Abstract: As in many other former communist countries of East Central Europe, antisemitism in Romania resurged almost concurrently with the demise of the previous regime. Empirical research on antisemitism, however, emerged only considerably later and did not become a main focus until the establishment of the National Institute for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania “Elie Wiesel” (INSHREW) in 2005. This does not imply that the subject of Jews, attitudes to Jews measured by instruments such as stereotypic perceptions and/or “social distance,” or attitudes toward controversial Romanian historical figures linked to the country’s antisemitic past were not tangentially or even directly tackled occasionally. What was lacking until 2005, however, was an effort to use a systematic method, such as a standard questionnaire capable of producing comparative results, that would permit focusing on the phenomenon of the strong reappearance of antisemitism in both its synchronic and diachronic unfolding. In other words, the task of gathering longitudinal data on antisemitism in the country to allow forging a “perceptual map” that would select in consistent aspects and select out inconsistencies is still just beginning.
Abstract: Ces dernières années, on croyait ne jamais plus voir ces images de synagogues brûlées. On pensait qu'un Juif pratiquant, portant kippa, ne pourrait pas être insulté dans une rue ou dans le métro, pas plus qu'un enfant dans une école ne pourrait être inquiété.
On se disait que les morts dormiraient en paix, sans que des tombes ne soient profanées. Mais voilà, les injures et les agressions se sont multipliées. Et ces derniers temps, les Juifs de France ont éprouvé comme un malaise, un sentiment d'abandon. Le texte que nous publions pour ce neuvième numéro des Études du CRIF est d'une grande richesse et d'une grande érudition.
Didier Lapeyronnie connaît bien le sujet et les questions qu'il pose nous interpellent gravement. Y a-t-il généralisation d'un sentiment antisémite dans les quartiers populaires ? Pourquoi certains jeunes, premiers touchés par une discrimination dirigée vers les populations arabes ou d'origine immigrée, sont-ils à l'origine d'incidents et de violences antisémites ? Comment l'antisémitisme s'explique-t-il alors et est-il une revendication d'ordre social et d'intégration ? Se donne-t-il à voir sous plusieurs formes ? Est-il présent dans le vocabulaire et les expressions quotidiennes ? S'exprime-t-il hors de toute idéologie constituée, comme s'il s'inscrivait régulièrement dans le vocabulaire et les expressions quotidiennes ?
Le sociologue pense que l'antisémitisme finit par structurer une représentation du monde dans laquelle il va chercher confirmation et renforcement.
Il ajoute ensuite cette réflexion saisissante : « Les Juifs sont tout, si je suis exclu, les Juifs sont intégrés, si je suis pauvre, ils sont riches, si je suis méconnu, ils sont reconnus, si je suis méchant, ils sont gentils, si je suis dépourvu de communauté, ils en ont une, si je suis impuissant, ils sont puissants... Au fond ils concentrent tout le sens et assèchent toutes les possibilités de donner une signification à la situation vécue. Si « je ne suis nulle part », «les Juifs, il y en a partout et c'est bien le problème !» Il devient donc inutile de chercher à se transformer ou à changer la société, il devient inutile de revendiquer ou d'agir. Il devient inutile de penser.
L'antisémitisme résout tous les problèmes : il suffit d'inverser les polarités. S'ils n'étaient pas « partout », je ne serais pas nulle part.»
Tout comme le racisme, il est évident que l'antisémitisme secoue notre société. Il met bien à mal les valeurs de la République et il est une tâche indélébile et crasse. Mais il est surtout l'affaire de tous. Ce ne sont pas aux seuls Juifs de France de combattre l'antisémitisme, mais à la société entière de combattre les racines du mal.
Marc Knobel
Abstract: Recently, the old anti-Semitic myths, both the Aryan and the Khazar, have been revived in Russia and have begun to spread. The Aryan myth, which is rooted in the Nazi propaganda of the 1920s and 1930s, was picked up and developed by the contemporary Russian radical nationalists. It restores to general history the Manichaean and Messianic approaches that reduce all complex historic processes to a struggle between two agents — the ‘Aryans’ (i.e. the ‘Slavic-Russes’) and the ‘World Evil’ (i.e. the Jews). It describes the ‘Slavic-Aryans’, the first humans, who mysteriously appeared at the Northern continent, ‘Hyperborea-Arctida’, and dispersed to become the ancestors of most of the peoples of the world and founders of the principal ancient civilizations. Later, they were forced out from their former lands by an evil agent represented by the ‘savage nomads of Arabia’.1
Abstract: [From the introduction to the article]
Between March and November 1999, under the auspices of the Minority Research Institute of the Department of Sociology, Eötvös Loránd University, I conducted a sociological survey of the current situation of the Jewish community in Hungary. In the course of the survey, 2015 respondents were interviewed. The most important demographic and social data were collected for four generations – from respondents’ grandparents to their children. Participants in the survey were asked to respond to questions concerning their relationship towards Jewish traditions and their acceptance or rejection of various forms of Jewish identity. They were also asked for their opinions on assimilation, integration and dissimilation, on Israel, and on the current significance of the Holocaust. Finally, an attempt was made to gauge the opinions of Hungarian Jews on the state of their own community, on their relationships with non-Jews, and on antisemitism in postcommunist Hungary.
My purpose in this article shall be to analyse the data that we collected in this latter area. Firstly, I shall reveal how Jews living in Hungary define antisemitism, and whether – when it comes to classifying particular statements as antisemitic – there are any significant differences between younger and older groups of Jews, between those who are better educated and those with less education, and between those with a stronger and those with a weaker sense of Jewish identity. I shall then explore how the various respondent groups judge the extent, intensity and gravity of anti-Jewish sentiment in the country, examining in particular whether respondents themselves have experienced such sentiment or have been subjected to discrimination. I shall reveal whether respondents think that antisemitism will increase or decrease in the coming years. Finally, I shall touch upon the policies that respondents consider desirable when it comes to tackling antisemitic phenomena. Evidently, the images formed by Jews and non-Jews shall determine in large part the relations between the two groups of one other.
Abstract: The article analyzes the newest survey results on antisemitic prejudices, antisemitic political discourses, and political antisemitism in present-day Hungary. According to the research findings, during the first decade and a half after the fall of communism, 10%-15% of the Hungarian adult population held a strong antisemitic prejudice. Surveys conducted after 2006 show not only an increase in the absolute percentage of antisemites, but also an increase in the proportion of antisemites who embed their antisemitism in the political context. This phenomenon is linked with the appearance on the political scene of Jobbik, a more or less openly antisemitic party. When examining the causes of antisemitism, the most interesting finding was that the strength of antisemitic feelings is regionally different and that these differences correlate with the strength of Jobbik’s support in the various regions. Accordingly, we hypothesized that support for a far-right party is not a consequence of antisemitism, but conversely should be regarded as a factor that mobilizes attitudes leading to antisemitism. Thus, antisemitism is—at least in large part—a consequence of an attraction to the far right rather than an explanation for it. While analyzing antisemitic discourse, we found that the primary function of the discourse is not to formulate anti-Jewish political demands but
to establish a common identity for groups that, for various reasons and motives, have turned against the liberal parliamentary system that replaced communism.
Abstract: CST recorded a record high total of 1,652 antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2018. 2018 was the third year in a row that CST has recorded a record high incident total and means the problem of rising antisemitism in our country continues to grow.
The 1,652 antisemitic incidents CST recorded in 2018 represent a 16 per cent rise from the 1,420 incidents recorded in 2017. These 1,652 incidents were spread throughout the year, with over 100 incidents recorded in every month for the first time in any calendar year; indicating that a general atmosphere of intolerance and prejudice is sustaining the high incident totals, rather than a one-off specific ‘trigger’ event. In addition to more general background factors, the highest monthly totals in 2018 came when the problem of antisemitism in the Labour Party was the subject of intense discussion and activity, or when violence surged temporarily on the border between Israel and Gaza; suggesting that these events, and reactions to them, also played a role in 2018’s record total.
The highest monthly totals in 2018 came in May, with 182 incidents; April, with 151 incidents; August, with 150 incidents; and September, with 148 incidents. It is likely that these higher monthly totals were partly caused by reactions to political events in the UK and overseas, involving the Labour Party and violence on the border of Israel and Gaza, during those months.
CST recorded 148 antisemitic incidents in 2018 that were examples of, or took place in the immediate context of, arguments over alleged antisemitism in the Labour Party. Of these 148 incidents, 49 occurred in August, 16 in September and 15 in April. These were all months in which allegations of antisemitism in the Labour Party attracted significant media and political attention. Also in April and May, several Palestinians were killed and many injured in violence connected to protests at the border between Israel and Gaza. CST recorded 173 antisemitic incidents in 2018 that showed anti-Israel motivation alongside antisemitism, of which 47 incidents – over a quarter – occurred in April and May. In 2018 as a whole, CST recorded 84 antisemitic incidents that showed far right motivation, and 13 that showed Islamist motivation.
The 182 incidents recorded by CST in May is the highest monthly total CST has recorded since August 2014, when Israel and Hamas last fought a sustained conflict over Gaza, and is the fourth-highest monthly total CST has ever recorded.
2018 saw an increase in the number and proportion of antisemitic incidents that used political or extremist language and imagery. Forty-five per cent of the incidents recorded by CST in 2018 involved the use of extremist language or imagery alongside antisemitism, compared to 30 per cent of incidents recorded in 2017. Not all of these incidents revealed a clear, single ideological motivation: many involved the varied and confused use of different extremist motifs, drawn from a broad reservoir of antisemitic sources. Of the 1,652 antisemitic incidents recorded during 2018, 456 involved language or imagery relating to the far right or the Nazi period; 254 involved references to Israel and the Palestinians, alongside antisemitism; and 29 involved references to Islam and Muslims. In 285 incidents, more than one type of extremist discourse was used.
Abstract: Antisemitism and anti-Zionism are complex, delineable, yet inter-related social-psychological phenomena. While antisemitism has been described as an irrational, age-old prejudice, anti-Zionism is often represented as a legitimate response to a ’rogue state’. Drawing upon media and visual sources and rich interview data from Iran, Britain and Israel, Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism: Representation, Cognition and Everyday Talk examines the concepts of antisemitism and anti-Zionism, tracing their evolution and inter-relations, and considering the distinct ways in which they are manifested, and responded to, by Muslim and Jewish communities in Iran, Britain and Israel. Providing insights from social psychology, sociology and history, this interdisciplinary analysis sheds light on the pivotal role of the media, social representations and identity processes in shaping antisemitism and anti-Zionism. As such, this provocative book will be of interest to social scientists working on antisemitism, race and ethnicity, political sociology and political science, media studies and Middle Eastern politics.
Abstract: In late 2017, JPR published a major study of attitudes towards Jews and Israel among the population of Great Britain, a project supported by the Community Security Trust and the Department for Communities and Local Government. We regard it as a groundbreaking piece of work - the first study conducted anywhere that empirically demonstrates a clear connection between extreme hostility towards Israel and more traditional forms of antipathy towards Jews.
This report explores this connection yet further, focusing specifically on two particularly prevalent ideas that are often experienced by Jews as antisemitic: the contention that Israel is 'an apartheid state' and that it should be subjected to a boycott.
In the first instance, the study finds that large proportions of people actually have no view at all on these ideas, either because they do not know anything about the issues, or because they are simply unsure of where they stand on them. This is particularly the case for young people and women - knowledge levels improve and opinions sharpen the older people are, and, as has been found in numerous other studies, women tend to be less opinionated than men on these types of political issues.
However, among those who do have a view, 21% agree with the contention that 'Israel is an apartheid state,' 5% strongly so, and 10% endorse the argument that 'people should boycott Israeli goods and products (3% strongly so). About the same proportion (18%) disagrees with the apartheid contention as agree with it, but a much higher proportion disagrees with the boycott one (47%) than agrees with it.
Disagreement with the boycott idea is higher in older age bands than in younger ones, increasingly so among those aged 40-plus, a phenomenon that is not found in relation to the apartheid contention. But the ideas are not particularly sensitive to educational level - both agreement and disagreement with both contentions increase the higher the educational qualification achieved.
However, clear distinctions can be found when looking at the data through the lens of religion, with Muslims much more likely than other groups to support both contentions.
The report goes on to explore the correlations between these views and more traditional anti-Jewish ones, and finds clear links between the two, although this is more the case with the boycott idea than the apartheid one. However, it also notes that the correlation is stronger with other anti-Israel beliefs, particularly those arguing that Israel exploits the Holocaust for its own purposes, and those claiming that Israel is excessively powerful or the primary cause of troubles in the Middle East.
Abstract: What can the internet tell us about antisemitism in the United Kingdom? It has been shown that people are remarkably honest when they search for information online. Their Google searches and queries reveal interests, prejudices and hatreds that they might keep hidden from friends, family members, neighbours, surveys and even from themselves. They have been shown to share their health secrets, sexual preferences, and hostility towards other groups.
We decided to put this to the test to see what the Google searches made by people in the United Kingdom could tell us about attitudes
towards Jewish people in this country and in general towards Jews. Unsurprisingly perhaps, we found that, every year, people in this
country express antisemitic thoughts through their internet searches. People make some Google searches that are disturbing, including searches such as “I hate Jews,” and “Why are Jews evil?”, along with other searches expressing violent intentions towards Jews. Others post on anonymous hate sites such as the far right Stormfront website, expressing their antisemitic feelings about various Jewish Members of Parliament and celebrities.
By analysing this data, we can get a better sense of the where, when, who and what of antisemitism in Britain today. For example,we looked at whether the voting patterns of towns and cities affect the number of antisemitic searches in those places. We found that searches looking for information on the Holocaust being a hoax rise about 30 per cent every year on Holocaust Memorial Day. We learnt that Jewish women in public life or positions of power are the subject of more antisemitic searches than Jewish men in similar positions. We found evidence of the rise in popularity of antisemitic conspiracy theories, such as the discredited myth relating to the role of the Rothschild family in running the world. And we found that sometimes heightened media focus on Jews or Israel, even if it is positive, can still lead to an increase in online searches for antisemitic content.
We also found strategies that technology companies and civil society organisations can use to fight hatred. For example, our research shows that, when Google changed its autocomplete formula to eliminate antisemitic search suggestions, this lowered the number of people searching for antisemitic material (which also means that, before removing those antisemitic search prompts, Google was directing people to make antisemitic searches
who might otherwise not have done so).
This is the story of the hidden hate that our report reveals.
Abstract: ComRes surveyed 7,092 adults online in seven countries between 7th September – 20th September (Great Britain, 1010; France, 1006; Germany, 1012; Poland, 1020; Hungary, 1019; Sweden 1018; Austria, 1007). Data were weighted to be representative of each country based on age, gender and region.
Over a third of adults (36%) say they are not favourable towards Muslims in their country, compared with one in ten (10%) who say they are unfavourable towards Jews
Three in ten (28%) adults say Jewish people have too much influence in finance and business across the world, compared with other people
One in five (20%) adults say Jewish people have too much influence in media across the world compared to other people
More than two in five (44%) agree anti-Semitism is a growing problem in their country today
Two in five (40%) adults agree Jewish people are at risk of racist violence in their country
Over half (54%) of adults agree Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish state
One third (32%) of adults agree criticism of Israel tends to be motivated by anti-Semitism
Three in ten (31%) adults agree Jewish people use the Holocaust to advance their position or to achieve certain goals
Over half (56%) of adults say they are not aware of ever having socialised with a Jewish person
