Abstract: Today, in the age of the internet, during recent epidemics such as H1N1, Ebola and Covid-19, it is striking to see how old accusatory scripts are circulated and perpetuated via social media, which serve as new channels for discrimination and blame directed at traditional figures who have been scapegoated at different moments in the history of European epidemics. The article shows how the laundering of information into a cliquey network takes empirical shape during a health crisis. We do so by focusing on VKontakte, a Russian social network similar to Facebook and the 15th largest website in the world in terms of traffic. Using an ethnographic approach to social media, we show how borderline information from an open and easily accessible website is reappropriated, made explicit, and transformed into legally prohibited hate content. It also documents the ability of conspiracy theorists to use the full range of discourse production channels in a country-in this case France-that has very strict laws on hate speech, including that published on social networks. These laws are circumvented by anti-Semitic communities that spread false information in marginal, open and legal networks, thus avoiding legal proceedings.
Abstract: The study examines antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes in Sweden, analyzing their links to prejudicial attitudes, conspiracy beliefs, and institutional trust. Based on a representative survey of 3,507 individuals, the findings reveal that antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes are related, but differ in important ways. Antisemitism is associated with anti-immigrant and sexist attitudes and greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs, but is unrelated to institutional trust. By contrast, anti-Israel attitudes are unrelated to anti-immigrant attitudes and are positively associated with governemnt trust and media confidence. Cluster analyses have identified three profiles: Neutral Moderates (low antisemitism and low anti-Israel attitudes), Critical Engagers (low antisemitism but moderate anti-Israel attitudes), and Distrustful Sceptics (heightened levels of both). These profiles differ in socio-demographic characteristics, prejudicial attitudes, and conspiracy beliefs, with higher institutional trust increasing the likelihood of belonging to Critical Engagers. The findings suggest that institutional trust may channel individuals toward stronger anti-Israel attitudes, particularly in Sweden.
Abstract: Golden Dawn (GD), Greece’s most prominent far-right political organization, strategically utilized antisemitism as its core ideological principle rather than a marginal prejudice or rhetorical device. This article argues that antisemitism served primarily as an epistemological conspiratorial framework central to GD’s ideological worldview, providing a coherent interpretive lens through which all political, economic, and social phenomena were explained as elements of a singular Jewish-orchestrated plot. Drawing on qualitative discourse analysis of over 10,300 GD publications spanning 1993 to 2020, the study illustrates how this epistemological master frame enabled the party to unify diverse domestic and international issues, from foreign policy tensions and immigration debates to economic crises, under a consistent antisemitic narrative. Additionally, by explicitly employing Holocaust denial, endorsing Nazi symbolism, and openly propagating antisemitic conspiracies, GD deliberately violated post-Holocaust European norms. This normative transgression was integral to the party’s identity, positioning it in overt defiance of mainstream moral and political boundaries. The article thus demonstrates how GD’s antisemitism functioned not merely as a rhetorical provocation but as the foundation of a comprehensive ideological system that consciously challenged established European taboos. These findings also suggest broader implications for understanding the role and adaptability of conspiratorial antisemitism and normative transgression in other extremist ideologies beyond the Greek context.
Abstract: To cope with the covid-19 pandemic, people not only relied on state measures and scientific knowledge, but also drew on the resources of religion. They may also have embraced conspiracy theories that sometimes led them to engage in protest behavior. Against this background, we address the following research question: “How are people's religiosity and spirituality related to their belief in covid-19 conspiracy theories in Germany?” We answer this question by conducting a theory-led empirical analysis. We apply quantitative methods based on primary data from a (non-representative) online survey that we carried out with 2,373 respondents in Germany between July 2020 and January 2021. The results show that belief in covid-19 conspiracy theories is positively correlated with the image of a punitive God, with exclusivist beliefs, and with private prayer—and negatively correlated with attendance at religious services. Moreover, Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, and Jews have a lower affinity for conspiracy theories than not religiously affiliated people, while the opposite is true for Evangelicals.
Abstract: In this report, we have studied different facets of antisemitism on non-password protected social media outlets with user-generated content. Our results show that antisemitic content exists on all social media platforms. However, the amount of antisemitic content seems to vary with the degree of moderation on each platform. Since 2017, discussions about the ZOG conspiracy narrative have increased, while the Covid-19 pandemic has given rise to new antisemitic conspiracy theories. Conspiracy narratives are closely related to antisemitic stereotypes, which were found in 25% of posts mentioning Jews or Jewishness. The most common stereotypes being that Jews are powerful, deceptive, and manipulative. In our study, almost 35% of all posts mentioning Jews or Jewishness expressed negativity toward Jews. These posts were found mainly on minimally moderated platforms. Jews are also one of the groups that are targeted by toxic language online. Over 4,000 occurrences of explicit Holocaust denial terminology were found during a three-month period. National legislation is difficult to apply to the global internet. A joint effort by governments and platform companies is important to develop techniques that keeps antisemitic content from the internet, while education is necessary to prevent antisemitism before it goes online
Abstract: Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, anti-Semitism (in both public discourse and policies and as manifested in the infrequency of anti-Semitic incidents) was at a historical low, and simultaneously Russia’s relationship with Israel was on the rise. Officially, the Kremlin denounced xenophobia and made a crucial distinction between the isolationist ethnic nationalism that it condemned and the broader Russian imperial nationalism that has become Putinism’s dominant framework, especially after 2014. T he war against Ukraine, which Russia conceptualises as the continuation of its “struggle against the Nazis,” is waged in the actual space where the Holocaust took place, and also, semantically, in the historical “bloodlands,” following Timothy Snyder’s term, that intersect with and evoke issues of Jewishness and Anti-Semitism, reactivating all manner of revisionist discourses about war-time collaboration, the Holocaust, and Ukrainian Jewish history. The Russian regime and its propagandists spin various conspiratorial narratives about the war and Ukraine’s leadership that both reactivate dormant Soviet-era prejudices and create new ones (e.g., “sects,” “global Satanism,” “Western elites,” “liberals as the fifth column,” etc.) that are linked to Jewishness. Russian anti-Semitism is an inherently dynamic phenomenon that is shaped by and is included in the escalation in the Middle East, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and Russia’s hostile relations with the “collective West” and as such should be considered within international, domestic, and historical contexts.
Abstract: Scapegoating and Conspiracy Theories during COVID-19 Antisemitism has unfortunately persisted throughout history, and the COVID-19 pandemic has not been an exception to this troubling trend. The conditions created by the pandemic, such as fear, uncertainty, and anxiety, have fueled the emergence and spread of conspiracy theories targeting various groups, including Jewish communities. The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered a plethora of baseless beliefs and conspiracy theories about its causes, which have contributed to the rise of antisemitism during this time. Pandemics, including the COVID-19 pandemic, inherently create anxiety and uncertainty among populations. This change has affected many areas, both political and social. Conspiracy theories that base the cause of the emergence of COVID-19 on Jewish identity are an essential factor for this study. Tendencies toward antisemitism and scapegoating have supported these conspiracy theories. In this study, how antisemitism manifested itself in media and online discourse during COVID-19 and how Jewish identity is affected by the process.
Topics: Internet, Social Media, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Attitudes to Israel, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Football, Hate and Hate Speech, AI, Antisemitism: Online, Conspiracy Theories, Antisemitism: Discourse and Tropes
Abstract: This cross-sectional study follows Open Science principles in estimating relationships between antisemitism, i.e. anti-Jewish bigotry, and conspiracy belief, i.e. endorsement of conspiracy theories, through analysis of data collected from a representative sample of UK adults (n=1722). Antisemitism was measured using the Generalized Antisemitism scale, and conspiracy belief was measured using the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale. Positive relationships were found to exist between all forms of antisemitism and all types of conspiracy belief, and an average across all items of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale was found to predict Generalized Antisemitism at least as well as any individual type of conspiracy belief. On a more detailed level, antisemitic attitudes relating to British Jews were found to be most strongly associated with belief in conspiracies relating to personal well-being, while antisemitic attitudes relating to the State of Israel and its supporters were found to be most strongly associated with belief in conspiracies relating to government malfeasance. Generalized Antisemitism itself was found to be most strongly associated with belief in malevolent global conspiracies. Exploratory analysis additionally examined the effect of standard demographic variables that had been introduced into the main analysis as controls. Through this means, it was found that antisemitic attitudes relating both to Jews qua Jews and to Israel and its supporters are more prevalent among less highly educated people and members of other-than-white ethnic groups, while antisemitic attitudes relating to Israel and its supporters are more common among younger people. In addition, it was found that female gender is associated with reduced antisemitic attitudes relating to Jews qua Jews and also with increased antisemitic attitudes relating to Israel and its supporters. However, the addition of demographic controls did not explain any additional variance in Generalized Antisemitism beyond that which was already explained by conspiracy belief – perhaps suggesting that demographic characteristics are more strongly associated with the inclination towards particular expressions of antisemitism than with antisemitism itself.
Abstract: Belief in conspiracy theories about Jews is a prototypical example of how a naïve theory can serve as a universal explanation of “all the bad things happening in society.” Such a theory often arises in times of political unrest that tend to breed feelings of uncertainty in politics and a lack of control over politics. As both uncertainty (a sense-making deficit) and lack of control (an agency deficit) can relate to conspiracy-based antisemitism, this research examines which of the two processes plays a pivotal role in the belief in Jewish conspiracy. Specifically, we hypothesize that political uncontrollability, rather than political uncertainty, is a critical factor in triggering conspiracy theories about groups. In Study 1 (N = 812) we found that lack of control, but not uncertainty, in the political domain predicted belief in Jewish conspiracy, and subsequently led to increased discriminatory attitudes toward Jews. The results of longitudinal Study 2 (N = 476) revealed that only political uncontrollability led to an increase in conspiracy-related stereotypes of Jews. In Study 3 (N = 172) we found that experimental induction of political uncontrollability increased belief in Jewish, German, and Russian conspiracy, whereas induction of political uncertainty did not. Finally, Study 4 (N = 370) replicated this pattern in another cultural context with more general measures of uncontrollability and uncertainty. It was lack of personal control, rather than uncertainty, that increased belief in Jewish conspiracy—and indirectly predicted other conspiracy theories. Our findings consistently support the critical role of political uncontrollability, not uncertainty, in triggering a conspiracy theory of Jews.
Abstract: This paper proposes that understanding the causes of anti-Semitic hate crime requires the
recognition of the cultural specificity of anti-Semitism, reflected in its unique mythical and
conspiratorial nature. By neglecting to consider the idiosyncrasies of anti-Semitic rhetoric,
general theories of hate crime often fail to provide an adequate explanation for the
persistence of anti-Jewish violence, especially in cultures where Jews do not constitute a
conspicuous minority, or where there is no noticeable tradition of anti-Jewish sentiment.
This point is illustrated using as an example the emergence of anti-Semitic hate crime in
Serbia in the aftermath of political changes in October 2000. The paper explores this
development in the context of Serbia’s recent past, arguing that the onset of violent
incidents towards Jews entailed two distinct but related stages, both of which are linked to
the conspiratorial nature of anti-Semitic ideology. The first phase – which culminated at
the time of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia – involved the proliferation of the belief in
Jewish conspiracy. At this stage, anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, which were to be found
even in the mainstream media, retained an ‘abstract’ quality and their proliferation did
not, in itself, lead to anti-Jewish hate crime. The onset of anti-Semitic violence is
associated with the second phase, which followed Milošević’s downfall, when, with the
marginalisation of conspiratorial culture, the belief in Jewish conspiracy, as an abstract
ideological position, became reified and transformed into concrete instances of violence
against the local Jewish population. In exploring this two-stage process, the paper
highlights the way in which a closer examination of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and
other anti-Semitic texts can help shed some light on the dynamic underpinning the
persistence of anti-Jewish hate crime in modern society.
Abstract: he Government needs to step up efforts to address attempts by the far-right to blame the COVID-19 pandemic on Jews, according to a think tank report.
The conspiracies are said to have permeated every corner of the internet, including encrypted apps like Telegram and everyday digital tools like podcasts. Despite much of the recent political and media focus being on mainstream platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, the report finds the most ardent forms of hatred circulate on peripheral so-called ‘alt-tech’ platforms.
The study — by the Henry Jackson Society — comes as it was revealed that Facebook has taken robust action in banning adverts by extremist group, which have attempted to sow the seeds of division amidst the COVID-19 crisis.
Among the online messages spread by the far-right identified within the report, are that:
Jews are using global lockdowns to “steal everything”.
“Satan in human form”, or Jewish people, are throwing dance parties to celebrate the spread of the coronavirus.
Jewish public leaders are using the COVID-19 crisis to “test the populations [sic] willingness to comply” with authoritarian restrictions on their civil liberties.
COVID-19 is being used as part of a plot to replace the ‘white’ population of Europe.
Those infected with the coronavirus should visit their local synagogue and mosque, and more broadly ethnically-diverse neighbourhoods, in order to spread the disease.
Jews spread the bubonic plague through Europe in the Middle Ages and demonstrate an inherent tendency for killing large numbers of non-Jews through efficient methods.
In response, the author recommends the introduction of stronger forms of internet regulation for alt-tech social media platforms, including a review by the Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE) and extensive training for law enforcement officers on the full scope of alt-tech platforms. The report also recommends that the Home Office establish a new counter-disinformation unit to tackle online conspiracy theories head-on by “exposing their fundamental lack of credibility, through well-organised social media campaigns”.
This material is said to be circulating on both sides of the Atlantic with extremist messaging from the British National Socialist Movement in the UK and the National Socialist Movement in the United States. The similarities between the content across the Atlantic is identified by the author as an area of particular concern
Topics: Antisemitism: Education against, Main Topic: Antisemitism, Schools: Non-Jewish, Schools: Primary / Elementary, Schools: Seconday / High Schools, Teaching and Pedagogy, Universities / Higher Education, Conspiracy Theories, Antisemitism: Jewish Perceptions and Experiences, Antisemitism: In Education Systems, Schools: Jewish Pupils In Non-Jewish Schools, Schools: Kindergarten / Nursery Schools, Teachers, Education: Adult Education
Abstract: Malmö stad har under hösten 2020 undersökt förekomsten av antisemitism och förutsättningarna för judiskt liv i Malmös förskolor, skolor, gymnasier och vuxenutbildning. Resultatet presenteras nu i en rapport tillsammans med en forskningsöversikt och förslag på åtgärder framåt. Undersökningen och rapporten är en del av Malmö stad och Judiska Församlingen Malmös samverkansöverenskommelse.
Rapporten handlar om att motarbeta antisemitism och stärka förutsättningarna för judiskt liv i Malmös förskolor, skolor, gymnasier och vuxenutbildning. Studien består av intervjuer med skolpersonal och judiska barn och unga i Malmö, vilket kompletteras med en skolpersonalenkät utförd i några av Malmös grundskolor och gymnasier, samt en forskningsöversikt.
- Antisemitismen i Malmö är ett verkligt problem med tydliga offer, men frågan är mer mångbottnad än vad den ibland beskrivs som. Målsättningen med det här arbetet är att, utifrån kunskap och forskning, identifiera problem och behov i Malmös skolor för att skapa förutsättningar för att arbeta systematiskt med dessa frågor i utbildningen, säger Mirjam Katzin, samordnare för arbetet mot antisemitism och författare till rapporten.
Resultatet visar att det ofta saknas tillräckliga förutsättningar och förkunskaper hos skolpersonal för att arbeta mot antisemitism. För att förebygga rasism och antisemitism är en ökad kunskapsnivå central. Detta gäller i första hand lärare och annan skolpersonal och i andra hand eleverna. Slutsatsen är att det behövs kunskap och utbildning i demokrati, rättigheter, antirasism och specifikt frågor om antisemitism, konspirationsteorier, Israel/Palestina och de nationella minoriteterna.
Abstract: The more than a million, mostly Muslim, arrivals in the European Union in recent years have given mainstream politicians an opportunity to generate and exploit the public racist, xenophobic and ultra-nationalist urges of the sort that had previously been the exclusive preserve of the extreme right. This successful vote-getting strategy hingeS on disassociating ethno-religious hatred, which Islamophobia is, from its most stigmatized example in Europe: antisemitism. Nowhere has this process been clearer than in Hungary, infamous for ‘solving’ the migration crisis by erecting a wire fence along its borders. Viktor Orbán and his ruling Fidesz party have stolen the racist thunder of the far-right Jobbik party, but without the latter’s once open antisemitism. Jobbik has responded by also seemingly renouncing antisemitism, ignoring the protests of its more die-hard neo-Nazi supporters. Kalmar’s article focuses on the government’s use of a conspiracy theory about the Jewish financier George Soros as an example of exploiting antisemitism while claiming to oppose it. It suggests that the process of rejecting antisemitism, if disingenuously, in order to legitimize Islamophobic racism in Hungary is a useful model for examining similar processes in much of the Euro-Atlantic world.
