Abstract: Yellow Star, Red Star asks why Holocaust memory continues to be so deeply troubled—ignored, appropriated, and obfuscated—throughout Eastern Europe, even though it was in those lands that most of the extermination campaign occurred. As part of accession to the European Union, Jelena Subotić shows, East European states were required to adopt, participate in, and contribute to the established Western narrative of the Holocaust. This requirement created anxiety and resentment in post-communist states: Holocaust memory replaced communist terror as the dominant narrative in Eastern Europe, focusing instead on predominantly Jewish suffering in World War II. Influencing the European Union's own memory politics and legislation in the process, post-communist states have attempted to reconcile these two memories by pursuing new strategies of Holocaust remembrance. The memory, symbols, and imagery of the Holocaust have been appropriated to represent crimes of communism.
Yellow Star, Red Star presents in-depth accounts of Holocaust remembrance practices in Serbia, Croatia, and Lithuania, and extends the discussion to other East European states. The book demonstrates how countries of the region used Holocaust remembrance as a political strategy to resolve their contemporary "ontological insecurities"—insecurities about their identities, about their international status, and about their relationships with other international actors. As Subotić concludes, Holocaust memory in Eastern Europe has never been about the Holocaust or about the desire to remember the past, whether during communism or in its aftermath. Rather, it has been about managing national identities in a precarious and uncertain world.
Abstract: The question as posed is a challenge, not only to those who assigned it as a theme to be explored, and not only to those who expect to answer it, but also to all of Europe in which anti-Semitism persistently continues to show its face half a century after the closing of the Death Camps. Five decades separate us from the last days of the Gas Chambers and of the Crematoria, and still the embers of hatred for Jews, for "The Despised Other", smoulder beneath the surface of post-World War II Europe, erupting spasmodically from Madrid to Moscow. The question as phrased is a direct challenge to all of European heritage precisely because it contains its own answer, an answer no one desires to express or hear, for it embodies a confession of a fundamental flaw in the fraying tapestry that is Europe today after Bosnia. To give voice to the answer, however circuitously, would be to confront head on the centrifugal danger that, if not neutralised, could unravel the process of European unification and integration. The question as put is a classic example of a rhetorical query of a combined question and answer: thus "Why is it so?" implies, at the same time, "Hatred for Jews did not die in Auschwitz; it was not even mortally wounded". The only question remaining is: "How forthright will the attempt to examine the answer be?" Not how accurate, but how honest? Unavoidably it will be accusatory and, quite possibly, offensive. As one performs cultural vivisection of that which was, still is, and, most probably, will continue to be an attribute of a Europe chronically infected by the virus of continuing anti-Semitism, there has to be, of necessity, a shocked response. Hence the underlying tension of the topic for which the messenger is all too often blamed.
Abstract: The successful incorporation of Eastern European states into the European Union, NATO and the Western pro-democratic family of nations usually focuses on the import of ideas, governmental and societal structures, and products, from West to East, and of large movements of East European populations westward. Often overlooked in the export of ideas has been the intensive, expensive and industrial-scale effort to rewrite the history of the Holocaust and World War II in the direction of Double Genocide and Holocaust Obfuscation, a trend spurred on dramatically by the decline in East-West relations and the increasingly frightening movement of Russia toward revanchist authoritarianism that threatens its neighbors. The paper argues that no good can or will come from the adaptation of models of bogus nationalist history rooted in far-right, ultranationalist thought in the liberated states of Eastern Europe. Double Genocide and its corollaries as currently practiced and underwritten by state budgets, represent a threat to history, freedom of thought and speech, equal rights and ultimately, a ruse to insert far-right academic revisionism disguised as anti-Russian activity into Western discourse.
Abstract: The article presents the results of surveys done on anti-Semitism in Poland in 1992, which in part were compared to results from a 1996 survey. The group, under the author's direction researched anti-Semitism in the context of Poles' attitudes towards other nations, as well as in terms of their own national identity. Two types of anti-Semitic attitudes were observed: traditional, religiously grounded anti-Semitism, and anti-Semitism rooted in anti-Semitic political ideology, of the type that has developed since in the French Revolution. Traditional anti-Semitism occurs only among older people who are not well educated and live in rural areas; increased education results in the disappearance of this type of anti-Semitism. Modern anti-Semitism, on the other hand occurs among both the lowest and most highly educated groups in society. Moreover, from 1992 to 1996, the percentage of the respondents declaring anti-Semitic views increased. At the same time, however, there was also a larger increase in the number of respondents declaring anti-anti-Semitic views, which has meant that there has been a clear polarization of attitudes. Having a university education makes a person more likely to be ill-disposed toward anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, the attitude of Poles toward Jews cannot be described simply on the basis of anti-Semitic attitudes. The researchers noted that there was also an attitude of "not liking Jews", which was less engaged than the anti-Semitic views, and to a large extent a result of the content comprising Polish national identity. The model of Polishness assumes a Romantic-Messianic image of the Polish nation. According to this model, Poles see themselves as being distinguished by their noble fulfillment of obligations, even when it is to their own detriment, particularly with respect to symbolic Jews and Germans. Researchers also assumed that there was a particular kind of competition between Poles and Jews with respect to the moral superiority of their respective nations. The results from 1992 in part confirmed this hypothesis.
Abstract: At the core of the debate in Ukraine about Babi Yar lies the Holocaust. Between 1941 and 1943 1.5 million Jews perished in Ukraine, yet a full understanding of that tragedy has been suppressed consistently by ideologies and interpretations of history that minimize or ignore this tragedy. For Soviet ideologues, admitting to the existence of the Holocaust would have been against the tenet of a “Soviet people” and the aggressive strategy of eliminating national and religious identities. A similar logic of oneness is being applied now in the ideological formation of an independent Ukraine. However, rather than one Soviet people, now there is one Ukrainian people under which numerous historical tragedies are being subsumed, and the unique national tragedies of other peoples on the territory of Ukraine, such as the massive destruction of Jews, is again being suppressed. According to this political idea assiduously advocated most recently during the Yushchenko presidency, the twentieth century in Ukraine was a battle for liberation. Within this new, exclusive history, the Holocaust, again, has found no real place. The author reviews the complicated history regarding the memorialization of the Jewish tragedy in Babi Yar through three broad chronological periods: 1943–1960, 1961–1991, and 1992–2009.
Abstract: This paper will investigate the construction and ongoing renegotiation of Jewish identity in the Irish context from the late nineteenth century to the present day, considering how some of the key elements that have shaped modern Irish identity have impacted on the consciousness of Ireland’s tiny Jewish minority.
Jewish immigration to Ireland, which peaked between 1890 and 1905, coincided with the crystallisation of an Irish identity with a strong foundation in the beliefs and values of Roman Catholicism. Consequently, the emerging discourses of Irish nationalism, in particular the struggle for independence and the complex Irish relationship with Britain, have had a major influence on the formation of a specific Irish-Jewish identity. The impact of Irish nationalism, sectarianism and anti-Jewish prejudice in a still-evolving Irish society will be explored in terms of Jewish perception and identity formation on both the individual and the collective levels. After a brief introduction, I will outline my findings on the Jewish relationship with Irish nationalism, before exploring the way in which Irish-Jewish identity has tended to be presented to the wider world. Issues to be considered will include the significance of variations in nuance between different representations of Irish-Jewish identity and belonging; the role of communal narrative in shaping the consciousness of the individual; and the question of why, in the post-modern era, it should be necessary to keep searching for, re-/presenting and justifying the identity of a minority within a minority to the world at large. Throughout, the focus will remain on the need for a fresh approach to the sources and the issues at hand, in order to create a more holistic, objective and inclusive history of the Jewish experience in Ireland.
Abstract: After 1989, post-communist countries such as Poland and Moldova have been faced with the challenge of
reinventing their national identity and rewriting their master narratives, shifting from a communist one to an
ethnic-patriotic one. In this context, the fate of local Jews and the actions of Poles and Moldovans during the
Holocaust have repeatedly proven difficult or even impossible to incorporate into the new national narrative. As
a result, Holocaust denial in various forms initially gained ground in post-communist countries, since denying
the Holocaust, or blaming it on someone else, even on the Jews themselves, was the easiest way to strengthen
national identities. In later years, however, Polish and Moldovan paths towards re-definition of self have taken
different paths. At least in part, this can be explained as a product of Poland's incorporation in the European
unification project, while Moldova remains in limbo, both in terms of identity and politics – between the Soviet
Union and Europe, between the past and the future.
Abstract: Focusing on three contemporary grassroots initiatives of preserving Jewish heritage and commemorating Jews in Belarus, namely, the Jewish Museum in Minsk, Ada Raǐchonak’s private museum of regional heritage in Hermanovichi, and the initiative of erecting the monument of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda in Hlybokae, the present article discusses how local efforts to commemorate Jews and preserve Jewish heritage tap into the culture of political dissent, Belarus’s international relations, and the larger project of redefining the Belarusian national identity. Looking at the way these memorial interventions frame Jewish legacy within a Belarusian national narrative, the article concentrates in particular on the institution of the public historian and the small, informal social networks used to operate under a repressive regime. Incorporating the multicultural legacy of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth into the canon of Belarusian national heritage and recognizing the contribution of ethnic minorities to the cultural landscape of Belarus, new memory projects devoted to Jewish history in Belarus mark a caesura in the country’s engagement with its ethnic Others and are also highly political. While the effort of filling in the gaps in national historiography and celebrating the cultural diversity of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania overlaps in significant ways with the agenda of the anti-Lukashenka opposition, Jewish heritage in Belarus also resonates with the state authorities, who seek to instrumentalize it for their own vision of national unity.
Author(s): Erb, Rainer; Graml, Hermann; Kovács, András; Mihok, Brigitte; Pelinka, Anton; Reiterer, Albert F.; Schmidt-Hartmann, Eva; Sekelj, Laslo; Stern, Frank; Varga, Lazlo; Bergmann, Werner
Author(s): Bauer, Yehuda; Benz, Wolfgang; Cała, Alina; Jelinek, Yeshayahu A.; Krzeminski, Ireneusz; Lerman, Antony; Löwe, Heinz-Dietrich; Pulzer, Peter; Vago, Raphael; Yukhneva, Natalia; Karady, Viktor
Author(s): Beloff (Lord); Benz, Wolfgang; Billig, Michael; Cesarani, David; Cohn-Sherbok, Dan; Cruise O'Brien, Conor; Elazar, Daniel J.; Dinerstein, Leonard; Fein, Helen; Gebert, Konstanty; Glazer, Nathan; Gould, Julius; Jakobovitz, Immanuel (Lord); Kushner, Tony; Leibler, Isi; Lerman, Antony; Marrus, Michael R.; Mitten, Richard; Pelinka, Anton; Pouakov, Leon; Raab, Earl; Rotensreich, Nathan; Roth, Stephen J.; Schnapper, Dominique; Strauss, Herbert A.; Wisse, Ruth R.; Wistrich, Robert; Wodak, Ruth
Abstract: We recently addressed the following statement and questions on the strength and nature of anti-Semitism in the 1990s to a number of Jews and non-Jews throughout the world:
Talk of a ‘revival’ or ‘resurgence’ of anti-Semitism is now commonplace. This seems to be the result of developments in the former USSR and in Eastern and Central Europe since 1989, but also of increasing reports of anti-Semitic incidents taking place throughout Western Europe and similar problems emerging in North America, South America, Australia and South Africa.
1) How serious is the recent ‘resurgence’ of anti-Semitism? Is this in any sense a global phenomenon? Is talk of a ‘revival of antisemitism’ justified?
2) What are in your view the most important contemporary manifestations of anti-Semitism? Should anti-Semitism still mainly be seen as a phenomenon of extreme right- and left-wing politics and ideology, or is contemporary anti-Semitism more seriously present in popular culture, within political and social élites, in the school playground?
3) What role, if any, do you think the conflict between Israel and the Arab world is playing in fostering anti-Jewish sentiment? How important is the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in this context? To what extent is anti-Semitism today taking the guise of anti-Zionism?
4) Finally, if there is indeed an upsurge in antiswemitism, what do you think are its major causes? What part is nationalism, particularly in the Commonwealth of Independent States and in Eastern and Central Europe, playing in causing or exacerbating contemporary anti-Semitism? Do you agree that there was until recently a post-Holocaust taboo on anti-Semitism that has now been lifted?
Abstract: The current research examines how representations of a traumatic history influence contemporary intergroup attitudes. Specifically, we examine antisemitism in Hungary as a case example of how the need to defend the group's moral image motivates the assumption of a defensive representation of history − a modification of the group's narrative with regards to its culpability in past atrocities committed against another group. Two studies examined the link between defensive representations of the Holocaust, nationalism, and antisemitism. In the first, correlational study (N = 348), we found that Hungarian nationalism and antisemitism were associated, and that this association was significantly mediated by defensive representations of the Holocaust – high nationalism was associated with higher endorsement of defensive representations which in turn were associated with more antisemitism. Low nationalism was associated with greater acknowledgement of in-group responsibility for historical crimes which was associated with less antisemitism. These findings were corroborated in an experimental study (N = 165) which indicated that priming defensive representations of the Holocaust increased antisemitism, even when controlling for nationalism. Study 2 further showed, in a 2-step mediation model, that defensive representation primes increased secondary antisemitism, conspiratorial antisemitism, and negative attitudes towards Israel. We discuss the implications of defensive representations of history on contemporary intergroup relations.
