Abstract: Together we seek to model the redemptive, liberatory, activist, feminist approach to collaborative working to which both authors are committed as teachers, students, rabbis and activists. In our rabbinic chain of tradition (more particularly through other female rabbis) we explore, through the lenses of student and teacher, the 5-year rabbinic course at Leo Baeck College (LBC). We seek to demonstrate how, when working at its best, LBC trains rabbis as activists. Our contention is that the rabbinic education at LBC has the potential to be transformative in creating rabbis as activist leaders, an ideal which ought to transcend the rabbinic training seminary and be taken forward into community.
Abstract: The emergence of interactive online spaces and the evolution of internet-based communication have dramatically changed the way the individual relates to the world and interacts with other web users. The specificities of online communication such as anonymity and mutual reinforcement of web users have led to an increase and normalisation of hate speech (Troschke and Becker 2019. “Antisemitismus im Internet. Erscheinungsformen, Spezifika, Bekämpfung.” In Das neue Unbehagen. Antisemitismus in Deutschland und Europa heute, edited by Günther Jikeli and Olaf Glöckner, 151–72. Glöckner Hildesheim: Olms; Becker and Troschke 2023. “Decoding Implicit Hate Speech: The example of antisemitism.” In Challenges and perspectives of hate speech analysis: An interdisciplinary anthology, edited by Christian Strippel, Sünje Paasch-Colberg, Martin Emmer and Joachim Trebbe. Berlin: Digital Communication Research). This paper presents the results of our qualitative analysis of antisemitic content on Facebook profiles of British, French and German mainstream media, generated in the framework of the Decoding Antisemitism research project. The online debates of interest were identified in the context of discourse events – real-world events that have the potential to trigger antisemitic reactions – such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, escalation phases in the Middle East conflict, including the events of October 2023, or scandals and instances of hate crime in Europe and beyond. The results of our analyses point to several commonalities in the three language communities in how Israel is conceptualised and evaluated through stereotypes in these comment sections. On the other hand, there are also consistent differences between the three corpora in the choice of stereotypes. Another significant difference concerns the verbal immediacy and frequency with which these mental concepts are communicated in online debates. This article will attempt to map the qualitative and quantitative patterns, compare and contrast the analyses for the three language communities and at the same time put forward for discussion possible socio-historical and -political reasons for this discursive behaviour (cf. Ascone et al. 2022. Decoding Antisemitism: An AI-driven Study on Hate Speech and Imagery Online. Discourse Report 4. Berlin: Technische Universität Berlin. Centre for Research on Antisemitism).
Abstract: This rapid review has sought to examine how the regulatory system for healthcare professionals, from employment through to national oversight and professional regulatory bodies, supports recognition and reporting of antisemitism and other forms of racism, and tackles racism at every stage and level. In particular, the review has sought to answer 2 principal questions:
How do we make sure in the NHS in England that perpetrators of antisemitism and other forms of racism are held to account with effective action taken to tackle their behaviour?
How do we make sure that patients and staff are protected from racism within the NHS in England and across the UK health and care professional regulation system?
This review proposes that the NHS establishes a clear organisation-wide priority to increase trust and confidence in NHS services among Jewish, and other minority ethnic patients and staff through actively promoting an anti-racist workplace culture and putting in place systems to tackle incidents of all forms of racism thoroughly, fairly and transparently. The NHS must work to embed anti-racism principles at its very core, eliminate racist prejudice and disadvantage, and demonstrate fairness in all aspects of NHS employment and care. That must include efforts to tackle anti-Jewish racism.
The scope of this review considers actions that can be taken to address racism from all quarters, including:
NHS staff
patients and their relatives
members of the public
Building on the existing large body of evidence on the impact of racism in healthcare, and on the extensive experience of Lord Mann, the review undertook:
a period of targeted engagement with relevant stakeholders, including the UK health and care system and professional regulatory bodies
thorough examination of existing mechanisms, guidance, and processes for addressing incidents of racism in the NHS
Abstract: The proliferation of antisemitic content on small, high harm online services poses a significant risk to users of user-to-user safety. This includes risks of radicalisation into extremist and violent ideologies, and with serious implications for online threats, abuse and harassment. These risks are exacerbated when users are from a group with protected characteristics, which include age, race, sex and sexual orientation.
In relation to antisemitism, content on these small services tends to be more extreme than the anti-Jewish racism on
large, mainstream platforms. As a result, it helps radicalise people into extreme narratives, the results of which have
included violence against Jews. The proliferation of antisemitism online also contributes to the rising levels
of racism that divide communities. It eases the spread and amplification of conspiracy theories that undermine
trust in democratic institutions and erode liberal values of tolerance and inclusion, across Europe. It also helps
normalise antisemitism in both online and offline discourse.
These small platforms, including, for example, BitChute, Gab, and 4chan, often operate with minimal moderation
and are also sometimes encrypted, providing safe havens for extremist content that includes antisemitic tropes,
incitement to violence, and radicalising material. Despite the harm they cause, many of these platforms manage to
escape robust regulation in Britain and the EU.
This is particularly worrying, considering the major increase in antisemitism in Europe. In Britain, the Community
Security Trust (CST) recorded 3,528 antisemitic incidents for 2024. This is roughly double the number of incidents
recorded in 2022, and slightly less than the number recorded in 2023–when there was a sharp rise following
the 7 October Hamas attack on Southern Israel.
In the EU, some organisations across Europe reported an increase of more than 400% in antisemitic incidents following 7 October 2023. A 2024 survey found that 96% of respondents from 13 EU countries have encountered
antisemitism in their daily life. Hate crimes tend to be severely under-reported, so these numbers–although
high– still represent only a portion of the real occurrence of antisemitic hate crimes.
In this report, we examine the antisemitic content that originates from these small services, and how it migrates to
larger platforms, where it spreads at a greater rate and has a wider, even worldwide, reach. This report will begin with an overview of antisemitism on small services and the synergy with larger services, to explain the risks. We will then look at services to demonstrate the origins of antisemitic content on these platforms. The report ends with recommendations for policy and regulation, to tackle the harm caused by small services, urging decision-makers and regulators to apply stronger enforcement and risk-based platform categorisation to protect Jewish communities and our democracies.
Abstract: The role of HM Government’s Independent Adviser on Antisemitism was established to provide independent advice to the Prime Minister and Government on issues relating to antisemitism in the UK and the most effective methods to combat it. As the first holder of the Office, I was appointed to the role of the Independent Adviser in 2019 for five years. Since then, I have maintained a constructive dialogue with the devolved nations as well as the UK Government.
This 2024 review collates recommendations from my major reports on antisemitism in the last two years, the first of which was a detailed action plan on tackling anti-Jewish hatred across the UK while the second addressed the alarming growth in antisemitism on our university campuses. The review also gives an overview of other important project areas that I have covered in my work plan.
While significant progress has been made, important recommendations still require adoption and implementation by the relevant department or devolved administration. I am therefore urging Ministers in the new UK Government, the devolved governments and senior officials to use this review as a blueprint or checklist for further action and the review is formatted in sections according to who holds the lead responsibility.
The need for action has been made even more urgent by the conflict in Israel and Gaza since 7th October 2023. The Community Security Trust (CST) recorded 4,103 antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2023, the highest total ever reported to CST in a single calendar year. Of the 4,103 instances of anti-Jewish hate reported, 2,699 (66%) occurred on or after 7th October. This figure alone exceeds any previous annual antisemitic incident total recorded by CST, which has been recording incidents since 1984.
Abstract: • In order to understand and address antisemitism, one must effectively define it. The universally agreed
international definition of antisemitism was developed and adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance
Alliance (IHRA)1
• On 12 December 2016, The United Kingdom Government was one of the first to adopt this definition, followed by other political parties and in 2020 it was adopted by 641 Members of Parliament in the UK House of Commons
• The declaration has already been signed by many local authorities and Universities, and it has been used by the UK police and Crown Prosecution Service to define what is and what is not antisemitism.
• Over recent months, there has been a rapid increase in adoption of the IHRA declaration, with over 35 Countries now having signed up. Italy, Sweden, Greece and Uruguay are the most recent signatories.
• In January 2020, as part of Lord Mann’s work plan, he wrote to several Premier League Football Clubs asking
them to adopt the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism.
• Lord Mann recommends adoption of this definition, as he believes it can be of practical assistance when dealing with antisemitic incidents.
• Clubs should adopt this definition of antisemitism as a statement of their club’s values. in order to set clear
guidelines, give clarity and to act as a reference point for employees, stewards and fans on what constitutes as
antisemitism.
Abstract: Pearn Kandola’s Antisemitism and Islamophobia at Work report (2024) is a comprehensive study in which over 1000 Muslim and Jewish employees participated, either through in-depth focus groups or our survey, to shine a light on their experiences of antisemitism and Islamophobia in the workplace since October 7th 2023.
Late last year, we published our groundbreaking Religion At Work (2023) report, the largest of its kind. It explored the experiences of people of faith in the workplace, highlighting the difficulty for employees of any religion to express their faith at work.
Released in November 2023, a question we were increasingly faced with as time went on was the impact on Muslim and Jewish employees, in particular, since October 7th. However, the data for this momentous report was gathered and analysed before the current Israel-Gaza conflict, which could tell us little to answer this question.
As a result, we carried out a new piece of research, designed to look at the:
Extent to which Jewish employees experience antisemitism in the workplace;
Extent to which Muslim employees experience Islamophobia in the workplace;
Impact of the Israel-Gaza conflict on them
Actions that organisations can take to ensure people feel safe and included in workplaces
The research was in two parts:
Firstly, a survey was carried out in June 2024 in which 500 Jewish and 500 Muslim employees participated, followed by in-depth interviews with 20 people, 10 of each faith.
The report closes with key recommendations for employers to better support Muslim and Jewish employees by research author Professor Binna Kandola OBE.
Abstract: Evaluative research in Jewish education often adopts a “silver bullet” approach, attributing identity outcomes to single programs or interventions. This article advances an ecosystem framework that situates Jewish schooling, family upbringing, and peer networks within their wider communal and societal contexts. Drawing on hierarchical regression analyses of large-scale survey data (n = 21,260) from four Jewish diaspora communities, we find that the impact of Jewish education depends on its interaction with family background, social capital, and national setting. Jewish identity thus emerges as a cumulative and relational process rather than the product of discrete experiences. These findings underscore the limitations of single-country studies, which often generalize about Jewish identity formation without considering the structural and contextual differences that shape communal life in different national settings. The findings also extend sociological theories of social capital, cultural capital, and the life course, offering new insight into how educational, familial, and communal forces together sustain Jewish identity in diaspora.
Abstract: The British Jewish community has faced an unprecedented number of attacks in recent weeks, including multiple arson incidents and a terrorist attack. As the UK government grapples with how to respond, this ISD policy brief offers a strategic framework for confronting a range of antisemitic threats. These threats encompass mainstream and extreme actors, state- and non-state-linked activity, online and offline environments, and both violence and latent cultural antisemitism. It urges a cross-government strategy, led by the UK Prime Minister’s Office, centred on the online environment and designed to address the diverse actors, tactics and harms targeting the Jewish community. This brief builds on ISD’s research and policy development on the diverse harms landscape, covering threats such as terrorism, extremism, hostile state activity and targeted hate including antisemitism.
Abstract: Following last week’s horrific antisemitic attack in Golders Green in north London, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer called on the public to “open their eyes to Jewish pain”. Yet our research suggests that the PM and his government might do better to open their own eyes to what underpins the pain many British Jews experience today: the state’s failure to honour its social contract with this minority.
Since the 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel and the subsequent Israel-Gaza war, Jews in Britain have experienced a growing tide of antisemitism. Over the course of 2025, 3,700 instances of antisemitic hate were reported, up 4 per cent from the previous year and 14 per cent lower than the highest ever annual total of 4,298 antisemitic incidents reported in 2023. Incidents include last week’s Golders Green attack, in which two men were stabbed; an arson attack at former synagogue in east London; an attack on the Jewish ambulance service Hatzola; an attempted firebombing at a synagogue in Kenton, London; and a terrorist attack on Manchester’s Heaton Park synagogue in October 2025, which killed two Jewish people and seriously injured three others.
In the wake of this alarming rise in antisemitism, focus groups we conducted between December 2025 and March 2026 with 43 British Jews across the UK revealed severely declining trust in Britain’s major institutions. The oldest non-Christian minority in the country, the Jewish community is less than 0.5 per cent of the UK population and includes both practising and non-practising members from a range of denominational affiliations and political views.
But despite their differences, people repeatedly expressed a similar stark sense of betrayal. Focus group participants stressed that while they were fulfilling their side of the bargain—complying with the law, paying taxes, contributing to civic life—the state increasingly was failing to provide them with protection and treat them fairly. “The pillars in the society we live in”, bemoaned a man in his 70s from Birmingham, “are letting us down”.
Abstract: This research investigates how recommender algorithms on TikTok and Rumble expose UK minors to antisemitic content.
Analysts created 10 TikTok profiles representing 15-year-old users with varied political and cultural interests, including neutral interest in the Israel-Palestine conflict, left and right-wing political interest, male lifestyle influencer content, far-right content and two neutral accounts. The profiles were prompted towards relevant topics for each interest through an hour and a half of manual content viewing, followed by content engagement via bespoke bot over 14 days, resulting in over 5,500 recommended videos. Thematic analysis clustered content into 10 core themes, revealing pathways from neutral lifestyle content to highly politicised and conspiratorial clusters. Relevant themes were manually reviewed, revealing that harmful content persisted through videos, comments, and TikTok’s sticker and sound features, illustrating systemic gaps in safeguarding minors.
On Rumble, analysts collected 4,412 videos from the platform’s “Editor’s Picks” over six months. Analysts filtered for antisemitism-related keywords and reviewed 259 videos potentially relevant to antisemitism. Findings show Rumble hosts more overt antisemitic content than TikTok, including slurs, Holocaust distortion and conspiracies about Jewish control. These findings underscore urgent gaps in platform accountability and the need for robust enforcement of the Online Safety Act to protect children from the normalisation and mainstreaming of antisemitic content.
Abstract: In this report:
According to new data from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, 742 people emigrated to Israel (‘made aliyah’) from the UK in 2025 – the highest annual count for over 40 years. This report examines the recent migration data in its historical context to assess whether this latest figure represents a genuine shift and if so, whether it is being fuelled by concerns about antisemitism in Britain.
Some of the key findings in the report:
742 people emigrated to Israel (‘made aliyah’) from the UK in 2025 – the highest annual count for over 40 years.
Over the past 20 years, annual counts have remained within a fairly narrow range, from about 400 to about 740.
Taking the past three years together, an average of 566 British Jews made aliyah per annum – close to the annual average over the past two decades.
About 2 Jews per 1,000 in the UK Jewish population currently make aliyah each year, somewhat higher than the equivalent figure for Canada (0.7), but considerably lower than in France (6.4), and orders of magnitude lower than the levels associated with major cases of Jewish flight during 20th Century crises or periods of acute uncertainty.
Since October 7, 2023, British Jews have shown a small but marked increase in their likelihood of making aliyah.
Younger people, orthodox Jews and those most affected by antisemitism are most likely to say they are considering making aliyah in the coming five years.
Aliyah, like all forms of migration, is also informed by socioeconomic conditions; there is clear evidence that factors such as unemployment rates are key determinants in people’s decisions.
Migration is not a one-way street: the number of people living in the UK who were born in Israel rose from 12,229 in 2001 to 23,152 in 2021, a net increase of 10,923 over those 20 years.
Abstract: Holocaust Memorial Day 2026 reached more people than ever before, with millions engaging across the UK through national moments of remembrance, education and community activity. From Light the Darkness to events in schools, workplaces and public spaces, this year showed the growing impact of coming together to remember, learn and stand against all prejudice today.
Central to this was the Light the Darkness campaign, which saw 230 buildings and landmarks illuminated in purple at 8pm as part of a nationwide act of remembrance – an increase from 200 in 2025. Delivered in partnership with Ocean Outdoor and supported by JCDecaux, Global and Bauer Media, the campaign appeared on 3,000 billboards across the UK, generating over 10 million impacts\*. HMDT’s radio advert aired more than 900 times across Global’s network, reaching a further 14 million impacts.
Engagement also grew at community level, with 3,800 organisations marking HMD – up from 3,500 the previous year. This was mirrored by a surge in digital participation on the day, with social media interactions across HMDT’s Facebook, Instagram and LinkedIn rising by 140%, from 10,000 in 2025 to 24,000 in 2026.
Crucially, the 2026 impact data highlights the reversal of a decline over the past two years in secondary school participation, which had previously attracted national concern. More than 1,000 secondary schools marked Holocaust Memorial Day this year – 17% of the total number of secondary schools nationwide, which increased from just 9% last year. This was further bolstered by the reach of the charity’s educational film, *It began with words*, which was viewed by over 130,000 pupils, helping ensure that the lessons of the Holocaust remain central to younger generations.
To take a deeper look at the key moments behind this year’s commemoration, read our Impact Report for Holocaust Memorial Day 2026. From a special event hosted by Their Majesties The King and Queen to acts of remembrance in communities across the UK, the report captures the scale and significance of HMD 2026.
Abstract: The recent Israeli onslaught on Gaza has sparked bitter arguments on United Kingdom (UK) university campuses. These conflicts have intertwined with wider disputes over politics, cultural identity, freedom of speech, and also empathy. Both sides routinely accuse their opponents of a lack of empathy with the victims of violence with whom they themselves identify. This chapter sets these arguments, in relation to empathy with suffering in particular, in historical context, extending back to the 1930s. The memory of the Holocaust, and the rise since the 1990s, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, of a form of empathy-focused Holocaust education, has fed into the politicization and weaponization of empathy in the context of the Middle East conflict. The chapter closes with four practical suggestions, which might help to unblock these unproductive, acrimonious, and emotionally charged disputes on British campuses.
Abstract: Since 7th October 2023, when Hamas perpetrated the worst single massacre against Jews since the Holocaust, there has been a surge in antisemitism in UK universities. Some of this has tipped over into outright anti-Jewish discrimination and harassment. Jewish students and staff have reported feeling unable to fully participate in university life, for fear of being abused, harassed, or attacked. This report offers a summary of research by the IntraCommunal Professorial Group (ICPG) aimed at understanding free speech on university campuses especially with regard to the approaches to speech concerning Jews, Israel, Zionism, and the Middle East conflict.
This report sets out the key issues, and a series of recommendations based on the research and grouped together under the subheadings of our three key findings. Those key findings are as follows:
1. UK universities have (a) a general legal duty, to protect freedom of expression on campus; (b) a duty to prevent discrimination and harassment based on protected characteristics; (c) a university-specific institutional duty to protect the academic freedoms of research and study. Currently UK universities are meeting neither (b) nor (c) in their response to the menace to Jewish students and academic staff posed by antisemitism, particularly antiIsrael antisemitism. That is, they are neither preventing discrimination and harassment, nor protecting freedom of research or freedom to study.
2. Anti-Israel protests and encampments on campuses, including in online spaces, have exacerbated what was already considered a hostile environment by many Jewish students and staff. Some university departments, trade unions, and student political milieus – inperson and online – have directly and indirectly discriminated against, abused, harassed and/or excluded Jewish students.
3. Traditional antisemitic concepts and tropes are being used by pro-Palestinian and/or antiIsrael staff and students. Israel and Zionism are regularly demonised and delegitimised, often using blood libels or other anti-Jewish hatred, and students or academics labelled as Zionists are routinely viewed as legitimate targets for discrimination, harassment, abuse, and/or attack.
Abstract: This report finds that the decision to ban away supporters from the fixture was reached through a flawed risk assessment process.
We argue that the prohibition was not justified by the risks as assessed, and it represented an unnecessary departure from ordinary policing practice, which we believe would likely have been sufficient to secure the match.
The Parliamentary Select Committee similarly concludes that the decision-making process was flawed. However, it maintains that the prohibition was proportionate to the level of risk, even if that risk had been more rigorously assessed.
Our analysis considers a further, key point. A central weakness in the decision-making process was the failure clearly to specify the nature and source of the risk.
If the primary risk came from away supporters themselves, then exclusion may have been justified. But if the principal risk derived from anti-Israel protestors, boycott activists, and antizionist actors seeking to disrupt or attack the match, then banning the away supporters risked punishing those who were being threatened and who did not themselves constitute a significant threat.
In such circumstances, the appropriate response would have required consideration beyond technical policing calculations. If there was a significant antisemitic threat, a policy priority might have been to mobilise sufficient police resources to defend the match, the visiting team, and their supporters rather than excluding them.
The decision-making process appears to have overestimated the risk posed by Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters, in part through a misreading of the Amsterdam precedent and perhaps through reliance on politically committed sources of advice. It may have given insufficient weight to risks arising from boycott activism and to the risk of antisemitic violence of the kind that occurred in Amsterdam.
The process did not engage in a serious way with institutions or individuals from the Jewish community either locally or nationally, or with HM Independent Advisor on Antisemitism. Doing so would have given it a better chance of avoiding the mistakes that it made in understanding the precedent, possible alternatives and the predictable impact of the away fans ban on Jewish communities.
If there was a significant antisemitic dimension to the threat environment, the risk assessment process did not identify or articulate it clearly.
Abstract: For this report, the Union of Jewish Students has collated dozens of testimonies from students who have
experienced antisemitism on campus.
The UJS also commissioned polling of 1,000 students, across all faiths and none, to assess the
impact of campus protests and the rise of antisemitism. The findings reveal alarming levels of campus
antisemitism, significant disruption caused by protests, and perceptions of Jewish students marred by
hostility and intolerance.
Key Findings:
1.Antisemitism has become normalised on our campuses.
- One in four students (23%) have seen behaviour that targets Jewish students for their religion/ethnicity.
- One in five (20%) students would be reluctant to, or would never, houseshare with a Jewish student.
- Jewish students have told us they have faced physical and verbal abuse, social ostracisation and
widespread antisemitic attitudes.
2.Glorification of terrorism is prevalent and unpunished.
- Our research has found that student groups have explicitly called for violence against Jews, even justifying the terrorist attack at Bondi Beach in December 2025.
- 49% of students have heard slogans or chants glorifying Hamas, Hezbollah or other proscribed groups on campus.
- 47% have witnessed justification of the October 7th attacks, rising to 77% among those who encounter Israel-Palestine protests regularly.
3. Protests disrupt all students, and universities have a clear mandate from students to take firmer action.
-Protests have disrupted learning for 65% of students, and 40% have altered their journey on campus to avoid disruption.
- Universities where protests are more frequent have seen higher levels of antisemitism, and four in ten (39%) of students who witness regular Israel-Palestine protests have seen Jewish students harassed often.
- 69% of students disapprove of protests blocking access to learning, and 82% deem calls to 'globalise the intifada' to be antisemitic.
Abstract: In June 2025, Hadassah UK partnered with the Hadassah Medical Organization in Jerusalem to undertake important mental health research in the community. Developed by leading Israeli trauma experts, a UK-wide survey was presented to the community to understand how British Jews were coping with the psychological and social impact of October 7th, the ongoing conflict, and rising antisemitism.
This research involved 511 participants from diverse backgrounds within the UK Jewish community, representing various denominational affiliations, geographic locations, and demographic characteristics. The completed study provided robust statistical power for examining complex relationships between trauma exposure, psychological symptoms, and protective factors.Our comprehensive statistical analysis reveals critical insights into the psychological impact of exposure to the October 7th events and subsequent antisemitism on the UK Jewish community.
Participants were recruited through multiple channels including synagogues, Jewish community organisations, and social networks to ensure broad representation, as well as help to capture the full spectrum of experiences within the UK Jewish community.
From our study, we can see that the psychological impact of October 7th and subsequent events created significant mental health challenges within the UK Jewish community. A key finding showed that over one-third of participants exhibited clinically significant PTSD symptoms, including intrusive memories of attack imagery, avoidance of trauma reminders, and heightened reactive responses.
Abstract: This article seeks to open a discursive space in which to reflect on issues of Holocaust historiography arising from emerging research on personal archives collected by “ordinary” people in relation to the Holocaust. The explorations, intended as a discussion piece, are anchored in a specific context, namely that of the Dorrith Sim Collection (DMSC) which is held in the Scottish Jewish Archives Centre (SJAC) in Glasgow. This collection offers a focus to concretize the historiographical discussion in a largely un-researched collection, while enabling consideration of a range of related collections and publications. The article investigates the historiographical practices of those involved in the collection, preservation, presentation, and publication processes, and considers the inherent ethical choices, choices that highlight the agency of the family, the archivist, and the scholar. Ethical choices, here, the investment of specific meanings and claims to significance, are amplified in this context because of their connection to genocide. I suggest that a “transparent historiography” that accounts for the research process within the published narrative could address the challenges arising from the necessity to be selective about what to collect, preserve, and write about, and how to do so. I borrow from other fields of research and professional practice to highlight possible avenues along which to advance historiographical discussion.
Abstract: The memories of the child refugees who fled Central Europe on the so-called Kindertransport between December 1938 and September 1939 are the most widely documented of any refugee and migrant group to come the United Kingdom. However, the dominant narrative has been one of migration to and settling in England, despite the fact that the child refugees settled in places across the British Isles, including Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland—the last of which, for example, received an estimated eight hundred Kindertransportees. This essay will investigate how former Kindertransportees negotiate their different identities in their memory narratives. The majority of the Kindertransportees were Jewish, although approximately 20 percent came from families that did not identify as Jewish but were persecuted as Jews. Therefore, there is a complicated interplay of religious identities, those derived from the country the child refugees were leaving behind and those of the country and the nations of settlement. This article will compare those narratives that construct non-English identity as Other, those that adopt separate national identities in the Diaspora with earlier definitions of Englishness versus Britishness, and others that adopt a center/margin hierarchy common in British culture.
Abstract: This article explores hate crime targeting three specific religious groups in the United Kingdom: Muslims, Jews and Hindus. Drawing on qualitative interviews with victims, the research considers both hate crimes and noncriminal incidents such as bias and discrimination. The central aim is to examine how individuals from these groups perceive and respond to their experiences of victimization. The article presents data from interviews with 30 participants and three focus groups, focusing particularly on the participants’ immediate reactions to incidents of hate crime. The research identifies both similarities and differences in how each group responded at the time of the incident. Participants described their immediate reactions in one of four ways: inaction (outwardly not reacting), seeking some form of recourse, verbally confronting the perpetrator or retaliating with violence. Notably, none of the Jewish or Hindu participants reported responding with verbal confrontation, retaliation or physical aggression; their typical response was inaction. In contrast, Muslim participants exhibited a broader range of immediate responses, including verbal confrontation, physical retaliation and seeking recourse. This article is the first to offer insight into the varied immediate responses to hate crime among these religious communities in the United Kingdom.
Abstract: CST recorded 3,700 antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2025, the second-highest total ever reported to CST in a single calendar year. This is an increase of 4% from the 3,556 anti-Jewish hate incidents recorded by CST in 2024, and 14% lower than the highest ever annual total of 4,298 antisemitic incidents reported in 2023. CST recorded 1,662 antisemitic incidents in 2022, and 2,261 in 2021.
The increase from the total recorded in 2024 reflects that antisemitic incident levels remain at a significantly higher rate than was the case prior to Hamas’ terror attack on Israel on 7 October 2023. There was an immediate and significant spike in recorded cases of anti-Jewish hate in the UK in the aftermath of that attack. The subsequent war, and its grip of public and media attention even during periods of ceasefire, has continued to impact the amount and nature of anti-Jewish hate reported in the 27 months since that date.
Abstract: Following the introduction of a religion question in the 2001 Census of England and Wales, and its inclusion in the two subsequent censuses of 2011 and 2021, multiple analyses have concluded that the strictly Orthodox Jewish population, known as haredim, has most likely been consistently and substantially undercounted on each occasion. Beyond technical concerns about enumeration accuracy, this is a pressing social problem since a high proportion of this community is young, lives in overcrowded conditions and is economically vulnerable. Previous attempts to investigate the nature of this suspected undercount have been focused on assessing missing individuals while assuming that haredi households have been enumerated accurately. Here, geographical information is used which takes advantage of the fact that, like many ethnic minority groups, the haredi population forms voluntary enclaves, presenting the possibility to directly compare detailed household counts at the postcode sector level held by the community, with equivalent data from the 2021 Census. In doing so, it is demonstrated that the assumption of accurate household enumeration is probably incorrect and that there is credible evidence to indicate that compared with community records, haredi households were undercounted by between 21% and 26% in the 2021 Census.
