Abstract: This rapid review has sought to examine how the regulatory system for healthcare professionals, from employment through to national oversight and professional regulatory bodies, supports recognition and reporting of antisemitism and other forms of racism, and tackles racism at every stage and level. In particular, the review has sought to answer 2 principal questions:
How do we make sure in the NHS in England that perpetrators of antisemitism and other forms of racism are held to account with effective action taken to tackle their behaviour?
How do we make sure that patients and staff are protected from racism within the NHS in England and across the UK health and care professional regulation system?
This review proposes that the NHS establishes a clear organisation-wide priority to increase trust and confidence in NHS services among Jewish, and other minority ethnic patients and staff through actively promoting an anti-racist workplace culture and putting in place systems to tackle incidents of all forms of racism thoroughly, fairly and transparently. The NHS must work to embed anti-racism principles at its very core, eliminate racist prejudice and disadvantage, and demonstrate fairness in all aspects of NHS employment and care. That must include efforts to tackle anti-Jewish racism.
The scope of this review considers actions that can be taken to address racism from all quarters, including:
NHS staff
patients and their relatives
members of the public
Building on the existing large body of evidence on the impact of racism in healthcare, and on the extensive experience of Lord Mann, the review undertook:
a period of targeted engagement with relevant stakeholders, including the UK health and care system and professional regulatory bodies
thorough examination of existing mechanisms, guidance, and processes for addressing incidents of racism in the NHS
Abstract: The proliferation of antisemitic content on small, high harm online services poses a significant risk to users of user-to-user safety. This includes risks of radicalisation into extremist and violent ideologies, and with serious implications for online threats, abuse and harassment. These risks are exacerbated when users are from a group with protected characteristics, which include age, race, sex and sexual orientation.
In relation to antisemitism, content on these small services tends to be more extreme than the anti-Jewish racism on
large, mainstream platforms. As a result, it helps radicalise people into extreme narratives, the results of which have
included violence against Jews. The proliferation of antisemitism online also contributes to the rising levels
of racism that divide communities. It eases the spread and amplification of conspiracy theories that undermine
trust in democratic institutions and erode liberal values of tolerance and inclusion, across Europe. It also helps
normalise antisemitism in both online and offline discourse.
These small platforms, including, for example, BitChute, Gab, and 4chan, often operate with minimal moderation
and are also sometimes encrypted, providing safe havens for extremist content that includes antisemitic tropes,
incitement to violence, and radicalising material. Despite the harm they cause, many of these platforms manage to
escape robust regulation in Britain and the EU.
This is particularly worrying, considering the major increase in antisemitism in Europe. In Britain, the Community
Security Trust (CST) recorded 3,528 antisemitic incidents for 2024. This is roughly double the number of incidents
recorded in 2022, and slightly less than the number recorded in 2023–when there was a sharp rise following
the 7 October Hamas attack on Southern Israel.
In the EU, some organisations across Europe reported an increase of more than 400% in antisemitic incidents following 7 October 2023. A 2024 survey found that 96% of respondents from 13 EU countries have encountered
antisemitism in their daily life. Hate crimes tend to be severely under-reported, so these numbers–although
high– still represent only a portion of the real occurrence of antisemitic hate crimes.
In this report, we examine the antisemitic content that originates from these small services, and how it migrates to
larger platforms, where it spreads at a greater rate and has a wider, even worldwide, reach. This report will begin with an overview of antisemitism on small services and the synergy with larger services, to explain the risks. We will then look at services to demonstrate the origins of antisemitic content on these platforms. The report ends with recommendations for policy and regulation, to tackle the harm caused by small services, urging decision-makers and regulators to apply stronger enforcement and risk-based platform categorisation to protect Jewish communities and our democracies.
Abstract: The role of HM Government’s Independent Adviser on Antisemitism was established to provide independent advice to the Prime Minister and Government on issues relating to antisemitism in the UK and the most effective methods to combat it. As the first holder of the Office, I was appointed to the role of the Independent Adviser in 2019 for five years. Since then, I have maintained a constructive dialogue with the devolved nations as well as the UK Government.
This 2024 review collates recommendations from my major reports on antisemitism in the last two years, the first of which was a detailed action plan on tackling anti-Jewish hatred across the UK while the second addressed the alarming growth in antisemitism on our university campuses. The review also gives an overview of other important project areas that I have covered in my work plan.
While significant progress has been made, important recommendations still require adoption and implementation by the relevant department or devolved administration. I am therefore urging Ministers in the new UK Government, the devolved governments and senior officials to use this review as a blueprint or checklist for further action and the review is formatted in sections according to who holds the lead responsibility.
The need for action has been made even more urgent by the conflict in Israel and Gaza since 7th October 2023. The Community Security Trust (CST) recorded 4,103 antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2023, the highest total ever reported to CST in a single calendar year. Of the 4,103 instances of anti-Jewish hate reported, 2,699 (66%) occurred on or after 7th October. This figure alone exceeds any previous annual antisemitic incident total recorded by CST, which has been recording incidents since 1984.
Abstract: • In order to understand and address antisemitism, one must effectively define it. The universally agreed
international definition of antisemitism was developed and adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance
Alliance (IHRA)1
• On 12 December 2016, The United Kingdom Government was one of the first to adopt this definition, followed by other political parties and in 2020 it was adopted by 641 Members of Parliament in the UK House of Commons
• The declaration has already been signed by many local authorities and Universities, and it has been used by the UK police and Crown Prosecution Service to define what is and what is not antisemitism.
• Over recent months, there has been a rapid increase in adoption of the IHRA declaration, with over 35 Countries now having signed up. Italy, Sweden, Greece and Uruguay are the most recent signatories.
• In January 2020, as part of Lord Mann’s work plan, he wrote to several Premier League Football Clubs asking
them to adopt the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism.
• Lord Mann recommends adoption of this definition, as he believes it can be of practical assistance when dealing with antisemitic incidents.
• Clubs should adopt this definition of antisemitism as a statement of their club’s values. in order to set clear
guidelines, give clarity and to act as a reference point for employees, stewards and fans on what constitutes as
antisemitism.
Abstract: In this policy paper:
Renowned demographer and President of JPR’s European Jewish Demography Unit Professor Sergio DellaPergola explores possible futures for the Jewish People over the next century, not by making precise predictions, but by identifying the core structural forces that have shaped Jewish history and will continue to do so. It highlights the enduring complexity of Jewish identity and existence, examining not only whether the Jewish People will endure but also in what form.
Some of the key findings and arguments in this policy paper:
Three enduring questions will shape the Jewish future: What defines Jewish identity? How is it transmitted? How do Jews relate to non-Jews as a minority? How does the Jewish collective organise and defend its shared interests?
Jewish existence will continue to rest on three interconnected pillars: Israel – a sovereign Jewish state, demographically strong but politically challenged; Diaspora – diverse minority communities, often influential but structurally vulnerable; the Israel–Diaspora relationship – a critical but fragile axis.
Three key dynamics affect Jewish demographics: Ageing and low fertility in most Diaspora communities; higher fertility in Israel, especially among more religious groups; and potential long-term transformation of the Jewish population’s internal composition.
Future migration patterns will depend heavily on political stability, economic conditions and levels of security and antisemitism.
Assimilation and identity erosion remain major challenges, while new forms of ‘joining’ Judaism may emerge.
Jews will continue to represent a tiny global minority, and Jewish life will continue to be shaped by external perceptions and pressures. At the same time, antisemitism is expected to persist in evolving forms.
Israel is likely to become home to the majority of the world’s Jews within decades. This shift will redefine the meaning of Jewish peoplehood, its cultural and political priorities and the power dynamics within global Jewry.
Rapid growth of more religious populations (particularly Haredim) may reshape economic structures, political systems and social cohesion.
Leadership capacity must include three key requirements: the ability to unite diverse segments of the Jewish People, a realistic assessment of challenges and opportunities, and the development of new or improved shared decision-making frameworks.
Abstract: Pearn Kandola’s Antisemitism and Islamophobia at Work report (2024) is a comprehensive study in which over 1000 Muslim and Jewish employees participated, either through in-depth focus groups or our survey, to shine a light on their experiences of antisemitism and Islamophobia in the workplace since October 7th 2023.
Late last year, we published our groundbreaking Religion At Work (2023) report, the largest of its kind. It explored the experiences of people of faith in the workplace, highlighting the difficulty for employees of any religion to express their faith at work.
Released in November 2023, a question we were increasingly faced with as time went on was the impact on Muslim and Jewish employees, in particular, since October 7th. However, the data for this momentous report was gathered and analysed before the current Israel-Gaza conflict, which could tell us little to answer this question.
As a result, we carried out a new piece of research, designed to look at the:
Extent to which Jewish employees experience antisemitism in the workplace;
Extent to which Muslim employees experience Islamophobia in the workplace;
Impact of the Israel-Gaza conflict on them
Actions that organisations can take to ensure people feel safe and included in workplaces
The research was in two parts:
Firstly, a survey was carried out in June 2024 in which 500 Jewish and 500 Muslim employees participated, followed by in-depth interviews with 20 people, 10 of each faith.
The report closes with key recommendations for employers to better support Muslim and Jewish employees by research author Professor Binna Kandola OBE.
Abstract: Evaluative research in Jewish education often adopts a “silver bullet” approach, attributing identity outcomes to single programs or interventions. This article advances an ecosystem framework that situates Jewish schooling, family upbringing, and peer networks within their wider communal and societal contexts. Drawing on hierarchical regression analyses of large-scale survey data (n = 21,260) from four Jewish diaspora communities, we find that the impact of Jewish education depends on its interaction with family background, social capital, and national setting. Jewish identity thus emerges as a cumulative and relational process rather than the product of discrete experiences. These findings underscore the limitations of single-country studies, which often generalize about Jewish identity formation without considering the structural and contextual differences that shape communal life in different national settings. The findings also extend sociological theories of social capital, cultural capital, and the life course, offering new insight into how educational, familial, and communal forces together sustain Jewish identity in diaspora.
Abstract: The British Jewish community has faced an unprecedented number of attacks in recent weeks, including multiple arson incidents and a terrorist attack. As the UK government grapples with how to respond, this ISD policy brief offers a strategic framework for confronting a range of antisemitic threats. These threats encompass mainstream and extreme actors, state- and non-state-linked activity, online and offline environments, and both violence and latent cultural antisemitism. It urges a cross-government strategy, led by the UK Prime Minister’s Office, centred on the online environment and designed to address the diverse actors, tactics and harms targeting the Jewish community. This brief builds on ISD’s research and policy development on the diverse harms landscape, covering threats such as terrorism, extremism, hostile state activity and targeted hate including antisemitism.
Abstract: The chapter uses an autoethnographic method to analyse the displacement experiences of its authors, who come from different ethnic backgrounds, mother tongues, geographies and histories in Turkey. The fact that the paths of the authors, as living representations of Turkey’s ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity, crossed in exile in Germany is also the history of the silencing of ethnic, religious and political minorities. The authors uncover the interconnectedness of those individual stories that are inherent in the larger historical narrative of the country. Thus, they offer us an analysis of the experiences of exile in Germany, through three intertwined autoethnographies of Jewish, Kurdish and anarchist academic exiles.
Abstract: Following last week’s horrific antisemitic attack in Golders Green in north London, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer called on the public to “open their eyes to Jewish pain”. Yet our research suggests that the PM and his government might do better to open their own eyes to what underpins the pain many British Jews experience today: the state’s failure to honour its social contract with this minority.
Since the 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel and the subsequent Israel-Gaza war, Jews in Britain have experienced a growing tide of antisemitism. Over the course of 2025, 3,700 instances of antisemitic hate were reported, up 4 per cent from the previous year and 14 per cent lower than the highest ever annual total of 4,298 antisemitic incidents reported in 2023. Incidents include last week’s Golders Green attack, in which two men were stabbed; an arson attack at former synagogue in east London; an attack on the Jewish ambulance service Hatzola; an attempted firebombing at a synagogue in Kenton, London; and a terrorist attack on Manchester’s Heaton Park synagogue in October 2025, which killed two Jewish people and seriously injured three others.
In the wake of this alarming rise in antisemitism, focus groups we conducted between December 2025 and March 2026 with 43 British Jews across the UK revealed severely declining trust in Britain’s major institutions. The oldest non-Christian minority in the country, the Jewish community is less than 0.5 per cent of the UK population and includes both practising and non-practising members from a range of denominational affiliations and political views.
But despite their differences, people repeatedly expressed a similar stark sense of betrayal. Focus group participants stressed that while they were fulfilling their side of the bargain—complying with the law, paying taxes, contributing to civic life—the state increasingly was failing to provide them with protection and treat them fairly. “The pillars in the society we live in”, bemoaned a man in his 70s from Birmingham, “are letting us down”.
Abstract: This research investigates how recommender algorithms on TikTok and Rumble expose UK minors to antisemitic content.
Analysts created 10 TikTok profiles representing 15-year-old users with varied political and cultural interests, including neutral interest in the Israel-Palestine conflict, left and right-wing political interest, male lifestyle influencer content, far-right content and two neutral accounts. The profiles were prompted towards relevant topics for each interest through an hour and a half of manual content viewing, followed by content engagement via bespoke bot over 14 days, resulting in over 5,500 recommended videos. Thematic analysis clustered content into 10 core themes, revealing pathways from neutral lifestyle content to highly politicised and conspiratorial clusters. Relevant themes were manually reviewed, revealing that harmful content persisted through videos, comments, and TikTok’s sticker and sound features, illustrating systemic gaps in safeguarding minors.
On Rumble, analysts collected 4,412 videos from the platform’s “Editor’s Picks” over six months. Analysts filtered for antisemitism-related keywords and reviewed 259 videos potentially relevant to antisemitism. Findings show Rumble hosts more overt antisemitic content than TikTok, including slurs, Holocaust distortion and conspiracies about Jewish control. These findings underscore urgent gaps in platform accountability and the need for robust enforcement of the Online Safety Act to protect children from the normalisation and mainstreaming of antisemitic content.
Abstract: In this report:
According to new data from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, 742 people emigrated to Israel (‘made aliyah’) from the UK in 2025 – the highest annual count for over 40 years. This report examines the recent migration data in its historical context to assess whether this latest figure represents a genuine shift and if so, whether it is being fuelled by concerns about antisemitism in Britain.
Some of the key findings in the report:
742 people emigrated to Israel (‘made aliyah’) from the UK in 2025 – the highest annual count for over 40 years.
Over the past 20 years, annual counts have remained within a fairly narrow range, from about 400 to about 740.
Taking the past three years together, an average of 566 British Jews made aliyah per annum – close to the annual average over the past two decades.
About 2 Jews per 1,000 in the UK Jewish population currently make aliyah each year, somewhat higher than the equivalent figure for Canada (0.7), but considerably lower than in France (6.4), and orders of magnitude lower than the levels associated with major cases of Jewish flight during 20th Century crises or periods of acute uncertainty.
Since October 7, 2023, British Jews have shown a small but marked increase in their likelihood of making aliyah.
Younger people, orthodox Jews and those most affected by antisemitism are most likely to say they are considering making aliyah in the coming five years.
Aliyah, like all forms of migration, is also informed by socioeconomic conditions; there is clear evidence that factors such as unemployment rates are key determinants in people’s decisions.
Migration is not a one-way street: the number of people living in the UK who were born in Israel rose from 12,229 in 2001 to 23,152 in 2021, a net increase of 10,923 over those 20 years.
Abstract: В статье рассматриваются фольклорные версии, объясняющие ненависть Гитлера к евреям. Рассматриваемые тексты зафиксированы в основном на территориях, входивших в черту оседлости, от людей старшего возраста, которые или сами контактировали с евреями, преимущественно до войны, или много слышали о них из уст родителей. Версии сводятся к одной из трех объяснительных стратегий: среди ближайших родственников Гитлера или его сослуживцев был еврей, на которого Гитлер был сильно обижен и по этой причине стал мстить всему народу; или ненависть вызвана особенностями самих евреев, которые, согласно этническим стереотипам славян, умнее, хитрее, ленивее немцев и славян, а также могут понимать немецкий язык. Наконец, Катастрофа может объясняться евангельскими событиями. Во всех трех случаях в рассказах о причинах, повлекших Холокост, используются разработанные традицией механизмы осмысления окружающего мира: этноконфессиональные стереотипы, сюжетные клише традиционной квазиисторической фольклорной прозы, объединенные с попытками индивидуальной интерпретации.
Abstract: This study develops a novel analytical framework to advance studies of monuments. It does so by systematically integrating four elements of a monument’s assemblage – design, surroundings, rituals, and narratives – to examine their combined potential affective impact on visitors’ bodily and emotional engagement with monuments and the past these represent. These four elements will be applied in the comparison of two Dutch Second World War monuments, the National Monument on Dam Square and the National Holocaust Monument of Names. The article reflects on who or what shapes these monuments’ four elements and what kind of potential affective experiences they engender. The results show that the Holocaust Names Monument creates a sacred space for personal and active Holocaust remembrance. In contrast, the National Monument allows more profane, non-commemorative behaviour, except on 4 May, when the Annual Remembrance Day turns it into a sacred site, evoking collective sentiment and remembering of diverse victims. Despite these differences, both monuments seek to foster empathy for individual victims and a sense of responsibility through reflection. These similarities and differences have emerged over time, reflecting the influence of both individual and institutional actors involved in the monument’s design and management, as well as broader socio-political shifts in commemoration.
Abstract: Historical commissions have played an important role in the most recent efforts to garner restitution and reparations for Holocaust victims and their families. Several dozen Holocaust commissions were convened in the late‑1990s and early‑2000s in European countries where histories of collaboration and complicity with the Nazi regime were either under‑documented or suppressed in the official discourse. This essay examines the Holocaust commissions from a historiographical perspective with special attention given to the methodological and rhetorical strategies they employed when confronted by the traumatic experiences and memories of victims and survivors. While the work of these commissions was shaped and influenced, to varying degrees, by external political forces and interest groups, this essay explores the ways in which “the politics of history” entered into their written reports and, consequently, obscured and silenced fundamental aspects of Holocaust history. Three commissions, in particular, are held up for scrutiny (i.e., Austria’s Jabloner Commission, the International Commission for Holocaust‑Era Insurance Claims, and France’s Mattéoli Commission), and an assessment of their work is given against the backdrop of ongoing debates within the field of trauma studies and in response to questions concerning the Holocaust and the “limits of representation.”
