authorities should step up efforts to raise rights awareness among Jews, encourage them to report antisemitic incidents and improve the recording of such incidents. Greater use of third-party and anonymous reporting could help.
The survey covers Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden where around 96% of the EU’s estimated Jewish population live. Almost 8,000 Jews aged 16 or over took part in the online survey from January to June 2023. This is the third survey of its kind, following those of 2013 and 2018.
Abstract: The purpose of this study is to compare two groups of Jewish women, native-born and migrants, who reside in Brussels regarding their social integration into native-born Jewish and non-Jewish communities and the acculturation strategies they employ. It seems that Brussels is not as socially and culturally open, as perceived by the interviewees. Hence, the social networks of women in our study, as well as their acculturation patterns, differ in degree of separation between native-born Jewish women, non-Israeli immigrants and Israeli immigrants. The former maintain social networks characterized by fluid boundaries between them and the majority society, whereas non-Israeli immigrants are characterized by shared, not very dense networks with the native-born Jewish community and diasporic networks. Finally, Israeli women are characterized by almost completely closed social networks, which can be defined as a distinct “Israeli bubble.” As for their acculturation strategies, native-born women are those who are more integrated among non-Jews and native-born Jews, as expected from their familiarity with the culture and their long-term interactions, despite being partially marginalized as minority. Migrant women are less integrated and more separated from both native-born Jews and – to a larger extent – from non-Jews; so are Israelis. Social networks which gradually become communities are mainly created by women and maintained by them over the years. Therefore, the study of social networks, their structure and construction through daily interactions, and their contribution to the ethnic-diasporic community building have become the source of women’s strength in the host country – as immigrants and as a native-born minority group.
Abstract: Rising antisemitism in the twenty-first century has alarmed Jewish communities and the general public, but antisemitic hate crime victimization remains understudied outside the US context. This study primarily relies on a comprehensive survey of 16,400 Jews across twelve European countries, supplemented with data from additional sources, to assess individual and country-level predictors of Jews’ experiences and fears of antisemitic harassment and violence. Multilevel models indicate that young age, perceived discrimination, identity visibility, and identification with Israel are pronounced individual risk factors for victimization. On the country level, negative opinion of Israel and Muslim population share predict victimization, highlighting the role of a “new” or Israel-derived antisemitism in the twenty-first century. The factors most strongly associated with fear are young age, previous victimization, perceptions of an ambient antisemitic threat, and recent occurrence of fatal antisemitic violence. Overall, the findings underscore the importance of integrating general theory on hate crime and victimization with context-specific factors when seeking to understand the experiences of targeted groups.
Abstract: The EU-Funded RELATION – RESEARCH, KNOWLEDGE & EDUCATION AGAINST ANTISEMITISM project (https://www.relationproject.eu) aims at defining an innovative strategy that starts from a better knowledge of the Jewish history/traditions as part of the common history/traditions, and puts in place a set of educational activities in Belgium, Italy, Romania and Spain as well as online actions in order to tackle the phenomenon.
The project activities include the monitoring of antisemitism phenomenon online in the four countries of the project (Belgium, Italy, Romania and Spain) by creating a cross-country web-monitoring of illegal antisemitic hate speech.
The shadow monitoring exercises aim at:
● Analyzing the removal rate of illegal antisemitic hate speech available on diverse Social Media Platforms signatory to the Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online, namely Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and TikTok.
● Analyzing the types of content and narratives collected by the research team.
Partners organizations focused on their country language: French for Belgium, Italian, Romanian and Spanish. Four organizations from four different countries (Belgium, Italy, Spain and Romania) took part in the monitoring exercise: Comunitat Jueva Bet Shalom De Catalunya (Bet Shalom, Spain), CEJI - A Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe
(Belgium), Fondazione Centro Di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea (CDEC, Italy), Intercultural Institute Timișoara (IIT, Romania).
The monitoring exercise follows the definition of Illegal hate speech as defined “by the Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law and national laws transposing it, means all conduct publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion,
descent or national or ethnic origin.”
The content was collected and reported to social media platforms in three rounds between October 2022 and October 2023. Content was checked for removal after a week or so to give enough time to social media platforms to analyze and remove the content. The monitoring exercises devote particular attention to the intersection of antisemitism and sexism.
Abstract: The EU-Funded RELATION – RESEARCH, KNOWLEDGE & EDUCATION AGAINST ANTISEMITISM project (https://www.relationproject.eu) aims at defining an innovative strategy that starts from a better knowledge of the Jewish history/traditions as part of the common history/traditions, and puts in place a set of educational activities in Belgium, Italy, Romania and Spain as well as online actions in order to tackle the phenomenon.
The project activities include the monitoring of antisemitism phenomenon online in the four countries of the project (Belgium, Italy, Romania and Spain) by creating a cross-country webmonitoring of illegal antisemitic hate speech.
The monitoring exercises aim at:
● Analyzing the removal rate of illegal antisemitic hate speech available on diverse Social Media Platforms, namely Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and TikTok.
● Partners organizations focused on their country language: French in Belgium, Italian, Romanian and Spanish;
● Analyzing the types of content and narratives collected by the research team
Four organizations from four different countries (Belgium, Italy, Spain and Romania) took part in the monitoring exercise. Comunitat Jueva Bet Shalom De Catalunya (Bet Shalom, Spain), CEJI - A Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe (Belgium), Fondazione Centro Di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea (CDEC, Italy), Intercultural Institute Timișoara (IIT, Romania).
The monitoring exercise follows the definition of Illegal hate speech as defined “by the Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law and national laws transposing it, means all conduct publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin.”
The content was collected and reported to social media platforms between April 21st and 22nd, 2023. Content was checked for removal on April 26th to give enough time to social media platforms to analyze and remove the content.1 The monitoring exercises devote particular attention to the intersection of antisemitism and sexism.
Abstract: The EU-Funded RELATION – RESEARCH, KNOWLEDGE & EDUCATION AGAINST ANTISEMITISM project https://www.relationproject.eu) aims at defining an innovative strategy that starts from a better knowledge of the Jewish history/traditions as part of the common history/traditions, and puts in place a set of educational activities in Belgium, Italy, Romania and Spain as well as online actions in order to tackle the phenomenon.
The project activities include the monitoring of antisemitism phenomenon online in the four countries of the project (Belgium, Italy, Romania and Spain) by creating a cross-country webmonitoring of illegal antisemitic hate speech.
The monitoring exercises aim at
• Analysing the removal rate of illegal antisemitic hate speech available on diverse Social Media Platforms, namely Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and TikTok.
• Partners organisations focused on their country language: French in Belgium, Italian, Romanian and Spanish;
• Analysing the types of content and narratives collected by the research team.
Four organisations from four different countries (Belgium, Italy, Spain and Romania) took part in the monitoring exercise. Comunitat Jueva Bet Shalom De Catalunya (Bet Shalom, Spain), CEJI - A Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe (Belgium), Fondazione Centro Di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea (CDEC, Italy), Intercultural Institute Timișoara (IIT, Romania).
The monitoring exercise follows the definition of Illegal hate speech as defined “by the Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law and national laws transposing it, means all conduct publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin.”
The content was collected and reported to social media platforms between October 6th and 7th, 2022. Content was checked for removal on October 12th to give enough time to social media platforms to analyse and remove the content. The monitoring exercises devote particular attention to the intersection of antisemitism and sexism.
Abstract: Les différentes réalités de l’antisémitisme sont enfin objectivées.
L’Institut Jonathas présente les résultats du premier sondage réalisé en Belgique sur la perception des Juifs, de l’antisémitisme, des autres minorités et de la guerre en cours à Gaza et en Israël.
Créé en mars 2024, l’Institut Jonathas est un centre d’études et d’action contre l’antisémitisme et contre tout ce qui le favorise en Belgique. Il a demandé à IPSOS d’objectiver et de mesurer, à la veille des élections du 9 juin, les opinions des Belges sur des sujets qui sont au cœur de sa raison d’être.
IPSOS a interrogé, du 8 au 12 mai, un échantillon de 1.000 personnes, représentatif de la population belge de 18 ans et plus, avec le même panel et la même méthodologie que pour les sondages politiques.
En l’absence de sondages pouvant tenir lieu de points de comparaison en Belgique, plusieurs questions ont été reprises de sondages récents menés en France par IPSOS ou par IFOP. Les résultats français sont indiqués ci-après, lorsque la comparaison avec les résultats belges est pertinente.
Le sondage réalisé par IPSOS pour l’Institut Jonathas met en lumière et objective les différentes facettes de l’image des Juifs et de l’antisémitisme dans la société belge :
Une image très moyenne des Juifs, 80 ans après la Shoah.
Des marqueurs d’antisémitisme primaire prégnants dans toutes les composantes de la société belge et sur-représentés à l’extrême-gauche, à l’extrême-droite et chez les musulmans
En plus de ces préjugés « traditionnels » (argent, pouvoir, religion…), des marqueurs d’antisémitisme dit « secondaire », aboutissant à banaliser la Shoah et à nazifier Israël
Une méconnaissance générale des Juifs, du judaïsme et de la réalité de l’antisémitisme en Belgique
Trois premières sources d’antisémitisme en Belgique, selon les Belges : l’hostilité à Israël, l’islamisme radical et les préjugés sur les Juifs
Un écho limité chez les Belges des sujets relatifs à Israël, à la Palestine et à la guerre, à l’exception d’une minorité dont certains éléments souhaitent la destruction de l’Etat d’Israël
Distance ou indifférence d’environ 50% des Belges vis-à-vis de la guerre entre Israël et le Hamas, mais aussi polarisation sur ce conflit de segments précis de la population belge.
La guerre, source d’inquiétude pour les Juifs en Belgique selon la majorité des Belges, mais aussi matière à hostilité contre les Juifs en Belgique pour une minorité de Belges
Un antisémitisme s’inscrivant dans une société belge plutôt tendue et inquiète concernant ses relations avec les différents groupes minoritaires et, en particulier, les musulmans et les Maghrébins.
Abstract: EUJS has published a report on the Rise of Antisemitism at European Universities as a result of the October 7 Massacre. For the compilation of this report, we received more than one hundred and ten (110) reports of antisemitic incidents across Europe. However, this in no way reflects the true magnitude of incidents that have taken place, as many have gone unreported.
This report has been sent out to the European Commission, Members of the European Parliament, major Jewish organisations, Heads of Jewish communities, our Partners, Universities, and the press.
The message we want to spread with the report is: Jewish students do not feel safe on their campuses. Jewish students have even stopped attending classes out of fear due to the extremely hostile campus atmosphere. In 2024, this is unacceptable.
The European Union of Jewish Students will continue to gather information and data on antisemitism from University campuses across Europe. We will continue to fight against all forms of antisemitism, be it on campus or online, and to protect our Jewish students. We will continue, throughout, to advocate for a world that will allow for Jews to showcase and celebrate their Judaism in a positive way. But for this, collaboration on a university, institutional, governmental, and societal level is needed
Abstract: Unia publie un rapport consacré à l’antisémitisme en Belgique (2024) et formule 10 recommandations. Ce travail d’analyse, basé sur les dossiers de 2018 à 2022, est structuré en deux volets. Le second volet est dédié à l’impact des évènements tragique du 7 octobre 2023 sur les signalements reçus par ses services.
I. L’antisémitisme en Belgique. Analyse et recommandations au départ des dossiers traités par Unia entre 2018 et 2022
En 2021, Unia a publié une note relative à l’antisémitisme et à la définition de l’IHRA. Le temps ne s’est pas arrêté dans l’intervalle. Les rapports de recherche ainsi que les signalements adressés à Unia et à d’autres acteurs, aux organisations juives et à la police indiquent que toutes sortes de messages de haine et délits de haine antisémites, notamment sur les réseaux sociaux, demeurent une triste réalité et que la lutte contre l’antisémitisme doit s’intensifier.
Dans le présent rapport, nous revenons d’abord succinctement sur l’analyse de 2021, puis nous passons en revue les différentes définitions des faits antisémites (qu’il s’agisse de définitions juridiques ou de définitions de travail alternatives) et leur utilisation dans la pratique.
II. L’impact du conflit israélo-palestinien : discours et délits de haine en Belgique – focus sur les signalements entre 7 octobre et le 7 décembre 2023
En raison de la tragique actualité, Unia a rédigé un document annexe au rapport, qui examine l’impact du conflit sur son activité.
En deux mois, entre le 7 octobre 2023 et le 7 décembre 2023, 91 signalements ont été enregistrés, dont 66 font explicitement référence à l’ascendance juive. Il s’agit essentiellement de messages de haine, pour plus de la moitié en ligne, mais aussi de propos tenus dans l’espace public. Unia est par ailleurs en contact avec le parquet et la police dans 9 dossiers relatifs à des agressions et dégradations.
A titre de comparaison, l’an passé, Unia a enregistré en moyenne entre 4 et 5 signalements par mois.
Le conflit ne change pas la nature des actes, mais il accroît leur intensité en raison d’un effet de loupe. Le même phénomène a été observé en 2008-2009.
Het rapport antisemitisme in België (2024) van Unia bestaat uit 2 delen: de analyse van de dossiers van 2018 tot 2022 en de impact van de tragische gebeurtenissen sinds 7 oktober 2023 op de nieuwe meldingen. We doen ook 10 aanbevelingen.
I. Antisemitisme in België. Analyse en aanbevelingen op basis van dossiers behandeld door Unia tussen 2018 en 2022
In 2021 publiceerde Unia een nota over antisemitisme en de definitie van de IHRA. De tijd is ondertussen niet stil blijven staan. Onderzoeksrapporten en meldingen bij Unia en bij onder meer Joodse organisaties en politie geven aan dat verschillende vormen van haatspraak (vooral op sociale media) en antisemitische misdrijven een jammerlijke realiteit blijven. De strijd tegen antisemitisme moet duidelijk worden opgevoerd.
In het rapport antisemitisme (2024) kijken we eerst kort terug op de analyse van 2021 en gaan we vervolgens in op verschillende definities van antisemitische feiten (zowel juridische definities als alternatieve werkdefinities) en hun praktische toepassing.
II. Impact van het Israëlisch-Palestijns conflict: haatspraak en -misdrijven in België – focus op de meldingen van 7 oktober tot 7 december 2023
Na de tragische gebeurtenissen sinds 7 oktober stelde Unia een bijlage op die de impact van het conflict op de meldingen analyseert.
In de 2 maanden tussen 7 oktober 2023 en 7 december 2023 werden 91 meldingen geregistreerd, waarvan er 66 expliciet verwijzen naar Joodse afstamming. Het gaat vooral om haatberichten, waarvan meer dan de helft online, maar ook uitlatingen in de openbare ruimte. Unia had in 9 gevallen contact met het parket en de politie voor dossiers over agressies en beschadigingen.
Ter vergelijking: vorig jaar registreerde Unia gemiddeld 4 à 5 meldingen per maand.
Het conflict heeft geen impact op de aard van de daden, maar verhoogt wel de intensiteit ervan. Hetzelfde fenomeen werd overigens waargenomen in 2008-2009
Abstract: The present report provides an overview of data on antisemitism as recorded by international organisations and by official and unofficial sources in the European Union (EU) Member States. Furthermore, the report includes data concerning the United Kingdom, which in 2019 was still a Member State of the EU. For the first time, the report also presents available statistics and other information with respect to North Macedonia and Serbia, as countries with an observer status to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). All data presented in the report are based on the respective countries’ own definitions and categorisations of antisemitic behaviour. At the same time, an increasing number of countries are using the working definition of antisemitism developed by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), and there are efforts to further improve hate crime data collection in the EU, including through the work of the Working Group on hate crime recording, data collection and encouraging reporting (2019–2021), which FRA facilitates. ‘Official data’ are understood in the context of this report as those collected by law enforcement agencies, other authorities that are part of criminal justice systems and relevant state ministries at national level. ‘Unofficial data’ refers to data collected by civil society organisations.
This annual overview provides an update on the most recent figures on antisemitic incidents, covering the period 1 January 2009 – 31 December 2019, across the EU Member States, where data are available. It includes a section that presents the legal framework and evidence from international organisations. The report also provides an overview of national action plans and other measures to prevent and combat antisemitism, as well as information on how countries have adopted or endorsed the non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) (2016) as well as how they use or intend to use it.
This is the 16th edition of FRA’s report on the situation of data collection on antisemitism in the EU (including reports published by FRA’s predecessor, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia).
Abstract: L’année 2021 est une année record avec 119 signalements. Le nombre le plus important depuis le
début du recensement en 2001.
• Cette augmentation pourrait être liée à l’opération « Gardiens des Murailles » opposant Israël au
Hamas. Le conflit au Moyen-Orient sert régulièrement de prétexte à l’expression de l’antisémitisme
sous couvert d’antisionisme.
• L’année 2021 a également été marquée par la pandémie du COVID-19 qui a exacerbé les frustrations et
peurs en tout genre. Les Juifs sont régulièrement pris pour cible étant tenus à tour de rôle responsables
de la maladie, ou, en tirant profit.
• Les signalements sur internet ont nettement augmenté. +62,75% en 2021
• Les signalements pour des actes antisémites commis dans l’espace public ont diminué.
• La majorité des incidents relevés, hors internet, a eu lieu à Anvers et Bruxelles.
• En mai, pendant le déroulement de l’opération « Gardien des Murailles » opposant Israël au Hamas, une
moyenne de 6 actes antisémites par jour a été enregistrée.
• 3 agressions physiques ont eu lieu à Anvers
Het jaar 2021 is een recordjaar met 119 meldingen. Het grootste aantal sinds de volkstelling in 2001
begon.
• Deze toename kan worden verklaard door het feit dat in mei 2021 de operatie «Guardian of the Walls»
tussen Israël en Hamas plaatsvond. Het conflict in het Midden-Oosten wordt regelmatig gecoöpteerd
om antisemitisme uit te drukken onder het mom van antizionisme.
• Het jaar 2021 is ook gekenmerkt door de COVID-19-pandemie die frustraties en angsten van allerlei
aard heeft verergerd. Joden worden regelmatig geviseerd en verantwoordelijk gehouden voor de ziekte
of ervan te profiteren.
• De berichten op internet zijn aanzienlijk toegenomen. +62,75% in 2021
• Het merendeel van de geregistreerde incidenten, buiten het internet, vond plaats in Antwerpen en
Brussel.
• In mei, tijdens Operatie Guardian of the Walls tussen Israël en Hamas, werden gemiddeld 6
antisemitische daden per dag geregistreerd.
• 3 aanslagen vonden plaats in Antwerpen
Abstract: 2020 zag een vermeerdering van signalementen ten belope van 36,5% tov 2019.
• Deze vermindering kan worden uitgelegd door het feit dat de Covid-19 pandemie in 2020 is begonnen
en de mensen heeft verplicht binnen te blijven gedurende meerdere maanden, zonder externe
contacten, hetgeen als gevolg heeft gehad de angst te versterken bij de geïsoleerde personen en de
meest zwakke geesten, alsook het gevoel van persecutie en de samenzweringstheorieën.
• De joden zijn ten alle tijden de zondebok geweest tijdens pandemieën en onzekere periodes. Het jaar
2020 heeft deze steretypen niet mogen tegenspreken.
• De signalementen op het Internet zijn in 2020 vermeerderd met 54,5%.
• Het merendeel van de vastgestelde incidenten, buiten het Internet, heeft plaatsgevonden te Antwerpen
en Brussel.
En 2020, on observe une augmentation de signalements de 36,5% par rapport à 2019.
• Cette augmentation peut s’expliquer par le fait qu’en 2020 a débuté la pandémie du COVID-19 qui
a contraint la population à rester confinée, sans contact extérieur pendant des mois. Cela a eu pour
conséquence d’augmenter les angoisses, sentiments de persécution et théories du complot chez les
plus fragiles et isolés.
• Les juifs ont de tout temps servi de bouc émissaire lors d’épidémies et périodes d’incertitudes. L’année
2020 n’aura pas échappé à ces stéréotypes.
• Les signalement sur internet ont nettement augmenté. +54,5% en 2020
• La majorité des incidents relevés, hors internet, a eu lieu à Anvers et Bruxelles.
Abstract: In this report:
We look into Jewish migration from 15 European countries - representing 94% of Jews living in Europe - comparing data from recent years to previous periods over the last century, and focusing on the signal that the current levels of Jewish migration from Europe send about the political realities perceived and experienced by European Jews.
Some of the key findings in this report:
Peak periods of Jewish migration in the past century – from Germany in the 1930s, North Africa in the 1960s and the Former Soviet Union in the 1990s, saw 50%-75% of national Jewish populations migrate in no more than a decade;
No European Jewish population has shown signs of migration at anywhere near that level for several decades, although recent patterns from Russia and Ukraine point to that possibility over the coming years;
France, Belgium, Italy and Spain saw strong surges in Jewish emigration in the first half of the 2010s, which declined subsequently, but not as far as pre-surge levels;
However, the higher levels of migration measured in these counties during the last decade have not reached the critical values indicating any serious Jewish ‘exodus’ from them;
For Russian and Ukrainian Jews, 2022 was a watershed year: if migration from these countries continues for seven years at the levels seen in 2022 and early 2023, 80%-90% of the 2021 Jewish population of Ukraine and 50%-60% of the 2021 Jewish population of Russia will have emigrated;
Jewish emigration from the UK, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark has mainly been stable or declining since the mid-1980s;
In Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, there has been some decline in Jewish migration over the observed period, with migration eventually settling at a new, lower level.
Abstract: The ADL Global 100: An Index of AntisemitismTM is the most extensive poll on antisemitic attitudes ever conducted, involving 102 countries and territories. The ADL Global 100: An Index of Antisemitism has provided crucial insights into national and regional attitudes toward Jews around the world, the levels of acceptance of antisemitic stereotypes and knowledge of the Holocaust.
In 2023, ADL released a focused survey that included 10 European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Spain, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.
First conducted in 2014, with follow up surveys in select countries since that time, this data is utilized by policy makers, researchers, Jewish communities, NGOs and journalists around the globe. The findings allow understanding of the magnitude of antisemitic attitudes around the world, and exactly which anti-Jewish beliefs are the most seriously entrenched.
The 2023 survey found that roughly one out of every four residents of the European countries polled for the 2023 survey harbored antisemitic attitudes. This result is consistent with the survey’s 2019 findings, showing that antisemitism continues to be entrenched across Europe. At least one in three respondents in Western European countries believe that Jews are more loyal to Israel than the countries they reside in. In Eastern Europe, the most commonly held stereotypes is that of Jewish economic control and the perception of Jews as clannish.
Among the questions asked of respondents, 11 questions measuring general acceptance of various negative Jewish stereotypes were used to compile an index that has served as a benchmark for ADL polling around the world since 1964. Survey respondents who said at least 6 out of the 11 statements are “probably true” are considered to harbor antisemitic attitudes.
The survey was fielded between November 2022 and January 2023 with 500 nationally representative samples in each of the eight European countries and 1,000 nationally representative samples in Russia and Ukraine, respectively.
Abstract: Existing scholarship on contemporary antisemitism tends to sacrifice breadth for depth, typically focusing on a specific dimension of the phenomenon or a single national or ideological context. This myopia threatens to limit our understanding of current antisemitism because separate parts of a complex picture are studied in isolation, and because crucial questions about temporal and cross-national variation remain understudied. To help remedy this situation, this article introduces a more comprehensive conceptual and empirical framework along with a new dataset intended to encourage the study of antisemitism as a multidimensional, cross-national, and dynamic phenomenon. The framework provides a model for studying antisemitism in four core dimensions—attitudes, incidents, cultural imagery, and Jews’ exposure—and specifies relevant variables and indicators, thus facilitating future research and data collection efforts. To supplement the framework, the article introduces a new dataset (DIMA—Dimensions of Antisemitism) featuring publicly available data covering three of the four dimensions: attitudes, incidents, and exposure. Based on patterns emerging from these data, hypotheses for further study are suggested. These contributions are intended to prepare the ground for a new and theoretically more ambitious research agenda in the field of contemporary antisemitism research.
Abstract: Muslim–Jewish relations have a long and complex history. However, notions that all Jews and Muslims are eternal enemies are proven wrong both historically and by today’s survey data. A comprehensive review of the available survey data from the last two decades provides a glimpse into the views of Muslims and Jews of each other in countries where both communities are a minority. It is based on surveys from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S., including more than 91,000 respondents, comprising almost 27,000 Muslims and, in additional surveys, more than 52,000 Jewish respondents. Many Muslims and Jews acknowledge that the other community suffers from discrimination, albeit to varying degrees. Jews often see Islam and Muslim extremists as a threat to Jews, but most Jews, more than society in general, seem to distinguish between Muslim extremists and Muslims in general. Antisemitic attitudes are significantly higher among Muslims than among the general population in all surveys, even though the majority of Muslims in most European countries and in the United States do not exhibit antisemitic attitudes. The differences in anti-Jewish attitudes between Muslims and non-Muslims do not disappear when controlling for sociodemographic factors.
Abstract: How attached do European Jews feel to the countries in which they live? Or to the European Union? And are their loyalties ‘divided’ in some way – between their home country and Israel? Answering these types of questions helps us to see how integrated European Jews feel today, and brings some empiricism to the antisemitic claim that Jews don’t fully ‘belong.’
This mini-report, based on JPR's groundbreaking report ‘The Jewish identities of European Jews’, explores European Jews’ levels of attachment to the countries in which they live, to Israel, and to the European Union, and compares them with those of wider society and other minority groups across Europe. Some of the key findings in this study written by Professor Sergio DellaPergola and Dr Daniel Staetsky of JPR’s European Jewish Demography Unit include:
European Jews tend to feel somewhat less strongly attached to the countries in which they live than the general population of those countries, but more strongly attached than other minority groups and people of no religion.
That said, levels of strong attachment to country vary significantly from one country to another, both among Jews and others.
European Jews tend to feel somewhat more strongly attached to the European Union than the general populations of their countries, although in many cases, the distinctions are small.
Some European Jewish populations feel more strongly attached to Israel than to the countries in which they live, and some do not. The Jewish populations that tend to feel more attached to Israel than the countries in which they live often have high proportions of recent Jewish immigrants.
Having a strong attachment to Israel has no bearing on Jewish people's attachments to the EU or the countries in which they live, and vice versa: one attachment does not come at the expense of another. They are neither competitive nor complementary; they are rather completely unrelated.
Jews of different denominations show very similar levels of attachment to the countries in which they live, but rather different levels of attachment to Israel and the EU.
Abstract: About 29,000 self-identifying Jews live in Belgium today, constituting 0.25% of Belgium’s population. Adding people with familial ties to Jews, who are entitled to settle in the State of Israel under its Law of Return, brings the total to 46,000 people (0.4%);
The Jewish population of Antwerp (56% of the whole) is now larger than the Jewish population living in and around Brussels (39%). 63% of the Jews living in Antwerp identify as Haredi, with a further 19% identifying as Orthodox. In Brussels, Haredi and Orthodox Jews make up only 4% of the Jewish community – the rest are mainly traditional, progressive or ‘just Jewish’;
At present, the Jewish population of Brussels is experiencing close to zero growth, while the Jewish population of Antwerp has a significant excess of births over deaths;
The proportion of Belgian Jewish adults with a university education (80%) is twice as high as that found in the general population. This pattern, and scale of difference, are observed in many Jewish populations around the world.
About half of all Jews in Belgium reported that they had experienced antisemitic harassment over the previous twelve months (48%). About one-third of Belgian Jews reported that they had experienced antisemitic discrimination over the same period. They are much less likely to report antisemitic vandalism (2%) or physical attacks (4%).
Topics: Antisemitism, Israel Criticism, Jewish Identity, Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism, Anthropology, Employment, Ethnography, Work, Main Topic: Other, Religious Observance and Practice, Jewish Women
Abstract: This research introduces an anthropological perspective in the debate on religious identity and the workplace. In particular, it examines the relationship between Jewish identity and practices and the workplace in Belgium, with a focus on gender issues. Thanks to in-depth interviews with a number of Jewish women in Brussels about their daily experiences in the workplace and extensive field work in this community, valuable and generally difficult to access data regarding Jewish women’s workplace participation, perceptions, and experiences has been collected and analyzed. There is a complex relationship between Jewish identity, practices and the perception of the respondents as it relates to the workplace and their own position. Perceived hostility towards Israel and the Jewry is a recurrent issue amongst the respondents. As Judaism is often connected to the State of Israel and the current political climate, individual Jewish women are sometimes confronted with unpleasant or negative comments or experiences in the workplace. Besides forming a strong deterrent for many of the respondents to participate in the mainstream workforce, this puts a lot of pressure on those women working for non-Jewish organizations. To a certain extent, Jewish practices are adapted, modified and negotiated by the working Jewish women to meet the demands of dominant norms in the modern Belgian workplace. In addition, the ‘coping mechanisms’ that are applied by the respondents are frequently gender-specific and family-motivated.
Abstract: The third of four mini-reports highlighting different aspects and findings from JPR’s major study ‘The Jewish identities of European Jews: what, why and how’, dives deeper into the different religious lifestyles and denominations of European Jews. Is there a single Jewish voice – or a majority Jewish voice – that represents the entire community? And if there is one – who holds it? In today’s political culture, understanding lifestyle differences within ethnic and religious groups is critical, both to understand their needs and concerns, and to address them.
The new mini-report highlights different aspects of how European Jews express their Jewishness through their choice of denomination – or lack of – and through different Jewish rituals:
• The most numerically significant subgroup is the ‘Just Jewish’ (38%), a general category indicating no clear denominational alignment, followed by the ‘Traditional’;
• European Jewry is undergoing a process of desecularisation: Today, across Europe, the share of more religious persons (Haredi and Orthodox) among younger age groups is substantially larger than among the older;
• The most traditional communities are those in Western Europe. In these communities, about 40%-60% of adult Jews identify as Traditional, Orthodox or Haredi;
• The less traditionally observant lifestyles are in the 74%-78% range in Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, and reach 90% in Hungary and Poland;
• Attending a Passover Seder and fasting on Yom Kippur are observed by most Jews, including those outside of the Haredi/Orthodox fold. Lighting candles on Friday night and keeping kosher at home are also observed by a much broader range of Jews than just those from the Haredi and Orthodox communities.
The report is based on research conducted in twelve European Union Member States in 2018, which, together, are home to about 80% of the Jewish population of Europe. The study includes the opinions and experiences of over 16,000 respondents – the largest sample of Jews ever surveyed in Europe.
Abstract: First International Resources was commissioned by the AntiDefamation League to research attitudes and opinions toward Jews in twelve European countries.
• Our research focused on the prevalent attitudes of the general public
in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and for the first time,
Poland and Hungary.
• Data results for each individual country were weighted based on age
and gender. The completed interview data underwent minor weighting
to national population data using official government information on
age and gender.
• In addition to the individual country results, we have compiled overall
“European” statistics which take into account the findings from the
twelve countries surveyed as a whole. These “European” figures are
combined results from our surveys, with each country’s findings being
weighted equally as one-twelfth of the whole.
• Fieldwork was done by Taylor Nelson Sofres, which conducted a total
of 6,000 telephone interviews -- 500 in each of the twelve countries --
among the general public between April 11 -- May 6, 2005.
• Interviews were conducted in the native language of each of the
countries and were completed by TNS.
• The margin of error for each country is +/- 4.5 at 95% level of
confidence.
Abstract: First International Resources was commissioned by the AntiDefamation League to research attitudes and opinions in ten European countries toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
• Our research focused on the prevalent attitudes of the general public
in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland.
• Data results for each individual country were weighted based on age
and gender. The completed interview data underwent minor weighting
to national population data using official government information on
age and gender.
• Fieldwork was done by Taylor Nelson Sofres, which conducted a total
of 5,000 telephone interviews -- 500 in each of the ten countries --
among the general public between March 16-April 8, 2004.
• Interviews were conducted in the native language of each of the
countries and were completed by TNS.
• The margin of error for each country is +/- 4.4 at 95% level of
confidence.
Abstract: Sixty years after the deportations of the Jews, it is perhaps time for Belgium, following the example of France, to acknowledge the Belgian state’s involvement in and accountability for the Nazi persecutions carried out on its territory. True, there are no grounds for comparing France and Belgium. France had a government – a head of state, ministers, and public services – which was independent, collaborationist and officially racist, whereas Belgium’s government, at odds with the king, had opted for exile. Nevertheless, from Brussels to Antwerp, via Liège and Charleroi, Nazi Germany could not have implemented the Final Solution without the active cooperation of local intermediaries, in the public services and the police force alike. Otherwise, it is inconceivable that fifteen German SS personnel could have organized the deportation from Belgium of some 25,000 individuals. Until recently, community-based conflicts kept the Shoah from occupying a place in the heart of Belgian memory of World War II. Now, although the path has been a rocky one, the Jews have set foot on the terrain of the history of World War II in Belgium. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part will analyze Belgium’s perception of collaboration, concentrating mainly on political differences over this issue between Flanders and the two largely francophone regions of Belgium, Brussels and Wallonia. The second part will examine the country’s complex attitude to the memory of the Holocaust, and particularly to Belgian collaboration in the deportation of the Jews, and to the interests and compensation of Jewish victims and their descendants.
Abstract: The NOA-Networks Overcoming Antisemitism project, launched in 2019, is an innovative effort to develop new public-civil society partnerships and enhance collaboration within the nongovernmental sector to support the European Council’s Declarations on fighting antisemitism and fostering Jewish life on the continent. This
report showcases the current policy landscape in 10 areas: culture, education, hate crime, hate
speech, Holocaust remembrance, intercultural dialogue, media, religious freedom, security, and
sport. The research demonstrates that there is still much the Belgian government can and should
do to combat antisemitism. Moreover, there appears to be resistance amongst policymakers to
pass specific measures or to honour commitments made at the national or European Union level.
Abstract: This chapter highlights stories of women’s conversion in contemporary Western European contexts. Theorising the connections among religion, storytelling, identity, subject-formation, and conversion, the chapter conceptualises conversion stories as enabling individual subjects to negotiate a terrain of difference and transformation, including multiple dimensions of belonging. On the basis of a critical operationalisation of Wohlrab-Sahr’s (1999) analytical concepts of ‘syncretism’ and ‘symbolic battle’, the analysis focuses on four memoirs written by women who turn to Judaism and Islam, and looks at motivations for conversion, and understandings of the past and present and different selves. The case studies show that the memoirs construct lifeworlds and selves on a continuum of syncretic and symbolic battle scripts. They moreover demonstrate that converts’ experiences need to be situated within the respective religious traditions, as well as within larger discourses about Judaism and Islam in Western Europe. As such, the chapter contributes empirical insights into experiences of religious, social, and gendered trajectories of conversion/transformation. Moreover, it connects empirical converts’ experiences of becoming Jewish or Muslim to theorising the positions of Judaism and Islam as minoritised traditions and communities in Western Europe.
Abstract: This chapter analyses the intersections between Judaism, conversion, belonging, and gender, through the lived material practice of the tallit. Conversion to a religious tradition is not merely a change in mind set, but rather implies the learning, performance and negotiation of a religious habitus. This is especially the case with conversions to Judaism, or giyur, which focuses on the learning of practices and commitment to synagogue life. Such process of ‘self-making’ is directly related to questions of gender and the possibility of taking on certain objects and tasks. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, this chapter traces how conversion materialises in daily ritual practice for women in various Jewish communities in the specific ritual use of the prayer shawl, or tallit. Gender equality has been one of the prime topics by which liberal Judaism came to distinguish itself from orthodoxy in the Netherlands. A symbol of this difference is the use of the tallit by women, both in the local Dutch context as well as internationally. Historically, women have been excluded from Shul life, and wearing a tallit, as is permitted in liberal synagogues, can be revolutionary as a marker of inclusion. For converted women in the Jewish diaspora of the Netherlands, wearing the tallit in service can be a confirmation of their Jewishness, but is more often met with ambivalence. Some don’t practice, because they do not want to disturb the status quo, or because they see value in gender segregation in shul. Others do, for equally varied reasons, from political quests for emancipation, to pious desires for submission and devotion. As a compromise, specific forms of ‘women’s tallit’ have entered the synagogues, worn by women who do so out of pious desire. This chapter starts from these various prayer shawl practices, to trace broader questions of belonging. It asks not only how this object is used, but also which types of gender discourses, pious desires, and notions of agency are expressed through the use (or lack thereof) of a tallit.
Abstract: This dissertation is concerned with present-day representations of Jews, with a focus on mainstream media. Research objectives are two-fold: first, to examine the ways Jews are constructed as Other in (1) traditional, offline mainstream media, (2) online environments, specifically in (a) comment fields under news content, and (b) SNS, and (3) offline group discussions with young people; second, to explore the relationship between the consumption of news and information through different channels and attitudes towards Jews in adolescents. This research builds on Social Identity Theory and Social Representations Theory, and insights from the literature on media representations of ethnic minorities, antisemitism, and hate speech. It employs a multi-method approach, including quantitative and qualitative content analysis, discourse analysis, text mining, and survey methods. The research questions are addressed in five studies: (1) a longitudinal (2006-2016), quantitative content analysis of the television news coverage of the Jewish minority in Belgium; (2) a semantic network analysis of the word "jew" in online reader comments under news content shared on the Facebook page of a leading Flemish news outlet; (3) a qualitative content analysis and co-occurrence network analysis of Instagram posts annotated with the hashtags #jew, #jewish, and #jews; (4) a cross-sectional survey study into the relationship between news consumption through different channels and attitudes towards Jews in adolescents; (5) a focus group study into perceptions and representations of Jews among non-Jewish youth. Findings point to substantial differences in representations of Jews between news media discourse on the one hand, and the "general public" on the other. Furthermore, attitudes towards Jews in adolescents are predicted by education and religious affiliation, rather than news consumption.
Abstract: Little is known about the gendered dimension of anti-Semitism. Emerging from a literature review on social identity theory, anti-Semitism, sexism, and Jewish feminism, I demonstrate the urgency of examining the link between gender and experiences of anti-Semitism, using the FRA’s 2018 dataset “Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism: Second Survey on Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in the EU,” a large-scale survey of Jews in thirteen countries across Europe. The independent variable is gender identity. Five dependent variables relate to experiences of sex/gender discrimination, physical attacks, offensive/threatening comments, offensive gestures/staring, and online harassment. Using five control variables—being identifiable as a Jew in public, country, Jewish identity, education level, and Jewish population in one’s neighborhood—I engage with descriptive statistics and binary logistic regression analysis to analyze my variables. The findings show that while women are more likely to experience gender discrimination, men are significantly more likely to experience anti-Semitism.
