Author(s): Halioua, Bruno; Bantman, Patrick; Rimmer, Rachel; Ghozlan, Eric; Vaislic, Muriel; Halioua, Dan; Amson, Fabienne; Taieb, Charles; Prasquier, Richard; Gutthman, Jean-François; Ejnes, Robert; Dassa, Stéphanie; Astruc, Alexis; Cohen, Marc; Sarfati, Samuel; Fohlen-Weill, Marc; Namia-Cohen, Odile; Deutscher, Aline; Taieb, Jonathan
Abstract: Objective: The terrorist attacks of 7 October 2023 in southern Israel had a significant impact on the mental health of Holocaust Survivors (HS), who are considered to be particularly vulnerable to traumatic events. The aim of the study was to assess the severity of perceived stress and the psychological impact of the 7 October attacks on HS.
Methods: The study was conducted from 30 October to 15 December 2023 among HS who were contacted through HS support organisations (OSE, Aloumim). They completed a questionnaire consisting of four sections: socio-demographic data and experiences during the Holocaust, assessment of psychological stress using the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-10), feelings of isolation, health consequences, and reactions to the 7 October attacks.
Results: 171 HS completed the questionnaire with 61 males (35.7%) with a mean age of 86.6+/−4.4 years (min 79–max 97). 59.6%, lived outside Israel, mainly in France. The mean score on the PSS-10 was 17.7 +/−6.0 on a scale of 5 to 40. The average PSS 10 score is not significantly higher in cases of age ≤90 years (18.0 ± 6.0 vs 15.7 ± 6.4, NS), or for those living in Israel (17.2 ± 5.3 vs 18.1 ± 6.6, NS). About a quarter reported feelings of isolation or loneliness following the attacks. The impact of the 7 October attacks was particularly significant among those living outside Israel. Approximately two-thirds felt that the events had rekindled memories of their Holocaust experiences, and nearly one-third observed a decline in their health since the attacks. Among survivors living outside Israel, 86.6% expressed concern about the future safety and identity of their children and grandchildren as Jews.
Conclusion: Identifying Holocaust survivors (HS) who are experiencing psychological distress is crucial to providing them with appropriate therapy.
HIGHLIGHTS
75.3% of Holocaust Suvivors experienced moderate to severe distress in the two months following the 7 October terrorist attacks, as measured by the PSS-10 questionnaire
Non-Israeli HS tend to think more frequently about the Holocaust period (87% vs 62.7%, p ≤ .05) and more often make a spontaneous link between the images broadcasted of the October 7 massacre and what happened during the Holocaust (83.7% vs 66.7%, p ≤ .05).
Compared to non-Israeli HS, those living in France and Canada are more anxious about the future of their children and grandchildren as Jews (86.6% vs 58.8%, p ≤ .05).
Abstract: October 7, 2023 is regarded as the deadliest massacre of Jews since the Shoah and marks a historical turning point. Since then, the repercussions of this terrorist attack and the subsequent Hamas-Israel war have been intensely debated. Antisemitic and violence-glorifying incidents in certain Muslim-migrant milieus have triggered emotionally charged debates on so-called “Muslim antisemitism.” However, little is known so far about the broader impact of October 7 and the war on the Muslim population in Germany. This study is based on a secondary analysis of the dataset Muslim Faith in Germany, collected between July 2023 and April 2024, and allows for a quasi-experimental before-and-after comparison in line with the Unexpected Event During Survey Design (N = 712 before, N = 1119 after October 7). The findings indicate that antisemitism among Muslims in Germany has changed significantly but only marginally since October 7, 2023, with consistently high approval rates between 30% and 35% for pronounced traditional antisemitism and between 23% and 19% for pronounced Israel-related antisemitism. Striking is the notable increase in radicalization potential: antisemitism—particularly in its Israel-related form—is significantly more strongly associated after October 7 with willingness to participate in unauthorized demonstrations, readiness for self-sacrifice, sympathies for Islamist actors, and acceptance of violence and terrorism as a means to enforce Muslim interests. Regression analyses show that especially lacking political integration, high fundamentalism, and threat perception are significantly associated with antisemitism after October 7. Implications for research and practice are discussed, regarding the strengthening of political trust, the dismantling of fundamentalism, and the reduction of collective threat perceptions.
Abstract: Transnistria, meaning “beyond the Dniester”, was an artificial geographic term created during the Second World War, referring to a region in the Ukraine that was situated between the Dniester River on the west and the Bug River on the east, also extending southward to the Black Sea. During October and November 1941, thousands of terrorized Jews, mostly without food and water, were deported on foot or by wagon to Transnistria. Depending on whose numbers one uses, between 120,000 and 180,000 Jews were deported to Transnistria from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Of this group, only 50,000 would survive the war.
For years, the fate of the Jews in Transnistria was not emphasized in Holocaust remembrance, education, or commemoration. The reasons for this were manifold. They included problems of documentation; attitudes of Eastern European governments until the transition of the 1990s; priorities of major Holocaust memorial organizations until that transition; activities, primarily internally focused, of the survivor organizations from Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Transnistria; and, finally, the dynamics among Jewish survivors from Romania as they reassembled their lives in the first postwar decades. All this contributed to Transnistria becoming “the forgotten Holocaust”.
As the last Jewish survivors of the Transnistrian ghettos and camps reached their eighth and ninth decades at the beginning of the 21st century, various political, social, educational, and demographic factors coalesced, changing pre-existing dynamics regarding the memory of Transnistria. In this chapter, I focus on these factors, showing how and why this “forgotten Holocaust” is slowly being remembered again.
Abstract: Public engagement with the Holocaust in Romania has developed slowly and unevenly, shaped by decades of political constraint and institutional silence. Until 1989, restricted archival access and an antifascist ideological framework marginalized the specificity of Jewish persecution, subsuming it under a generalized narrative of “victims of fascism”. A substantive public acknowledgment of Romania’s responsibility emerged only in 2004, with the adoption of the Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania. This belated recognition profoundly influenced the spatial articulation of memory in Bucharest.
The chapter examines the fragmented mnemonic landscape of the city through a theoretical distinction between imprints and places. Imprints are material interventions – monuments, plaques, museums – that inscribe historical facts into public space. While essential for visibility and moral acknowledgment, they operate largely as static markers. Places, by contrast, are urban sites whose latent memory is reactivated through collective engagement. Rather than merely preserving the past, they generate memory through interaction, interpretation, and embodied experience.
Through case studies – including Giurgiului Cemetery, the Bucharest Holocaust Memorial (2009), and the Memorial to the Martyrs of the Bucharest Pogrom (2016) – the chapter traces the transition from enclosed, community-bound remembrance to civic visibility. It then analyzes the pedagogical project PLACES (2021), developed with architecture students, which reconstructed the prewar addresses of the 125 pogrom victims and reinscribed them into the contemporary city through mapping, archival research, and digital interfaces.
By shifting attention from sites of death to spaces of everyday life, PLACES exemplifies a performative model of remembrance grounded in secondary witnessing. The study argues that, in the absence of living testimony, urban space itself becomes a medium of memory – capable not only of conserving history but of ethically reactivating it within the present.
Abstract: Government and political parties must adopt an amended definition of antisemitism, aimed at promoting a zero-tolerance approach while allowing free speech on Israel and Palestine to continue. The persistent use of 'Zionist' as a term of abuse is a particular concern: use of the word in an accusatory context should be considered inflammatory and potentially antisemitic by law enforcement and political party officials.
While the UK remains one of the least antisemitic countries in Europe, it is alarming that recent surveys show that as many as one in 20 adults in the UK could be characterised as "clearly antisemitic".
There is a worrying disparity in police-recorded antisemitic crime across the country, with virtually no cases recorded in some police force areas where thousands of Jewish people live. It calls on the National Police Chiefs' Council to investigate this apparent under reporting, and to provide support to police forces with less experience of investigating potentially antisemitic incidents.
Shami (now Baroness) Chakrabarti's report into antisemitism in the Labour Party is ultimately compromised by its failure to deliver a comprehensive set of recommendations, to provide a definition of antisemitism, or to suggest effective ways of dealing with antisemitic incidents. In addition, her decision to join the Labour Party in April and accept a peerage as a nominee of the Labour Leader, along with her recent appointment to Jeremy Corbyn's Shadow Cabinet, has thrown into question the independence of the Labour Party's inquiry.
Despite his proud record on fighting racism, the Committee is not persuaded that Mr Corbyn fully appreciates the distinct nature of contemporary antisemitism, and the fact that it is perfectly possible for an 'anti-racist campaigner' to express antisemitic views. His lack of consistent leadership on this issue has created what some have referred to as a 'safe space' for those with vile attitudes towards Jewish people, exacerbated by the Party's demonstrable incompetence at dealing with members accused of antisemitism.
Abstract: This paper examines the adaptation and proliferation of antisemitic narratives on Telegram during the Russian-Ukrainian war, tracing their evolution from historical myths to digital propaganda. Through a qualitative analysis of Telegram channels in Russian and Ukrainian, we explore how classical antisemitic tropes such as conspiracy theories about Jewish global control, Holocaust denial, and accusations of dual loyalty are repurposed to shift blame for the war onto Jews. Our findings reveal a multilayered process of blame-shifting operating across historical, social, national, and global levels, positioning Jews as instigators of conflict to deflect civic and political responsibility from Russians and Ukrainians. We argue that this antisemitic rhetoric serves as a tool of social manipulation and political deflection, embedded in diverse nationalist and conspiratorial digital environments. By embedding these narratives within Telegram’s unregulated and virally oriented ecosystem, content creators amplify prejudice, erode social cohesion, and perpetuate cycles of mistrust and scapegoating. This study highlights the enduring power of antisemitic myths in contemporary digital conflict narratives and calls for further research into the structural mechanisms enabling their spread.
Abstract: Antisemitism, understood as a particular manifestation of racism directed against a collectivity defined by religion, ethnicity, or a combination of both, constitutes a form of social exclusion. Such exclusion operates through formal and informal mechanisms that separate members of the targeted group from full participation in various spheres of social life. It may manifest as an outright prohibition from entering specific social circles or events, or as a conditional and restricted form of participation-one permitted only under special, typically unfavorable, terms. In both situations, inclusion is perceived as improper or undesirable, and when it occurs, it is often subject to heightened scrutiny or control. As with other forms of racism, antisemitism may persist within a society irrespective of the presence or absence of legislation explicitly supporting it. Moreover, antisemitism can remain operative even in contexts where laws formally prohibit ethnic or religious discrimination. This is possible because exclusion and discrimination may assume subtle or covert forms, legitimized through the selective or manipulative use of legal provisions that allow for differential treatment on ostensibly neutral grounds. The capacity of antisemitism to hide behind seemingly unrelated attitudes or arguments -masking negative sentiment toward Jews as a collectivity- raises fundamental questions about how the term “antisemitism” should be defined and what indicators are necessary for its identification and systematic analysis. This paper discusses the controversy surrounding competing definitions of antisemitism as it emerged before and after the recent Israel-Palestinian conflict, where legitimate political critique of the State of Israel is at times intertwined with antisemitic discourse disguised as purely political disapproval of Israeli policies or leadership.
Abstract: This joint report from HOPE not hate and Antisemitism Policy Trust explores the overlap and interplay between antisemitism and misogyny in a series of articles, case studies and social media analysis.
The report investigates the ways in which antifeminism and misogyny can act as slip roads towards antisemitism and other forms of racism, due to a perceived loss of status among white men – and women – based on gender and racial hierarchies. In recent years, the antisemitic far right, in particular, has become increasingly adept at steering antipathy to feminism and women more broadly towards Jew-hatred, reasserting men’s status at the expense of others.
It also outlines the role of conspiracy theories in bridging anti-feminism and antisemitism, in particular the “Cultural Marxism” and “White Genocide” ideologies that implicitly or explicitly position Jews as the root of feminism and women’s behaviour in general. Such theories can provide a grand context for personal frustrations and prejudices, as well as scapegoats.
We explore the ways in which Jewish people are gendered in antisemitic discourse, outlining longstanding stereotypes of Jewish men and particularly Jewish women who, being on the receiving end of both antisemitism and misogyny, are the targets of especially vile abuse.
We also look into the important, but precarious, role of women in antisemitic movements as recruiters and propagandists, including several of the UK’s best-known Holocaust deniers. Women can play a conscious role in “softening” extreme prejudice, although they can also quickly become targets for abuse themselves.
This report also includes an analysis of misogyny and gender politics on the messaging app Telegram, a key online hub for the antisemitic far right. We found that open misogyny is widespread and enabled within antisemitic spaces on the platform. Attacks on gay men are especially commonplace, which itself indicates the heterosexual male dominance of these spaces. Sexual assault is a prominent theme, and whilst it is discussed in a variety of ways, pro-rape comments are not uncommon.
Abstract: Polish-Jewish relations, rather good in pre-partition Poland, deteriorated in the mid-19th century, and even more in the Second Republic (1919-39) with its exclusivist nationalism. The wartime period was marked by strong anti-Jewish moods in Poland; antisemitism was a "legitimate" stance within the resistance movement. However, many Poles helped Jews. Between 1944-48 Polish rulers conducted politics favorable toward Jews, but they used the Jewish issue as a tool in their struggle against the old elite, which whipped up anti-Jewish sentiments. In the 1950s-60s the Holocaust was increasingly de-Judaized in Polish discourse; after 1968, when Poland engaged in the anti-Zionist campaign, Jews ceased to be mentioned at all. The genocide of the Jews began to be discussed in Poland only after 1978; the Solidarity movement used its memory in its struggle against the government. At the same time, popular antisemitism re-emerged. Now, many Poles object to what they see as over-emphasis of Jewish suffering and neglect of non-Jewish suffering under the Nazis.
Abstract: n 2000, I was commissioned by Inter Nationes to update my 1997 brochure on Jews in Contemporary Germany. I submitted the following article in early 2001. Unfortunately, Inter Nationes felt that my new version was too long and too inflammatory; they felt that it might end up annoying too many people. So the Inter Nationes version which has since appeared in several languages is greatly abridged. This ‘original’ version reflects my own opinions, and has not been ‘politically corrected’. I believe, however, that it presents a more comprehensive, better balanced and ultimately more positive picture of Jews in Germany today. THE QUESTION COMPLEXES There are so many aspects to the ‘Jews in contemporary Germany’ theme that I find it practical to group them into three complexes. The first complex concerns Jews among themselves, and I call it ‘Germany’s Jews’. Who are the Jews living in Germany now, the remaining ‘establishment’ (the postwar, pre-unification community) and the newcomers? How and how well do they coexist? What are the major internal issues confronting the Jewish community today, and what is likely to be the future of Jewry in Germany? It is the second question complex which tends to attract the most attention, both within Germany and outside the country: ‘Jews and non-Jews in Germany’. How come there are still any Jews at all living in Germany after the Holocaust? How do these Jews get along with the Germans (a loaded question if ever there was once, since it assumes that Jews are not Germans, and Germans are not Jews) and vice versa? What role does anti- Semitism play in Germany, assuming that it does play one? What do the Jews living in Germany perceive as the major issues confronting their relationship with the ‘outside world’ – that is, with anybody and everybody who is not a Jew living in Germany, and in particular, with Jews living in the United States? And this last question brings us to the third complex, since we are back to considering Jews among themselves, this time not just within Germany but across the Atlantic. I call this complex ‘the American factor’ and extend it to include the current state of the so-called German-Jewish dialogue. This too is a loaded concept, complicated by the fact that the ‘Germans’ in this case are automatically non-Jews, and the ‘Jews’ are usually American Jews. In the pages to follow, I shall try to give a brief overview of all three complexes. The first is probably the most interesting, if only because only the people concerned, the Jews living in Germany, know anything much about it. Certainly, the internal Jewish complex is generally little known to, and even less understood by, the rest of the German population. For the most part, the rest of the world, including other Jewish populations, either have no interest in the topic, or have erroneous ideas based on myth and prejudice. I shall therefore start with the Jews among themselves.
Abstract: The authors of this text, two Israeli historians, probe the background to the keynote speech delivered by Thomas Rose, the US ambassador to Poland, at the conference of the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Judges in Warsaw in November 2025. The newly appointed envoy—a Republican political appointee and former publisher of The Jerusalem Post—insisted that claims of any Polish complicity in the German annihilation of Polish Jewry amount to a “blood libel.” In Contrast, Dreifuss and Weinbaum contend that these remarks serve to reinforce ongoing efforts by individuals and Polish officialdom to delegitimize the rigorous scholarship of a determined band of Polish researchers who have been studying wartime Polish–Jewish relations for nearly three decades. While condemning the occasional conflation of Poles with the actual masterminds and prime perpetrators of the Final Solution, the authors emphasize that local participation in the degradation, dispossession, and destruction of Polish Jews was far more extensive than had been previously recognized. They further argue that both Communist and post-Communist governments, as well as Polish individuals and institutions at home and in exile, have resisted confronting these findings and that scholars and others who challenge more reassuring narratives have faced sustained and often vitriolic attacks. The authors conclude that this excruciating chapter of history must be confronted dispassionately—on the basis of meticulous scholarly inquiry—and should not be subordinated to diplomatic or political agendas.
Abstract: In his article, the author responds to Jörg Hermann Yiftach Fehige's criticism, expressed in the article “Jewish Theology as a Science in the Context of Post-Shoah Germany” in the fall 2026 issue of “Theology and Science”. He explains why theologies, as a subject, are an integral part of the arts and humanities within the Central European university system, and why Jewish theology was added as a university subject as late as 2013, 190 years after this had been demanded by Rabbis Abraham Geiger (1836) and Ludwig Philippson (1837) as a prerequisite for the successful emancipation of Jews in a “Christian State” (Friedrich Schlegel). He also speaks out against allegations reported in Fehige's contribution that he is an abuser, cheater, and plagiarist. Keywords: Paul Feyerabend, Abraham Geiger, German Science and Humanities Council, Jewish emancipation, Jewish identity, Jewish theology, liberal democracy, relationship between state and religions, Reform Judaism, Wissenschaft des Judentums, World Union for Progressive Judaism.
Abstract: This study explores how students negotiate complex and sensitive issues in schools, focussing on the October 7, 2023, attacks and their consequences. Drawing on discourse analysis informed by Foucault and discursive psychology, we analyse students’ talk in focus group discussions as situated social action, examining how they make sense of events, construct accounts and position themselves and others. The analysis provides empirical insights into how students navigate a contested topic and contributes to pedagogical approaches that support democratic dialogue and critical engagement. The results show that students negotiate meaning through a knowledge positioning discourse, which shapes students’ willingness to engage amid epistemic ambiguity; a moral positioning discourse, which introduces pressures to take a stance and challenges deliberative ideals; and an anti-antisemitism discourse, which exposes tensions between critique of Zionism and antisemitism. Findings reveal that reliance on media-informed narratives, moral framings and contested identity categories can both enable and constrain dialogue, sometimes reinforcing polarisation and feelings of alienation. The study argues for pedagogical strategies that foster epistemic security, promote perspective-taking and critically engage with the politics of language to dismantle stereotypes and prevent dichotomous narratives.
Abstract: Burchett's article sheds light on the community of Facebook users who interact with posts by the populist far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), and how they respond to the AfD’s contradictory narratives regarding Jews and antisemitism. The AfD uses its online space to construct an everyday reality of victimhood for its political community, which conditionally includes Jews. Jewish victimhood and inclusion are emphasized by the AfD when they fit its political aims, such as focusing on ‘Muslim-Arab’ antisemitism to underline an anti-immigration stance, but are minimized when Jewish victimhood is perceived to threaten non-Jewish German victimhood, as it is seen to do in the context of Holocaust remembrance. Burchett compares comment threads from these two thematic streams and finds that, regardless of the difference in victimhood framing by the AfD, users in both streams react with similar narratives of defensive, competitive and rejective victimhood, as well as a reluctance to include Jews in their in-group of victims, even when the AfD explicitly includes them. Her paper argues that so-called ‘secondary’ antisemitism, Jewish exclusion as a result of resistance to Holocaust guilt, also has an effect on contemporary Jewish victimhood.
Abstract: – Beyond campus incidents, broader longitudinal survey data suggest attitudinal shifts across society, especially among younger populations. This longitudinal attitude survey suggests that there has been a significant rise in antisemitic sentiments in both Germany and the United States since the beginning of 2024 (unfortunately this is when the data set begins).
– Age is the strongest predictor of antisemitic attitudes, with younger respondents, particularly young men, consistently more likely to endorse exclusionary views about Jews in both the U.S. and Germany.
– High social media use and conspiratorial thinking strongly correlate with antisemitic sentiment, especially in the United States, indicating digital environments as key drivers of contemporary prejudice formation.
– In the United States young people are more likely to evince antisemitic views, while in Germany older people are more likely to be islamophobic.
– The data do not support a broad resurgence of left-wing antisemitism; instead, political polarization and xenophobia, especially on the right, remain central predictors of exclusionary attitudes.
Topics: Main Topic: Antisemitism, October 7 2023 attacks + aftermath, Gender, Feminism, Antisemitism, Antisemitism: Israel-Related, Antisemitism: Left-Wing, Antisemitism: Theory, Theory: Critical Theory, Sexism and Misogyny, Intersectionality
Abstract: Antisemitism and Sexism: Ideological Constellations Before and After 7 October analyses the manifold ways in which antisemitism and sexism appear not as isolated ideologies but as intersecting ones, exploring their historical, social, political, economic, and psychological constellations. Drawing on Critical Theory, the book offers a comparative historical analysis of these entanglements from nineteenth-century Europe—particularly Germany and Austria—through National Socialism and its preconditions, to the historical and contemporary formations of Islamism. The sexist antisemitism of 7 October and its aftermath are examined as a contemporary eruption of these enduring ideological patterns, while Critical Theory itself is sharpened in light of these events.
Structured around distinct analytical dimensions, the book opens with a theoretically dense examination of the damaged relationship between human beings and nature under modern labour society, identified by Critical Theory as a key source of both antisemitism and sexism. Subsequent chapters analyse the contradictory constructions of Judaism and femininity, the relation between body and mind, and socially regulated forms of sexuality. Conspiracy myths linking weakness and omnipotence, the psychosocial roots of authoritarian dispositions, and the embedding of these ideologies in specific formations of capitalist modernity and repressive communities are examined in turn. The book also offers a critical examination of intersectional feminist antisemitism in the aftermath of 7 October and advances a proposal to reformulate intersectionality as an ideology-critical framework for a feminist critique of antisemitism.
Abstract: This article explores how Holocaust education can be reimagined through the lens of Critical Theory—particularly the work of Theodor W. Adorno—in order to more effectively confront contemporary antisemitism. While Holocaust education is often invoked as a response to rising antisemitism, its actual impact in this regard remains contested. Drawing on Adorno’s reflections on antisemitism and education after Auschwitz, the article highlights both the emancipatory potential and the limitations of education. Central themes include the importance of early childhood education, the critique of ideology, and the tension between pedagogical aims and societal structures. The article proposes eleven impulses for rethinking Holocaust education, emphasizing, among other points, the need to turn toward the subject, the dangers of half-education ( Halbbildung ), and the importance of linking historical specificity with sociological insight. Rather than offering a prescriptive model, it outlines a conceptual framework that situates Holocaust education within a broader project of social critique and enlightenment. Ultimately, it argues that Holocaust education alone cannot prevent antisemitism, but can meaningfully contribute to resisting it.
Abstract: Together we seek to model the redemptive, liberatory, activist, feminist approach to collaborative working to which both authors are committed as teachers, students, rabbis and activists. In our rabbinic chain of tradition (more particularly through other female rabbis) we explore, through the lenses of student and teacher, the 5-year rabbinic course at Leo Baeck College (LBC). We seek to demonstrate how, when working at its best, LBC trains rabbis as activists. Our contention is that the rabbinic education at LBC has the potential to be transformative in creating rabbis as activist leaders, an ideal which ought to transcend the rabbinic training seminary and be taken forward into community.
Abstract: Comment les minorités peuvent-elles s’intégrer aux nations européennes ? Comment renouer avec le projet émancipateur de l’Europe moderne, qui apparaît plus que jamais en crise ? Pour répondre à ces interrogations, Bruno Karsenti adopte le prisme de la question juive : question qui se pose à propos de cette minorité que sont les juifs, question qu’ils se posent à eux-mêmes au fil de leur intégration. Il retrace l’essor et le déclin des centres que les juifs ont constitués tout au long de leur histoire moderne, entre assimilation et émancipation, discrimination et persécution. Cette trajectoire heurtée part de l’expulsion des juifs d’Espagne en 1492, s’instaure comme question juive dans l’Allemagne du xixe siècle, manque de disparaître avec l’anéantissement du monde juif à l’Est et se transforme avec la persistance d’un centre juif en France.
Nourri par des travaux d’histoire et de sociologie, ce livre de philosophie politique éclaire le rapport complexe des juifs de la diaspora à leur identité, aux nations dont ils sont devenus les citoyens et, depuis 1948, à l’État d’Israël. En restituant ce cadre, Bruno Karsenti met au jour les paradoxes qui traversent tous les processus d’intégration, depuis la Shoah, les décolonisations et le 7-Octobre. Ce diagnostic s’accompagne d’un engagement : comprendre l’antisémitisme et le racisme, interroger le sionisme et le modèle républicain, c’est rouvrir le champ d’une critique politique fidèle à l’idéal d’émancipation – et donc à la promesse européenne.
