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Date: 2016
Date: 2020
Abstract: Written by the world’s leading Jewish demographer, Professor Sergio DellaPergola, and Dr Daniel Staetsky, Director of JPR’s European Jewish Demography Unit, this report shines a light on the demography of Jewish in Austria today, and presents in-depth analysis of fertility rates, age distribution data, patterns of Jewish identity, migration and intermarriage rates to predict Austrian Jewry’s future. It demonstrates, through careful and methodical analysis, that the population is projected to grow.

Whilst the Austrian Jewish population is small, its projected growth constitutes an important finding in European Jewish demography. The Jewish population of Europe has declined dramatically over the past century and a half, particularly as a result of mass migration and the Holocaust. Yet today, in several European countries, demographers are beginning to see signs of growth, driven particularly by high birth rates in the strictly Orthodox population. This study provides an important example of this phenomenon.

The report is a publication of JPR’s European Jewish Demography Unit, an initiative established in 2019 to produce new data to support Jewish community planning across Europe. Funded by the Rothschild Foundation Hanadiv Europe, the Unit is working to produce country-specific reports annually, and this study about Austria is the first of these.

The report draws on three major sources of data: the 2001 Austrian Census, comprehensive records of the Austrian Jewish community and a survey carried out by a JPR/Ipsos consortium in 2018 for the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).

Key findings include:

Today the core Jewish population of Austria is estimated to be just above 10,000. The ‘core Jewish population’ consists of people who would explicitly identify themselves as Jews. This is the highest number of Jews observed in Austria since the 1960.
According to the Israeli Law of Return – which uses a broader definition to determine who is entitled to migrate to Israel and immediately apply for Israeli citizenship – the eligible Jewish population in Austria is currently about 20,000.
The core Jewish population constitutes 0.1% of the total population of Austria. 64% of all Austrians are Roman Catholics, 17% are unaffiliated in religious terms, and 8% are Muslims.
The Jewish population of Austria is growing and may reach 11,000-12,000 by the mid-2030s.
About 86% of all Austrian Jews reside in Vienna. Only 19% of all Austrians live in Vienna
The average number of children that a Jewish woman in Austria is expected to have in her lifetime is 2.5; strictly Orthodox Jewish women have 6–7 children per woman, on average, while non-strictly Orthodox Jewish women typically have about 2. The average among Austrian women in general is 1.5.
Migration has been a powerful factor of growth in the Austrian Jewish population. Jews born in Israel constitute about 20% of Jews in Austria today.
About 78% of Jewish households in Austria are affiliated with the Jewish community through membership of its representative organisation. Compared to other communities around the world, this is a very high level of affiliation.
About 30% of Jews in Austria identify as ‘Orthodox’ or ‘Traditional’ and 19% as ‘strictly Orthodox.’ 15% identify as ‘Reform/Progressive’ and 19% as ‘just Jewish.’ Austrian Jewry has one of the highest proportions of strictly Orthodox Jews of all European Jewish communities.
Due to their high fertility, the strictly Orthodox represent the main engine of population growth for the Jewish community as a whole. For the same reason, their share in the Jewish population is expected to increase significantly in the medium term.
About two thirds (70%) of partnered Austrian Jews have a Jewish partner.
About 70% of all Jewish children of compulsory school age in Austria attend Jewish schools. While 100% of strictly Orthodox Jews attend Jewish schools, among the non-strictly Orthodox uptake is still significant – about 52%.
Date: 2020
Author(s): Vašečka, Michal
Date: 2006
Author(s): Graham, David
Date: 2020
Abstract: This report, published in conjunction with the Isaac and Jessie Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies at the University of Cape Town, contains a detailed demographic assessment of the South African Jewish population and the results of the 2019 Jewish Community Survey of South Africa – the largest and most extensive study of its kind ever undertaken. The fieldwork for the survey generated a final sample of 4,193 individuals (aged 18 and over) living in 2,402 unique households. Accounting for everyone living within those households, the report draws on data on 5,287 individuals.

Authored by JPR Senior Research Fellow Dr David Graham, the report finds that the Jewish population of the country has declined over the past twenty years, mainly as a result of migration, but also due to the natural ageing of the population. Jews have emigrated from South Africa in significant numbers since the 1960s; the study speculates that the South African Jewish diaspora may now be larger than the Jewish population living in South Africa.

However, despite the numerical decline, the report demonstrates that the South African Jewish community is remarkably vibrant and resilient. Overall, Jewish identity in South Africa appears to be stronger, and more religious, than in either Australia or the UK and the community remains very close-knit.

The study finds significant differences between the Jewish communities of Johannesburg and Cape Town, with 48% in Johannesburg self-identifying as either Orthodox or strictly Orthodox, compared with 22% in Cape Town. In Cape Town 40% self-describe as Progressive or Secular, compared with 18% in Johannesburg.

The report explores South African Jews' sense of belonging to the country and sense of satisfaction with their lives, as well as their attitudes to issues such as unemployment, government corruption and crime levels, anti-Israel sentiment and antisemitism. It also contains new data on synagogue membership and Jewish school enrolment.

The study is designed to provide an up-to-date set of empirical data to help Jewish community leaders plan for the future, including those involved in social care, health and welfare, education, religious life and combating antisemitism.
Author(s): Fromson, Hadassah
Date: 2018
Abstract: This thesis aimed to explore whether religion, sexual knowledge and sexual attitudes impact sexual satisfaction amongst Orthodox Jews. This thesis intended to address weaknesses of previous research by using robust multidimensional measures of religion and sexuality and focusing on a specific religious group. 515 participants completed measures circulated through an online survey. The measures used were: The New Sexual Satisfaction Scale; Centrality of Religiosity Scale (CRS); threes subscales of the Brief Sexual Attitudes Scale (Permissiveness, Communion and Instrumentality); and a new measure, the Brief Sexual Knowledge scale, developed for this study. Participants were also presented with optional open-ended questions that asked about their sexual expectations and sexual education. Religious level was categorised using self-defined groups for Religious Culture; Ultra-Orthodox, Modern-Orthodox and Non-Orthodox groups as well as CRS categories for Religious Practice; Highly Religious, Religious, Not Religious. The findings show significant differences in the sexual satisfaction between Religious Practice groups but not Religious Culture groups. Significant differences in sexual knowledge and sexual attitudes were found for both types of religious variables. A correlation analysis revealed that sexual satisfaction is positively correlated with CRS and Communion scores whilst negatively correlated with Sexual Knowledge, Permissiveness and Instrumentality scores. Communion and Sexual Knowledge were significant predictors of sexual satisfaction in a multiple regression analysis. The findings of this study enhance theoretical understanding of religion and sexuality and address gaps in the literature. Clinical implications for therapists working with Orthodox Jewish clients suffering from sexual dissatisfaction are discussed.
Date: 2019
Abstract: Since 1995, Surveys on antisemitism using national representative samples have been regularly carried out in Hungary. In this article, we used data from the 2011 and 2017 surveys to explore the relationship between three types of antisemitism, namely religious, secular, and emotional. Moreover, we scrutinized how different religiosity indicators can be used as explanatory variables for the different types of antisemitism. We found a slight increase in religious and secular antisemitism between 2011 and 2017, while emotional antisemitism remained almost the same. Religious anti-Judaism significantly correlated with both secular and emotional antisemitism, however, its relationship was much stronger with the former. When analyzing the relationship between different types of antisemitism and religiosity indicators, we found that while in 2011, all the indicators were connected to religious, and most of them to secular and emotional antisemitism, in 2017, only the variables measuring subjective self-classification remained significant. The results show that the relationship between religion and antisemitism underwent some substantial changes between 2011 and 2017. While in 2011, personal religiosity was a significant predictor of the strength of antisemitism, in 2017, religion serving as a cultural identity marker took over this function. The hypothetical explanatory factor for the change is the rebirth of the “Christian-national” idea appearing as the foundational element of the new Hungarian constitution, according to which Christian culture is the ultimate unifying force of the nation, giving the inner essence and meaning of the state. In this discourse, being Christian is equated with being Hungarian. Self-declared and self-defined Christian religiosity plays the role of a symbolic marker for accepting the national-conservative identity discourse and belonging to the “Christian-national” cultural-political camp where antisemitic prejudices occur more frequently than in other segments of the society
Date: 2020
Abstract: Книга посвящена одной из деноминаций иудаизма — так называемомупрогрессивному, или реформистскому, иудаизму, а также его особенностямв России, идентичности его последователей и ряду факторов, способствую-щих его распространению. Хотя реформистский иудаизм пока сравнитель-но мало распространен в России, за рубежом, особенно в США, он являетсянаиболее крупной деноминацией иудаизма. Эта тема почти не изучена в на-шей стране и за рубежом, поэтому книга является новаторской, она вводитв научный оборот новые материалы, касающиеся истории реформистскогоиудаизма и его состояния в РФ.Книга построена в основном на полевых материалах автора, в приложе-ниях содержатся тексты нескольких интервью с раввинами и членами ре-формистской общины, а также таблицы и графики, составленные по резуль-татам опроса, проведенного в реформистской общине.Книга представляет интерес для историков, социальных антропологов,социологов, религиоведов, специалистов по иудаике, а также для студентов,обучающихся по этим специальностям
Date: 2019
Abstract: [Edited from press release]

The AJC Paris study was conducted by IFOP, a leading polling firm, in partnership with Fondapol, a major French think tank. They polled 505 French Jews and 1027 French people between October 14 and November 19, 2019.

As antisemitism in France continues to spiral, Jews and the general population in France agree on the magnitude of the problem, according to the American Jewish Committee (AJC) Paris survey of perceptions of and experiences with antisemitism in France.

But alignment on the antisemitism threat to French society, and the government’s weak responsiveness, does not mitigate the fears of Jews about their safety and future in France.

Nearly three-quarters, 73%, of the French public, and 72% of Jews, consider antisemitism a problem that affects all of French society. 47% of the general public and 67% of the Jewish respondents say the level of antisemitism in France is high, while 27% and 22%, respectively, say it is low.

While 53% of the general public say antisemitism has been increasing, and 18% decreasing, in recent years, 77% of Jews say it has increased and 12% decreased.

The AJC Paris survey found that 70 percent of French Jews say they have been victims of at least one antisemitic incident in their lifetime, 64% have suffered anti-Semitic verbal abuse at least once, and 23% have been targets of physical violence on at least one occasion, with 10 percent saying they were attacked several times.

The continued spiraling of antisemitism in France has led significant percentages of the Jewish population to take protective actions. More than one-third, 37%, refrain from using visible Jewish symbols, 25% avoid revealing their Jewish identity in the workplace, and 52% have considered leaving France.

Overall, 44% of the Jewish sample say the situation for French Jews is worse than a year ago, only 11% say it is better and 42% no better or worse.

The youngest Jews, ages 18-24, are on the “front line” more than older cohorts in confronting antisemitism. 84% of them have suffered at last one antisemitic act, compared with 70% of all respondents; 79 percent had suffered verbal abuse, compared with 64% of all respondents, and 39% faced an act of physical aggression, compared with 23% of the full Jewish sample.

Visibly religious French Jews feel the most vulnerable, with 74% of them saying they had been a victim of at least one act of verbal abuse, compared with 64% of the full Jewish sample.

The main locations where antisemitic incidents occur the most are in the street and school. 55% said they had been insulted or threatened on the street, and 59% said they had suffered physical abuse in the school.

54% were victims of verbal abuse, and 26% had been victims of antisemitic violence in schools.

But equally disturbing is the finding that 46% said they had suffered anti-Semitic verbal abuse in the workplace.

Regarding the responsiveness of elected officials, Jews and the general public agree. Only 47% of Jews and 48% of the general public have confidence in the President of France tackling antisemitism, 46% of Jews and 41% of the public in the French government, and 58% of Jews and 56% of the public in local elected officials

Date: 2019
Date: 2002
Abstract: The article presents the results of surveys done on anti-Semitism in Poland in 1992, which in part were compared to results from a 1996 survey. The group, under the author's direction researched anti-Semitism in the context of Poles' attitudes towards other nations, as well as in terms of their own national identity. Two types of anti-Semitic attitudes were observed: traditional, religiously grounded anti-Semitism, and anti-Semitism rooted in anti-Semitic political ideology, of the type that has developed since in the French Revolution. Traditional anti-Semitism occurs only among older people who are not well educated and live in rural areas; increased education results in the disappearance of this type of anti-Semitism. Modern anti-Semitism, on the other hand occurs among both the lowest and most highly educated groups in society. Moreover, from 1992 to 1996, the percentage of the respondents declaring anti-Semitic views increased. At the same time, however, there was also a larger increase in the number of respondents declaring anti-anti-Semitic views, which has meant that there has been a clear polarization of attitudes. Having a university education makes a person more likely to be ill-disposed toward anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, the attitude of Poles toward Jews cannot be described simply on the basis of anti-Semitic attitudes. The researchers noted that there was also an attitude of "not liking Jews", which was less engaged than the anti-Semitic views, and to a large extent a result of the content comprising Polish national identity. The model of Polishness assumes a Romantic-Messianic image of the Polish nation. According to this model, Poles see themselves as being distinguished by their noble fulfillment of obligations, even when it is to their own detriment, particularly with respect to symbolic Jews and Germans. Researchers also assumed that there was a particular kind of competition between Poles and Jews with respect to the moral superiority of their respective nations. The results from 1992 in part confirmed this hypothesis.
Date: 2005
Date: 2003
Date: 2003
Abstract: Background: Jewish culturally supported beliefs may discourage drinking and drunkenness as ways of socialising and coping with stress. Thus Jewish men under stress may be relatively more likely to become depressed, and less likely to use and abuse alcohol. This study is the first qualitative comparison of Jews and Protestants, men and women. It examines whether alcohol-related beliefs are consistent with the alcohol-depression hypothesis, i.e. that positive beliefs about alcohol use and effects are associated with high alcohol use and low depression.

Material and discussion: A thematic (interpretive phenomenological) analysis on open-ended question responses, from 70 Jews and 91 Protestants, and on semi-structured interviews with five Jews and four Protestants, identified three salient themes: the importance of retaining self-control; the pleasures of losing inhibitions; and the relations of alcohol-related behaviour to identity. Compared to Protestants, Jews described alcohol-related behaviour as threatening to self-control, loss of inhibition as unenjoyable and dangerous and distinguished between the kinds of drinking behaviours appropriate for Jews and others. Sub-themes for Protestant men were denial that drinking threatens self-control, and appropriateness of going to the pub.

Conclusions: The themes identified are not measurable using published research instruments. Alcohol-related behaviour may be a feature of Jewish identity. The beliefs identified are consistent with the alcohol-depression hypothesis.
Date: 2003
Author(s): Volovici, Leon
Date: 1994
Date: 1996
Abstract: W książce, którą Państwu przedstawiamy, omawiamy wyniki ogólnopolskiego badania ankietowego. Badanie to poświęcone było wielu różnym zagadnieniom, które wiązały się bezpośrednio i pośrednio ze stosunkiem Polaków do mniejszości narodowych, sąsiadów, a nade wszystko — do Żydów. [... ]
Obraz, jaki się wyłania z naszego badania, nie jest tak ciemny i niekorzystny dla społeczeństwa polskiego, jak by wynikało z opinii, popularnych choćby na początku lat dziewięćdziesiątych. [...]
Początek lat dziewięćdziesiątych nie był łaskawy dla obrazu Polski i Polaków w oczach opinii światowej. Zachwytowi zwycięstwem nad komunizmem i wprowadzeniem zasadniczych reform ustrojowych towarzyszyły opinie o Polakach - antysemitach, zamkniętych w sobie, a w dodatku wzajemnie ze sobą skłóconych. Do przywołania tego obrazu przyczynili się politycy, choć już wcześniej zaczęła to publicystyka, zwłaszcza w czasie kampanii wyborczych: prezydenckiej i do Sejmu. Wówczas to niektóre ważne osoby z dawnej opozycji demokratycznej nader często pisały — również w prasie zagranicznej — o niechęci Polaków do obcych i ich antysemityzmie. [...]
Na podstawie odpowiedzi na pytania ankiety wyodrębniliśmy dwa rodzaje antysemityzmu: pierwszy — polityczny [...], zwany nowoczesnym, oraz drugi — religijny, nazwany tradycyjnym. [...] W Polsce mamy do czynienia raczej z przejawami polityczno-ideologicznej formy antysemityzmu, na którą składa się charakterystyczny zespół poglądów występujący w całej Europie. Nie znajdujemy w nim nic „specyficznie polskiego". Natomiast tradycyjny, religijnie uzasadniony antysemityzm bardziej zasługiwałby na to miano. Jednakże obecnie występuje on rzadko. [..,] W żadnym więc przypadku nie można uznać go za charakterystyczny rys polskich postaw antyżydowskich. Również wiara religijna samodzielnie w niewielkim stopniu wyjaśnia niechęci i antyżydowskie stereotypy.
Date: 2013
Date: 2018
Abstract: Реализация этого проекта предполагала включение 25 вопросов в ежемесячный опрос по общенациональной выборке. Опрос был проведен 23–30 августа 2018 года по репрезентативной
всероссийской выборке городского и сельского населения объемом 1600 человек в возрасте от
18 лет и старше в 136 населенных пунктах, 52 субъектах РФ. Исследование проводилось на дому
у респондента методом личного интервью. Распределение ответов (если не указано иное) приводится в процентах от общего числа опрошенных. Полученные данные дополнены результатами и
выводами из аналогичных исследований Левада-центра, проводимых с 1990 года, прежде всего –
материалами июльского опроса 2018 года.
В настоящем Отчете акцент сделан на анализ ксенофобских установок и их изменений в России;
меньшее внимание уделено потенциалу и угрозе, вызванных антисемитизмом, поскольку сравнительно недавно (в 2016 г.) Левада-центром были проведено большое исследование населения
России по этой проблеме, а в 2018 году отдельно - опрос евреев России по этой же теме (количественный опрос и серия фокус групп)1
, посвященных среди прочего динамике ксенофобских
и антисемитских настроений в обществе и форм их выражения, а также оценкам потенциальных
угроз российскими евреями
Date: 2018
Abstract: В настоящем исследовании была использована значительная часть вопросов общеевропейского
опроса, проводившимся Агентством Европейского Союза по основным правам (АОП) в восьми
странах Европейского Союза в 2012 году1
, направленного на мониторинг антисемитизма, личного
опыта опрошенных с подобными проявлениями, среди еврейского населения 8 европейских
стран.2
Использование одних и тех же вопросов дает возможность сравнить мнения и оценки
российских евреев с такими же оценками среди евреев из других стран, то есть оценивать современный масштаб антисемитизма в России в общеевропейском контексте. Отметим, что методика
европейского опроса иная, в отличие от российского опроса, проводившегося методом интервью face-to-face, европейское исследование – опрос онлайн. Это означает, что респонденты самостоятельно принимали решение отвечать на анкету. Несмотря на эти методические расхождения, мы считаем возможным сравнение полученных нами данных с европейскими, поскольку
они указывают на общие тенденции.
Все приводимые в настоящем отчете данные представляют собой распределение ответов (процент ответов к числу всех опрошенных, равное 517 человек, старше 16 лет, если не указано иное).
Отправной точкой для проведения настоящего исследование служит представление, что в последние многие годы мы не наблюдаем явного роста антисемитизма, основанное на результатах предыдущих массовых общероссийских исследований, проведенных по заказу РЕК. На фоне
весьма высокого уровня ксенофобии, нараставшего с середины 1990-х гг. по отношению к представителям различных этнонациональных общностей, прежде всего – к приезжим из кавказских
и среднеазиатских республик бывшего СССР, массовый негативизм по отношению к евреям выражен достаточно слабо. Но таковы были зафиксированные в социологических опросах массовые
установки всего населения России. Общенациональная репрезентативная выборка не позволяла
при этом сколько-нибудь определенно судить о том, а как смотрят на те же самые проблемы сами
российские евреи, насколько они обеспокоены угрозой агрессивного национализма, расизма и
антисемитизма в России. Потребность ответить на эти вопросы обусловила проведение настоящего социологического исследования.
Date: 2013
Author(s): Staetsky, L. Daniel
Date: 2019
Abstract: Is criticism of Israel antisemitic? Do anti-Israel views and attitudes constitute a “new antisemitism”? These questions have occupied the minds of many academics and pubic intellectuals – both Jewish and non-Jewish – since the beginning of the twenty-first century. So far, no consensus has emerged. The definitions of antisemitism are many but all have been contested to varying degrees. This paper offers a brief survey of the definitions of antisemitism and the way in which these definitions accommodate anti-Israel and/or anti-Zionist views and attitudes. This is done, however, by way of introduction and without any assessment of the quality of the definitions in scientific terms, or their acceptability in political terms. The overview simply provides the background and the motivation for the main subject of the paper. The Jewish public’s perception of the link between antisemitism and anti-Israel/anti-Zionist attitudes forms the main focus of this paper. This is, to my knowledge, the first time that this subject has been treated in a strictly empirical, quantitative manner using large datasets.

What does the Jewish public, as opposed to the intellectual elite, think about the link between antisemitism and anti-Zionism? This question has so far remained unexplored, and in this paper I attempt to answer it utilising a newly created dataset. In summer 2012, a survey of experiences and perceptions of antisemitism among Jews took place in selected European countries.

Using advanced statistical techniques, it is possible to explore the extent to which the Jewish public makes a distinction between classic antisemitic and anti-Israel/anti-Zionist statements. Are anti-Israel/anti-Zionist statements perceived as antisemitic by Jews? Are they perceived to be antisemitic to the same extent as other, more classic, antisemitic statements? The paper addresses these questions focusing on the British and French samples of Jews, and comparing and contrasting insights produced by these two contexts.