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Editor(s): Rose, Hannah
Date: 2024
Editor(s): Ermida, Isabel
Date: 2023
Abstract: This chapter introduces the notion of ‘enabling concepts’: concepts which may or may not themselves constitute a mode of hate speech, but which through their broad social acceptability facilitate or legitimate the articulation of concepts which can be more directly classed as hate speech. We argue that each distinct hate ideology will contain its own, partly overlapping set of ‘enabling concepts.’ In this chapter, we will focus on the enabling role of references to apartheid for the constitution of antisemitism in British online discourse around Israel. This argument does not rest on agreement as to whether the ‘apartheid analogy’—comparisons between contemporary Israel and the former Apartheid regime in South Africa—itself constitutes a form of antisemitism. The chapter draws on qualitative analysis of more than 10,000 user comments posted on social media profiles of mainstream media in the UK, undertaken by the Decoding Antisemitism project in the wake of the May 2021 escalation phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We will show how web commenters frequently use the apartheid analogy to trigger more extreme antisemitic stereotypes, including age-old tropes, intensifying and distorting analogies (such as Nazi comparisons) or calls for Israel’s elimination. The results will be presented in detail based on a pragmalinguistic approach taking into account the immediate context of the comment thread and broader world knowledge. Both of these aspects are relevant preconditions for examining all forms of antisemitic hate speech that can remain undetected when conducting solely statistical analysis. Based on this large dataset, we suggest that—under the cover of its widespread social acceptability—the apartheid analogy thus facilitates the articulation and legitimation of extreme antisemitic concepts that would, without this prior legitimation, be more likely to be rejected or countered.
Date: 2024
Abstract: Over the past 3.5 years, the Decoding Antisemitism research project has been analysing antisemitism on the internet in terms of content, structure, and frequency. Over this time, there has been no shortage of flashpoints which have generated antisemitic responses. Yet the online response to the Hamas attacks of 7 October and the subsequent Israeli operations in Gaza has surpassed anything the project has witnessed before. In no preceding escalation phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict has the predominant antisemitic reaction been one of open jubilation and joy over the deaths of Israeli Jews. As demonstrated in the sixth and final Discourse Report, this explicit approval of the Hamas attacks was the primary response from web users. The response to 7 October therefore represents a turning point in antisemitic online discourse, and its repercussions will be felt long into the future.

The report contains analysis of the various stages of online reactions to events in the Middle East, from the immediate aftermath to the Israeli retaliations and subsequent accusations of genocide against Israel. As well as examining online reactions in the project’s core focus—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—this report also, for the first time, extends its view to analyse Israel-related web discourses in six further countries, including those in Southern and Eastern Europe as well as in North Africa. Alongside reactions to the escalation phase, the report also examines online responses to billionaire Elon Musk’s explosive comments about Jewish individuals and institutions.

Additionally, the report provides a retrospective overview of the project’s development over the past 3.5 years, tracking its successes and challenges, particularly regarding the conditions for successful interdisciplinary work and the ability of machine learning to capture the versatility and complexity of authentic web communication.

To mark the publication of the report, we are also sharing our new, interactive data visualisations tool, which lets you examine any two discourse events analysed by our research team between 2021 and 2023. You can compare the frequencies and co-occurrences of antisemitic concepts and speech acts by type and by country, look at frequencies of keywords in antisemitic comments, and plot keyword networks.
Date: 2023
Author(s): Becker, Matthias J
Date: 2022
Date: 2024
Abstract: This landmark study provides a detailed and updated profile of how British Jews understand and live their Jewish lives. It is based on JPR’s National Jewish Identity Survey, conducted in November-December 2022 among nearly 5,000 members of the JPR research panel. It is the largest survey of its kind and the most comprehensive study of Jewish identity to date.

The report, written by Dr David Graham and Dr Jonathan Boyd, covers a variety of key themes in contemporary Jewish life, including religious belief and affiliation, Jewish education and cultural consumption, Jewish ethnicity, Zionism and attachment to Israel, antisemitism, charitable giving and volunteering, and the relationship between community engagement and happiness.

Some of the key findings in this report:

Just 34% of British Jews believe in God ‘as described in the Bible’. However, over half of British Jewish adults belong to a synagogue and many more practice aspects of Jewish religious culture.
94% of Jews in the UK say that moral and ethical behaviour is an important part of their Jewish identities. Nearly 9 out of 10 British Jews reported making at least one charitable donation yearly.
88% of British Jews have been to Israel at least once, and 73% say that they feel very or somewhat attached to the country. However, the proportion identifying as ‘Zionists’ has fallen from 72% to 63% over the past decade.
Close to a third of all British Jewish adults personally experienced some kind of antisemitic incident in the year before the survey, a much higher number than that recorded in police or community incident counts.
Author(s): Miller, Helena
Date: 2023
Abstract: The initiatives that took place to support Israeli families temporarily in the UK
started within three days after 7th October.
• Key organisations in the Jewish Community came together to help: JAFI, UJIA,
PaJeS, CST.
• They were supported by other organisations in various ways, e.g. JVN, and by
many individuals.
• There was a huge gap between the large number of expressions of interest in
school places and eventual places taken up.
• Each Local Education Authority Admissions process was different from each other,
and LEAs waived usual procedures to be accommodating and speed up the
admissions processes.
• Almost all temporary Israeli families were able to visit their UK school prior to
accepting a place and starting school.
• By November, more than 100 children had been placed in schools, mostly in the
primary sector.
• Whilst each school dealt uniquely with the situation of having temporary families in
their schools, there were many commonalities, e.g. acquiring school uniform,
communication, pairing with other Hebrew speakers.
• Relating to the school system in the UK has been a steep learning curve for these
families.
• PaJeS has been significantly involved in providing support, especially in
admissions advice, Hebrew, wellbeing, funding and resources.
• A concern at the beginning, which was that the regular school population would be
disadvantage by schools accepting these additional families, has not materialised.
• By the beginning of December 2023, although some families are still arriving, the
number of Israelis temporarily in UK schools has already begun to decrease.
• Some families who are leaving, want an option to return and want schools to “save”
their places for them, which challenges the schools.
Date: 2023
Abstract: This cross-sectional study follows Open Science principles in estimating relationships between antisemitism, i.e. anti-Jewish bigotry, and conspiracy belief, i.e. endorsement of conspiracy theories, through analysis of data collected from a representative sample of UK adults (n=1722). Antisemitism was measured using the Generalized Antisemitism scale, and conspiracy belief was measured using the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale. Positive relationships were found to exist between all forms of antisemitism and all types of conspiracy belief, and an average across all items of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale was found to predict Generalized Antisemitism at least as well as any individual type of conspiracy belief. On a more detailed level, antisemitic attitudes relating to British Jews were found to be most strongly associated with belief in conspiracies relating to personal well-being, while antisemitic attitudes relating to the State of Israel and its supporters were found to be most strongly associated with belief in conspiracies relating to government malfeasance. Generalized Antisemitism itself was found to be most strongly associated with belief in malevolent global conspiracies. Exploratory analysis additionally examined the effect of standard demographic variables that had been introduced into the main analysis as controls. Through this means, it was found that antisemitic attitudes relating both to Jews qua Jews and to Israel and its supporters are more prevalent among less highly educated people and members of other-than-white ethnic groups, while antisemitic attitudes relating to Israel and its supporters are more common among younger people. In addition, it was found that female gender is associated with reduced antisemitic attitudes relating to Jews qua Jews and also with increased antisemitic attitudes relating to Israel and its supporters. However, the addition of demographic controls did not explain any additional variance in Generalized Antisemitism beyond that which was already explained by conspiracy belief – perhaps suggesting that demographic characteristics are more strongly associated with the inclination towards particular expressions of antisemitism than with antisemitism itself.
Date: 2023
Abstract: This article has been composed from a larger mixed methods study that explores how Haredi mothers in the United Kingdom experience their motherhood and what they understand by “social work support.” The mixed method study used questionnaires and interviews as its tools in data collection. Thirty Haredi mothers from across the UK’s Haredi communities responded to an online questionnaire and thirteen subsequently took part in an online interview. Mary Douglas’s Group-Grid Cultural theoretical perspectives as well as gender theories’ principles were utilized in data collection and analysis. Findings include an overview of quantified data and a thematic discussion of how Haredi mothers experience their motherhood and what they understand by “social support” and “social work.” Their individual perceptions of social work engagement within the Haredi community are presented with the quotes from the interviews. Motherhood is seen by Haredi mothers as a life’s goal, “a raison d’etre,” and mothers’ experiences are focused around their community and strict religious observance that is transmitted to their children through religious education and traditional rituals. Although social support is seen as welcome but only when absolutely necessary, the social work involvement is seen as problematic. Haredi mothers reported that the lack of cultural sensitivity from social workers is a major barrier. That barrier has tremendous implications for the mothers and whole families, be it further isolation, shame, stigma and helplessness. Haredi mothers voice their views on the need of the cultural sensitivity training and professional curiosity that will help building trust between the insular Haredi and the outside social support services
Author(s): Boyd, Jonathan
Date: 2023
Abstract: In this report:
Five weeks after the barbaric attack on innocent Israeli civilians by Hamas, this factsheet uses data from recent polling by two major polling agencies, Ipsos and YouGov, alongside historical data on these issues, to shed light on what people in the UK think about the conflict, where their sympathies lie, and what they believe the British government should do in response to the latest events in Israel and Gaza.

Some of the key findings in this report:

Since the 7 October attack, the proportion of British adults sympathising with the Israeli side has doubled from a pre-war level of about 10% to about 20%, whereas sympathy for the Palestinian side has fallen by a few percentage points from 24% to around 15%-21%;
Nevertheless, levels of sympathy for the Palestinian side have been gradually climbing since October 7, and are now approaching their pre-war levels;
Young adults are much more likely to sympathise with the Palestinians than the Israelis; older people hold the opposite view;
British adults are over twice as likely to think that Israel does not try to minimise harm to civilians than it does make such efforts;
British adults are more likely to think the UK should be more critical toward Israel than it has been, as opposed to more supportive. The younger respondents are, the more likely they are to believe the UK should be more critical;
British adults are twice as likely to think the police should be making more arrests at pro-Palestinian demonstrations than less, though there is are clear generational differences of opinion on this issue;
Almost all subgroups think the police should arrest people who openly support Hamas at demonstrations in the UK.
Date: 2023
Abstract: Key findings
• Since 7 October, Decoding Antisemitism has analysed more than 11,000 comments
posted on YouTube and Facebook in response to mainstream media reports of the
Hamas terrorist attacks in Israel.
• Our analysis reveals a significant jump in the number of antisemitic comments, even
compared with other violent incidents in the Middle East.
• CELEBRATION, SUPPORT FOR and JUSTIFICATION OF THE HAMAS TERROR ATTACKS make up the
largest proportion of antisemitic comments – ranging between 19 % in German
Facebook comment sections and 53 and 54.7 % in French Facebook and UK YouTube
comment sections, respectively – in contrast to previous studies where direct
affirmation of violence was negligible.
• The number of antisemitic comments CELEBRATING THE ATROCITIES rises in response to
media reports of attacks on Israelis/Jews themselves, compared with reports on the
conflict more generally.
• Beyond affirmation of the Hamas attacks, other frequently expressed antisemitic
concepts across the corpus included DENIALS OF ISRAEL’S RIGHT TO EXIST, attributing SOLE
GUILT to Israel for the entire history of the conflict, describing Israel as a TERRORIST
STATE, CONSPIRACY THEORIES about Jewish POWER, and ideas of inherent Israeli EVIL.
• As with the project’s past research, this analysis reveals a diversity of antisemitic
concepts and communicative strategies. The findings reaffirm that antisemitism
appears as a multifaceted mosaic, as a result of which it is not possible to deal with
all the elements. Only the most prominent tendencies are brought into focus here.
Author(s): Kasstan, Ben
Date: 2023
Author(s): Egorova, Yulia
Date: 2023
Author(s): Millan, Anne D.
Date: 2023
Abstract: The thesis explores the drivers of professionalism for Jewish Heritage Charities as well as the impact on the organisations in the study. Though there was a growing body of research on development of professionalism in charities, there is very limited studies on how this was impacting Jewish Heritage Charities in the UK. Charities have been reporting decreasing revenue from traditional fundraising activities over the last decade as well as significant competition for major grants and governmental funding. The loss of traditional funding and the increase in reliance on major donors and funding bodies has led to more regulation and now the growing concern with the management and accountability of charities. The study explored how this development of professionalism has impacted on (JHC). Using a case study approach, 11 interviews took place with senior management, trustees, and volunteers of three JHC’s and one non-Jewish museum that had recently been through major governance and structural changes. Due to the nature of the research and small sample the findings are limited to the case study however some good practice has been highlighted and professionalism within the case study was identified by the developing business processes and managerialism. The study also identified that rigorous governance procedures for trustees as well as performance management of trustees was needed however proved controversial. The study also identified the need for more development of recruitment processes of volunteers and trustees alongside professional development and training programmes to ensure professional practices are embedded into the organisations and good practice is maintained.
Author(s): Wilson, Nissan
Date: 2022
Abstract: The indoctrination charge has been levelled at religious studies teachers who teach controversial propositions as fact (see for example Snook, 1972; Hand, 2004). On this view, indoctrination takes place when the process which brings children to believe controversial propositions bypasses their rational autonomy. Taking into account the above argument and the proposed responses, my study goes beyond the arena of normative philosophy and looks at teachers’ conceptions of their role, asking whether they experience tensions between their mission as religious studies teachers and the values of the Western, liberal polity in which they live. I focus on a unique subset of Orthodox Jewish schools, where the schools’ religious ethos appears to be at odds with many of the parent body who are not religiously observant, and I ask to what extent religious studies teachers take parental wishes into account in choosing what and how to teach their subject. Using grounded theory methods in a critical realist paradigm, field work takes the form of in-depth interviews with religious studies teachers in the above group of schools. Working from initial codes to higher levels of theoretical abstraction led to clear findings on teachers’ conceptions of their role and their response to the indoctrination charge. For the purposes of their role at least, religious studies teachers describe religion using the language of the market and getting pupils to “buy-into the product” rather than necessarily to believe its propositions as true. As a corollary to this, participants see autonomy as having to do with choice, rather than with rationality, suggesting that while scholars, in their critique of religious nurture view a rationalist conception of autonomy based on Kant as the dominant paradigm, in the real world (of my research field at least) a more existentialist Millian conception sets the terms of the discourse.
Date: 2023
Abstract: The report examines how the conflict in Israel and Gaza in May 2021 affected Jewish people living in the UK, by asking the JPR Research Panel members to mark their levels of agreement with two contentions: "Because I am Jewish, I felt I was being held responsible by non-Jews for the actions of Israel’s government during the conflict” and “Public and media criticism of Israel during the conflict made me feel Jews are not welcome in the UK".

This is JPR's second report looking into the May 2021 conflict: the first report on the conflict, published in March 2023, focused on the attitudes of Jewish people in the UK towards the conflict; the new report now looks into how the conflict affected Jews' feeling of security living in the UK.

Some of the key findings in this report:

Nearly three-quarters (73%) of all UK Jews felt that, as Jews, they were being held responsible in some way by non-Jews for the actions of Israel's government during the conflict
Almost one in five (19%) of respondents marked the highest score of agreement (10) to the contention that they felt they were being held responsible by non-Jews
56% of respondents said they felt public and media criticism during the conflict made them feel Jews were unwelcome in the UK
Jewish people's perceptions of these issues are significantly informed by their assessments of the state of antisemitism in the UK and by the degree to which they feel emotionally attached to Israel
Jewish people's political stances or levels of religiosity have little bearing on their feelings of anxiety or vulnerability, particularly concerning non-Jews holding them responsible for Israel's actions at that time
Author(s): Sapiro, Philip
Date: 2023
Abstract: The release in March/April 2023 of England and Wales 2021 Census complete data on “usual residents” by the Office for National Statistics provides an opportunity to analyze, understand and comment on the current geographic disposition of Anglo–Jewry. The analysis presented in this paper incorporates data from the 2001 and 2011 censuses, and makes use of a geodemographic assessment of Jewish communities developed from the 2011 census, setting the scene for changes which have taken place, particularly in the last 10 years. Estimates of the scale of births, deaths and net migration in the 2011–2021 period have been developed to explain why the changes in population have taken place. The potential impact of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on the census results is also considered. A total of 26 sub-communities in the London and Manchester areas, together with 34 free-standing communities, each with more than 200 Jewish residents, have been analyzed in detail. Unexpected changes in Stamford Hill, Gateshead and Bristol are investigated. A total of 42 smaller communities (60–200 members) are also identified. The paper shows that an understanding of the socio-economic characteristic of each of the communities explains their changes in population since 2011, particularly when factors such as “meta-suburbanisation” in the London fringe area, the impact of student numbers in university towns, and special factors affecting Haredi areas are also taken into account. The picture presented is one of a stable (indeed slightly growing) overall population, but with a large variation in fortunes of the many communities which make up Anglo–Jewry.
Author(s): Boyd, Jonathan
Date: 2023
Abstract: This factsheet looks into Jewish education in the UK and the rest of Europe, highlighting parents’ different motives when choosing a Jewish or non-Jewish school for their children. The paper draws data from three sources: previous JPR research on school registration numbers, a 2018 pan-European study sponsored by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), conducted by a joint JPR-Ipsos team, and JPR’s spring 2023 survey of Jews in the UK.

Some of the key findings in this factsheet:

The number of Jewish children attending Jewish schools has increased significantly over time and is expected to reach about 40,000 by the mid-2020s;
In the UK, the number of children attending Haredi schools outnumbers the number of Jewish children in mainstream Jewish schools by about three to two.
Parents in the UK, France and across Europe are most likely to point to a desire for their child to develop a strong Jewish identity as a motive for registering their children to a Jewish school;
Jewish identity is followed in most places by a desire for their children to have friends with similar values, with the exception of France, where concern about antisemitism in non-Jewish schools is a more common motive;
In the UK and France, the most common motive for parents to send their children to a non-Jewish school is actively preferring a non-Jewish (integrated) environment, cited by about two-thirds of all such parents in both countries;
Convenience also commonly features as a reason not to send children to a Jewish school, coming second on the list in the UK and France, and topping it elsewhere in Europe.
Academic standards and availability are also marked highly as reasons parents prefer a non-Jewish school for their children, particularly in the UK.
Author(s): Graham, David
Date: 2023
Date: 2023
Abstract: From Introduction:

Antisemitism is global and multifaceted. One area in which ADL has seen a growth of antisemitism is within elements of the political left. This often takes the form of anti-Zionism, a movement that rejects the Jewish right to self-determination and of Israel to exist as a Jewish state, and frequently employs antisemitic tropes to attack Israel and its supporters. It also manifests through the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, a campaign that promotes diplomatic, financial, professional, academic and cultural isolation of Israel, Israeli individuals, Israeli institutions, and Jews who support Israel’s right to exist.

Political actors and advocacy movements associated with some left-wing political organizations have engaged in such antisemitism both in the U.S. and in Europe. While antisemitism from individuals associated with left-leaning political organizations is generally less violent than right-wing antisemitism, its penetration into the political mainstream is cause for concern and has in some cases alienated Jews and other supporters of Israel. Concerns are both political and physical. As described in this report, Jews and Jewish institutions have been targeted and have suffered violent attacks, associated with anti-Zionism, often in the wake of fighting between Israel and the Palestinians, most recently in 2021.

The challenges facing Jewish communities in Europe can be a bellwether for what is to come for the U.S. Jewish community, as evidenced for example by the recent rise in violent antisemitism in the U.S., which has plagued European Jewish communities for many years, and the increase in anti-Zionism in U.S. progressive spaces, something that has existed in Europe for some time. To better understand this phenomenon in Europe, ADL asked partners in the UK, France, Germany and Spain to describe some of the expressions of left-wing political antisemitism and anti-Israel bias in their countries. The individual contributors are responsible for the content of those chapters and their positions may differ with standard ADL practice and/or policy.

Our British partner, the Community Security Trust, is the British Jewish community’s security agency, which monitors, reports on, and educates about antisemitism among other vital tasks for the safety and security of the Jewish community.

Our French partner, the politics and culture magazine “K., The Jews, Europe, the 21st Century,” reports on contemporary challenges and opportunities for Jewish life in France and elsewhere in Europe.

Our German partner, Amadeu Antonio Foundation, is one of Germany's foremost independent non-governmental organizations working to strengthen democratic civil society and eliminate extremism, antisemitism, racism and other forms of bigotry and hate.

Our Spanish partner, ACOM, is a non-denominational and independent organization that strengthens the relationship between Spain and Israel, and whose work is inspired by the defense of human rights, democratic societies, civil liberties and the rule of law.

Those European contributions comprise the first sections of this report. Based on those essays, in the subsequent chapter, ADL analyzed common themes and notable differences among the four countries.

The final section adds ADL’s perspective on left-wing antisemitism in the political and advocacy spheres in the U.S. and provides suggested actions that can be taken to address antisemitism. To be sure, while not all antisemitism that has manifested in some elements of the political left in the U.S. is imported from Europe, lessons can be learned from this transatlantic phenomenon to protect against the mainstreaming of such antisemitism in U.S. politics.
Date: 2019
Abstract: Campaigning organisation Avaaz commissioned ICM Unlimited to conduct a nationally representative poll to look into attitudes of the British public towards Jews and Muslims.

Some of the key findings include:

Overall, just under half of British adults say that they have a positive view of Jews (47%), while 7% say that they have a negative view. When it comes to Muslims, the British public’s attitudes are more unfavourable. A quarter say that they have a negative view of Muslims (26%), while a third say that they have a positive view (32%).
2017 Conservative voters are more likely than those who voted Labour to have a negative view of Muslims. Just under four in ten of those who voted Conservative in 2017 say that they have a negative view of Muslims (37%), more than double the proportion of those who voted Labour who have a negative view (16%).
A greater proportion of people agree than disagree for four of the five statements about Muslims/Islam that Avaaz tested. That is, more people agree than disagree that: Islam threatens the British way of life (45% agree vs. 31% disagree), Islamophobia in Britain is a response to the everyday behaviour of Muslims (36% vs. 34%), parts of the UK are under Sharia law (33% vs. 28%), and that there should be a reduction in the number of Muslims entering Britain (41% vs. 25%). The only statement with which more people disagree than agree is: ‘Islamic terrorism reflects the views of the Muslim community in Britain’ (26% agree vs. 49% disagree).
Six in ten 2017 Conservative voters agree that ‘Islam threatens the British way of life’ (62%), compared to 35% of 2017 Labour voters.
When it comes to attitudes towards Jews, just over one in seven of people agree that ‘Jews have disproportionate influence in politics’ (15%). Among 2017 Labour voters, this figure rises to one in five (20%), compared to one in seven 2017 Conservative voters (14%).
Date: 2022
Abstract: From Foreword:

The events of 2021 have left their mark on Britain’s Jews.

For several weeks in May and June, during the conflict between Hamas and Israel thousands of miles away, antisemitism surged on British streets and campuses, online, in workplaces, schools and hospitals and in other institutions. Reported incidents broke records, with some making national headlines and prompting intervention by the Prime Minister.

Among the incidents were demonstrations that featured antisemitic speakers, chants and banners — some of which were endorsed, promoted and addressed by politicians, trade unionists and other luminaires — and convoys that saw allegations of the most despicable antisemitic incitement and violence in Jewish neighbourhoods.

These events weighed on British Jews, with almost eight in ten disclosing in our research that the various demonstrations, processions and convoys during the conflict caused them to feel intimidated as a Jew.

Consequently, there is a noticeable reversal this year in the optimism reflected in polling a year ago. Fewer British Jews believe that their community has a long-term future in the UK, and a record number — nearing half — have disclosed that they avoid displaying outward signs of their Judaism in public due to antisemitism.

Not only do perpetrators of antisemitism give the Jewish community reason for concern, but so does the criminal justice system. The Crown Prosecution Service has always performed poorly in our polling, but for the first time ever, a majority of British Jews do not believe that the police or the courts do enough to protect them either.

Antisemitism this year has also affected how British Jews view wider society. For the first time ever, a majority do not believe that their non-Jewish neighbours do enough to protect them, with many respondents deeply concerned about apathy towards Jews amongst the British public.

As our polling of the British public shows, there is reason for discomfort: almost one quarter of British adults believe that “Israel treats the Palestinians like the Nazis treated the Jews,” which is antisemitic under the International Definition of Antisemitism, and more than one in ten Britons have entrenched antisemitic views.

There are more specific incubators of antisemitism as well. Over eight in ten British Jews still feel that Labour is too tolerant of racism against Jews, belying Sir Keir Starmer’s claim to have “shut the door” on antisemitism in his Party. Almost all British Jews also believe that antisemitism in British universities and on social media is a problem — the first time these issues have been polled — underlining the need for action.

Britain cannot be content when almost half of a long-established minority community avoids disclosing identifying signs in public, or when a broad majority considers one of the two major political parties to be too tolerant of racism. It is not too late to make the right changes in politics, at universities, online and to criminal justice, but the time for action is now.
Date: 2023
Abstract: The subjects of Jewish identity and Jewish communal vitality, and how they may be conceptualized and measured, are the topics of lively debate among scholars of contemporary Jewry (DellaPergola 2015, 2020; Kosmin 2022; Pew Research Center 2021; Phillips 2022). Complicating matters, there appears to be a disconnect between the broadly accepted claim that comparative analysis yields richer understanding of Jewish communities (Cooperman 2016; Weinfeld 2020) and the reality that the preponderance of that research focuses on discrete communities.

This paper examines the five largest English-speaking Jewish communities in the diaspora: the United States of America (US) (population 6,000,000), Canada (population 393,500), the United Kingdom (UK) (population 292,000), Australia (population 118,000), and South Africa (population 52,000) (DellaPergola 2022). A comparison of the five communities’ levels of Jewish engagement, and the identification of factors shaping these differences, are the main objectives of this paper. The paper first outlines conceptual and methodological issues involved in the study of contemporary Jewry; hierarchical linear modeling is proposed as the suitable statistical approach for this analysis, and ethnocultural and religious capital are promoted as suitable measures for studying Jewish engagement. Secondly, a contextualizing historical and sociodemographic overview of the five communities is presented, highlighting attributes which the communities have in common, and those which differentiate them. Statistical methods are then utilized to develop measures of Jewish capital, and to identify explanatory factors shaping the differences between these five communities in these measures of Jewish capital. To further the research agenda of communal and transnational research, this paper concludes by identifying questions that are unique to the individual communities studied, with a brief exploration of subjects that Jewish communities often neglect to examine and are encouraged to consider. This paper demonstrates the merits of comparative analysis and highlights practical and conceptual implications for future Jewish communal research.
Author(s): Staetsky, Daniel
Date: 2023
Abstract: In this report:
We look into Jewish migration from 15 European countries - representing 94% of Jews living in Europe - comparing data from recent years to previous periods over the last century, and focusing on the signal that the current levels of Jewish migration from Europe send about the political realities perceived and experienced by European Jews.

Some of the key findings in this report:

Peak periods of Jewish migration in the past century – from Germany in the 1930s, North Africa in the 1960s and the Former Soviet Union in the 1990s, saw 50%-75% of national Jewish populations migrate in no more than a decade;
No European Jewish population has shown signs of migration at anywhere near that level for several decades, although recent patterns from Russia and Ukraine point to that possibility over the coming years;
France, Belgium, Italy and Spain saw strong surges in Jewish emigration in the first half of the 2010s, which declined subsequently, but not as far as pre-surge levels;
However, the higher levels of migration measured in these counties during the last decade have not reached the critical values indicating any serious Jewish ‘exodus’ from them;
For Russian and Ukrainian Jews, 2022 was a watershed year: if migration from these countries continues for seven years at the levels seen in 2022 and early 2023, 80%-90% of the 2021 Jewish population of Ukraine and 50%-60% of the 2021 Jewish population of Russia will have emigrated;
Jewish emigration from the UK, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark has mainly been stable or declining since the mid-1980s;
In Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, there has been some decline in Jewish migration over the observed period, with migration eventually settling at a new, lower level.
Author(s): Brunssen, Pavel
Date: 2023
Abstract: The European soccer clubs FC Bayern Munich, Austria Vienna, Ajax Amsterdam, and Tottenham Hotspur (London) are known as “Jew Clubs,” although none of them is explicitly Jewish. This study approaches the conundrum of identity performances, (e.g., Jew as self and “Jew” as other) from a transnational perspective. Using the “Jew Clubs” as case studies, I unpack the connection between collective memories and identity formations in post-Holocaust societies through the lens of sports. With the help of a wide range of primary sources and archival material such as fanzines, fan performances, street art, photographs, films, monuments, and museums, this study illustrates how soccer cultures function as a key site for the construction of collective memories and collective identities. As such, this dissertation joins the extant and growing international scholarship on sport and fan cultures, popular culture, Judaic studies, memory cultures, performance studies, museum studies, and German studies. The work also enhances our understanding of antisemitism, philosemitism, and gentile-Jewish relationships. Chapter 1 examines the “Jew Club” as memory culture and provides a detailed analysis of FC Bayern Munich’s “rediscovery” of its German-Jewish former club president Kurt Landauer in the early 21st century. By analyzing how the club’s turn to Landauer overshadowed the club’s role in expelling its Jewish members, this chapter puts forward the argument that memory is always also a form of forgetting. Chapter 2 illustrates how the “Jew Club” FK Austria Vienna (FAK) functions as a “cultural code,” that, in the interwar period, became associated with stereotypically “Jewish” features such as modernity, cosmopolitanism, and rootlessness. It analyzes the puzzling case of a “Jew Club” that is now supported by a neo-Nazi fan base. Finally, this chapter claims that a new “cultural code” emerges, as the club embraces its “Jew Club” identity to counter neo-Nazi fans. Chapter 3 assesses the “Jew Club” as fan performance. It analyzes how Ajax Amsterdam’s supporters developed their identity as “Super Jews” in reaction to the antisemitic taunts by rival fans. The chapter is grounded in a thorough discussion of fan and club cultures, as well as the transformations of Dutch memory culture and Dutch antisemitism. It argues that fan performances offer a particular opportunity to engage with the unmastered history of the Holocaust. Chapter 4 addresses the “Jew Club” as a problem by discussing the case of Tottenham Hotspur. It analyzes the debates about Spurs fans’ appropriation of the term “Yid,” which had previously been used by antisemitic rival supporters. This chapter introduces a new model of linguistic appropriation, which alters our understanding of linguistic reclamation. Ultimately, by engaging Jewish perspectives, it argues that the “Jew Club” offers a unique space for anti-antisemitic agency. The conclusion summarizes the findings of this study, identifies the similarities and differences among the four case studies, and applies the study’s results to reconsider the concept of a “(negative) German-Jewish symbiosis.” In essence, this study illuminates the ways sport clubs and fan cultures perform memory cultures and thus function as an important societal arena for constructing collective identities. The work clarifies the common features and distinctive characteristics of “Jew Clubs” from a transnational perspective. It shows how “soccer” serves as a contested space for questions of identity, subjectivity, and belonging, with implications reaching far beyond the stadium gate.
Date: 2023
Abstract: Holocaust memory in Europe is shifting and diversifying, often in conflicting ways. This report is the culmination of a comparative and multidisciplinary study aimed at exploring these contemporary shifts in Holocaust memory in five European countries that played very different roles during the Holocaust, and whose post-WWII histories differed too: Poland, Hungary, Germany, England and Spain.

The study took place from 2019-2022 and offers a snapshot of Holocaust memory at the start of the 21st century. In addition to the rise of far-right political parties, antisemitic incidents and crises around immigration and refugees, this period was also overshadowed by the Covid pandemic and its ensuing economic instability. Our central guiding question was: How do experiences of the present relate to the memory of the Holocaust? Do they supersede it, leading to the gradual fading from memory of the mass-murder that shook the twentieth century? Do they reshape it, shedding new light on its lessons? Is the meaning assigned to present-day events shaped by its metaphors and symbols, or perhaps the present and the past engage in multidirectional dialogue over diverse memory platforms?

To explore this question and other questions about the extent to which Holocaust memory is present in European public discourses, the circumstances in which it surfaces, and the differences in its expressions in the countries we examined, we focused on three complementary domains that serve as memory sites: the public-political, Holocaust education and social media.

We used a between/within analysis matrix of the countries and the domains, to understand how Holocaust memory is expressed in these countries. We found that while the memory of the Holocaust remains alive, in some places
it is struggling for relevance. A common memory practice that surfaced across domains was “relationing the Holocaust,” a variant of multidirectional memory. We also found that a distinguishing aspect of Holocaust memory relates to the political left-right identification of subgroups within countries. There were also interactions
between domains and countries, for example, in the countries we explored in Western Europe, teachers’ attitudes about the Holocaust corresponded to those of their political establishment, but this was not the case in Central and Eastern Europe.

This report is intended for Holocaust and memory scholars, educators, commemorators, policymakers, journalists and anyone interested in deciphering the complex intersections of past and present. The report culminates with a series of recommendations for various policymakers, NGOs, educational organizations and social media moderators.
Author(s): Staetsky, L. Daniel
Date: 2023
Date: 2023
Abstract: The ADL Global 100: An Index of AntisemitismTM is the most extensive poll on antisemitic attitudes ever conducted, involving 102 countries and territories. The ADL Global 100: An Index of Antisemitism has provided crucial insights into national and regional attitudes toward Jews around the world, the levels of acceptance of antisemitic stereotypes and knowledge of the Holocaust.

In 2023, ADL released a focused survey that included 10 European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Spain, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.

First conducted in 2014, with follow up surveys in select countries since that time, this data is utilized by policy makers, researchers, Jewish communities, NGOs and journalists around the globe. The findings allow understanding of the magnitude of antisemitic attitudes around the world, and exactly which anti-Jewish beliefs are the most seriously entrenched.

The 2023 survey found that roughly one out of every four residents of the European countries polled for the 2023 survey harbored antisemitic attitudes. This result is consistent with the survey’s 2019 findings, showing that antisemitism continues to be entrenched across Europe. At least one in three respondents in Western European countries believe that Jews are more loyal to Israel than the countries they reside in. In Eastern Europe, the most commonly held stereotypes is that of Jewish economic control and the perception of Jews as clannish.

Among the questions asked of respondents, 11 questions measuring general acceptance of various negative Jewish stereotypes were used to compile an index that has served as a benchmark for ADL polling around the world since 1964. Survey respondents who said at least 6 out of the 11 statements are “probably true” are considered to harbor antisemitic attitudes.

The survey was fielded between November 2022 and January 2023 with 500 nationally representative samples in each of the eight European countries and 1,000 nationally representative samples in Russia and Ukraine, respectively.