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Date: 2016
Abstract: Although different patterns of political participation among self-aware minority groups have spurred much debate in the academic circles, especially in stable democracies, this issue remains understudied in the newer post-communist societies and notably so the post-conflict countries of former Yugoslavia. Much of the existing research conducted in established democracies has demonstrated that increased levels of national minority political involvement are directly related to democratic development, but that these groups are shunning more traditional forms of engagement, notably political party membership in favour of direct engagement through informal participation. Nevertheless, there is very little understanding of what national minority political participation represents in post-conflict states, as much scholarly research has termed it as underground, invisible or inexistent. Despite this, there is evidence that in these states formal political participation of national minority groups is still strong, but it remains unknown to what degree this occurs, what factors influence this behavior and to what degree is this behavior present among autochthon minority groups. As active political participation of national minorities plays an important role in the democratization and stabilization of such societies, this represents an important gap in our knowledge. This thesis aims to investigate the level of conventional political participation and the trigger factors for such engagement of two significant, yet contrasting national minority groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), namely Jews and Poles. To do this, a mixed-method approach embedded in the transformative paradigm is employed, combining qualitative and quantitative findings of fieldwork. The thesis assesses eight indicators of formal political participation and reveals whether we can observe new trends when it comes to conventional engagement of these two, but also whether their influence remains limited due to their inability to formally participate in the government. It finds that both groups are political communicators, which choose to opt out of political party membership or financial support to electoral campaigns, because they feel alienated from formal politics due to constitutional limitations. However, this exit from the highest forms of political participation is not coupled with total disengagement, as both groups are actively engaged in other forms of formal political activism. This thesis concludes that new trends of political behaviour are emerging among the two observed groups, and especially so among their youth.
Author(s): Kuperberg, Rebecca
Date: 2021
Date: 2014
Date: 1994
Abstract: With the rise of ultranationalist organizations throughout Europe, the issue of attitudes and orientations held toward designated "out-groups" has become a critical concern of anxious observers. In Russia the strength registered by Vladimir Zhirinovskii's ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party during the parliamentary elections of 1993 has been interpreted as a sign of intolerance among the Russian populace. In fact, the success of candidates associated with the Liberal Democratic Party was not only based upon appeals to strengthen the Russian nation against perceived enemies, but also upon promises of a return to price stability and upon Zhirinovskii's anti-establishment, populist program. Nonetheless, Zhirinovskii's success in the 1991 presidential elections (he attracted 7.8% of the electorate) does serve to reaffirm the importance of tracking how attitudes toward groups that have often been targeted as scapegoats in times of social or economic upheaval have evolved in the late Soviet and immediate post-Soviet period. Two major questions concern us here: first, how pervasive among Russians and Ukrainians are perceptions of significant "social distance" between themselves and designated out-groups, most notably the Jewish population; and second, to what extent do these perceptions of distance form part of a cohesive ideology of ultranationalism? Understanding the basis of sentiments toward Jewish populations is particularly important for interpreting the workings of the complex mosaic of the post-Soviet political culture.
Author(s): Renton, David
Date: 2021
Abstract: Between 2015 and 2020 the Labour Party was riven by allegations that the party had tolerated antisemitism.

For the Labour right, and some in the media, the fact that such allegations could be made was proof of a moral collapse under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership. Sections of the left, meanwhile, sought to resist the accusations by claiming that the numbers of people accused of racism were few, that the allegations were an orchestrated attack, and that those found guilty were excluded from the party. This important book by one of Britain’s leading historians of anti- fascism gives a more detailed account than any yet published of what went wrong in Labour. Renton rejects those on the right who sought to exploit the issue for factional advantage. He also criticises those of his comrades on the left who were ignorant about what most British Jews think and demonstrated a willingness to antagonise them.

Table of Contents
1. Introduction

2. The Uniqueness of Antisemitism

3. Naz Shah and the Cause of Palestine

4. Ken Livingstone and the Crimes of Zionism

5. Jews and the Slave Trade

6. Seeing No Evil: Trump and the US Right

7. Seeing No Evil: Corbyn and the Mear One Mural

8. Jewdas and the Figure of the Bad Jew

9. The Labour Left and the Israel Lobby

10. The Labour Right and Anti-Zionist Jews

11. The Bullying of Luciana Berger

12. Fighting the Rich, Without Fighting Jews

13. From the Edge of the Anti-War Movement

14. Israel’s Eastern European Allies

15. On Gatekeeping

16. Antisemitism and Black Emancipation

17. Conclusion
Date: 2021
Abstract: Overt state-sponsored antisemitism ended in Europe with the fall of the Soviet Union. Antisemitic attitudes, however, remain prevalent in Europe, and some European political actors have instrumentalized antisemitism for political gain. This report examines both the conscious use of antisemitism in European politics and the calculated tolerance of antisemitism, demonstrating that the oldest hatred remains a modern political tool.

Unlike antisemitic incidents of violence, vandalism, or insults, the political use of antisemitism does not target Jews themselves. Instead, antisemitic propaganda targets domestic or foreign audiences as a means of gaining political support. Demonstrating tolerance for antisemitism is another tactic of attracting political support. Polling data shows that these strategies have a rational basis. ADL’s 2019 Global 100 survey of antisemitic attitudes found that one in four Europeans polled harbored antisemitic beliefs.

Antisemitic propaganda has as its goal to energize and attract followers. Antisemitic propaganda is also used to tarnish political opponents in the eyes of a specific audience by intimating that someone is Jewish, supportive of Jewish causes or of the State of Israel. Other times, political opponents are slandered as antisemites or Nazis to diminish their reputations with specific audiences. Each of these techniques will be covered in this report, which focuses on the conscious choice of instrumentalizing or tolerating antisemitism for political gain. Antisemitic rhetoric by political actors as an indicator of bias is a much broader topic, and this report does not cover those instances.

The broad categories of the politicization of antisemitism include (1) politically motivated accusations of, or uses of, antisemitism against political opponents; (2) political appeals to antisemitic beliefs among the public, including the conspiracy theories about Jewish control of government, economy, media; and (3) tolerance of antisemitism within political movements as a strategy for increasing popular support. This list not exhaustive of the political instrumentalization of antisemitism, but this report provides illustrative examples from recent years in these broad categories.

Why is this report important? While violent antisemitic attacks receive wide publicity – and rightly so – the politicization of antisemitism can also severely impact Jewish communities. The British Jewish community provides a compelling example.

In January 2015, 11% of British Jews were considering emigrating, according to a poll by the UK’s Jewish Chronicle. That survey was conducted before Jeremy Corbyn, widely regarded within the British Jewish community as an antisemite himself, was even a leadership candidate for the Labour party. In September 2018, after antisemitism had become a serious problem in the Labour party under Corbyn, the Jewish Chronicle poll found that 39% of British Jews were considering emigrating. And in an October 2019 poll by the UK’s Jewish Leadership Council, just prior to the UK General Election, 47% of British Jews said they would “seriously consider” leaving the UK if Jeremy Corbyn were to win the election.

Had Jeremy Corbyn won, leading a major party widely recognized as tolerating antisemitism among its members, and had even 30% of British Jews emigrated as a result of that single event, that number of roughly 90,000 Jews would have been similar to the total of all the French Jews who left France over the past 20 years.

The sections below are select examples of the different ways in which antisemitism has been instrumentalized for political gain by various actors. The purposes and tactics vary substantially, but have the common element of politicizing antisemitism:

The Russian government instrumentalized antisemitism in the forms of propaganda and “false flag” operations to influence domestic and foreign public opinion in its conflict with Ukraine.
Polish political campaigns used overt antisemitic rhetoric during elections to win votes.
The Hungarian government used coded antisemitism in political campaigns against EU migration policies.
The UK Labour party consciously tolerated antisemitism to widen its political support from far-left radicals.
Ukrainian nationalists glorified World War II era fighters to promote nationalist narratives, while trivializing their involvement in the Holocaust.
The far-right Alternative for Germany party trivialized the Holocaust as part of their appeal to “Holocaust fatigue” among German voters.
Other political actors have engaged in similar acts of politicization, and their absence from this report is not indicative of any assessment. The cases below are simply the most blatant examples of the types of politicization to be highlighted.
Author(s): Bolton, Matthew
Date: 2020
Abstract: This article analyses the British left’s response to allegations of antisemitism within the UK Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership. It uses as its foil a collection of essays on the topic written over the course of the Corbyn era for leading online outlets of the contemporary Anglo-American left, and given away as a free e-book by Verso, the world’s biggest leftist publisher, during the 2019 British election campaign. On the basis of this collection, the article suggests that the Labour antisemitism crisis was the culmination of a long process of political and theoretical degeneration within the left. It argues that the tendency to reduce of the question of antisemitism to that of class “interests,” with antisemitism understood primarily as an “instrument” used by the powerful to divide the “oppressed,” leaves many leftists unable to comprehend the possibility of exterminatory antisemitism as an end-in-itself. The appeal of this approach lies in the apparent alibi against antisemitism it provides for those on the left, like Corbyn, whose interests supposedly coincide with those of “the oppressed,” and means that accusations of antisemitism within the left can be similarly denounced as cover for the underlying ‘interests’ of those making the accusation. The article argues that the insistence that the State of Israel is “a racist endeavour,” a claim which lay at the heart of the Labour antisemitism dispute, rests upon an arbitrary and ahistorical rejection of the notion of Jewish peoplehood. This critique itself draws upon a long history of right-nationalist and liberal-republican antisemitism in which Jews were viewed as an illegitimate “anti-nation,” and in its partiality is radically distinct from a critique of the nation-state as such. The article suggests that this same partiality and ahistoricity reappears in the inability of a class instrumentalist perspective to apprehend the intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, relationship between Israel and antisemitism, and the genocidal antisemitism of the Holocaust in particular.
Author(s): Kalmar, Ivan
Date: 2020
Author(s): Allington, Daniel
Date: 2018
Abstract: Existing research suggests that, in contemporary liberal democracies, complaints of racism are routinely rejected and prejudice may be both expressed and disavowed in the same breath. Surveys and historical research have established that – both in democratic states and in those of the Soviet Bloc (while it existed) – antisemitism has long been related to or expressed in the form of statements about Israel or ‘Zionist’, permitting anti-Jewish attitudes to circulate under cover of political critique. This article looks at how the findings of a survey of anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli attitudes were rejected by users of three Facebook pages associated with the British Left. Through thematic discourse analysis, three recurrent repertoires are identified: firstly, what David Hirsh calls the ‘Livingstone Formulation’ (i.e. the argument that complaints of antisemitism are made in bad faith to protect Israel and/or attack the Left), secondly, accusations of flawed methodology similar to those with which UK Labour Party supporters routinely dismiss the findings of unfavourable opinion polls, and thirdly, the argument that, because certain classically antisemitic beliefs pertain to a supposed Jewish or ‘Zionist’ elite and not to Jews in general, they are not antisemitic. In one case, the latter repertoire facilitates virtually unopposed apologism for Adolf Hitler. Contextual evidence suggests that the dominance of such repertoires within one very large UK Labour Party-aligned group may be the result of action on the part of certain ‘admins’ or moderators. It is argued that awareness of the repertoires used to express and defend antisemitic attitudes should inform the design of quantitative research into the latter, and be taken account of in the formulation of policy measures aiming to restrict or counter hate speech (in social media and elsewhere).
Author(s): Ullrich, Peter
Date: 2019
Abstract: Mit der im Jahr 2016 von der International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) anerkannten «Arbeitsdefinition Antisemitismus» liegt ein Instrument für die notwendige Erfassung und Bekämpfung von Antisemitismus vor, das weite Verbreitung gefunden hat. In einem Handlungsfeld, das durch hochgradige begriffliche Verunsicherung gekennzeichnet ist, verspricht die Definition als praktische Arbeitsgrundlage begriffliche Orientierung. Tatsächlich stellt die «Arbeitsdefinition» mit ihrer konkreten, ohne Fachterminologie auskommenden Sprache sowie mit anschaulichen Beispielen, die den Begriff Antisemitismus anhand typischer, immer wieder auftretender Phänomene verdeutlichen, inzwischen eine Grundlage für die Arbeit verschiedener Nutzer*innengruppen dar. Zudem erfolgte mit der Aufnahme bis dato nur wenig beleuchteter (israelbezogener) Aspekte von Antisemitismus eine zum Zeitpunkt der Formulierung der Definition (Anfang der 2000er Jahre) notwendige Aktualisierung der Diskussion.

Bei einer näheren Untersuchung offenbaren sich jedoch auch gravierende Mängel. Insbesondere ist die «Arbeitsdefinition» inkonsistent, widersprüchlich und ausgesprochen vage formuliert; mithin erfüllt sie nicht die Anforderungen guten Definierens. Die Kerndefinition des Antisemitismus ist zudem reduktionistisch. Sie hebt einige antisemitische Phänomene und Analyseebenen hervor, spart aber andere, wesentliche, sehr weitgehend aus. Dies gilt insbesondere für ideologische und diskursive Aspekte, beispielsweise den Antisemitismus als verschwörungstheoretisches Weltbild. Ebenso fehlt eine Erwähnung organisationssoziologischer Aspekte der Mobilisierung in Bewegungen und Parteien sowie deren Niederschlag in diskriminierenden institutionellen Regelungen und Praxen. Zudem können manche israelbezogenen Beispiele, die der Kerndefinition hinzugefügt sind, nur mithilfe weiterer Informationen über den Kontext als antisemitisch klassifiziert werden, da das Beschriebene mehrdeutig ist. Es tritt in komplexen, sich überlagernden Konfliktkonstellationen auf, bei denen eine Zuordnung zu einem spezifischen Problemkreis wie Antisemitismus oft nicht einfach möglich ist. Ein Beispiel sind die sogenannten doppelten Standards. Sie sind kein hinreichendes Kriterium, um eine antisemitische Fokussierung auf Israel von einer solchen zu unterscheiden, die mit den Spezifika israelischer Politik und ihrer weltpolitischen Bedeutung zusammenhängen.

In der Folge begünstigt die «Arbeitsdefinition» eine widersprüchliche und fehleranfällige Anwendungs praxis und führt zu Einschätzungen von Vorfällen oder Sachverhalten, die nicht auf klaren Kriterien basieren, sondern eher auf Vorverständnissen derer, die sie anwenden, oder auf unreflektiert übernommenen verbreiteten Deutungen. Die Anwendung der «Arbeitsdefinition» produziert die Fiktion eines kriteriengeleiteten, objektiven Beurteilens. Die Definition stellt prozedurale Legitimität für Entscheidungen zur Verfügung, die faktisch auf der Grundlage anderer, implizit bleibender Kriterien getroffen werden, welche weder in der Definition noch in den Beispielen festgelegt sind.

Die Schwächen der «Arbeitsdefinition» sind das Einfallstor für ihre politische Instrumentalisierung, etwa um gegnerische Positionen im Nahostkonflikt durch den Vorwurf des Antisemitismus moralisch zu diskreditieren. Dies hat relevante grundrechtliche Implikationen. Die zunehmende Implementierung der «Arbeitsdefinition» als quasi-rechtliche Grundlage von Verwaltungshandeln suggeriert Orientierung. Stattdessen ist sie faktisch ein zu Willkür geradezu einladendes Instrument. Dieses kann genutzt werden, um Grundrechte, insbesondere die Meinungsfreiheit, in Bezug auf missliebige israelbezogene Positionen zu beschneiden. Anders als die Bezeichnung «Arbeitsdefinition» suggeriert, findet auch keine Weiterentwicklung der Definition statt, um diese Schwächen zu beheben.

Fazit: Der Versuch, Probleme allgemeiner begrifflicher Klärung und universeller praktischer Einsetzbarkeit mithilfe der «Arbeitsdefinition Antisemitismus» zu lösen, muss insgesamt als gescheitert angesehen werden. Vor allem aufgrund ihrer handwerklichen Schwächen, ihrer defizitären Anwendungspraxis, ihres trotzdem teilweise verbindlichen rechtlichen Status und ihrer politischen Instrumentalisierbarkeit mit problematischen Implikationen für die Meinungsfreiheit kann die Verwendung der «Arbeitsdefinition Antisemitismus» nicht empfohlen werden. Eine mögliche Ausnahme könnten lediglich eng umgrenzte pädagogische Kontexte darstellen.

Wie die Entstehungsgeschichte der «Arbeitsdefinition Antisemitismus» und ihre weite Verbreitung deutlich machen, gibt es – auch angesichts einer weiter bestehenden Bedrohung durch gegenwärtigen Antisemitismus – einen großen Bedarf vonseiten verschiedener Institutionen nach in der Praxis anwendbaren Kriterien zur Identifikation antisemitischer Phänomene. Folglich ist die Entwicklung von klaren und kontextspezifischen Instrumenten für die Praxis dringend zu empfehlen.
Author(s): Volovici, Leon
Date: 1994
Author(s): Kovács, András
Date: 2012
Abstract: The article analyzes the newest survey results on antisemitic prejudices, antisemitic political discourses, and political antisemitism in present-day Hungary. According to the research findings, during the first decade and a half after the fall of communism, 10%-15% of the Hungarian adult population held a strong antisemitic prejudice. Surveys conducted after 2006 show not only an increase in the absolute percentage of antisemites, but also an increase in the proportion of antisemites who embed their antisemitism in the political context. This phenomenon is linked with the appearance on the political scene of Jobbik, a more or less openly antisemitic party. When examining the causes of antisemitism, the most interesting finding was that the strength of antisemitic feelings is regionally different and that these differences correlate with the strength of Jobbik’s support in the various regions. Accordingly, we hypothesized that support for a far-right party is not a consequence of antisemitism, but conversely should be regarded as a factor that mobilizes attitudes leading to antisemitism. Thus, antisemitism is—at least in large part—a consequence of an attraction to the far right rather than an explanation for it. While analyzing antisemitic discourse, we found that the primary function of the discourse is not to formulate anti-Jewish political demands but
to establish a common identity for groups that, for various reasons and motives, have turned against the liberal parliamentary system that replaced communism.