Abstract: Our point of departure being that free speech by all sides must be protected and that pro-Palestinian speech is not antisemitic by definition, this chapter examines the extent to which Greek political parties’ critique of Israeli policies diachronically might implicitly or explicitly contribute to the dissemination of antisemitic mythopoesis. Moving beyond the conventional focus on far-right rhetoric, this analysis explores how antisemitic tropes are reproduced within the discourses of mainstream political actors, including the conservative party New Democracy and the socialist PASOK. Particular emphasis is placed on the Greek left, a heterogeneous political formation encompassing a broad spectrum of ideologies that ostensibly uphold human rights and progressive values. The presence of discriminatory discourse within such frameworks reveals the deep entrenchment of antisemitic attitudes in Greek society, where they function as a form of ideological common sense. By examining periods such as the Greek debt crisis and the War in Gaza starting in 2023, we argue that this latent antisemitism tends to resurface during periods of socio-political crisis and permeates the entire political spectrum, challenging assumptions about its marginality or exclusivity to far right politics and rhetoric. At this point, and in light of the turbulent historical moment we are witnessing—marked by an ongoing humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, the endless suffering of the Palestinean people and the widespread instability throughout the Middle East—we deem it necessary to clarify that it is not our intention to intervene in the broader debate surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In contrast, our objective is to examine the phenomenon of antisemitism through a historical, cultural, and political lens, with a specific focus on how public opinion is shaped with regard to Greek Jewish citizens—and Jews more broadly—within the discourse articulated by Greek political actors. We would like to explicitly state that antisemitism, in this context, is not to be understood solely as a contemporary political manifestation, but as a multidimensional and diachronic phenomenon. With reference to the events of October 7th and their aftermath, we align ourselves with the position articulated by Gabor Maté, who, discussing the trauma and Palestinian suffering, emphatically stated that: “Any colonial power does precisely what Israel is doing and has been doing. (…) So, there is nothing specifically ‘Jewish’ about this. It also goes along with the colonial trajectory
Topics: Antisemitism: Far right, Antisemitism: Muslim, Attitudes to Jews, Attitudes to Israel, Islamophobia, Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism, Holocaust Commemoration, Authoritarianism, Main Topic: Holocaust and Memorial, Populism, Political Parties, Politics
Abstract: In the early 2020s, two seemingly unrelated political developments came to a head in the Netherlands. First, in January 2020, then-Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the center-right VVD party issued an official apology on behalf of the Dutch government for its complicity in the deaths of more than 100,000 Dutch Jews in the Holocaust. Second, in the November 2023 national elections, Geert Wilders’s anti-Muslim, pro-Israel PVV party won the highest percentage of votes, leading to the formation of a far-right cabinet under Prime Minister Dick Schoof in July 2024. In this article, we argue that this double consolidation of the historical legacy of the Holocaust and of racist, right-wing politics has put Dutch Jews in a dangerous bind. On the one hand, the memory of the Holocaust and the contemporary safety of Dutch Jews have been elevated as a paramount concern in Dutch institutional, legal, and political life. On the other hand, Dutch Jews have been positioned as the perennial would-be victims of violent antisemitism—virtually always, it is falsely imagined, at the hands of Dutch Muslims. The historical persecution of the Jews in the Holocaust is now used to underwrite a “proprietary” form of Jewish victimhood in the present: non-Jewish white Dutch people position themselves as the saviors of Jews, and thereby claim ownership over their past, their collective fate, and the political means to secure their safety.
Abstract: We provide a comparative analysis of how European radical left parties (RLPs) politicise the Israel – Palestine and Russia – Ukraine conflicts. Examining the positions of 25 RLPs, we test four hypotheses examining variation in Israel-hostility, Russia-related stances, cross-conflict coherence, and the dynamics of war fatigue. Patterns of politicisation are complex and there is no unified party family response. We show that while no RLP is Israel-friendly, levels of Israel-hostility vary substantially and tend to intensify as the Gaza war persists. By contrast, positions on Russia – Ukraine remain deeply divided, with no linear shift towards Russia-friendliness. Ideological subtype shapes, but does not determine, party responses, while broader contextual factors, most notably the ‘Trump effect’, repoliticise questions of European security. However, further politicisation is limited by the weakness of cross-conflict coherence. Several parties express consistent anti-imperialist logic in their response, but most disaggregate their critiques. RLP foreign policy emerges as ideologically-driven but contextually responsive.
Abstract: Golden Dawn (GD), Greece’s most prominent far-right political organization, strategically utilized antisemitism as its core ideological principle rather than a marginal prejudice or rhetorical device. This article argues that antisemitism served primarily as an epistemological conspiratorial framework central to GD’s ideological worldview, providing a coherent interpretive lens through which all political, economic, and social phenomena were explained as elements of a singular Jewish-orchestrated plot. Drawing on qualitative discourse analysis of over 10,300 GD publications spanning 1993 to 2020, the study illustrates how this epistemological master frame enabled the party to unify diverse domestic and international issues, from foreign policy tensions and immigration debates to economic crises, under a consistent antisemitic narrative. Additionally, by explicitly employing Holocaust denial, endorsing Nazi symbolism, and openly propagating antisemitic conspiracies, GD deliberately violated post-Holocaust European norms. This normative transgression was integral to the party’s identity, positioning it in overt defiance of mainstream moral and political boundaries. The article thus demonstrates how GD’s antisemitism functioned not merely as a rhetorical provocation but as the foundation of a comprehensive ideological system that consciously challenged established European taboos. These findings also suggest broader implications for understanding the role and adaptability of conspiratorial antisemitism and normative transgression in other extremist ideologies beyond the Greek context.
Abstract: Romania has proved to be no outlier in the ongoing trend of mainstream-ization of far-right and neo-fascist politics and discourses, despite the optimistic outlook that many shared not long ago. AUR marked a historical success, being the first “radical return” political formation to gain seats in Parliament after 1989. As a result, a process of accelerated normalization of the far-right discourse is taking place, moving the political spectrum further to the (extreme) right, while also rehabilitating historical figures that played a significant role in the Holocaust. The present paper draws on Discourse Historical Analysis and concepts such as “calculated ambivalence” and “dog-whistle politics” to unpack the coded meanings and whistles entwined in the discursive provocations and reactions of AUR’s leader, George Simion. Starting from AUR’s press release from January 2022, minimizing the Holocaust, which set in motion the “right-wing populist perpetuum mobile”, I analyze the main discursive strategies, both confrontational and submissive, used by Simion in his effort to “dog-whistle” to AUR’s ultranationalist supporters, while at the same time denying allegations of antisemitism, Holocaust minimization, and fascist sympathies. For a qualitative measure of the success or failure of these strategies, a complementary critical analysis of the reactions of some of the most prominent antisemitic ultranationalist voices in Romania is carried out. Is Simion a skillful “dog-whistler” or a “traitor”? The study shows that there is a thin and fluid line between the two.
Abstract: Durant quarante ans, l’extrême droite a été l’ennemie officielle des Juifs de France. Or, certains leaders extrémistes ont pu voir dans l’irruption de l’islamisme radical l’opportunité de séduire un électorat jusque-là hostile: l’islamisme n’était-il pas un ennemi commun?
Marine Le Pen a ainsi voulu surfer sur l'inquiétude des Juifs de France face à la montée d’un antisémitisme dont elle prétendait, de surcroît, pouvoir les protéger. D’où ses tentatives, nombreuses et variées, pour les rallier à sa cause.
Le FN, devenu Rassemblement National, serait-il devenu un partenaire respectable? Ou, tout au moins un opposant fréquentable ?
Les auteurs de cette enquête ont sillonné la France à l’écoute des communautés juives présentes dans les villes d'extrême droite, de Fréjus à Hayange, de Béziers aux quartiers-nord de Marseille. Ils ont remonté le fil de l’histoire du Front National et de ses tentatives de séduction, ainsi que celle des réactions des juifs face à cette main tendue. Pour mieux comprendre, ils ont recueilli des confidences d’élus frontistes, de témoins et d'intellectuels.
Et ils racontent les coulisses de cette tentative de hold-up idéologique.
Abstract: L’adjectif « résiduel » a été récemment utilisé par le ministre de l’Intérieur Bruno Retailleau pour qualifier l’antisémitisme d’extrême droite, en considérant que désormais la haine des Juifs était l’affaire de l’islamisme et de l’extrême gauche. Il reprenait ainsi le qualificatif de Jean-Luc Mélenchon, qui avait écrit quelques mois auparavant que « Contrairement à ce que dit la propagande de l’officialité, l’antisémitisme reste résiduel en France. » Durant les campagnes électorales de 2024 en France, le Rassemblement national (RN) s’est présenté comme le bouclier des Français juifs. L’actualité paraît ainsi renfoncer le storytelling entretenu depuis une quinzaine d’années, selon lequel l’extrême droite ne serait plus antisémite, voire deviendrait solidaire des Français juifs. Autour de ce sujet sont souvent mis en avant des déclarations philosémites de ténors nationaux-populistes. D’autre part, les révélations publiques de prétendus « dérapages » antisémites de candidats malheureux du RN sont monnaie courante. Pour circonscrire le phénomène, il faut distinguer les modes d’expression de cet antisémitisme. Les questions des violences, de la place accordée aux marqueurs antisémites dans la communication des partis, et de l’expression culturelle sont trois dimensions qui se recoupent pour distinguer la place de l’objet au sein de ce champ politique.
Abstract: This article examines antisemitism and Holocaust denial in contemporary Far-Right German politics with a focus on the party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD). The article argues that the AfD has attempted to ‘tiptoe around Nazism’—a phrase coined by the author, which describes how the party has strategically and haphazardly reacted to scandals as they arise in order to avoid being associated with Nazism and losing moderate voters. The first section investigates how the AfD has reacted to various internal scandals that have damaged its reputation. This analysis encompasses the party’s fraught relationship to the Islamophobic, anti-refugee organization PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamicization of the Occident) as well as the ‘Höcke Affair,’ in which prominent AfD leader Björn Höcke denigrated the Berlin Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe as a ‘monument of shame.’ The second section examines the AfD’s proactive attempts to tiptoe around Nazism by portraying itself as philosemitic and pro-Israel and courting Jewish voters as part of its controversial subgroup Jews in the AfD (Juden in der AfD, JAfD). Here it explains how JAfD members, particularly Jews who immigrated to Germany from the former Soviet Union, have rationalized their paradoxical support for this outwardly antisemitic and denialist party. The conclusion situates the AfD in the broader transatlantic context of Far-Right extremism, highlighting trends that may signal—yet, more likely, will fail to bring about—the party’s demise.
Abstract: On the eve of the 2024 UK General Election, national polls show the Labour Party ahead of the
Conservative Party by 20 percentage points. An average of polls at the time of publication has Labour
at 41.9% and Conservatives at 22.2%, with Reform UK at 15.0%, well ahead of the Liberal Democrats,
Greens, Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru and other parties. These polls do not, however,
show the voting intention of Jewish people in the UK. The JPR Research Panel provides the research
infrastructure to gather nationally representative data about Jewish people’s behaviours and attitudes
on a wide range of social and political issues. This paper presents initial data on voting intentions for
4 July 2024, based on 2,717 UK-based Jewish adults who responded to a survey between 14-20 June
