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Date: 2019
Abstract: Since 1995, Surveys on antisemitism using national representative samples have been regularly carried out in Hungary. In this article, we used data from the 2011 and 2017 surveys to explore the relationship between three types of antisemitism, namely religious, secular, and emotional. Moreover, we scrutinized how different religiosity indicators can be used as explanatory variables for the different types of antisemitism. We found a slight increase in religious and secular antisemitism between 2011 and 2017, while emotional antisemitism remained almost the same. Religious anti-Judaism significantly correlated with both secular and emotional antisemitism, however, its relationship was much stronger with the former. When analyzing the relationship between different types of antisemitism and religiosity indicators, we found that while in 2011, all the indicators were connected to religious, and most of them to secular and emotional antisemitism, in 2017, only the variables measuring subjective self-classification remained significant. The results show that the relationship between religion and antisemitism underwent some substantial changes between 2011 and 2017. While in 2011, personal religiosity was a significant predictor of the strength of antisemitism, in 2017, religion serving as a cultural identity marker took over this function. The hypothetical explanatory factor for the change is the rebirth of the “Christian-national” idea appearing as the foundational element of the new Hungarian constitution, according to which Christian culture is the ultimate unifying force of the nation, giving the inner essence and meaning of the state. In this discourse, being Christian is equated with being Hungarian. Self-declared and self-defined Christian religiosity plays the role of a symbolic marker for accepting the national-conservative identity discourse and belonging to the “Christian-national” cultural-political camp where antisemitic prejudices occur more frequently than in other segments of the society
Date: 2020
Abstract: Книга посвящена одной из деноминаций иудаизма — так называемомупрогрессивному, или реформистскому, иудаизму, а также его особенностямв России, идентичности его последователей и ряду факторов, способствую-щих его распространению. Хотя реформистский иудаизм пока сравнитель-но мало распространен в России, за рубежом, особенно в США, он являетсянаиболее крупной деноминацией иудаизма. Эта тема почти не изучена в на-шей стране и за рубежом, поэтому книга является новаторской, она вводитв научный оборот новые материалы, касающиеся истории реформистскогоиудаизма и его состояния в РФ.Книга построена в основном на полевых материалах автора, в приложе-ниях содержатся тексты нескольких интервью с раввинами и членами ре-формистской общины, а также таблицы и графики, составленные по резуль-татам опроса, проведенного в реформистской общине.Книга представляет интерес для историков, социальных антропологов,социологов, религиоведов, специалистов по иудаике, а также для студентов,обучающихся по этим специальностям
Date: 2019
Abstract: [Edited from press release]

The AJC Paris study was conducted by IFOP, a leading polling firm, in partnership with Fondapol, a major French think tank. They polled 505 French Jews and 1027 French people between October 14 and November 19, 2019.

As antisemitism in France continues to spiral, Jews and the general population in France agree on the magnitude of the problem, according to the American Jewish Committee (AJC) Paris survey of perceptions of and experiences with antisemitism in France.

But alignment on the antisemitism threat to French society, and the government’s weak responsiveness, does not mitigate the fears of Jews about their safety and future in France.

Nearly three-quarters, 73%, of the French public, and 72% of Jews, consider antisemitism a problem that affects all of French society. 47% of the general public and 67% of the Jewish respondents say the level of antisemitism in France is high, while 27% and 22%, respectively, say it is low.

While 53% of the general public say antisemitism has been increasing, and 18% decreasing, in recent years, 77% of Jews say it has increased and 12% decreased.

The AJC Paris survey found that 70 percent of French Jews say they have been victims of at least one antisemitic incident in their lifetime, 64% have suffered anti-Semitic verbal abuse at least once, and 23% have been targets of physical violence on at least one occasion, with 10 percent saying they were attacked several times.

The continued spiraling of antisemitism in France has led significant percentages of the Jewish population to take protective actions. More than one-third, 37%, refrain from using visible Jewish symbols, 25% avoid revealing their Jewish identity in the workplace, and 52% have considered leaving France.

Overall, 44% of the Jewish sample say the situation for French Jews is worse than a year ago, only 11% say it is better and 42% no better or worse.

The youngest Jews, ages 18-24, are on the “front line” more than older cohorts in confronting antisemitism. 84% of them have suffered at last one antisemitic act, compared with 70% of all respondents; 79 percent had suffered verbal abuse, compared with 64% of all respondents, and 39% faced an act of physical aggression, compared with 23% of the full Jewish sample.

Visibly religious French Jews feel the most vulnerable, with 74% of them saying they had been a victim of at least one act of verbal abuse, compared with 64% of the full Jewish sample.

The main locations where antisemitic incidents occur the most are in the street and school. 55% said they had been insulted or threatened on the street, and 59% said they had suffered physical abuse in the school.

54% were victims of verbal abuse, and 26% had been victims of antisemitic violence in schools.

But equally disturbing is the finding that 46% said they had suffered anti-Semitic verbal abuse in the workplace.

Regarding the responsiveness of elected officials, Jews and the general public agree. Only 47% of Jews and 48% of the general public have confidence in the President of France tackling antisemitism, 46% of Jews and 41% of the public in the French government, and 58% of Jews and 56% of the public in local elected officials

Date: 2019
Date: 2002
Abstract: The article presents the results of surveys done on anti-Semitism in Poland in 1992, which in part were compared to results from a 1996 survey. The group, under the author's direction researched anti-Semitism in the context of Poles' attitudes towards other nations, as well as in terms of their own national identity. Two types of anti-Semitic attitudes were observed: traditional, religiously grounded anti-Semitism, and anti-Semitism rooted in anti-Semitic political ideology, of the type that has developed since in the French Revolution. Traditional anti-Semitism occurs only among older people who are not well educated and live in rural areas; increased education results in the disappearance of this type of anti-Semitism. Modern anti-Semitism, on the other hand occurs among both the lowest and most highly educated groups in society. Moreover, from 1992 to 1996, the percentage of the respondents declaring anti-Semitic views increased. At the same time, however, there was also a larger increase in the number of respondents declaring anti-anti-Semitic views, which has meant that there has been a clear polarization of attitudes. Having a university education makes a person more likely to be ill-disposed toward anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, the attitude of Poles toward Jews cannot be described simply on the basis of anti-Semitic attitudes. The researchers noted that there was also an attitude of "not liking Jews", which was less engaged than the anti-Semitic views, and to a large extent a result of the content comprising Polish national identity. The model of Polishness assumes a Romantic-Messianic image of the Polish nation. According to this model, Poles see themselves as being distinguished by their noble fulfillment of obligations, even when it is to their own detriment, particularly with respect to symbolic Jews and Germans. Researchers also assumed that there was a particular kind of competition between Poles and Jews with respect to the moral superiority of their respective nations. The results from 1992 in part confirmed this hypothesis.
Date: 2005
Date: 2003
Date: 2003
Abstract: Background: Jewish culturally supported beliefs may discourage drinking and drunkenness as ways of socialising and coping with stress. Thus Jewish men under stress may be relatively more likely to become depressed, and less likely to use and abuse alcohol. This study is the first qualitative comparison of Jews and Protestants, men and women. It examines whether alcohol-related beliefs are consistent with the alcohol-depression hypothesis, i.e. that positive beliefs about alcohol use and effects are associated with high alcohol use and low depression.

Material and discussion: A thematic (interpretive phenomenological) analysis on open-ended question responses, from 70 Jews and 91 Protestants, and on semi-structured interviews with five Jews and four Protestants, identified three salient themes: the importance of retaining self-control; the pleasures of losing inhibitions; and the relations of alcohol-related behaviour to identity. Compared to Protestants, Jews described alcohol-related behaviour as threatening to self-control, loss of inhibition as unenjoyable and dangerous and distinguished between the kinds of drinking behaviours appropriate for Jews and others. Sub-themes for Protestant men were denial that drinking threatens self-control, and appropriateness of going to the pub.

Conclusions: The themes identified are not measurable using published research instruments. Alcohol-related behaviour may be a feature of Jewish identity. The beliefs identified are consistent with the alcohol-depression hypothesis.
Date: 2003
Author(s): Volovici, Leon
Date: 1994
Date: 1996
Abstract: W książce, którą Państwu przedstawiamy, omawiamy wyniki ogólnopolskiego badania ankietowego. Badanie to poświęcone było wielu różnym zagadnieniom, które wiązały się bezpośrednio i pośrednio ze stosunkiem Polaków do mniejszości narodowych, sąsiadów, a nade wszystko — do Żydów. [... ]
Obraz, jaki się wyłania z naszego badania, nie jest tak ciemny i niekorzystny dla społeczeństwa polskiego, jak by wynikało z opinii, popularnych choćby na początku lat dziewięćdziesiątych. [...]
Początek lat dziewięćdziesiątych nie był łaskawy dla obrazu Polski i Polaków w oczach opinii światowej. Zachwytowi zwycięstwem nad komunizmem i wprowadzeniem zasadniczych reform ustrojowych towarzyszyły opinie o Polakach - antysemitach, zamkniętych w sobie, a w dodatku wzajemnie ze sobą skłóconych. Do przywołania tego obrazu przyczynili się politycy, choć już wcześniej zaczęła to publicystyka, zwłaszcza w czasie kampanii wyborczych: prezydenckiej i do Sejmu. Wówczas to niektóre ważne osoby z dawnej opozycji demokratycznej nader często pisały — również w prasie zagranicznej — o niechęci Polaków do obcych i ich antysemityzmie. [...]
Na podstawie odpowiedzi na pytania ankiety wyodrębniliśmy dwa rodzaje antysemityzmu: pierwszy — polityczny [...], zwany nowoczesnym, oraz drugi — religijny, nazwany tradycyjnym. [...] W Polsce mamy do czynienia raczej z przejawami polityczno-ideologicznej formy antysemityzmu, na którą składa się charakterystyczny zespół poglądów występujący w całej Europie. Nie znajdujemy w nim nic „specyficznie polskiego". Natomiast tradycyjny, religijnie uzasadniony antysemityzm bardziej zasługiwałby na to miano. Jednakże obecnie występuje on rzadko. [..,] W żadnym więc przypadku nie można uznać go za charakterystyczny rys polskich postaw antyżydowskich. Również wiara religijna samodzielnie w niewielkim stopniu wyjaśnia niechęci i antyżydowskie stereotypy.
Date: 2013
Date: 2018
Abstract: Реализация этого проекта предполагала включение 25 вопросов в ежемесячный опрос по общенациональной выборке. Опрос был проведен 23–30 августа 2018 года по репрезентативной
всероссийской выборке городского и сельского населения объемом 1600 человек в возрасте от
18 лет и старше в 136 населенных пунктах, 52 субъектах РФ. Исследование проводилось на дому
у респондента методом личного интервью. Распределение ответов (если не указано иное) приводится в процентах от общего числа опрошенных. Полученные данные дополнены результатами и
выводами из аналогичных исследований Левада-центра, проводимых с 1990 года, прежде всего –
материалами июльского опроса 2018 года.
В настоящем Отчете акцент сделан на анализ ксенофобских установок и их изменений в России;
меньшее внимание уделено потенциалу и угрозе, вызванных антисемитизмом, поскольку сравнительно недавно (в 2016 г.) Левада-центром были проведено большое исследование населения
России по этой проблеме, а в 2018 году отдельно - опрос евреев России по этой же теме (количественный опрос и серия фокус групп)1
, посвященных среди прочего динамике ксенофобских
и антисемитских настроений в обществе и форм их выражения, а также оценкам потенциальных
угроз российскими евреями
Date: 2018
Abstract: В настоящем исследовании была использована значительная часть вопросов общеевропейского
опроса, проводившимся Агентством Европейского Союза по основным правам (АОП) в восьми
странах Европейского Союза в 2012 году1
, направленного на мониторинг антисемитизма, личного
опыта опрошенных с подобными проявлениями, среди еврейского населения 8 европейских
стран.2
Использование одних и тех же вопросов дает возможность сравнить мнения и оценки
российских евреев с такими же оценками среди евреев из других стран, то есть оценивать современный масштаб антисемитизма в России в общеевропейском контексте. Отметим, что методика
европейского опроса иная, в отличие от российского опроса, проводившегося методом интервью face-to-face, европейское исследование – опрос онлайн. Это означает, что респонденты самостоятельно принимали решение отвечать на анкету. Несмотря на эти методические расхождения, мы считаем возможным сравнение полученных нами данных с европейскими, поскольку
они указывают на общие тенденции.
Все приводимые в настоящем отчете данные представляют собой распределение ответов (процент ответов к числу всех опрошенных, равное 517 человек, старше 16 лет, если не указано иное).
Отправной точкой для проведения настоящего исследование служит представление, что в последние многие годы мы не наблюдаем явного роста антисемитизма, основанное на результатах предыдущих массовых общероссийских исследований, проведенных по заказу РЕК. На фоне
весьма высокого уровня ксенофобии, нараставшего с середины 1990-х гг. по отношению к представителям различных этнонациональных общностей, прежде всего – к приезжим из кавказских
и среднеазиатских республик бывшего СССР, массовый негативизм по отношению к евреям выражен достаточно слабо. Но таковы были зафиксированные в социологических опросах массовые
установки всего населения России. Общенациональная репрезентативная выборка не позволяла
при этом сколько-нибудь определенно судить о том, а как смотрят на те же самые проблемы сами
российские евреи, насколько они обеспокоены угрозой агрессивного национализма, расизма и
антисемитизма в России. Потребность ответить на эти вопросы обусловила проведение настоящего социологического исследования.
Date: 2013
Author(s): Staetsky, L. Daniel
Date: 2019
Abstract: Is criticism of Israel antisemitic? Do anti-Israel views and attitudes constitute a “new antisemitism”? These questions have occupied the minds of many academics and pubic intellectuals – both Jewish and non-Jewish – since the beginning of the twenty-first century. So far, no consensus has emerged. The definitions of antisemitism are many but all have been contested to varying degrees. This paper offers a brief survey of the definitions of antisemitism and the way in which these definitions accommodate anti-Israel and/or anti-Zionist views and attitudes. This is done, however, by way of introduction and without any assessment of the quality of the definitions in scientific terms, or their acceptability in political terms. The overview simply provides the background and the motivation for the main subject of the paper. The Jewish public’s perception of the link between antisemitism and anti-Israel/anti-Zionist attitudes forms the main focus of this paper. This is, to my knowledge, the first time that this subject has been treated in a strictly empirical, quantitative manner using large datasets.

What does the Jewish public, as opposed to the intellectual elite, think about the link between antisemitism and anti-Zionism? This question has so far remained unexplored, and in this paper I attempt to answer it utilising a newly created dataset. In summer 2012, a survey of experiences and perceptions of antisemitism among Jews took place in selected European countries.

Using advanced statistical techniques, it is possible to explore the extent to which the Jewish public makes a distinction between classic antisemitic and anti-Israel/anti-Zionist statements. Are anti-Israel/anti-Zionist statements perceived as antisemitic by Jews? Are they perceived to be antisemitic to the same extent as other, more classic, antisemitic statements? The paper addresses these questions focusing on the British and French samples of Jews, and comparing and contrasting insights produced by these two contexts.
Date: 2018
Abstract: This article analyses the results of a study conducted for the Russian Jewish Congress in 2018. 517 people over the age of 16, living in 21 towns in the Russian Federation and identifying as Jews were interviewed. The goal of the study was to establish the scale of modern day anti-Semitism in Russia and to put it into all-European context. With this goal in mind the scientists used a considerable part of the questions from the all-European survey conducted
by the European Union agency for Fundamental Rights in 8 EU countries in 2012. The use of the same questions allowed to compare the views and evaluations of Russian Jews with those of Jews from other countries, that is to evaluate the modern scale of anti-Semitism in Russia in a European context. Anti-Semitism in Europe and in Russia is similar in several ways. It’s most often demonstrated in the form of offences, threats and publishing
of anti-Semite materials in the media. The main platform for expression of anti-Semite views today
is the Internet. Nevertheless, Russia differs from European countries in several important aspects.

Firstly, the origins and nature of anti-Semitism are different. In Russia anti-Semitism is built into xenophobia and is most often expressed on a mundane level. Its carriers are average citizens and not members of certain (neo-nazi) organizations. Xenophobia in Russia is, in turn, oriented against the “ethnically different” and not Jews who are
after all considered ‘insiders”. Secondly, there’s no anti-Zionist component in Russian anti-Semitism,
unlike European countries, where waves of antiSemitism are closely tied with Israel’s policies in the
Middle East.
Date: 2016
Abstract: Le dispositif d’enquête dont les principaux enseignements sont présentés ci-après a été conduit par l’Institut Ipsos à la demande de la Fondation du Judaïsme Français. Ce dispositif d’études s’articule autour de trois volets.

Le premier volet concerne l’ensemble de la population française : nous avons interrogé 1005 personnes constituant un échantillon représentatif de la population française âgée de 18 ans et plus (méthode des quotas). L’enquête a été réalisée par internet du 15 au 24 juillet 2014.

Le second concerne les personnes se considérant comme juives : après avoir réalisé 45 entretiens qualitatifs d’environ 2h auprès de juifs (45) dont des responsables communautaires (15) en région parisienne, à Toulouse et Strasbourg, Ipsos a réalisé une étude quantitative auprès de 313 personnes.
Il n’existe pas de définition satisfaisante de qui est juif et qui ne l’est pas. Il n’existe pas non plus de statistiques permettant d’appliquer des quotas. La méthode utilisée a été celle de l’autodéfinition par les personnes elles-mêmes. Est juif celui ou celle qui se considère comme tel. A partir de plusieurs dizaines de milliers de panélistes interrogés, on a ainsi pu extraire un échantillon de 313 personnes se déclarant comme juif ou juive, auquel le questionnaire a été administré du 24 février au 8 juin 2015. Cette méthode a l’avantage de limiter les biais que l’on rencontre lors de recrutement « dans la rue » ou à proximité de lieux de culte

Le troisième concerne les personnes se considérant comme musulmanes. Pour les mêmes raisons, il a été procédé exactement de la même façon que pour les répondants juifs. Un échantillon de 500 personnes se déclarant musulman/musulmane extrait de notre Acces Panel a ainsi été interrogé du 24 février au 9 mars 2015.
Author(s): Kovács, András
Date: 2006
Abstract: [From the introduction to the article]
Between March and November 1999, under the auspices of the Minority Research Institute of the Department of Sociology, Eötvös Loránd University, I conducted a sociological survey of the current situation of the Jewish community in Hungary. In the course of the survey, 2015 respondents were interviewed. The most important demographic and social data were collected for four generations – from respondents’ grandparents to their children. Participants in the survey were asked to respond to questions concerning their relationship towards Jewish traditions and their acceptance or rejection of various forms of Jewish identity. They were also asked for their opinions on assimilation, integration and dissimilation, on Israel, and on the current significance of the Holocaust. Finally, an attempt was made to gauge the opinions of Hungarian Jews on the state of their own community, on their relationships with non-Jews, and on antisemitism in postcommunist Hungary.
My purpose in this article shall be to analyse the data that we collected in this latter area. Firstly, I shall reveal how Jews living in Hungary define antisemitism, and whether – when it comes to classifying particular statements as antisemitic – there are any significant differences between younger and older groups of Jews, between those who are better educated and those with less education, and between those with a stronger and those with a weaker sense of Jewish identity. I shall then explore how the various respondent groups judge the extent, intensity and gravity of anti-Jewish sentiment in the country, examining in particular whether respondents themselves have experienced such sentiment or have been subjected to discrimination. I shall reveal whether respondents think that antisemitism will increase or decrease in the coming years. Finally, I shall touch upon the policies that respondents consider desirable when it comes to tackling antisemitic phenomena. Evidently, the images formed by Jews and non-Jews shall determine in large part the relations between the two groups of one other.