Abstract: Projekt Overview
This study explores the experiences, perceptions, and coping strategies of Jewish individuals in Germany in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. Our research aimed to provide a comprehensive understanding of how Jews in Germany, with or without Israeli migration background, navigated the complex emotional landscape of collective trauma and rising antisemitism.
Key Objectives
Examine the immediate and ongoing impacts of the October 7 events on Jewish individuals in Germany
Investigate changes in experiences of antisemitism and perceptions of societal responses
Identify coping strategies and resilience mechanisms employed by Jewish individuals
Explore the influence of these events on Jewish identity and community engagement
Assess concerns and hopes for the future of Jewish life in Germany
Methodology
We conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 18 Jewish individuals living in Germany, including both Israeli and non-Israeli backgrounds. Participants ranged in age from 23 to 68 years old and represented diverse socioeconomic backgrounds and levels of religious observance.
Key Findings
Profound emotional disruption and trauma following the October 7 attacks
Significant changes in social relationships, often leading to social withdrawal
Increased community engagement and activism among Jewish individuals
Heightened sense of insecurity and vigilance in expressing Jewish identity
Complex coping strategies, including humor, community involvement, and selective avoidance
Abstract: Reports have indicated an increase in anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitic incidents following the Hamas terrorist attack in Israel on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war in Gaza. In two studies (NStudy1 = 354 and NStudy2 = 490), we experimentally investigated the impact of priming with material referring to the war in Gaza on hostility toward Jews, and on antisemitism as well as other various ethnic groups (to determine whether this exposure specifically affected attitudes toward Jews or had a broader impact on ethnic attitudes in general). We also examined the indirect relationship between political orientation and anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism, through sociopolitical factors such as global identification, out-group identity fusion, social dominance orientation, and misanthropy. Our results showed an experimental effect of increased negative attitudes toward Jews, as well as toward Britons and Scandinavians, but did not reveal an increase in antisemitism. This effect was not replicated in Study 2, possibly due to reduced media attention. The indirect effects suggested that political orientation (left vs. right-wing) was positively associated with anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism through social dominance orientation. In contrast, conservative political orientation was negatively associated with antisemitism through out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people. Our findings imply two distinct political pathways to antisemitism: one linked with classical political right-wing orientation and the other to a complex identity-based conflation of attitudes toward Israel with prejudice toward the Jewish ethnic group.
Abstract: From Introduction:
As the world marks the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, the J7 – Large Communities’ Task Force Against Antisemitism is releasing its first J7 Annual Report on Antisemitism. This report offers a comprehensive and sobering overview of the current state of antisemitism across seven countries with the largest Jewish communities outside Israel: Argentina, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The J7 Task Force was established in July 2023 to foster cooperation among these communities in response to growing concern about the resurgence of antisemitism worldwide. This crisis has only intensified following Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, which was followed by a marked rise in antisemitic incidents across the world, including in the J7 countries. In the months following the attack, reports of antisemitic activity increased by hundreds, and in some cases, thousands, of percentage points, compared to the same period the previous year, with incidents targeting Jewish schools, synagogues, businesses, and individuals.3 The data presented here is troubling. Across all seven countries, there has been a clear rise in antisemitic incidents, particularly violent ones. From 2021 to 2023, antisemitic incidents increased by 11 percent in Australia, 23 percent in Argentina, 72 percent in Germany, 90 percent in the United Kingdom, 83 percent in Canada, 185 percent in France, and 227 percent in the United States. In two of the four J7 countries that published incident numbers for 2024, namely Australia and the United States, the number of antisemitic incidents continued to rise, showing the lasting impact of the tsunami of antisemitism unleashed by Oct. 7.
Abstract: Antisemitismus als leidenschaftliche Welt(um-)deutung findet nicht erst seit dem 7. Oktober 2023 über den Kreis der „üblichen Verdächtigen“ im Rechtsextremismus hinaus Anklang. Der Band zeigt die Persistenz, Wandelbarkeit und globale Verbreitung judenfeindlicher Vorstellungen und Äußerungsformen auf und verfolgt sie von der Antike bis in die Telegram-Chats, Universitätshörsäle und Demonstrationen der Gegenwart.
Der interdisziplinär ausgerichtete Band versammelt antisemitismuskritische Studien junger Antisemitismusforscher*innen, die neue Schlaglichter auf die Akteur*innen, sich wandelnden Kommunikationsmodi und milieu- und kontextabhängigen Spezifika eines zunehmend global vernetzten antisemitischen Diskurses werfen. Über die offenen Erscheinungsformen judenfeindlicher Ressentiments hinaus verweist er auf die Virulenz latenter, halb- und unbewusst tradierter sowie bewusst codierter Vorstellungen über „die Juden“, „das Jüdische“ oder den jüdischen Staat Israel. Letzterer ist nicht erst seit, aber gegenwärtig wieder verstärkt infolge des Hamas-Pogroms vom 7. Oktober 2023 Gegenstand antisemitischer Agitationen, wobei gefühlte Wahrheiten über den Staat und den arabisch-israelischen Konflikt den öffentlichen Diskurs prägen. Die Analysen des Bandes stellen die Gemeinsamkeiten dieser Vorstellungen und Äußerungen heraus, in denen „die Juden“ oder Israel als Projektionsflächen für die Ängste und Wünsche der antisemitisch denkenden Subjekte dienen, und verweisen auf die Notwendigkeit einer kritischen und hörbaren Antisemitismusforschung nach der Zäsur des 7. Oktober.
Abstract: On October 7, 2023, a Hamas-led terrorist attack in Israel killed 1,200 Israelis and kidnapped about 250 others. The almost immediate spread of news and images of the attack produced heavy emotional reactions in public opinion in many countries. The article analyzes data from a representative survey on the attitudes toward Jews and Muslims of Italian undergraduates conducted between late September and late October 2023, encompassing both those dramatic events and the war that followed. Four main findings emerge. First, Italian students tend to organize attitudes towards Jews around three main dimensions, those toward Muslims around one. Second, attitudes towards the two groups vary according to cultural values of reference, commitment to study, and political orientation. Third, negative attitudes towards Muslims are more prevalent than those toward Jews, but this difference narrows between center-left and left-leaning students and, in some cases, reverses. Finally, the analysis shows that one of the dimensions organizing unfavourable attitudes towards Jews experienced very substantial growth on the days immediately following October 7, that is, the date of the Hamas terrorist attack inside Israeli territory.
Abstract: CST recorded 3,528 antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2024, the second-highest total ever reported to CST in a single calendar year. This is a decrease of 18% from the 4,296 anti-Jewish hate incidents recorded by CST in 2023, which remains the record annual total ever reported, and was fuelled by responses to the 7 October terror attack by Hamas on Israel that year. CST recorded 1,662 antisemitic incidents in 2022, 2,261 in 2021, and 1,684 in 2020.
Although the 3,528 anti-Jewish hate incidents recorded in 2024 is a fall from the all-time high of 2023, it remains an unusually large total: 56% higher than the third-highest annual figure of 2,261 incidents reported in 2021. It is a reflection of the sustained levels of antisemitism that have been recorded across the UK since the Hamas terror attack in Israel on 7 October 2023. CST’s Antisemitic Incidents Report 2023 charted the immediacy and scope of the rise in anti-Jewish hate following that attack, before Israel had set in motion any extensive military response in Gaza. The subsequent ongoing war, and the public attention that it continues to hold, impacted both the volume and content of antisemitism in 2024.
Abstract: The findings of this report demonstrate a concerning rise in antisemitism and anti-Zionism in Europe since October 7, 2023, drawing on extensive data analysis of incidents, trends, online sentiments, and influential figures utilizing Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) methodologies.
Dramatic Increase in Sentiment: There has been a significant and consistent surge in both antisemitic and anti-Zionist sentiments across Europe, among both far-right and far-left groups. This more than 400% increase in hateful content is primarily linked to heightened anti-Israel sentiments following the country s response to the October 7
attacks.
Traditional Antisemitism: While the surge in sentiment correlates with growing anti-Israel sentiment, it has increasingly become intertwined with long-standing antisemitic stereotypes. Narratives suggesting that Jews exert disproportionate control, equating Jews with Nazis, or accusing them of genocidal intentions have
become more prevalent.
Geographical Concentration: The most concerning developments have been observed in the UK, France, and Germany—countries with substantial Jewish populations. This trend underscores the heightened risks faced by these communities, both online and in physical spaces.
Influencers and Content Generators: The primary drivers of antisemitic and anti-Zionist content have been pro-Palestinian advocates (both politicians, groups, and influencers) who o en employ antisemitic rhetoric to advance an anti-Israel agenda. This rhetoric seeks to delegitimize the state of Israel and its right to self-defense in the aftermath of the October 7 attacks.
This report serves as a critical resource for understanding the contemporary landscape of antisemitism and anti-Zionism in Europe, highlighting the urgent need for awareness and action in combating these dangerous trends.
Abstract: This article adopts a historical perspective to explore Jewish women’s experiences of anti semitism in Sweden. The empirical foundation of the study comprises interviews with approximately thirty women born in the 1950s, 1970s or 1990s, all of whom self identify as Jewish. Employing a dialogical epistemology rooted in intersectionality and shared authority, the study emphasises both the content of the women’s life stories and the ways they interpret and articulate their experiences. A key finding of this study is that the fear of antisemitism is a persistent presence in the lives of most participants. A notable continuity over time is the school, which emerges as a recurring site where Jewish women have experienced a sense of being different. However, there is a generational shift in how these experiences are interpreted. Women born in the 1990s are more likely to identify such experiences explicitly as antisemitism, compared to those born in the 1950s or 1970s. Another significant conclusion is that understanding Jewish women’s stories about antisemitism requires these accounts to be situated within broader relational contexts, encompassing both their own and others’ experiences as well as both contemporary and historical processes. Past experiences are often reactivated by current events, such as the attack of 7 October 2023. There is also a before and after 7 October. After 7 October, the fear of antisemitism increased, and some women describe the fear as constant or existential.
A general conclusion in the article is that the fear of antisemitism is present in most of the women's lives. A continuity over time is that the school is a place where Jewish women have experienced that they are different. Women born in the 1990s interpret these experiences to a greater extent, than the women born in the 1950’s and the 19970’s, as an experience of antisemitism. In this respect, our results differ from previous international research showing that older people in particular experience and regard society as antisemitic, while younger people do not do so to the same extent.
A further conclusion is that to understand women's narratives about experiences of antisemitism, these should also be understood in relation to the experiences of others both in the present and in the past, since these form layer upon layer of experiences that are actualized by current events such as October 7. There is also a before and after October 7. After 7 October, the feeling of insecurity has increased, and some women describe the fear as constant or existential.
Abstract: Currently, Jewish and Muslim communities can be found as ethno-cultural minorities both in Berlin, the capital of Germany, and in the surrounding state of Brandenburg. While they sometimes differ greatly in religious and cultural life, both communities also share similar experiences - such as the (former) existence as immigrants, the image of the “cultural other” and the confrontation with group-related misanthropy (anti-Semitism and Islamophobia). Moreover, there are Jewish-Muslim encounters, there are forms of encounter between Muslims and Jews in the region, in different milieus and intercultural and interreligious projects that appear as a kind of “experimental laboratory”. Though, what are the differences, what are the similarities between the two groups? Finally, this article also relates to how October 7th 2023, Hamas’ brutal massacres of Israeli civilians and the subsequent war in the Gaza Strip influence relationships between Muslims and Jews in Berlin and Brandenburg today.
Abstract: Since 7th October 2023, the date when Hamas perpetrated the worst and most murderous single massacre against Jews since the Holocaust, there has been a surge in antisemitism in UK universities. This report offers a summary of research by the Intra-Community Professorial Group (ICPG) about antisemitism at UK universities since the 7th October attacks, aimed at understanding and documenting problems on and off campus and proposing evidence-based solutions to address them.
Key findings include:
1. There has been up to 34 percentage points increase in rates of antisemitic abuse in universities since Oct 7th. These include physical attacks, threats of rape, violence, verbal abuse, harassment, and use of Nazi imagery.
2. Jewish students are withdrawing from all aspects of university life, including lecture theatres and seminar rooms,
online learning spaces, social activities, and entire areas of campus. More than half of respondents reported being
fearful of being on campus, and three quarters being uncomfortable to be open about their Jewish identity. The
consequential impact on their ability to participate in university life, let alone their mental and physical health, is
profound.
3. There is compelling evidence that some universities are failing in their responsibility to adequately safeguard
Jewish students from verbal abuse and physical attack.
Abstract: In this report:
This landmark report looks at how the October 7 attacks on Israel and the war in Gaza have impacted the British Jewish community one year on. The report demonstrates the profound impact the events of the last year have had on Jews in the UK by analysing the responses of over 4,500 adult British Jews to the JPR Jewish Current Affairs Survey in July 2024 – the largest survey of British Jews since October 7, 2023.
Among other things, the report explores how the original Hamas attack and the subsequent war have affected how British Jews view Israel politically, how the public reaction to the conflict has affected Jews’ sense of security and trust in critical organisations in the UK, and how the conflict has impacted the Jewish lives of British Jews – their connections to Israel and the Jewish community. The findings also form the basis for the second series of the JPR/JW3 “Jews Do Count” podcast, available on the JPR website and all major platforms.
Some of the key findings in this report:
British Jews express far more concern today about the state of Israel’s democracy than they did fifteen or so years ago. Nevertheless, more still believe it to be alive and well today than do not, by 52% to 38%.
British Jews are more likely to agree than to disagree that the IDF is acting morally and according to international law, though we see much division in the responses. 50% of British Jews feel that the IDF military action against Hamas since October 7 has been unsuccessful
For all the division and criticism, British Jews are still more likely to have felt proud of Israel than ashamed since October 7.
Just 54% of Jews in the UK agree that a two-state solution is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours, compared to 77% who did so in 2010. Only about one in four (26%) British Jews think that most Palestinians want peace with Israel, compared to nearly half (47%) in 2010.
Nearly four in five British Jews say that they often feel that they are being held responsible by non-Jews for the actions of Israel’s government, with 43% ‘strongly agreeing’ with this statement.
Nearly half of British Jews (46%) say that antisemitism is ‘a very big problem’ in the UK today, compared to 28% in 2018 and only 11% in 2012. In total, 83% of British define antisemitism as a problem in Britain, the highest proportion found since records began over a decade ago.
Nearly three in four respondents say they feel less safe as a Jewish person living in the UK, and almost two in three adult British Jews said they feel less confident displaying their Jewishness since the October 7 attacks.
Although most British Jews report no overall change in this regard, substantial proportions of British Jews say that they feel closer to their Jewish friends since October 7 (39%) and less close to their non-Jewish friends (24%). The findings also suggest a notable increase in levels of attachment to their local Jewish community.
Attachment levels of British Jews to Israel were steady before October 7 but have risen significantly since then, with half of British Jews saying they are ‘very’ attached to Israel today (up from 40% in 2022).
About two in three British Jews (65%) identify as Zionist, up slightly compared to before October 7. 10% identify as anti-Zionist, also up slightly.
Levels of anxiety among British Jews are higher than they were before October 7 and are notably higher than they are among the general population of Britain.
There is no evidence to indicate Jews are leaving the UK in elevated numbers in the past year – on the contrary, emigration levels are generally low and stable and have been for several decades. At the same time, a slight change in sentiment around this issue has occurred over the past year, with many moving up one notch from wherever they were on it before October 7.
Topics: Antisemitism: Attitude Surveys, Antisemitism: Monitoring, Antisemitism: Online, Antisemitism: Left-Wing, Antisemitism: Muslim, Antisemitism: Discourse, Israel Criticism, Anti-Zionism, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Policy, October 7 2023 attacks + aftermath
Abstract: In this policy paper:
How have levels of antisemitism in the UK and across Europe changed since the October 7 attack on Israel and the war in Gaza? Using the most recent survey data from July 2024, this policy paper demonstrates how the antisemitic incident reporting figures most commonly quoted significantly underestimate the number of incidents happening in reality. The paper also introduces the concept of ‘ambient antisemitism’ – Jews experiencing antisemitism that isn’t personally directed at them –looking at how the context in which Jews are living today affects their perceptions of antisemitism. It also explores the general population’s attitudes to Jews and Israel before and after October 7, 2023.
The paper concludes that better research methods are required to accurately assess the general population’s attitudes to Jews and Israel and Jewish people’s perceptions and experiences of antisemitism. It points to a critical gap in research compared with the EU and calls on the UK Government and philanthropic community to plug it as a matter of urgency.
Some of the key findings in this policy paper:
Reports of antisemitic incidents increased dramatically in the months following the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7 in multiple European countries.
Survey data demonstrate that the number of antisemitic incidents being recorded by the police and community monitoring agencies vastly underestimates the amount of antisemitism taking place.
An evident rise in antisemitism since October 7 has had a significant impact on Jewish people’s feelings of safety and security in the UK and across Europe.
The degree to which the Hamas attacks on October 7 were marked by open celebration and affirmation of violence reveals a level of antisemitic hate that exists within parts of Western Europe that poses a severe threat to Jews living on the continent.
A culture of ‘ambient antisemitism’ has emerged in the post-October 7 period, marked by incidents such as defacing or tearing down posters of Israeli hostages, that, whether strictly antisemitic or not, create a broader milieu that feels threatening and hostile to many Jewish people.
Inaccurate and irresponsible media reporting can lead directly to an increase in antisemitism, although more research is required to understand how and when this occurs.
There has been a significant increase in sympathy for the Palestinians among young people and those on the political left since October 7; levels of sympathy for Israel are much lower, even in the very immediate aftermath of the Hamas attacks.
The lack of sympathy for Israel is likely to lead to many Jews feeling a greater sense of alienation from the societies in which they live over time.
Given the apparent levels of concern among Jews today, much more needs to be done to invest in a robust and systematic approach to measuring antisemitism in society and its effects on Jews as part of a serious strategy to combat it going forward. This is particularly the case in the UK, which has fallen far behind the EU since leaving the European Union in this respect.
Abstract: The report looks into what Jews in the UK think of key Israeli political leaders and the country’s future, drawing on data from the responses of over 4,500 adult British Jews, members of the JPR Research Panel, to the JPR Jewish Current Affairs Survey, held in June-July 2024. The report reveals that levels of pessimism about Israel’s current situation have increased significantly among British Jews when compared to data gathered before the October 7 attacks on Israel and the war in Gaza.
Some of the main findings in this report:
Three-quarters (74%) of Jews in the UK describe Israel’s situation as “bad” (37%) or “very bad” (37%), increasing from 57% measured in Apr/May 2023. Overall, Jews in the UK characterise Israel’s current state more negatively than Israelis.
95% of adult British Jews have an opinion on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the most widely known leader among those examined. Four in five Jews hold an unfavourable opinion of him, with 65% saying they “strongly disapprove” and 15% saying they “somewhat” disapprove of him.
Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich (-78%), Minister of Security Itamar Ben-Gvir (-77%) and Netanyahu (-68%) are the Israeli leaders British Jews least approve of when looking at their net approval ratings. Former Prime Minister Yair Lapid (+12%) and former Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister Benny Gantz (+10%) are the only two leaders showing positive net ratings among those examined.
Lapid is the only leader examined showing an increase in net approval rate compared to data from before October 7.
Politically ‘right-leaning’ Jews were much more likely to approve of Netanyahu than those who are ‘left-leaning’.
Abstract: This report draws on data collected in June and July 2024, eight months after the October 7 attacks on Israel and in the context of the war in Gaza, to explore Jewish parents' understanding of whether their children have experienced antisemitism either at school, in the vicinity of school, and travelling to and from school. The research goes further to investigate whether parents would make different choices about where to educate their Jewish children in light of the events of October 7, the war in Gaza and the rise in antisemitism in the UK.
This is part of a growing body of evidence demonstrating how antisemitism can drive Jews away from participation in wider society, and that should be of concern to anyone who cares about building a more cohesive and understanding society. The findings raise critical questions for mainstream school administrators about how to manage the issue of antisemitism in their schools and, indeed, for government leaders about social cohesion.
Some of the key findings in this report:
A little under a quarter (23%) of British Jewish parents surveyed reported that their child or children had experienced antisemitism at school (12%), in the vicinity of school (6%) or travelling to or from school (9%).
Parents of children at a Jewish school are more likely to report that their children experienced antisemitism while travelling to or from school (13%) than at school (3%).
In comparison, those with children at mainstream schools are more likely to report their children experienced antisemitism at school (21%) than travelling to/from it (2%).
Three-quarters (73%) of Jewish parents with children in mainstream schools said that the October 7 attacks and the war in Gaza would not affect their choice about where to educate the children, but one in five (20%) said they would now be more likely to send their children to a Jewish school.
This proportion doubles (40%) for parents whose children have experienced antisemitism in, around or travelling to or from their mainstream school.
Just over half of Jewish parents with children in Jewish schools (52%) said that the attacks on Israel and the war in Gaza would not affect their school choice, with most of the remainder (46%) saying they would be even more likely to opt for Jewish schooling now.
Abstract: CST recorded 1,978 antisemitic incidents across the UK in the first half of 2024, the highest total ever reported to CST in the first six months of any year. This is an increase of 105% from the 964 antisemitic incidents recorded by CST in the January-to-June period of 2023, which was the third-highest half year figure reported to CST. CST recorded 823 incidents in the first six months of 2022, 1,371 from January to June 2021, and 875 in the first half of 2020.
The 1,978 antisemitic incidents recorded in the first six months of 2024 is 44% higher than the previous half-year record of 1,371 incidents in 2021, and is a reflection of the ongoing high volume of anti-Jewish hate reported since the Hamas terror attack in Israel on 7 October 2023. As documented in CST’s Antisemitic Incidents Report 2023, there was an instant increase in antisemitic incident levels in the UK following Hamas’ attack on Israel, before Israel had coordinated any large scale military response in Gaza. The subsequent war, and the widespread public focus it has drawn, have continued to impact the scale and content of antisemitism so far this year.
Abstract: Federace židovských obcí v České republice (dále jen FŽO) zaznamenala v roce 2023 celkem 4 328 antisemitských incidentů. Ve srovnání s rokem 2022, kdy bylo registrováno 2 277 incidentů, tak došlo k nárůstu o 90 %. Rok 2023 tedy znovu potvrdil konstantní trend dramatického nárůstu antisemitismu.
Shromážděná data nejsou úplným statistickým přehledem všech antisemitských incidentů za rok 2023. FŽO čerpá informace výlučně z otevřených zdrojů, které zahrnují pouze malý výsek popisované reality. Počet registrovaných incidentů závisí rovněž na ochotě a možnostech obětí i svědků projevy antisemitismu hlásit. V České republice, stejně jako v jiných zemích, přetrvává nedostatečná míra nahlašování nenávistných činů, často kvůli stigmatizaci, nedůvěře v instituce nebo obavám o osobní bezpečnost. Statistiky FŽO neumí odpovědět na otázku, jaká část české populace smýšlí či jedná antisemitsky, vypovídají však o trendech v jeho vnímání a o společenském klimatu ve vztahu k protižidovské předsudečné nenávisti. K antisemitsky motivovanému fyzickému násilí dochází v České republice pouze výjimečně. V posledních pěti letech byly FŽO nahlášeny dva násilné útoky (2020, 2021). V roce 2023 nebylo evidováno žádné napadení. Z hlediska fyzické bezpečnosti zůstala v roce 2023 Česká republika pro židovskou komunitu bezpečnou zemí.
Témata, motivy a rychlost šíření antisemitismu ovlivňovala řada domácích a zahraničních událostí. Až do samého konce roku 2023 se objevovaly antisemitské narativy spojené s ruskou vojenskou agresí proti Ukrajině i s doznívající pandemií nemoci covid-19. Jednoznačným zlomem se stal 7. říjen 2023, kdy palestinské teroristické organizace pod vedením Hamásu zaútočily z Pásma Gazy proti civilním a vojenským cílům v jižním Izraeli. Bezprecedentní útok zahájil válku mezi Izraelem a Hamásem. Bezprostředně po 7. říjnu následovala celosvětová explozivní vlna antisemitismu, která silně zasáhla i Českou republiku.
Měsíční statistiky zcela jednoznačně dokládají masivní nárůst antisemitismu v posledním čtvrtletí roku 2023. Za období leden–září bylo registrováno 2 528 incidentů, tj. 58,41 % celkového počtu, za období říjen–prosinec pak dalších 1 800 incidentů, které představují 41,59 % celkového počtu. Pro období leden–září 2023 platí, že průměrný měsíční nárůst v porovnání s rokem 2022 činil 50,03 %. V období říjen–prosinec byl průměrný nárůst 254,32 %.
Z hlediska šíření antisemitismu došlo v posledních pěti letech k aktivizaci všech hlavních ideologických proudů. Do roku 2019 představoval největší hrozbu pro židovskou komunitu pravicový extremismus. V letech 2020–2023 v souvislosti s pandemií nemoci covid-19 a s ruskou agresí proti Ukrajině významně posílil vliv dezinformačních platforem. Po teroristickém útoku 7. října akcelerovaly aktivity krajní levice a islamismu. Protižidovská nenávist zejména v podobě démonizace a delegitimizace Státu Izrael v roce 2023 masivně vstoupila do veřejného prostoru a stala se společensky přijatelným postojem. Stoupala agresivita antisemitských incidentů, které byly čím dál častěji adresovány konkrétním osobám či institucím. Protižidovské postoje přejímalo a šířilo stále více jednotlivců, kteří jinak neprojevovali žádné sympatie k politickému či ideologickému extremismu. Závěr roku 2023 tak přinesl zcela nový trend normalizace antisemitismu.
Abstract: The Sixth Survey of European Jewish Community Leaders and Professionals, 2024, presents the results of an online survey offered in 10 languages and administered to 879 respondents in 31 countries. Conducted every three years using the same format, the survey seeks to identify trends and their evolution over time.
The 2024 survey came during a historically fraught moment for the Jewish people globally. The impact of the horrific October 7th attacks and the subsequent war in Israel cannot be understated. How is this affecting Jewish leadership and Jewish communal life? Therefore, in addition to the regular topics covered by the survey (community priorities, threats, security concerns, attitudes towards Europe and Israel), this edition included a special section designed to understand the impact of October 7th on Jewish life in Europe.
That October 7th has profoundly affected Jewish Europe is evident across multiple sections throughout the survey. Concern about antisemitism and the threat of physical attack has intensified. A large majority of 78% feel less safe living as Jews in their cities than they did before the Hamas attack, and respondents are more cautious about how they identify themselves as Jews. They are also more distant from their wider environments, with 38% reporting they have become more distant from non-Jewish friends.
The respondents were comprised of presidents and chairpersons of nationwide “umbrella organizations” or Federations; presidents and executive directors of private Jewish foundations, charities, and other privately funded initiatives; presidents and main representatives of Jewish communities that are organized at a city level; executive directors and programme coordinators, as well as current and former board members of Jewish organizations; among others
