Abstract: This rapid review has sought to examine how the regulatory system for healthcare professionals, from employment through to national oversight and professional regulatory bodies, supports recognition and reporting of antisemitism and other forms of racism, and tackles racism at every stage and level. In particular, the review has sought to answer 2 principal questions:
How do we make sure in the NHS in England that perpetrators of antisemitism and other forms of racism are held to account with effective action taken to tackle their behaviour?
How do we make sure that patients and staff are protected from racism within the NHS in England and across the UK health and care professional regulation system?
This review proposes that the NHS establishes a clear organisation-wide priority to increase trust and confidence in NHS services among Jewish, and other minority ethnic patients and staff through actively promoting an anti-racist workplace culture and putting in place systems to tackle incidents of all forms of racism thoroughly, fairly and transparently. The NHS must work to embed anti-racism principles at its very core, eliminate racist prejudice and disadvantage, and demonstrate fairness in all aspects of NHS employment and care. That must include efforts to tackle anti-Jewish racism.
The scope of this review considers actions that can be taken to address racism from all quarters, including:
NHS staff
patients and their relatives
members of the public
Building on the existing large body of evidence on the impact of racism in healthcare, and on the extensive experience of Lord Mann, the review undertook:
a period of targeted engagement with relevant stakeholders, including the UK health and care system and professional regulatory bodies
thorough examination of existing mechanisms, guidance, and processes for addressing incidents of racism in the NHS
Abstract: The proliferation of antisemitic content on small, high harm online services poses a significant risk to users of user-to-user safety. This includes risks of radicalisation into extremist and violent ideologies, and with serious implications for online threats, abuse and harassment. These risks are exacerbated when users are from a group with protected characteristics, which include age, race, sex and sexual orientation.
In relation to antisemitism, content on these small services tends to be more extreme than the anti-Jewish racism on
large, mainstream platforms. As a result, it helps radicalise people into extreme narratives, the results of which have
included violence against Jews. The proliferation of antisemitism online also contributes to the rising levels
of racism that divide communities. It eases the spread and amplification of conspiracy theories that undermine
trust in democratic institutions and erode liberal values of tolerance and inclusion, across Europe. It also helps
normalise antisemitism in both online and offline discourse.
These small platforms, including, for example, BitChute, Gab, and 4chan, often operate with minimal moderation
and are also sometimes encrypted, providing safe havens for extremist content that includes antisemitic tropes,
incitement to violence, and radicalising material. Despite the harm they cause, many of these platforms manage to
escape robust regulation in Britain and the EU.
This is particularly worrying, considering the major increase in antisemitism in Europe. In Britain, the Community
Security Trust (CST) recorded 3,528 antisemitic incidents for 2024. This is roughly double the number of incidents
recorded in 2022, and slightly less than the number recorded in 2023–when there was a sharp rise following
the 7 October Hamas attack on Southern Israel.
In the EU, some organisations across Europe reported an increase of more than 400% in antisemitic incidents following 7 October 2023. A 2024 survey found that 96% of respondents from 13 EU countries have encountered
antisemitism in their daily life. Hate crimes tend to be severely under-reported, so these numbers–although
high– still represent only a portion of the real occurrence of antisemitic hate crimes.
In this report, we examine the antisemitic content that originates from these small services, and how it migrates to
larger platforms, where it spreads at a greater rate and has a wider, even worldwide, reach. This report will begin with an overview of antisemitism on small services and the synergy with larger services, to explain the risks. We will then look at services to demonstrate the origins of antisemitic content on these platforms. The report ends with recommendations for policy and regulation, to tackle the harm caused by small services, urging decision-makers and regulators to apply stronger enforcement and risk-based platform categorisation to protect Jewish communities and our democracies.
Abstract: The role of HM Government’s Independent Adviser on Antisemitism was established to provide independent advice to the Prime Minister and Government on issues relating to antisemitism in the UK and the most effective methods to combat it. As the first holder of the Office, I was appointed to the role of the Independent Adviser in 2019 for five years. Since then, I have maintained a constructive dialogue with the devolved nations as well as the UK Government.
This 2024 review collates recommendations from my major reports on antisemitism in the last two years, the first of which was a detailed action plan on tackling anti-Jewish hatred across the UK while the second addressed the alarming growth in antisemitism on our university campuses. The review also gives an overview of other important project areas that I have covered in my work plan.
While significant progress has been made, important recommendations still require adoption and implementation by the relevant department or devolved administration. I am therefore urging Ministers in the new UK Government, the devolved governments and senior officials to use this review as a blueprint or checklist for further action and the review is formatted in sections according to who holds the lead responsibility.
The need for action has been made even more urgent by the conflict in Israel and Gaza since 7th October 2023. The Community Security Trust (CST) recorded 4,103 antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2023, the highest total ever reported to CST in a single calendar year. Of the 4,103 instances of anti-Jewish hate reported, 2,699 (66%) occurred on or after 7th October. This figure alone exceeds any previous annual antisemitic incident total recorded by CST, which has been recording incidents since 1984.
Abstract: • In order to understand and address antisemitism, one must effectively define it. The universally agreed
international definition of antisemitism was developed and adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance
Alliance (IHRA)1
• On 12 December 2016, The United Kingdom Government was one of the first to adopt this definition, followed by other political parties and in 2020 it was adopted by 641 Members of Parliament in the UK House of Commons
• The declaration has already been signed by many local authorities and Universities, and it has been used by the UK police and Crown Prosecution Service to define what is and what is not antisemitism.
• Over recent months, there has been a rapid increase in adoption of the IHRA declaration, with over 35 Countries now having signed up. Italy, Sweden, Greece and Uruguay are the most recent signatories.
• In January 2020, as part of Lord Mann’s work plan, he wrote to several Premier League Football Clubs asking
them to adopt the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism.
• Lord Mann recommends adoption of this definition, as he believes it can be of practical assistance when dealing with antisemitic incidents.
• Clubs should adopt this definition of antisemitism as a statement of their club’s values. in order to set clear
guidelines, give clarity and to act as a reference point for employees, stewards and fans on what constitutes as
antisemitism.
Abstract: In this policy paper:
Renowned demographer and President of JPR’s European Jewish Demography Unit Professor Sergio DellaPergola explores possible futures for the Jewish People over the next century, not by making precise predictions, but by identifying the core structural forces that have shaped Jewish history and will continue to do so. It highlights the enduring complexity of Jewish identity and existence, examining not only whether the Jewish People will endure but also in what form.
Some of the key findings and arguments in this policy paper:
Three enduring questions will shape the Jewish future: What defines Jewish identity? How is it transmitted? How do Jews relate to non-Jews as a minority? How does the Jewish collective organise and defend its shared interests?
Jewish existence will continue to rest on three interconnected pillars: Israel – a sovereign Jewish state, demographically strong but politically challenged; Diaspora – diverse minority communities, often influential but structurally vulnerable; the Israel–Diaspora relationship – a critical but fragile axis.
Three key dynamics affect Jewish demographics: Ageing and low fertility in most Diaspora communities; higher fertility in Israel, especially among more religious groups; and potential long-term transformation of the Jewish population’s internal composition.
Future migration patterns will depend heavily on political stability, economic conditions and levels of security and antisemitism.
Assimilation and identity erosion remain major challenges, while new forms of ‘joining’ Judaism may emerge.
Jews will continue to represent a tiny global minority, and Jewish life will continue to be shaped by external perceptions and pressures. At the same time, antisemitism is expected to persist in evolving forms.
Israel is likely to become home to the majority of the world’s Jews within decades. This shift will redefine the meaning of Jewish peoplehood, its cultural and political priorities and the power dynamics within global Jewry.
Rapid growth of more religious populations (particularly Haredim) may reshape economic structures, political systems and social cohesion.
Leadership capacity must include three key requirements: the ability to unite diverse segments of the Jewish People, a realistic assessment of challenges and opportunities, and the development of new or improved shared decision-making frameworks.
Abstract: The British Jewish community has faced an unprecedented number of attacks in recent weeks, including multiple arson incidents and a terrorist attack. As the UK government grapples with how to respond, this ISD policy brief offers a strategic framework for confronting a range of antisemitic threats. These threats encompass mainstream and extreme actors, state- and non-state-linked activity, online and offline environments, and both violence and latent cultural antisemitism. It urges a cross-government strategy, led by the UK Prime Minister’s Office, centred on the online environment and designed to address the diverse actors, tactics and harms targeting the Jewish community. This brief builds on ISD’s research and policy development on the diverse harms landscape, covering threats such as terrorism, extremism, hostile state activity and targeted hate including antisemitism.
Abstract: This research investigates how recommender algorithms on TikTok and Rumble expose UK minors to antisemitic content.
Analysts created 10 TikTok profiles representing 15-year-old users with varied political and cultural interests, including neutral interest in the Israel-Palestine conflict, left and right-wing political interest, male lifestyle influencer content, far-right content and two neutral accounts. The profiles were prompted towards relevant topics for each interest through an hour and a half of manual content viewing, followed by content engagement via bespoke bot over 14 days, resulting in over 5,500 recommended videos. Thematic analysis clustered content into 10 core themes, revealing pathways from neutral lifestyle content to highly politicised and conspiratorial clusters. Relevant themes were manually reviewed, revealing that harmful content persisted through videos, comments, and TikTok’s sticker and sound features, illustrating systemic gaps in safeguarding minors.
On Rumble, analysts collected 4,412 videos from the platform’s “Editor’s Picks” over six months. Analysts filtered for antisemitism-related keywords and reviewed 259 videos potentially relevant to antisemitism. Findings show Rumble hosts more overt antisemitic content than TikTok, including slurs, Holocaust distortion and conspiracies about Jewish control. These findings underscore urgent gaps in platform accountability and the need for robust enforcement of the Online Safety Act to protect children from the normalisation and mainstreaming of antisemitic content.
Abstract: In this report:
According to new data from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, 742 people emigrated to Israel (‘made aliyah’) from the UK in 2025 – the highest annual count for over 40 years. This report examines the recent migration data in its historical context to assess whether this latest figure represents a genuine shift and if so, whether it is being fuelled by concerns about antisemitism in Britain.
Some of the key findings in the report:
742 people emigrated to Israel (‘made aliyah’) from the UK in 2025 – the highest annual count for over 40 years.
Over the past 20 years, annual counts have remained within a fairly narrow range, from about 400 to about 740.
Taking the past three years together, an average of 566 British Jews made aliyah per annum – close to the annual average over the past two decades.
About 2 Jews per 1,000 in the UK Jewish population currently make aliyah each year, somewhat higher than the equivalent figure for Canada (0.7), but considerably lower than in France (6.4), and orders of magnitude lower than the levels associated with major cases of Jewish flight during 20th Century crises or periods of acute uncertainty.
Since October 7, 2023, British Jews have shown a small but marked increase in their likelihood of making aliyah.
Younger people, orthodox Jews and those most affected by antisemitism are most likely to say they are considering making aliyah in the coming five years.
Aliyah, like all forms of migration, is also informed by socioeconomic conditions; there is clear evidence that factors such as unemployment rates are key determinants in people’s decisions.
Migration is not a one-way street: the number of people living in the UK who were born in Israel rose from 12,229 in 2001 to 23,152 in 2021, a net increase of 10,923 over those 20 years.
Abstract: The Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum received two million visitors in 2019, making it the most heavily visited museum in Poland. This entry situates tourism at Auschwitz within the broader context of Holocaust tourism by providing an historical account of the phenomenon. It begins with those visitors to the camp before 1945 who were not tourists (Nazi officials, local suppliers, engineers), drawing attention to tourism’s ethical ambiguity. Since the museum’s 1947 opening, tourists have encountered a site undergoing continual development, its exhibition spaces and its messaging evolving from the Stalinist era through the Cold War to the present period. This chapter considers how shifts in the site’s memory politics, especially regarding the representation of different victim groups, have led to unresolved tensions that still surface during the tour. It then considers some present-day challenges to the legitimacy of tourism at Auschwitz, such as visitor behaviour or the difficulties in providing an appropriate, authentic, and informative experience to large crowds. Finally, the chapter reviews different scholarly approaches to Holocaust tourism, such as dark tourism theory and empirical visitor research, before concluding with questions for future research into Auschwitz tourism.
Abstract: The chapter addresses the key problem of Polish collective memory of Auschwitz, that is, how Poles perceive the former camp, in a wider context of Polish memory of World War II, Nazi camps, and the Holocaust. It presents and discusses results of surveys representative of Poland’s population, particularly two designed by the authors and conducted in 2020. The surveys show that the war is the major theme of Polish collective memory, and Nazi camps in general and Auschwitz in particular belong to top Polish lieux de mémoire. Auschwitz evokes in Poles mostly general and universalist associations with destruction, murder, crematoria, gas chambers, and death. The Holocaust is spontaneously associated with Auschwitz only rarely. On the other hand, the camp is the most frequently associated site of the destruction of Jews. The Polish collective memory of Auschwitz hinges upon a poor awareness of the number, nationality, and countries of origin of the camp’s victims. However, Poles are aware of the major historical functions of the camp and share different symbolic meanings of it. Some survey results suggest that a cosmopolitan Holocaust memory focusing on Auschwitz developed among Poles while others indicate that the Polish memory of Auschwitz has nationalist characteristics.
Abstract: The past is never past, wrote William Faulkner. The great American writer had in mind his native Mississippi, but he might as well have written those words about Poland. Indeed, among history-conscious Poles, the findings of historians have had far-reaching social and political consequences that transcend the esoteric discussions of scholars. This was corroborated in recent times by the emergence of a discourse in Poland over what some have called polityka historyczna (Geschichtspolitik, or history policy), which focuses on the question of whether historians who write of the less glorious episodes in Polish history are actually acting against the interests of the nation. Many Polish historians, including the best-known scholars among them, have protested against this suggestion, which poses a clear danger to the fidelity of their discipline. The dissolution of the Communist regime in Poland at the end of the 1980s made possible the deconstruction of every aspect of contemporary history. The process of reconstruction, begun in earnest, proved to be complex and painful. This was particularly the case when dealing with the bitterest chapters in the millennial story of Polish-Jewish relations, which were, and continue to be, the subject of popular and intellectual discussion as well as serious scholarly research. Out of this process emerged a new understanding of history, one that renders much of the earlier canon on the topic virtually obsolete. It had, in fact, been under way for some years even before the collapse of Communism – especially in the pages of Poland’s extraordinarily vibrant underground press and also, to an impressive extent given the prevailing censorship, in those of Poland’s legally operated independent Catholic press. Polish émigré journals were also regularly smuggled into Poland and had significant influence. Nevertheless, it was only with the collapse of the old regime and the birth of Poland’s Third Republic that this activity could be carried out without interference and Poland could finally undergo its own Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past). This chapter discusses the evolution of Poland’s confrontation with the destruction of Polish Jewry.
Abstract: Holocaust Memorial Day 2026 reached more people than ever before, with millions engaging across the UK through national moments of remembrance, education and community activity. From Light the Darkness to events in schools, workplaces and public spaces, this year showed the growing impact of coming together to remember, learn and stand against all prejudice today.
Central to this was the Light the Darkness campaign, which saw 230 buildings and landmarks illuminated in purple at 8pm as part of a nationwide act of remembrance – an increase from 200 in 2025. Delivered in partnership with Ocean Outdoor and supported by JCDecaux, Global and Bauer Media, the campaign appeared on 3,000 billboards across the UK, generating over 10 million impacts\*. HMDT’s radio advert aired more than 900 times across Global’s network, reaching a further 14 million impacts.
Engagement also grew at community level, with 3,800 organisations marking HMD – up from 3,500 the previous year. This was mirrored by a surge in digital participation on the day, with social media interactions across HMDT’s Facebook, Instagram and LinkedIn rising by 140%, from 10,000 in 2025 to 24,000 in 2026.
Crucially, the 2026 impact data highlights the reversal of a decline over the past two years in secondary school participation, which had previously attracted national concern. More than 1,000 secondary schools marked Holocaust Memorial Day this year – 17% of the total number of secondary schools nationwide, which increased from just 9% last year. This was further bolstered by the reach of the charity’s educational film, *It began with words*, which was viewed by over 130,000 pupils, helping ensure that the lessons of the Holocaust remain central to younger generations.
To take a deeper look at the key moments behind this year’s commemoration, read our Impact Report for Holocaust Memorial Day 2026. From a special event hosted by Their Majesties The King and Queen to acts of remembrance in communities across the UK, the report captures the scale and significance of HMD 2026.
Abstract: With the now-established visibility and electoral success of the contemporary populist radical right (PRR) in Western Europe, existing literature has examined these parties’ refutation of antisemitism in parallel to their continued allusion to antisemitic tropes, to greater and lesser extents. This PhD thesis brings these two strands of literature together in a three-country, three-party, and two-platform analysis of the Facebook and X posts of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), the National Rally (RN) in France, and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) between 2017 and early 2023. First, this thesis applies elements of discourse-historical analysis and of populist “style” to social media data in a novel way to contribute a framework of when Jewish inclusion and exclusion are acceptable to the parties. It demonstrates that the parties construct their ingroups as “victims”, and that Jews are included when this is strategically conducive or when Jewish victimhood does not threaten that of the non-Jewish majority. Second, while existing literature on the PRR’s framing of Jews, Israel, and antisemitism has predominantly focused on party output, this thesis uses mixed methods, Natural Language Processing (NLP) tools and inductive qualitative analysis, to analyse the comments by users who engage with the parties’ posts. It contributes a novel framework of user victimhood, showing that users are not able to form a common identity with Jews when they see Jews as an Other (rejective), see Jewish victimhood as competing with their own (competitive), and perceive Jewish victimhood as an accusation of antisemitism (defensive). Despite this, a third contribution of this research is an examination of user responses to antisemitic code words, such as “globalists”, and a conclusion that only rarely are these overtly understood and escalated by users. The thesis thus provides both empirical and methodological contributions to scholarship on the PRR: combining influences from psychology, political science, and history, and applying mixed methods in an original way to deepen and widen understanding of both the parties and users, and examining how the strategy of (anti-)antisemitism fits into broader processes of PRR mainstreaming.
Abstract: Since 7th October 2023, when Hamas perpetrated the worst single massacre against Jews since the Holocaust, there has been a surge in antisemitism in UK universities. Some of this has tipped over into outright anti-Jewish discrimination and harassment. Jewish students and staff have reported feeling unable to fully participate in university life, for fear of being abused, harassed, or attacked. This report offers a summary of research by the IntraCommunal Professorial Group (ICPG) aimed at understanding free speech on university campuses especially with regard to the approaches to speech concerning Jews, Israel, Zionism, and the Middle East conflict.
This report sets out the key issues, and a series of recommendations based on the research and grouped together under the subheadings of our three key findings. Those key findings are as follows:
1. UK universities have (a) a general legal duty, to protect freedom of expression on campus; (b) a duty to prevent discrimination and harassment based on protected characteristics; (c) a university-specific institutional duty to protect the academic freedoms of research and study. Currently UK universities are meeting neither (b) nor (c) in their response to the menace to Jewish students and academic staff posed by antisemitism, particularly antiIsrael antisemitism. That is, they are neither preventing discrimination and harassment, nor protecting freedom of research or freedom to study.
2. Anti-Israel protests and encampments on campuses, including in online spaces, have exacerbated what was already considered a hostile environment by many Jewish students and staff. Some university departments, trade unions, and student political milieus – inperson and online – have directly and indirectly discriminated against, abused, harassed and/or excluded Jewish students.
3. Traditional antisemitic concepts and tropes are being used by pro-Palestinian and/or antiIsrael staff and students. Israel and Zionism are regularly demonised and delegitimised, often using blood libels or other anti-Jewish hatred, and students or academics labelled as Zionists are routinely viewed as legitimate targets for discrimination, harassment, abuse, and/or attack.
Abstract: This report finds that the decision to ban away supporters from the fixture was reached through a flawed risk assessment process.
We argue that the prohibition was not justified by the risks as assessed, and it represented an unnecessary departure from ordinary policing practice, which we believe would likely have been sufficient to secure the match.
The Parliamentary Select Committee similarly concludes that the decision-making process was flawed. However, it maintains that the prohibition was proportionate to the level of risk, even if that risk had been more rigorously assessed.
Our analysis considers a further, key point. A central weakness in the decision-making process was the failure clearly to specify the nature and source of the risk.
If the primary risk came from away supporters themselves, then exclusion may have been justified. But if the principal risk derived from anti-Israel protestors, boycott activists, and antizionist actors seeking to disrupt or attack the match, then banning the away supporters risked punishing those who were being threatened and who did not themselves constitute a significant threat.
In such circumstances, the appropriate response would have required consideration beyond technical policing calculations. If there was a significant antisemitic threat, a policy priority might have been to mobilise sufficient police resources to defend the match, the visiting team, and their supporters rather than excluding them.
The decision-making process appears to have overestimated the risk posed by Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters, in part through a misreading of the Amsterdam precedent and perhaps through reliance on politically committed sources of advice. It may have given insufficient weight to risks arising from boycott activism and to the risk of antisemitic violence of the kind that occurred in Amsterdam.
The process did not engage in a serious way with institutions or individuals from the Jewish community either locally or nationally, or with HM Independent Advisor on Antisemitism. Doing so would have given it a better chance of avoiding the mistakes that it made in understanding the precedent, possible alternatives and the predictable impact of the away fans ban on Jewish communities.
If there was a significant antisemitic dimension to the threat environment, the risk assessment process did not identify or articulate it clearly.
Abstract: For this report, the Union of Jewish Students has collated dozens of testimonies from students who have
experienced antisemitism on campus.
The UJS also commissioned polling of 1,000 students, across all faiths and none, to assess the
impact of campus protests and the rise of antisemitism. The findings reveal alarming levels of campus
antisemitism, significant disruption caused by protests, and perceptions of Jewish students marred by
hostility and intolerance.
Key Findings:
1.Antisemitism has become normalised on our campuses.
- One in four students (23%) have seen behaviour that targets Jewish students for their religion/ethnicity.
- One in five (20%) students would be reluctant to, or would never, houseshare with a Jewish student.
- Jewish students have told us they have faced physical and verbal abuse, social ostracisation and
widespread antisemitic attitudes.
2.Glorification of terrorism is prevalent and unpunished.
- Our research has found that student groups have explicitly called for violence against Jews, even justifying the terrorist attack at Bondi Beach in December 2025.
- 49% of students have heard slogans or chants glorifying Hamas, Hezbollah or other proscribed groups on campus.
- 47% have witnessed justification of the October 7th attacks, rising to 77% among those who encounter Israel-Palestine protests regularly.
3. Protests disrupt all students, and universities have a clear mandate from students to take firmer action.
-Protests have disrupted learning for 65% of students, and 40% have altered their journey on campus to avoid disruption.
- Universities where protests are more frequent have seen higher levels of antisemitism, and four in ten (39%) of students who witness regular Israel-Palestine protests have seen Jewish students harassed often.
- 69% of students disapprove of protests blocking access to learning, and 82% deem calls to 'globalise the intifada' to be antisemitic.
Abstract: In June 2025, Hadassah UK partnered with the Hadassah Medical Organization in Jerusalem to undertake important mental health research in the community. Developed by leading Israeli trauma experts, a UK-wide survey was presented to the community to understand how British Jews were coping with the psychological and social impact of October 7th, the ongoing conflict, and rising antisemitism.
This research involved 511 participants from diverse backgrounds within the UK Jewish community, representing various denominational affiliations, geographic locations, and demographic characteristics. The completed study provided robust statistical power for examining complex relationships between trauma exposure, psychological symptoms, and protective factors.Our comprehensive statistical analysis reveals critical insights into the psychological impact of exposure to the October 7th events and subsequent antisemitism on the UK Jewish community.
Participants were recruited through multiple channels including synagogues, Jewish community organisations, and social networks to ensure broad representation, as well as help to capture the full spectrum of experiences within the UK Jewish community.
From our study, we can see that the psychological impact of October 7th and subsequent events created significant mental health challenges within the UK Jewish community. A key finding showed that over one-third of participants exhibited clinically significant PTSD symptoms, including intrusive memories of attack imagery, avoidance of trauma reminders, and heightened reactive responses.
Abstract: CST recorded 3,700 antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2025, the second-highest total ever reported to CST in a single calendar year. This is an increase of 4% from the 3,556 anti-Jewish hate incidents recorded by CST in 2024, and 14% lower than the highest ever annual total of 4,298 antisemitic incidents reported in 2023. CST recorded 1,662 antisemitic incidents in 2022, and 2,261 in 2021.
The increase from the total recorded in 2024 reflects that antisemitic incident levels remain at a significantly higher rate than was the case prior to Hamas’ terror attack on Israel on 7 October 2023. There was an immediate and significant spike in recorded cases of anti-Jewish hate in the UK in the aftermath of that attack. The subsequent war, and its grip of public and media attention even during periods of ceasefire, has continued to impact the amount and nature of anti-Jewish hate reported in the 27 months since that date.
Abstract: • Nahamu’s position on the state of education for charedi children is set out in a
paper published in September 2024. The paper made recommendations that
require primary legislation. This bill is a welcome step towards ensuring every
child receives a broad and balanced education, and we welcome the inclusion
of provisions that will specifically improve the lives of charedi children.
• This submission focuses on the following areas of the bill:
Children not in school (clauses 24 to 29 and schedule 1)
• Independent educational institutions (clauses 30 to 35)
• Ofsted’s powers to investigate unregistered, and therefore illegal,
independent schools (clauses 36 to 37)
• Revised national curriculum (clause 41)
• School admission arrangements (clauses 47 to 50)
• The opening new schools (clauses 51 to 55).
• While legitimate homeschooling should be supported, tighter provisions are
needed to prevent misuse as a guise for unregistered, illegal schooling. This
includes clear definitions of “efficient” and “full-time” education, standardised
guidelines, and sufficient funding for oversight.
• Current enforcement mechanisms, including SAOs, risk being ineffective
without stronger accountability measures. Remedies must prioritise access to
education over punitive approaches.
• This submission underscores the need for targeted funding, strengthened
oversight, and specific measures to address the unique challenges within
charedi communities, ensuring all children, including charedi children, access
their legal right to education
Abstract: This document is a consolidated summary of urgent policy priorities of the Jewish community, following the
antisemitic terrorist attack on the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation on Yom Kippur (2 October 2025), the holiest day of the Jewish calendar. This attack was not just an attack on British Jews, but on British society and British values.
These priorities are based on consultations within and between leading community organisations, including the Board of Deputies, JLC, UJS, and CST, and reflect the focus of our engagement with government and others since the attack.
We have seen a series of welcome announcements from government in response, and we are actively seeking
further action and implementation across these priorities.
However, these measures on their own will not be sufficient to meet the long-term society-wide challenge of
confronting antisemitic hatred as it has manifested itself in recent years. What is needed is a Comprehensive Government Strategy on Antisemitism, and this paper reflects what that might encompass.
Building on existing initiatives, including the recent report of the Board of Deputies Commission on Antisemitism,
we will continue working with partners and experts, with government, and with all parts of our diverse community, to seek input on these priorities and to integrate them into a wider strategy that addresses the problem at its
deepest roots. This includes ensuring the relevance of these priorities for the whole of the UK, taking account of
administrative and legal variations in devolved nations and regions.
Abstract: In this chapter I intend to present what happens when contemporary Western activist and academic anti-Zionism falls on the fertile soil of a country which is, firstly, semi-peripheral and, secondly, burdened with a history of antisemitism that is as intense as it is specific. Its specificity entails three postwar waves of Jewish emigration caused by antisemitic violence, primarily to Israel. The first two happened in 1946–9 and 1956–60, respectively. The third of these waves was triggered by what in Poland is generally referred to as ‘March’. The repression of student youth protesting against censorship intensified in March 1968, but the antisemitic campaign with which the state authorities cracked down on opposition within the party and on the streets lingered on for much longer. It was unleashed under the banner of ‘anti-Zionism’. I will first briefly outline the events of that period, since knowledge of them is essential to understanding the meanings with which the term ‘Zionism’ is imbued in Poland. Next I will outline the contemporary politics of remembrance of ‘March’ and, more broadly, the stakes of Polish historical politics, which are related to the collective manifestations of Poles’ attitudes towards Jews. These three phenomena – March 1968, the management of its memory and contemporary historical politics reproducing antisemitic clichés – form, so I would like to suggest, the first context against which the functioning of anti-Zionism in Poland today should be considered.
Abstract: The report shares, for the first time, data on observing Succot in the UK, based on the responses of over 4,800 adult British Jews to the JPR 2025 Jews in Uncertain Times Survey. The report compares Succot observance with other Jewish New Year holidays and festivals, and explores who is more likely to celebrate Succot.
Some of the key findings in this report:
50% of Jews in the UK said they celebrate Succot in some way (e.g. attending synagogue, spending some time in a 'Succah', etc.)."
Compared with its neighbouring High Holidays, Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur, and with other Jewish festivals and practices, Succot is somewhat less commonly observed.
The larger the household size, the more likely it is that Succot is observed. Households with school-aged children at home are much more likely to celebrate Succot, especially if they are in Jewish schools.
74% of British Jews observe Rosh Hashanah rituals at home. 63% of British Jews fast on Yom Kippur most or all years.
Abstract: In this report:
As the 80th Session of the United Nations General Assembly approaches, and with key statesmen and leaders, including British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, announcing that their countries may recognise a Palestinian state at the summit, this report finds levels of agreement with the contention that “a two-state solution is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours in the Middle East” have fallen to below 50% among British Jews for the first time since records began.
The report is based on over 4,800 responses from members of the JPR Research Panel to the 2025 Jews in Uncertain Times Survey, conducted in June/July 2025.
Some of the key findings in this report:
49% of respondents agree with the two-state solution contention, compared with 54% a year ago, and 78% in 2010.
Despite the reported drop, support for the two-state solution remains the majority opinion among British Jews, as 41% disagree with it and 10% are not sure.
Younger Jews are found to be less likely to believe in the two-state solution than their elders, with over 40% of 16-29-year-olds showing a degree of support for a shared bi-national state.
Attitudes to support for the two-state solution correlate with Jews’ Jewish denominational positions, political allegiances and attitudes to Zionism.
Anti-Zionist Jews, who constitute a small minority of British Jews as a whole, are particularly likely to favour bi-nationalism over the two-state solution. The much larger, mainstream and orthodox communities overwhelmingly reject this position, but show considerable scepticism for the two-state solution, most likely on security grounds.
British Jews overwhelmingly reject the idea that ‘Israel should take over full control of Gaza.’
Topics: Jewish Identity, Jewish Involvment, Jewish Community, Main Topic: Identity and Community, Jewish Education, Jewish Schools, Youth Movements, Educational Tours, Family and Household, Age and Generational Issues, Denominations
Abstract: CST recorded 1,521 antisemitic incidents across the UK in the first half of 2025, the second-highest total ever reported to CST in the first six months of any year. This is a decrease of 25% from the 2,019 antisemitic incidents recorded by CST in the January- to-June period of 2024, which was the highest figure ever reported to CST for the first half of any year. CST recorded 965 incidents in the first six months of 2023, 823 from January to June 2022, and 1,371 in the first half of 2021.
The 1,521 anti-Jewish hate incidents recorded in the first six months of 2025 is a fall from the half-year record reported in 2024, but it is a significant total, fuelled by ongoing reactions to the conflict in the Middle East. It is 11% higher than the third- highest six-monthly figure of 1,371 incidents recorded in 2021, which itself was a result of antisemitic reactions to an escalation of conflict in the Middle East across May and June that year. Antisemitic incidents have been reported to CST at an increased rate since the Hamas terror attack in Israel on 7 October 2023. After an immediate and notable spike in anti-Jewish hate immediately following that date, observed before Israel had coordinated any large- scale on-the-ground military response in Gaza, incident levels eventually settled at a substantially higher average than prior to the attack.
In the six months leading up to 7 October 2023, CST recorded a monthly average of 161 antisemitic incidents per month. In the first six months of 2025, this monthly average stood at 254 incidents, a 58% increase from that earlier period. CST had only ever recorded monthly incident totals exceeding 200 on five occasions prior to October 2023, each correlating with past periods when Israel was at war.Since the 7 October attack, the only month in which CST logged an incident figure below 200 was December 2024. The current war in the Middle East has lasted the entirety of the period covered in this report and has continued to impact the volume and discourse of antisemitism reported to CST in the first six months of this year, as it has every month since October 2023.
Abstract: Since long before the October 7 attacks, Jewish communities in Europe have experienced growing hate, harassment and hostility on social media. This policy paper articulates the key challenges of online antisemitism, and provides comprehensive and practical policy steps which governments, platforms, regulators and civil society organisations can take to address them. Built through 42 interviews with Jewish organisations and experts in antisemitism and digital policy from across CCOA’s five geographies (France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Sweden), it collates local experiences and channels them into a cohesive pan-European strategy, uniting communities and sectors in joint responses.
Interviewees identified five central challenges with online antisemitism:
Jewish communities and organisations across the five geographies report the significant behavioural, social and psychological impacts of online antisemitism, which have created a chilling effect on participation in public life.
Concerns exist not just over fringe violent extremist content, but the prevailing normalisation of mainstream antisemitism and a permissive culture which facilitates its spread across all areas of society.
There are a wide range of social media platforms in the social media ecosystem each adopting distinctive approaches and standards to content moderation, however the widespread accessibility of antisemitism suggest that significant barriers remain to the effective implementation of Terms of Service, and that many platforms are failing in this regard.
There is limited awareness and understanding of the Digital Services Act (DSA) in Jewish civil society, little capacity to implement it, and a lack of confidence in its efficacy in addressing antisemitism.
Law enforcement has lacked both the capacity and legislative tools to effectively respond to the scale of illegal activity on social media.
Mainstreaming Digital Human Rights
This policy paper presents policy recommendations for Governments, Tech Platforms, Digital Regulators, and Civil Society. These approaches constitute a collective pathway, but may be diversely applicable across different geographies, communities and jurisdictions.
Topics: Jewish Identity, Jewish Community, Denominations, Main Topic: Identity and Community, Jewish History, Reform/Liberal/Progressive Judaism, Conservative / Masorti Judaism, Orthodox Judaism, Chabad-Lubavitch, Haredi / Strictly Orthodox Jews, Israel-Diaspora Relations
Abstract: This chapter analyzes developments that profoundly transformed French Judaism over decades. The former paradigm of French Judaism, dating back to the nineteenth century, was of Judaism united and unified under the auspices of the Consistory, the central religious institution Napoleon created. In this model of "Israelitism," the symbiosis between Jewish and French affiliations was based on Judaism as a faith and French citizenship. International links were established towards the end of the 19th century, notably through the Alliance israélite universelle and intellectuals supporting the Zionist project, but it was the post-1945 world that witnessed a gradual departure from this confessional model. A new Franco-Judaism emerged in the 1970s-1980s, combining Jewish and French identities in new ways: solidarity with Israel, an attachment to diasporic Jewish cultures, an increasingly public affirmation of Jewishness, and advocacy against forms of Holocaust denial. It marked a definitive rupture with the older paradigm of Israelitism. This chapter also focuses on the development of religious pluralism and the increasing internationalization of French Judaism. It examines the four branches of French Jewish Orthodoxy (ultra-Orthodoxy, Chabad, Religious Zionism, and Modern Orthodoxy), as well as the more liberal Reform and Massorti movements. It provides a broad overview of the environments and actors constituting this reconfiguration of a new French Judaism, henceforth anchored in pluralism and internationalization.
