Abstract: As in many other former communist countries of East Central Europe, antisemitism in Romania resurged almost concurrently with the demise of the previous regime. Empirical research on antisemitism, however, emerged only considerably later and did not become a main focus until the establishment of the National Institute for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania “Elie Wiesel” (INSHREW) in 2005. This does not imply that the subject of Jews, attitudes to Jews measured by instruments such as stereotypic perceptions and/or “social distance,” or attitudes toward controversial Romanian historical figures linked to the country’s antisemitic past were not tangentially or even directly tackled occasionally. What was lacking until 2005, however, was an effort to use a systematic method, such as a standard questionnaire capable of producing comparative results, that would permit focusing on the phenomenon of the strong reappearance of antisemitism in both its synchronic and diachronic unfolding. In other words, the task of gathering longitudinal data on antisemitism in the country to allow forging a “perceptual map” that would select in consistent aspects and select out inconsistencies is still just beginning.
Abstract: Although the Holocaust ended more than fifty years ago, its impact continues to be an enduring trauma in the 21st century. Most of the survivors have passed away, but the second and third generations continue to carry this dark inheritance within their lives. Historians have reflected upon the destruction visited upon the European landscape, and we have come to see that even in America significant changes have taken place within that community. Germany continues to be a puzzle. Immediately after the war, the prevailing attitude saw all Germans as evil, and the occupying forces were forbidden to fraternize. Yet it is not in the nature of soldiers to remain distant from the people around them, and that wall disappeared far quicker than the ‘Wall’ built by the Communists to separate East and West Germany. Later, distinctions began to be made between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Germans, partially through the ‘denazification’ courts and later by the general public. Once business ties were re-established the attitude towards the Germans began to change. Eventually, wealthy German tourists were accepted, even though sly jokes about them continued. But Germany itself had to undergo dramatic changes, which continue to be played out in a country which now holds a commanding position in the European Community.
Abstract: In 1995 the German federal centre for political education published a collection of essays on the problems arising from public representations of the Holocaust. Angela Genger, director of the Dusseldorf Memorial Centre, expressed her worries about developments at the major memorial centres following the unification of Germany. Under the heading ‘Are we facing a roll back?’, she laments that ‘the discursive and process-orientated practice adopted since the early eighties’ has been playing ‘non-principal role’2 in the memorials’ quest for renewal. As president of the working group for memorials in North Rhine-Westfalia, she particularly regrets that the discourse has since become ‘state-based’. In the old federal republic, the protagonists had often met with solid political opposition from the various municipalities, regions and federal states. Passionate and lengthy debates were carried on between so-called ‘barefoot historians’ and history workshops, trade union and church groups (especially ‘Aktion Sühnezeichen’), engaged activists and local politicians, but most of all former inmates and other victims of National Socialism. They eventually succeeded in bringing about a range of vastly different, decentralized memorials. These are seen in strong contrast to the centralized memorials, which are funded by the federal government and the relevant states, were conceived by historians and other experts, and are headed by academics and administrators enjoying a superior level of social security, with pension benefits and even the provision of housing.
Abstract: Soviet historiography ignored the Jewish role in World War II, for reasons shall explore. Yet the topic is very important to Soviet and post-Soviet Jews (as well as to others), in part precisely because it was ignored by the Soviets. This is manifested in the number of articles and books published on the subject in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the Soviet Jewish diaspora, few of them by professional historians. One way of supplementing amateur historiography and filling in gaps in our knowledge is by taking oral testimonies from participants in the war. This has been done successfully by some popular historians in the United States. Oral history has serious limitations, of course. It should probably not be used to establish facts, especially at a distance of more than fifty years and in regard to events fraught with great meanings and emotions. Oral history allows for embellishment, cover-ups, falsifications and distortions. However, it can be most useful in establishing perceptions, that is, not so much what happened — though that should not be dismissed — but what people think happened, or think now happened then.
Abstract: In march 1998, the Vatican released a long-awaited statement on the Catholic Church and the Holocaust. In a preface to the document, entitled We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah, Pope John Paul II expressed his hope that it would ‘help to heal the wounds of past misunderstandings and injustices’. Eighteen months after the publication of the document, it seems now possible to conclude that, however sincere the Vatican’s intentions, the pope’s hopes will almost certainly not be realized. Indeed, far from healing, the document has succeeded largely in re-opening, if not actually deepening, old wounds. Not only did it divide the Catholic intellectual and journalistic communities. More importantly, I think, it bewildered and frustrated many Jewish readers and bitterly disappointed others. It also called forth a literary response from Jewish intellectuals and organizations that, while especially vigorous in the immediate wake of the document’s publication, had force and feeling to last more than a year. Since the energy driving these responses appears to have subsided, it seems possible now to undertake a comprehensive survey of Jewish reaction to We Remember and to attempt to account for its intensity and duration.
Abstract: Recently, the old anti-Semitic myths, both the Aryan and the Khazar, have been revived in Russia and have begun to spread. The Aryan myth, which is rooted in the Nazi propaganda of the 1920s and 1930s, was picked up and developed by the contemporary Russian radical nationalists. It restores to general history the Manichaean and Messianic approaches that reduce all complex historic processes to a struggle between two agents — the ‘Aryans’ (i.e. the ‘Slavic-Russes’) and the ‘World Evil’ (i.e. the Jews). It describes the ‘Slavic-Aryans’, the first humans, who mysteriously appeared at the Northern continent, ‘Hyperborea-Arctida’, and dispersed to become the ancestors of most of the peoples of the world and founders of the principal ancient civilizations. Later, they were forced out from their former lands by an evil agent represented by the ‘savage nomads of Arabia’.1
Abstract: [From the introduction to the article]
Between March and November 1999, under the auspices of the Minority Research Institute of the Department of Sociology, Eötvös Loránd University, I conducted a sociological survey of the current situation of the Jewish community in Hungary. In the course of the survey, 2015 respondents were interviewed. The most important demographic and social data were collected for four generations – from respondents’ grandparents to their children. Participants in the survey were asked to respond to questions concerning their relationship towards Jewish traditions and their acceptance or rejection of various forms of Jewish identity. They were also asked for their opinions on assimilation, integration and dissimilation, on Israel, and on the current significance of the Holocaust. Finally, an attempt was made to gauge the opinions of Hungarian Jews on the state of their own community, on their relationships with non-Jews, and on antisemitism in postcommunist Hungary.
My purpose in this article shall be to analyse the data that we collected in this latter area. Firstly, I shall reveal how Jews living in Hungary define antisemitism, and whether – when it comes to classifying particular statements as antisemitic – there are any significant differences between younger and older groups of Jews, between those who are better educated and those with less education, and between those with a stronger and those with a weaker sense of Jewish identity. I shall then explore how the various respondent groups judge the extent, intensity and gravity of anti-Jewish sentiment in the country, examining in particular whether respondents themselves have experienced such sentiment or have been subjected to discrimination. I shall reveal whether respondents think that antisemitism will increase or decrease in the coming years. Finally, I shall touch upon the policies that respondents consider desirable when it comes to tackling antisemitic phenomena. Evidently, the images formed by Jews and non-Jews shall determine in large part the relations between the two groups of one other.
Abstract: L'arte e il Museo rappresentano due settori all'avanguardia nella ricerca e nella trasmissione della Memoria della Shoah. Esattamente queste due frontiere disciplinari si occupano fra l'altro dei molti e diversi modi in cui la Memoria stessa è vista, comunicata o percepita. Il libro, frutto di uno studio durato molti anni, accoglie contributi di specialisti fra i più accreditati nei due temi: persone, situazioni e realtà nuove e a tratti sorprendenti aiutano il lettore a comprendere meglio i volti, le sembianze della Memoria della Shoah nel mondo di oggi e di domani.
Indice
Maya Zack, Counterlight
Clara Ferranti, Per una definizione linguistica del totalitarismo del XXI secolo: “radiografia” controluce dell’epoca contemporanea
Paolo Coen, Da Richard Serra in qua. La memoria dell’Olocausto nell’arte e nel Museo, fra continuità, fratture e intersezioni
Eleonora Palmoni, Proposta per musealizzare una delle località di internamento fascista nelle Marche: la Villa Giustiniani-Bandini di Urbisaglia
Daria Brasca, “Holocaust-Era Looted Art” nel contesto italiano: le collezioni private ebraiche tra rimozioni storiche e mancata coscienza nazionale
Manfredo Coen, Il Parco del Cardeto ad Ancona
Chiara Censi, Il patrimonio ebraico di Ancona e delle Marche. La musealizzazione del Cimitero Ebraico di Ancona
Lola Kantor-Kazovsky, Post-Holocaust Reflexion in Moscow Non-conformist Art of the 1960s and Michail Grobman’s Israeli Leviathan group
Danielle Pardo Rabani, La memoria del Bene, Brindisi accoglie: proposta per il recupero e la valorizzazione della ex Stazione Sanitaria Marittima di via Mater Domini
Giorgia Calò, Rappresentare il non rappresentabile. Il volto della Shoah
Anastasia Felcher, Of Their Own Design: Curatorial Solutions to Commemorate the Shoah in Museums across Eastern Europe
Elenco delle immagini
Abstract: The article analyzes the newest survey results on antisemitic prejudices, antisemitic political discourses, and political antisemitism in present-day Hungary. According to the research findings, during the first decade and a half after the fall of communism, 10%-15% of the Hungarian adult population held a strong antisemitic prejudice. Surveys conducted after 2006 show not only an increase in the absolute percentage of antisemites, but also an increase in the proportion of antisemites who embed their antisemitism in the political context. This phenomenon is linked with the appearance on the political scene of Jobbik, a more or less openly antisemitic party. When examining the causes of antisemitism, the most interesting finding was that the strength of antisemitic feelings is regionally different and that these differences correlate with the strength of Jobbik’s support in the various regions. Accordingly, we hypothesized that support for a far-right party is not a consequence of antisemitism, but conversely should be regarded as a factor that mobilizes attitudes leading to antisemitism. Thus, antisemitism is—at least in large part—a consequence of an attraction to the far right rather than an explanation for it. While analyzing antisemitic discourse, we found that the primary function of the discourse is not to formulate anti-Jewish political demands but
to establish a common identity for groups that, for various reasons and motives, have turned against the liberal parliamentary system that replaced communism.
