Abstract: The article analyzes the newest survey results on antisemitic prejudices, antisemitic political discourses, and political antisemitism in present-day Hungary. According to the research findings, during the first decade and a half after the fall of communism, 10%-15% of the Hungarian adult population held a strong antisemitic prejudice. Surveys conducted after 2006 show not only an increase in the absolute percentage of antisemites, but also an increase in the proportion of antisemites who embed their antisemitism in the political context. This phenomenon is linked with the appearance on the political scene of Jobbik, a more or less openly antisemitic party. When examining the causes of antisemitism, the most interesting finding was that the strength of antisemitic feelings is regionally different and that these differences correlate with the strength of Jobbik’s support in the various regions. Accordingly, we hypothesized that support for a far-right party is not a consequence of antisemitism, but conversely should be regarded as a factor that mobilizes attitudes leading to antisemitism. Thus, antisemitism is—at least in large part—a consequence of an attraction to the far right rather than an explanation for it. While analyzing antisemitic discourse, we found that the primary function of the discourse is not to formulate anti-Jewish political demands but
to establish a common identity for groups that, for various reasons and motives, have turned against the liberal parliamentary system that replaced communism.
Abstract: The present study examines Jewish politics in Communist Hungary. As it is widely known, politicians of Jewish origin played an important role in the political life of post-war Hungary as leaders of the Communist party or as officials in the Communist governments. Their activity had a considerable effect, both directly and indirectly, on the life of Hungarian Jews. "Judeo-Bolshevic" rule is still a favorite topic of contemporary antisemitic publiciations. No doubt, the question of whether the Jewish origin of these politicians had an impact on their decisions, and if so, to what extent, could be a relevant subject for historical study. However, this essay deals with a different topic. It is concerned only with those politicians in post-war Hungary who identified themselves publicly as Jews or openly
represented Jewish causes. How did these politicians, who viewed Jews as a collectivity and sought to defend the Jews’ collective interests, act in the troublesome post-war decades?
Abstract: After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Jewish community within Yugoslavia was also split up, and now various Jewish communities exist in the seven post-Yugoslav countries. Although all of these communities are relatively small, their size, influence, and activity vary. The political and legal status of Jewish communities, normatively speaking, differs across the former Yugoslav republics. Sometimes Jews or Jewish communities are mentioned in constitutions, signed agreements with governments, or are recognized in laws that regulate religious communities. Despite normative differences, they share most of the same problems – a slow process of return of property, diminishing numbers due to emigration and assimilation, and, although on a much lower scale than in many other countries, creeping anti-Semitism. They also share the same opportunities – a push for more minority rights as part of ‘Europeanization’ and the perception of Jewish communities as a link to influential investors and politicians from the Jewish diaspora and Israel.
Abstract: Представленная книга документированных исследований А. Бураковского исторически охватывает 30-летний период развития социально-политической жизни Украины начиная с распада СССР и до 2016 года включительно. Книга содержит 10 глав и соответствуещее теме книги вступительное слово профессора истории Ивана Химки (John-Paul Himka). События в ней разворачиваются на фоне всех «майданов», начиная от первого — НРУ, и заканчивая «евромайданом», при президентах Л. Кравчуке, Л. Кучме, В. Ющенко, В. Януковиче — вплоть до революционного перехода власти в независимой Украине к ее 5-му президенту П.Порошенко. Все события в книге разворачиваются на фоне эволюции развития как украинского, так и еврейского возрождения, и их жесткого взаимовлияния. При этом автор, будучи долгое время в центре тех и других событий, большое внимание уделяет трансформации еврейско-украинских отношений, главным образом, уже в независимой Украине.
Abstract: Over the course of the ongoing war in Ukraine, the identity of the global Russian-speaking Jewish community was put to the test. The conflict in Ukraine marked the first time in the history of Russian-speaking Jews that every expression, blog or Twitter post, and opinion article were recorded on the World Wide Web. This readily available data enables us to reconstruct the information climate that surrounded Russian-speaking Jews. The present article explores the sway of this climate on the political discourse of Jewish elites in Ukraine, Russia, and Jewish Russian-speaking diasporas between 2014 and 2015. Our findings suggest that identities of these groups are multilayered, but not hierarchical. Moreover, the elites’ common ethno-cultural Jewish identity coexists with distinct political affiliations. The allegiance of minorities to host societies is a well-known phenomenon. However, its mechanisms have yet to command sufficient research interest. Is it fear, prudence, genuine attachment to the country of residence, or other factors that stand behind the minorities’ commitment? This paper fuses thematic maps with content analysis to show that the “infosphere” is a key to understanding the position of Jews toward host regimes and their co-ethnics in other nation-states.
Abstract: Israel is increasingly the epicentre of Jewish peoplehood, shaping the lives of diaspora Jews as both an engine driving interconnectedness and a source of division. ‘Israelization’ impacts diaspora Jews differently according to country of domicile. This article examines British Jewry, providing historical context and drawing on interviews to explore the community’s shifting identity and culture. It argues that Britain represents a unique model between America and France. In America, where security is greater, Jewish ethnic ties are loosening, whereas in France, doubts over the Jewish community’s future increase their focus on Israel. While British Jews experience hostility, they feel safer than in France. Flourishing British Jewish culture reflects commitment to multi-ethnic Britain, alongside loyalty to Israel. The dynamics of those loyalties are changing, however, with dissent against Israeli policies increasingly legitimised. We conclude that the Israelization of British Jewry is all encompassing, even while allowing for a thriving diaspora community.
Abstract: Elections were held in 181 local authorities
in England, Scotland and Wales on 3 May 2012, for
the London Assembly and for the mayoralties of
London, Liverpool and Salford. Ten other cities held
a referendum to decide whether to adopt the
system of an elected mayor, while one, Doncaster,
voted on whether to abolish theirs.
The British National Party (BNP) stood 137
candidates in the local elections, as well as standing
for the mayors of London, Salford and Liverpool,
and for the party list section of the London
Assembly. This compares poorly with the 323 BNP
candidates who stood in the local elections in 2011,
and with the 611 BNP candidates who stood the last
time these seats were up for election, in 2008. This
fall in candidate numbers continued the BNP’s
gradual decline in membership numbers, financial
resources and popular support over the past three
years.
Partly as a result of the BNP’s problems, this
election saw an increased presence from other
far right parties. The National Front (NF) stood
38 candidates, more than it has managed
to muster for several years, and stood for mayor
of Liverpool and the party list section of the London
Assembly. Other, tiny far right groups, such as the
British Freedom Party and the Democratic
Nationalists, stood candidates in single figures.
The English Democrats (ED), although not itself
a far right party, has absorbed large numbers
of former BNP members in recent years without
requiring any of them to publicly renounce their
views. In this election the ED stood 87 candidates
in the local elections, well over a third of whom
were former BNP activists, candidates or councillors.
It also stood for the mayor of Liverpool and for the
party list section of the London Assembly.
The elections took place against the backdrop
of recession and public service cuts, which might
be expected to benefit extremist parties. The
question of candidates’ attitudes to the Jewish
community became a significant theme in the
London mayoral election, particularly regarding
statements allegedly made by the Labour
candidate, Ken Livingstone
Abstract: Besides being a confusing designation, culture is
a contentious issue. Nevertheless, people depend
on the relatively safe and stable entity called
culture, which both aids and encumbers them as
they negotiate their way in society
Conventionally, religious beliefs and practices
have been the main symbols of collective Jewish
identity; their development and legitimation have
been profoundly embedded in group life, social
class and organizations. ln the Jewish Diaspora,
these beliefs and practices were the 'mortar' that
cemented the 'Jewish' bricks. However, as
European societies have modernized and become
more secular, more pluralistic and multicultural,
Jews have had to adapt. But European Jewish
communities do not stand in isolation and the
issue is not simply 'modernize and die' or
'modernize or die'-secularism v. religion.
European Jewish communities, in their struggle to
survive and create Jewish identities with which
they are at ease, must contend with new streams
of Jewish life emanating from North America and
lsrael. With the exception of France and the
United Kingdom, which still have relatively large
and viable-and autonomous-Jewish
communities, most European communities are
small with consrderable need of external support
Debate on culture is taking place among Jews in
terms of the nature and content of Jewish
cultures. But Jewish cultures are changing, as
they have always done; this fact is most evident
in both lsrael and North America.
lf European Jewish communities are to survive
and prosper as autonomous entities without being
over-influenced by any one ideological or religious
tendency in the Jewish world, or without fear of
assimilation, they must be sufficiently brave to
develop their own means of self-expression and
to learn to live with them. This is not an easy task,
because those who offer single-track alternatives
-such as the dissolution of the Diaspora or a
return to a form of Judaism which isolates itself
from the rest of society-do so with forceful
conviction. European Jews must be able to
develop an independent and vibrant culture.
The construction of forward-looking European
Jewries will be hampered by attempts at
delegitimization. Many accusations-e.g. that it is
not the traditional way, that it is against the overall
Jewish interest-will probably be aimed at efforts
by European Jewry to set its own course for
survival. However, if European Jewish
communities are to avoid irreversible decline,
there is no other way. The present offers a golden
opportunity to communities of European Jews to
co-operate across national boundaries and develop
coalitions with other ethnic groups, and cultural
and religious minorities, so that they can be leaders
rather than hangers-on in the era of multiculturalism.
It is an opportunity not to be missed.
Abstract: This report summarises the findings of a survey of Jewish students conducted by NUS between November 2016 and February 2017. It aimed to take stock of the experience of Jewish students in higher education at a time when the number of recorded antisemitic incidents has increased, both on and off campus, and because it is critical that NUS, students’ unions, universities and the wider higher education sector understand the needs of Jewish students.
Some 485 self-defining Jewish students responded to the survey. The vast majority of the respondents were in full time education (96 per cent), aged 17-24 (91per cent), studying at undergraduate level (86 per cent) and were UK citizens (87 per cent).
The key findings of the report can be summarised as follows:
Provision:
• A plurality of students reported there was no kosher food on or near campus (42 per cent)
• The majority of students surveyed disagreed or strongly disagreed that their university avoids scheduling classes and exams during Sabbath and Jewish religious festivals (59 per cent).
Academic coverage of Judaism:
A plurality of students surveyed either agreed or strongly agreed that:
• They feel comfortable with the way in which issues relating to Jewish people/Judaism are covered in class (36 per cent).
The majority of students surveyed either agreed or strongly agreed that:
• They have not experienced negative issues in classes related to Judaism (57 per cent).
Engagement with Students’ Unions:
• Respondents showed a high level of engagement with their students’ unions including being members of a society
or a sports club (69 per cent) and voting in student elections (75 per cent)
• Almost half of students felt they were always or usually able to participate in student politics (47 per cent).
A plurality or the majority of students surveyed either disagreed or strongly disagreed that:
• As a Jewish student they felt their SU understands their needs (43 per cent)
• As a Jewish student they feel represented by their SU (51 per cent).
• Their SU policy reflects the views of Jewish students (45 per cent).
Engagement with NUS:
• Almost half of students surveyed either disagreed or strongly disagreed that they would feel comfortable attending NUS events (49 per cent)
• Two fifths either disagreed or strongly disagreed that they would feel comfortable engaging in NUS policymaking processes (42 per cent)
• The majority of students either disagreed or strongly disagreed that NUS would respond appropriately to allegations of antisemitism if they arose (65 per cent).
Israel/Palestine:
• In an academic context, over half of students surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that they felt comfortable engaging in debate on Israel/Palestine (55 per cent).
Either a plurality or the majority of students surveyed disagreed or strongly disagreed that:
• As a Jew they felt confident to voice their opinions on Israel/Palestine in class (45 per cent)
• They felt comfortable engaging in debate on Israel/Palestine in their SUs or in a society context (54 per cent)
• They felt comfortable engaging in debate on Israel/Palestine on campus (50 per cent)
• The vast majority of students whose Students’ Union had a BDS policy or campaign did not feel comfortable or comfortable at all with it (68 per cent).
Hate Crime:
The majority of students surveyed:
• Were not very or not at all worried about being subject to verbal abuse, physical attack, vandalism, property damage or theft because of their Jewish belief (73 per cent)
• Had not experienced any crime whilst they have been students at their current place of study (65 per cent)
• Over a quarter have experienced personal abuse through social media or other communication (28 per cent)
• Of those who had experienced crime the majority believed these incidents were motivated by the perpetrator’s prejudice
towards them based on their Jewish belief (66 per cent).
