Abstract: Das Internet, als zentraler Ort für gesellschaftliche Diskussionen, zählt heute zu den Haupttradierungsorten von Antisemitismus und gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit. In Foren, Blogs oder Chat-Gruppen können Inhalte leicht geteilt und weitgehend ungehindert in Sekundenschnelle verbreitet werden. Dies macht gerade soziale Netzwerke wie Instagram, X, Facebook oder Telegram besonders attraktiv, um einfach und schnell Inhalte zu teilen, denen antisemitische Narrative und Stereotype zugrunde liegen. Durch das Internet gelangen Desinformationen, Hass und Hetze tief ins kollektive Bewusstsein. Die Folge ist, dass vor allem auch der Hass auf Jüdinnen und Juden rasant ansteigt. Der vorliegende „Jahresreport zum OnlineMonitoring 2025“ ist Teil des Projekts „Aktuelle Dynamiken des Antisemitismus im Internet: Formen, Ursachen und Gegenstrategien“ des Jüdischen Forums für Demokratie und gegen Antisemitismus e.V. (JFDA). Gerade in Zeiten von Krisen, gesellschaftlicher Transformation und Weiterentwicklung bietet das Internet einen idealen Nährboden für die Verbreitung demokratiefeindlicher Inhalte. Um
diese zu beleuchten und besser zu verstehen, wie Antisemitismus im digitalen Raum funktioniert, hat das JFDA ein systematisches Online-Monitoring aufgebaut. Dieses erkennt und analysiert antisemitische Inhalte und gibt fundierte Einblicke in deren Entwicklung. Das Internet, als zentraler Ort für gesellschaftliche Diskussionen, zählt heute zu
den Haupttradierungsorten von Antisemitismus und gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit. In Foren, Blogs oder
Chat-Gruppen können Inhalte leicht geteilt und weitgehend ungehindert in Sekundenschnelle verbreitet werden. Dies macht gerade soziale Netzwerke wie Instagram, X, Facebook oder Telegram besonders attraktiv, um einfach und schnell Inhalte zu teilen, denen antisemitische Narrative und Stereotype zugrunde liegen. Durch das Internet gelangen Desinformationen, Hass und Hetze tief ins kollektive Bewusstsein. Die Folge ist, dass vor allem auch der Hass auf Jüdinnen und Juden rasant ansteigt. Der vorliegende „Jahresreport zum OnlineMonitoring 2025“ ist Teil des Projekts „Aktuelle Dynamiken des Antisemitismus im Internet: Formen, Ursachen und Gegenstrategien“ des Jüdischen Forums für Demokratie und gegen Antisemitismus e.V. (JFDA). Gerade in Zeiten von Krisen, gesellschaftlicher Transformation und Weiterentwicklung bietet das Internet einen idealen Nährboden für die Verbreitung demokratiefeindlicher Inhalte. Um diese zu beleuchten und besser zu verstehen, wie Antisemitismus im digitalen Raum funktioniert, hat das JFDA ein systematisches Online-Monitoring aufgebaut. Dieses erkennt und analysiert antisemitische Inhalte und gibt fundierte Einblicke in deren Entwicklung.
Abstract: This paper examines the adaptation and proliferation of antisemitic narratives on Telegram during the Russian-Ukrainian war, tracing their evolution from historical myths to digital propaganda. Through a qualitative analysis of Telegram channels in Russian and Ukrainian, we explore how classical antisemitic tropes such as conspiracy theories about Jewish global control, Holocaust denial, and accusations of dual loyalty are repurposed to shift blame for the war onto Jews. Our findings reveal a multilayered process of blame-shifting operating across historical, social, national, and global levels, positioning Jews as instigators of conflict to deflect civic and political responsibility from Russians and Ukrainians. We argue that this antisemitic rhetoric serves as a tool of social manipulation and political deflection, embedded in diverse nationalist and conspiratorial digital environments. By embedding these narratives within Telegram’s unregulated and virally oriented ecosystem, content creators amplify prejudice, erode social cohesion, and perpetuate cycles of mistrust and scapegoating. This study highlights the enduring power of antisemitic myths in contemporary digital conflict narratives and calls for further research into the structural mechanisms enabling their spread.
Abstract: This joint report from HOPE not hate and Antisemitism Policy Trust explores the overlap and interplay between antisemitism and misogyny in a series of articles, case studies and social media analysis.
The report investigates the ways in which antifeminism and misogyny can act as slip roads towards antisemitism and other forms of racism, due to a perceived loss of status among white men – and women – based on gender and racial hierarchies. In recent years, the antisemitic far right, in particular, has become increasingly adept at steering antipathy to feminism and women more broadly towards Jew-hatred, reasserting men’s status at the expense of others.
It also outlines the role of conspiracy theories in bridging anti-feminism and antisemitism, in particular the “Cultural Marxism” and “White Genocide” ideologies that implicitly or explicitly position Jews as the root of feminism and women’s behaviour in general. Such theories can provide a grand context for personal frustrations and prejudices, as well as scapegoats.
We explore the ways in which Jewish people are gendered in antisemitic discourse, outlining longstanding stereotypes of Jewish men and particularly Jewish women who, being on the receiving end of both antisemitism and misogyny, are the targets of especially vile abuse.
We also look into the important, but precarious, role of women in antisemitic movements as recruiters and propagandists, including several of the UK’s best-known Holocaust deniers. Women can play a conscious role in “softening” extreme prejudice, although they can also quickly become targets for abuse themselves.
This report also includes an analysis of misogyny and gender politics on the messaging app Telegram, a key online hub for the antisemitic far right. We found that open misogyny is widespread and enabled within antisemitic spaces on the platform. Attacks on gay men are especially commonplace, which itself indicates the heterosexual male dominance of these spaces. Sexual assault is a prominent theme, and whilst it is discussed in a variety of ways, pro-rape comments are not uncommon.
Abstract: Burchett's article sheds light on the community of Facebook users who interact with posts by the populist far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), and how they respond to the AfD’s contradictory narratives regarding Jews and antisemitism. The AfD uses its online space to construct an everyday reality of victimhood for its political community, which conditionally includes Jews. Jewish victimhood and inclusion are emphasized by the AfD when they fit its political aims, such as focusing on ‘Muslim-Arab’ antisemitism to underline an anti-immigration stance, but are minimized when Jewish victimhood is perceived to threaten non-Jewish German victimhood, as it is seen to do in the context of Holocaust remembrance. Burchett compares comment threads from these two thematic streams and finds that, regardless of the difference in victimhood framing by the AfD, users in both streams react with similar narratives of defensive, competitive and rejective victimhood, as well as a reluctance to include Jews in their in-group of victims, even when the AfD explicitly includes them. Her paper argues that so-called ‘secondary’ antisemitism, Jewish exclusion as a result of resistance to Holocaust guilt, also has an effect on contemporary Jewish victimhood.
Abstract: – Beyond campus incidents, broader longitudinal survey data suggest attitudinal shifts across society, especially among younger populations. This longitudinal attitude survey suggests that there has been a significant rise in antisemitic sentiments in both Germany and the United States since the beginning of 2024 (unfortunately this is when the data set begins).
– Age is the strongest predictor of antisemitic attitudes, with younger respondents, particularly young men, consistently more likely to endorse exclusionary views about Jews in both the U.S. and Germany.
– High social media use and conspiratorial thinking strongly correlate with antisemitic sentiment, especially in the United States, indicating digital environments as key drivers of contemporary prejudice formation.
– In the United States young people are more likely to evince antisemitic views, while in Germany older people are more likely to be islamophobic.
– The data do not support a broad resurgence of left-wing antisemitism; instead, political polarization and xenophobia, especially on the right, remain central predictors of exclusionary attitudes.
Abstract: The emergence of interactive online spaces and the evolution of internet-based communication have dramatically changed the way the individual relates to the world and interacts with other web users. The specificities of online communication such as anonymity and mutual reinforcement of web users have led to an increase and normalisation of hate speech (Troschke and Becker 2019. “Antisemitismus im Internet. Erscheinungsformen, Spezifika, Bekämpfung.” In Das neue Unbehagen. Antisemitismus in Deutschland und Europa heute, edited by Günther Jikeli and Olaf Glöckner, 151–72. Glöckner Hildesheim: Olms; Becker and Troschke 2023. “Decoding Implicit Hate Speech: The example of antisemitism.” In Challenges and perspectives of hate speech analysis: An interdisciplinary anthology, edited by Christian Strippel, Sünje Paasch-Colberg, Martin Emmer and Joachim Trebbe. Berlin: Digital Communication Research). This paper presents the results of our qualitative analysis of antisemitic content on Facebook profiles of British, French and German mainstream media, generated in the framework of the Decoding Antisemitism research project. The online debates of interest were identified in the context of discourse events – real-world events that have the potential to trigger antisemitic reactions – such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, escalation phases in the Middle East conflict, including the events of October 2023, or scandals and instances of hate crime in Europe and beyond. The results of our analyses point to several commonalities in the three language communities in how Israel is conceptualised and evaluated through stereotypes in these comment sections. On the other hand, there are also consistent differences between the three corpora in the choice of stereotypes. Another significant difference concerns the verbal immediacy and frequency with which these mental concepts are communicated in online debates. This article will attempt to map the qualitative and quantitative patterns, compare and contrast the analyses for the three language communities and at the same time put forward for discussion possible socio-historical and -political reasons for this discursive behaviour (cf. Ascone et al. 2022. Decoding Antisemitism: An AI-driven Study on Hate Speech and Imagery Online. Discourse Report 4. Berlin: Technische Universität Berlin. Centre for Research on Antisemitism).
Abstract: The proliferation of antisemitic content on small, high harm online services poses a significant risk to users of user-to-user safety. This includes risks of radicalisation into extremist and violent ideologies, and with serious implications for online threats, abuse and harassment. These risks are exacerbated when users are from a group with protected characteristics, which include age, race, sex and sexual orientation.
In relation to antisemitism, content on these small services tends to be more extreme than the anti-Jewish racism on
large, mainstream platforms. As a result, it helps radicalise people into extreme narratives, the results of which have
included violence against Jews. The proliferation of antisemitism online also contributes to the rising levels
of racism that divide communities. It eases the spread and amplification of conspiracy theories that undermine
trust in democratic institutions and erode liberal values of tolerance and inclusion, across Europe. It also helps
normalise antisemitism in both online and offline discourse.
These small platforms, including, for example, BitChute, Gab, and 4chan, often operate with minimal moderation
and are also sometimes encrypted, providing safe havens for extremist content that includes antisemitic tropes,
incitement to violence, and radicalising material. Despite the harm they cause, many of these platforms manage to
escape robust regulation in Britain and the EU.
This is particularly worrying, considering the major increase in antisemitism in Europe. In Britain, the Community
Security Trust (CST) recorded 3,528 antisemitic incidents for 2024. This is roughly double the number of incidents
recorded in 2022, and slightly less than the number recorded in 2023–when there was a sharp rise following
the 7 October Hamas attack on Southern Israel.
In the EU, some organisations across Europe reported an increase of more than 400% in antisemitic incidents following 7 October 2023. A 2024 survey found that 96% of respondents from 13 EU countries have encountered
antisemitism in their daily life. Hate crimes tend to be severely under-reported, so these numbers–although
high– still represent only a portion of the real occurrence of antisemitic hate crimes.
In this report, we examine the antisemitic content that originates from these small services, and how it migrates to
larger platforms, where it spreads at a greater rate and has a wider, even worldwide, reach. This report will begin with an overview of antisemitism on small services and the synergy with larger services, to explain the risks. We will then look at services to demonstrate the origins of antisemitic content on these platforms. The report ends with recommendations for policy and regulation, to tackle the harm caused by small services, urging decision-makers and regulators to apply stronger enforcement and risk-based platform categorisation to protect Jewish communities and our democracies.
Abstract: Wenn eine KI-generierte Anne Frank im Feed auftaucht, DJs in der Gaskammer auflegen, die AfD Tipps zur Ahnenforschung gibt und Israel zur neuen Chiffre des Bösen wird: Geschichtsbilder von jungen Menschen werden heute maßgeblich im Netz, durch Videospiele und digitale Anwendungen geprägt. Doch die Gefahren werden bislang noch viel zu wenig beleuchtet – und die Potenziale und Chancen, die sich durch digitale Geschichtsvermittlung ergeben, sind noch längst nicht voll ausgeschöpft.
In unserem Report „Der Holocaust als Meme“ stellen wir einige Beispiele geschichtsrevisionistischer Inhalte in digitalen Medien vor, die in unseren Augen eine breitere Öffentlichkeit brauchen – sei es, weil sie besonders große Reichweiten erzielen, besonders subtilen Strategien folgen oder zu schon bedenklich normalisierten Formen alternativhistorischer Erzählungen gehören. Die aufgeführten Beispiele und Analysen dienen dazu, zentrale Beobachtungen, wiederkehrende Muster und exemplarische Phänomene im Umgang mit Geschichte in digitalen Räumen zu veranschaulichen.
Ein besonderer Fokus liegt auf den Plattformen Instagram und TikTok, da sie zu den reichweitenstärksten und einflussreichsten Social-Media-Kanälen unter Jugendlichen und jungen Erwachsenen zählen. Neben sozialen Medien beziehen wir uns auch auf digitale Spiele mit historischem Setting.
Abstract: This research investigates how recommender algorithms on TikTok and Rumble expose UK minors to antisemitic content.
Analysts created 10 TikTok profiles representing 15-year-old users with varied political and cultural interests, including neutral interest in the Israel-Palestine conflict, left and right-wing political interest, male lifestyle influencer content, far-right content and two neutral accounts. The profiles were prompted towards relevant topics for each interest through an hour and a half of manual content viewing, followed by content engagement via bespoke bot over 14 days, resulting in over 5,500 recommended videos. Thematic analysis clustered content into 10 core themes, revealing pathways from neutral lifestyle content to highly politicised and conspiratorial clusters. Relevant themes were manually reviewed, revealing that harmful content persisted through videos, comments, and TikTok’s sticker and sound features, illustrating systemic gaps in safeguarding minors.
On Rumble, analysts collected 4,412 videos from the platform’s “Editor’s Picks” over six months. Analysts filtered for antisemitism-related keywords and reviewed 259 videos potentially relevant to antisemitism. Findings show Rumble hosts more overt antisemitic content than TikTok, including slurs, Holocaust distortion and conspiracies about Jewish control. These findings underscore urgent gaps in platform accountability and the need for robust enforcement of the Online Safety Act to protect children from the normalisation and mainstreaming of antisemitic content.
Abstract: Expressions of antisemitic hate abound on social media today, reinvigorating ancient stereotypes around Jewish people and their history. The current user-centered study examined the shapes and the extent of antisemitic stereotypes from the point of view of emerging adults and their daily social media consumption. Emerging adults (N = 47) between 18 and 30 years of age were asked to keep guided media diaries of their social media activity over a period of 21 days (February to May 2022), zooming in on Jewish people, Jewish life, the Middle East conflict, and other topics associated with Jewry. A sample of N = 1,024 threads from a variety of social media channels was collected, encompassing textual and visual material. Qualitative content analysis was used to determine the presence of antisemitism, how explicit/implicit it was, and the types of argumentation used to support antisemitic claims. Frequency analysis and Chi-Square tests yielded beyond-chance patterns in the data. Findings reveal a high prevalence of explicit Israel-related antisemitic discourse encountered by emerging adults on social media, as well as highly ambiguous and implicit content that eludes easy detection by emerging adult users. Findings also point to the highly interactive nature in which antisemitism is co-constructed online.
Abstract: Wir untersuchen Manifestationen von Online-Antisemitismus im deutschen Sprachraum anhand von Tweets über Jüdinnen, Juden und Israel aus den Jahren 2019–2022. Die manuell annotierten Zufallsstichproben von insgesamt mehr als 8000 Tweets geben Aufschluss darüber, wie in sozialen Medien im deutschen Sprachraum vor dem 7. Oktober 2023 über jüdisches Leben und Israel gesprochen wurde.
Auch wenn nur ein kleiner Teil der Kommentare, mit 312 Nachrichten etwa vier Prozent, antisemitisch laut der IHRA-Definition von Antisemitismus waren, zeigen sie eine große Bandbreite an Formen von Antisemitismus auf. So wird sichtbar, dass viele der nach dem 7. Oktober 2023 gemachten Anschuldigungen gegen Israel auch schon vorher vorhanden waren.
Aber auch die als nicht antisemitisch gelabelten Posts bilden viele unterschiedliche Aspekte und Perspektiven ab, mit denen in Deutschland über jüdisches Leben und Antisemitismus gesprochen wird. Ein Thema war die Shoah. Dabei wurden zum Teil fragwürdige Vergleiche gezogen, etwa zwischen der Verfolgung von Jüdinnen und Juden während des Nationalsozialismus und zeitgenössischen Themen. Beispiele dafür sind die öffentliche Kritik an Personen, die sich gegen Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung der COVID-19-Pandemie stellen, das Diskriminierungsempfinden von Muslim_innen oder AfD-Sympathisant_innen sowie das Leid der Palästinenser_innen. Ein weiters Thema war Antisemitismus und die Verurteilung dessen, meist allgemein, gelegentlich aber auch konkret in Bezug auf eine bestimmte Äußerung oder Handlung. Eine zentrale Erkenntnis der Untersuchung ist, dass sich die meisten Online-Diskurse, in denen die Begriffe „Juden“ oder „Israel“ verwendet wurden, in irgendeiner Form mit Antisemitismus in Vergangenheit oder Gegenwart befassten – der Alltag von Jüdinnen, Juden und Israelis spielte dagegen eine untergeordnete Rolle.
Abstract: With the now-established visibility and electoral success of the contemporary populist radical right (PRR) in Western Europe, existing literature has examined these parties’ refutation of antisemitism in parallel to their continued allusion to antisemitic tropes, to greater and lesser extents. This PhD thesis brings these two strands of literature together in a three-country, three-party, and two-platform analysis of the Facebook and X posts of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), the National Rally (RN) in France, and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) between 2017 and early 2023. First, this thesis applies elements of discourse-historical analysis and of populist “style” to social media data in a novel way to contribute a framework of when Jewish inclusion and exclusion are acceptable to the parties. It demonstrates that the parties construct their ingroups as “victims”, and that Jews are included when this is strategically conducive or when Jewish victimhood does not threaten that of the non-Jewish majority. Second, while existing literature on the PRR’s framing of Jews, Israel, and antisemitism has predominantly focused on party output, this thesis uses mixed methods, Natural Language Processing (NLP) tools and inductive qualitative analysis, to analyse the comments by users who engage with the parties’ posts. It contributes a novel framework of user victimhood, showing that users are not able to form a common identity with Jews when they see Jews as an Other (rejective), see Jewish victimhood as competing with their own (competitive), and perceive Jewish victimhood as an accusation of antisemitism (defensive). Despite this, a third contribution of this research is an examination of user responses to antisemitic code words, such as “globalists”, and a conclusion that only rarely are these overtly understood and escalated by users. The thesis thus provides both empirical and methodological contributions to scholarship on the PRR: combining influences from psychology, political science, and history, and applying mixed methods in an original way to deepen and widen understanding of both the parties and users, and examining how the strategy of (anti-)antisemitism fits into broader processes of PRR mainstreaming.
Abstract: In 2009, the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum took the experimental initiative of creating a Facebook page; since then, it has established accounts on other social media platforms, such as Instagram and Twitter, and is now followed by more than one million users across these networks. This chapter investigates the ways in which the Museum utilises social media, particularly with regard to its authority as an institution and site of Holocaust education and remembrance. On one hand, the Museum has fostered an online virtual community where Auschwitz victims are commemorated, the ethics of remembrance are discussed, and users’ feedback is sought and acknowledged. On the other hand, the institution uses social media to fact-check and criticise certain representations of Auschwitz, suggesting only those explicitly approved by the Museum are acceptable. This demonstrates a wider Museum dichotomy between retaining traditional, didactic practices and establishing contemporary, participatory ones.
Abstract: In this chapter, we investigate how four Italian and five German Holocaust memorials and museums, as well as three major internationally relevant Holocaust organizations, employed Facebook for Holocaust remembrance purposes during the period of pandemic lockdown. A comparison was made of the quantity and variety of activity on their Facebook pages during the months of April and May 2020, as compared with the same time span in 2019 and 2021. Although the study revealed major changes and adjustments in Holocaust institutions’ Facebook activities, both in terms of volume and type of content and regarding interaction strategies, the results show that the COVID-19 lockdown did not appear to trigger a radical change in Holocaust remembrance institutions’ use of social media. Despite the changes found in many Holocaust remembrance practices on Facebook and their growing use of digital media, the memorials and museums considered in this study appear to adopt a conservative stance in terms of the topics and themes addressed via social media and a general little change in the framework of commemoration policies. Also, despite a drive toward internationalization, as demonstrated by the Holocaust institutions’ increased use of English, there still appears to be a certain tension between local and global memories of the Holocaust.
Abstract: The social media landscape is ever-changing as is its relationship to Holocaust memory and education. In the earlier days of Facebook and Twitter’s dominance, there was a clear divide of opinions in the Holocaust sector. On one hand, some institutions were early adopters (notably the Auschwitz State Museum) and others experimented with the affordances of these platforms such as the team at Grodzka Gate, Lublin extending the analogue practice of school pupils sending letters to child Holocaust victim Henio Zytomirski onto Facebook and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s ‘tweet-up’ hybrid architecture tour. On the other hand, expressions of hesitance about these participatory spaces informed the need for the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s Education Working Group to establish guidelines for using social media in this context (2014).
As practice grew, it also became somewhat formalised with most organisations predominantly focusing on Twitter, Facebook and Instagram for public engagement work, and most content presenting traditional curation of historical sources with additional narrative, promoting the organisation’s offline (or elsewhere online) work, or behind the scenes access to curator and educator experiences. Whilst, one of the
celebrated potentials about social media is their ability to help organisations to reach wider (global) audiences, little has changed online since Eva Pfanzelter’s (2014) claim that the Holocaust institutions that dominated previously offline, also dominate on social media platforms. Few others attract much engagement with their posts.
TikTok has brought both new opportunities and challenges for the Holocaust sector – organisations and individuals who have taken to creating content on the platform are seeing far greater engagement than they had on previous ones. Yet, TikTok is also one of the most data-invasive and opaque platforms regarding researcher access. Many also encounter far more Holocaust denial, distortion and trivialisation on this platform. However, the social media landscape is also far larger than the Holocaust sector has really acknowledged and much of the coded hate content that appears on mainstream platforms has been cultivated at scale on others, from 8Chan to Telegram, and gaming and VR social spaces. It is imperative therefore that we bring together a wide range of stakeholders and experts to discuss what the sector needs to move forward with its work on social media. If Holocaust memory and education is to remain visible in the ever-expanding digital world, then it must be visible across a variety of digital spaces.
This report serves as an important first step in this work. It was created as part of the research project ‘Participatory Workshops – Co-Designing Standards for Digital Interventions in Holocaust Memory and Education’, which is one thread of the larger Digital Holocaust Memory Project at the University of Sussex.
The participatory workshops project have focused on six themes, each of which brought together a different range of expertise to discuss current challenges and consider possible recommendations for the future. The themes were:
AI and machine learning
Digitising material evidence
Recording, recirculating and remixing testimony
Social media
Virtual memoryscapes
Computer games
Abstract: Today, in the age of the internet, during recent epidemics such as H1N1, Ebola and Covid-19, it is striking to see how old accusatory scripts are circulated and perpetuated via social media, which serve as new channels for discrimination and blame directed at traditional figures who have been scapegoated at different moments in the history of European epidemics. The article shows how the laundering of information into a cliquey network takes empirical shape during a health crisis. We do so by focusing on VKontakte, a Russian social network similar to Facebook and the 15th largest website in the world in terms of traffic. Using an ethnographic approach to social media, we show how borderline information from an open and easily accessible website is reappropriated, made explicit, and transformed into legally prohibited hate content. It also documents the ability of conspiracy theorists to use the full range of discourse production channels in a country-in this case France-that has very strict laws on hate speech, including that published on social networks. These laws are circumvented by anti-Semitic communities that spread false information in marginal, open and legal networks, thus avoiding legal proceedings.
Abstract: The research examines changes in online antisemitic narratives following the Hamas terror attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war. These events led to a rise in antisemitism across Europe, underscoring the need to analyze how antisemitic narratives evolved online.
Conducted simultaneously in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania using a unified methodology, the study focused on online textual content, including articles, comments, and Facebook posts. It analyzed content from 1–15 April in both 2023 and 2024, reviewing nearly 7,000 pieces per country. The research methodology and categories were finalised in late 2023 and early 2024, with data collection beginning in spring 2024. The final report was completed in December 2024.
The research was based on the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism, adopted by 43 countries and several international organizations, including the EU and most of its member states.
Abstract: The research examines changes in online antisemitic narratives following the Hamas terror attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war. These events led to a rise in antisemitism across Europe, underscoring the need to analyze how antisemitic narratives evolved online.
Conducted simultaneously in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania using a unified methodology, the study focused on online textual content, including articles, comments, and Facebook posts. It analyzed content from 1–15 April in both 2023 and 2024, reviewing nearly 7,000 pieces per country. The research methodology and categories were finalised in late 2023 and early 2024, with data collection beginning in spring 2024. The final report was completed in December 2024.
The research was based on the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism, adopted by 43 countries and several international organizations, including the EU and most of its member states.
Abstract: The research examines changes in online antisemitic narratives following the Hamas terror attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war. These events led to a rise in antisemitism across Europe, underscoring the need to analyze how antisemitic narratives evolved online.
Conducted simultaneously in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania using a unified methodology, the study focused on online textual content, including articles, comments, and Facebook posts. It analyzed content from 1–15 April in both 2023 and 2024, reviewing nearly 7,000 pieces per country. The research methodology and categories were finalised in late 2023 and early 2024, with data collection beginning in spring 2024. The final report was completed in December 2024.
The research was based on the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism, adopted by 43 countries and several international organizations, including the EU and most of its member states.
Abstract: This study introduces an annotated dataset for the study of antisemitic hate speech and attitudes towards Jewish people in Romanian, collected from social media. We performed two types of annotation: with three simple tags
(’Neutral’, ’Positive’, ’Negative’), and with five more refined tags (Neutral’, ’Ambiguous’, ’Jewish Community’, Solidarity’, ’Zionism’, ’Antisemitism’). We perform several experiments on this dataset: clusterization, automatic classification, using classical machine learning models and transformer-based models, and sentiment analysis. The three classes clusterization produced well grouped clusters, while, as expected, the five classes clusterization produced moderately overlapping groups, except for ’Antisemitism’, which is well away from the other four groups. We obtained a good F1-Score of 0.78 in the three classes classification task with Romanian BERT model and a moderate F1-score of 0.62 for the five classes classification task with a SVM model. The lowest negative
sentiment was contained in the ’Neuter’ class, while the highest was in ’Zionism’, and not in ’Antisemitism’, as expected. Also, the same ’Zionism’ category displays the highest level of positive sentiment.
Abstract: In this report, we have studied different facets of antisemitism on non-password protected social media outlets with user-generated content. Our results show that antisemitic content exists on all social media platforms. However, the amount of antisemitic content seems to vary with the degree of moderation on each platform. Since 2017, discussions about the ZOG conspiracy narrative have increased, while the Covid-19 pandemic has given rise to new antisemitic conspiracy theories. Conspiracy narratives are closely related to antisemitic stereotypes, which were found in 25% of posts mentioning Jews or Jewishness. The most common stereotypes being that Jews are powerful, deceptive, and manipulative. In our study, almost 35% of all posts mentioning Jews or Jewishness expressed negativity toward Jews. These posts were found mainly on minimally moderated platforms. Jews are also one of the groups that are targeted by toxic language online. Over 4,000 occurrences of explicit Holocaust denial terminology were found during a three-month period. National legislation is difficult to apply to the global internet. A joint effort by governments and platform companies is important to develop techniques that keeps antisemitic content from the internet, while education is necessary to prevent antisemitism before it goes online
Topics: Antisemitism: Incident Monitoring, Antisemitism: Online, Politics: Democratic Politics, Elections and Voting, European Union, Hate and Hate Speech, Internet, Islamophobia, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Social Media, Racism, Ukraine-Russia conflict (2014 onwards)
Abstract: W wyniku przeprowadzonego drugiego etapu pilotażowego monitoringu, mającego zbadać zjawisko narastającej liczby treści o charakterze nienawistnym w internecie w okresie kampanii wyborczej, dokonano wielu istotnych obserwacji.
Kampania do Parlamentu Europejskiego, będąca kolejną z serii kampanii wyborczych odbywających się w krótkim odstępie czasu od poprzednich, miała miejsce w okresie okołowakacyjnym, co wiązało się z mniejszym zaangażowaniem zarówno ze strony partii politycznych, jak i użytkowników internetu. Mimo tego obniżonego poziomu zaangażowania wzrost treści o charakterze nienawistnym był już zauważalny przed formalnym rozpoczęciem kampanii, co sugeruje, że polityczny i społeczny klimat pozostawał spolaryzowany na skutek poprzednich wyborów do Sejmu i Senatu, które odbyły się 9 października 2023 roku.
Wraz z formalnym rozpoczęciem kampanii wyborczej zaobserwowano stały wzrost aktywności w serwisach internetowych oraz ciągłą tendencję wzrostową treści o charakterze nienawistnym. Po zakończeniu kampanii doszło do istotnego zmniejszenia liczby tego typu treści.
Analiza zachowań użytkowników internetu podczas monitoringu ujawniła, że wzrost treści nienawistnych rozprzestrzeniał się między różnymi grupami, co świadczy o dynamicznym i płynnym charakterze tego zjawiska. Zauważono, że nienawistne treści skierowane do jednej grupy mniejszościowej często prowadziły do generowania nienawiści wobec innych grup mniejszościowych. Szczególnie interesującym aspektem jest fakt, że wzrost treści antysemickich korelował z nasileniem treści antyukraińskich i antyuchodczych, co sugeruje związek między różnymi formami nienawiści w dyskursie społecznym.
Zapraszamy do zapoznania się z raportem
Spis treści:
Wstęp
Metodologia
Badanie – wyniki
Analiza zmian
Treści o charakterze antysemickim
Treści o charakterze antyuchodźczym i antymuzułmańskim
Treści o charakterze antyukraińskim
Treści o charakterze anty-LGBT+
Wnioski końcowe
Publikacja powstała w ramach projektu „Kompleksowa strategia przeciwdziałania antysemickiej mowie nienawiści w przestrzeni publicznej”, finansowanego przez Fundację Pamięć, Odpowiedzialność i Przyszłość, realizowanego przez Żydowskie Stowarzyszenie Czulent przy wsparciu merytorycznym Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami.
Niniejsza publikacja nie prezentuje stanowiska i opinii Fundacji Pamięć, Odpowiedzialność i Przyszłość (EVZ).
Abstract: Religious spaces in the London borough of Barnet provide a lens through which to understand Muslim–Jewish encounters. This case study, pre-dating the 2023 escalation in the Israel–Gaza conflict, examines community relations in the context of the hegemonic discourses that play into racialisations, power dynamics and cultural connectedness through minority religious and ethnic identities in superdiverse urban centres. It focuses on a mosque’s application for planning permission in an area with a sizable Jewish population. Contestations and cooperation developed between the mosque and local Jewish communities, with some offering support while others mobilised, eventually successfully, to prevent planning permission being granted. Power differentials around race, class, religious affiliation and access to political power structures emerge in these instances, in which the impacts of racialisations, societal anxiety and communal hierarchy are sometimes overt and sometimes subtle. These complex and multifaceted events can be productively viewed through the narratives that circulate through local relations, social hierarchies, national discourses and culturally charged communal entanglements. This article draws on mixed methods of interviewing, press and social media analysis, and ethnographic observations to explore religious spaces as a lens to local encounters, in a manner that seeks to avoid direct involvement in an already complex incident.
Abstract: In this paper, I focus on online and offline practices of community-building within two specific religious communities that remain active despite mass emigration. These communities are based in Derbent, Dagestan, and Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria, with members located in Moscow and the North Caucasus. Both communities have formally accepted rabbis from Chabad-Lubavitch, who are likely to promote Chabad-Lubavitch values among community members. I investigate the strategies and methods used by Chabad emissaries in the region to facilitate the process of chabadization. In addition to outreach activities, the visual manifestations of chabadization are significant in this study, as they are presented across multiple online platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, and other social forums, chats, and websites. My research combines online analysis with fieldwork conducted in Dagestan, Azerbaijan, and Moscow between 2018 and 2020.
Topics: Discourse and Narrative, Internet, Social Media, Israel Criticism, Attitudes to Israel, Anti-Zionism, Conflict, Jewish Identity, Main Topic: Identity and Community, October 7 2023 attacks + aftermath, Antisemitism: Jewish Perceptions and Experiences
