Abstract: This paper proposes that understanding the causes of anti-Semitic hate crime requires the
recognition of the cultural specificity of anti-Semitism, reflected in its unique mythical and
conspiratorial nature. By neglecting to consider the idiosyncrasies of anti-Semitic rhetoric,
general theories of hate crime often fail to provide an adequate explanation for the
persistence of anti-Jewish violence, especially in cultures where Jews do not constitute a
conspicuous minority, or where there is no noticeable tradition of anti-Jewish sentiment.
This point is illustrated using as an example the emergence of anti-Semitic hate crime in
Serbia in the aftermath of political changes in October 2000. The paper explores this
development in the context of Serbia’s recent past, arguing that the onset of violent
incidents towards Jews entailed two distinct but related stages, both of which are linked to
the conspiratorial nature of anti-Semitic ideology. The first phase – which culminated at
the time of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia – involved the proliferation of the belief in
Jewish conspiracy. At this stage, anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, which were to be found
even in the mainstream media, retained an ‘abstract’ quality and their proliferation did
not, in itself, lead to anti-Jewish hate crime. The onset of anti-Semitic violence is
associated with the second phase, which followed Milošević’s downfall, when, with the
marginalisation of conspiratorial culture, the belief in Jewish conspiracy, as an abstract
ideological position, became reified and transformed into concrete instances of violence
against the local Jewish population. In exploring this two-stage process, the paper
highlights the way in which a closer examination of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and
other anti-Semitic texts can help shed some light on the dynamic underpinning the
persistence of anti-Jewish hate crime in modern society.
Abstract: Many in Europe today are concerned about the rise in violence against Jews, which clearly raises fears in Jewish communities on the Continent. Neither Jewish communities nor individual Jews can be protected unless there is data on antisemitic incidents and scientifically thorough situation analysis. We need to know and analyze the current social attitudes related to antisemitism, to the coexistence with Jews, mutually held prejudices, related taboos in a representative sample of the European countries’ population.
This is the reason why we have launched the largest European antisemitism survey. The research, initiated by the Action and Protection League and carried out by the polling companies Ipsos and Inspira, aims to provide a comprehensive picture of antisemitic prejudice in 16 countries in the European Union.
Data were collected between December 2019 and January 2020 in 16 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 1000 people were surveyed in each country.
We used a total of 24 questions to measure antisemitism. We measured the cognitive and conative dimensions of prejudice with 10 questions, and three additional questions for the affective dimension of antisemitism, that is, to measure the emotional charge of antisemitic prejudice. We mapped secondary antisemitism relativizing the Holocaust with seven questions and antisemitic hostility against Israel with four questions. We used two and three questions, respectively, to measure sympathy for Jews and for Israel.
With the exception of questions about affective antisemitism, all questions were asked in the same form: Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point scale how much they agreed with the statements in the question (strongly agree; tend to agree; neither agree nor disagree; tend to disagree; strongly disagree).
Abstract: Many in Europe today are concerned about the rise in violence against Jews, which clearly raises fears in Jewish communities on the Continent. Neither Jewish communities nor individual Jews can be protected unless there is data on antisemitic incidents and scientifically thorough situation analysis. We need to know and analyze the current social attitudes related to antisemitism, to the coexistence with Jews, mutually held prejudices, related taboos in a representative sample of the European countries’ population.
This is the reason why we have launched the largest European antisemitism survey. The research, initiated by the Action and Protection League and carried out by the polling companies Ipsos and Inspira, aims to provide a comprehensive picture of antisemitic prejudice in 16 countries in the European Union.
Data were collected between December 2019 and January 2020 in 16 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 1000 people were surveyed in each country.
We used a total of 24 questions to measure antisemitism. We measured the cognitive and conative dimensions of prejudice with 10 questions, and three additional questions for the affective dimension of antisemitism, that is, to measure the emotional charge of antisemitic prejudice. We mapped secondary antisemitism relativizing the Holocaust with seven questions and antisemitic hostility against Israel with four questions. We used two and three questions, respectively, to measure sympathy for Jews and for Israel.
With the exception of questions about affective antisemitism, all questions were asked in the same form: Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point scale how much they agreed with the statements in the question (strongly agree; tend to agree; neither agree nor disagree; tend to disagree; strongly disagree).
Abstract: Antisemitism is a problem that is prevalent throughout the world. Violence and riots have frequently occurred for many years in football games in many countries, committed by fans of a club or by hooligans. Antisemitism has also become common at games, with football clubs using antisemitic language and symbols against their rivals. Sometimes, antisemitism is used by far-right political organizations at football stadiums for propaganda purposes and as a device to incite violence. It is interesting, and puzzling, that some fans of two teams, Spurs in London, and Ajax in Amsterdam, have declared themselves “Jewish,” and adopted and displayed Jewish symbols, as a response to antisemitic attacks on their club. While it is difficult to eradicate manifestations of antisemitism, it is encouraging that various private organizations, football clubs, and local and national governmental bodies have begun to formulate rules to punish those responsible for antisemitic language and actions.
Abstract: This article analyzes the attitudes of 25 refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, now living in Germany, toward Jews, the Holocaust, Israel, and the Middle East conflict. It reveals both anti-Jewish and anti-Israel sentiments among many of the respondents, as well as a lack of knowledge about the Holocaust, and a wide range of attitudes between individual participants. Some of the factors influencing attitudes include everyday knowledge in the countries of origin, Arab nationalism, as well as specific religious and ethnic identities. The findings are discussed in relation to other recent studies, and against the backdrop of German media discourse, current debates about an “imported” antisemitism among refugees and migrants, and the relationship between experiences of racial discrimination and anti-Jewish attitudes.
Abstract: Threats and violence from radicalized Islamists have led to heightened security measures for Jewish organizations in France. French soldiers are protecting Jewish schools, kindergartens, community centers, and other Jewish institutions. In addition to terrorism, there are a number of other factors that have led to increased antisemitism in France. This article discusses data on antisemitic incidents and surveys on antisemitic attitudes in France. While there is a clear rise in antisemitic incidents, the trend in antisemitic attitudes is less clear. Levels of antisemitic attitudes are particularly high among Muslims, the far-right, and also the far-left, but not necessarily among the general French population. However, the rise of antisemitism has hit observant Jews more than non-observant Jews and it has led to changes in behavior, including in the display of religious signs and avoidance of places of worship. Many French Jews today question their future in France.
Abstract: This article examines three case studies of new-old sensibilities toward antisemitism, the Holocaust, and liberalism, in Hungary, which show: 1) how in a climate of mutual resentment, a debatable charge of intellectual antisemitism elicited widespread rejection; 2) how an official attempt to partially displace the West European “Holocaust paradigm” during the 2014 Holocaust commemoration led to a recoding of an older anti-fascist narrative in a right-wing key; and, 3) how new discourses on ethnic homogeneity and the Hungarian mainstream's partial convergence with the Western far-right have yielded an odd combination of anti-Jewish, anti-Muslim, and pro-Israel attitudes today. The article argues that antisemitism in Hungary grew substantially from 2006 to 2011, but has not exploded into a major political or social force under the authoritarian and xenophobic shift of the country since 2010. Hungarian Jews have not found themselves at the center of conflicts beyond their making, as in the past, but they are no longer able to enjoy the kind of security they experienced under Hungarian liberal democracy either—the situation in the country has become volatile and unpredictable.
Abstract: Bereits seit einigen Jahren schwelt eine Diskussion über einen neuen Antisemitismus. Im Fokus dieser Debatten finden sich immer häufiger Einwanderer:innen, vor allem aber Muslim:innen wieder. Als Folge kam der Begriff eines islamisierten Antisemitismus auf. Schnell wurden diese Diskussionen zu einem Politikum. Rechtsextreme Akteure wie die Alternative für Deutschland griffen die Hinweise auf Antisemitismus unter Muslim:innen auf und instrumentalisierten diese für ihre antimuslimische Agenda. Diese Instrumentalisierung wiederum macht es Menschen, die sich gegen antimuslimische Diskriminierung einsetzen, schwer, die Existenz eines muslimischen Antisemitismus anzuerkennen. Anhand unterschiedlichen empirischen Materials untersucht dieser Beitrag die Prävalenz antisemitischer Ressentiments unter Muslim:innen und wie diese mit der Persistenz von Antisemitismus in der deutschen Gesellschaft zusammenhängen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass traditionelle Formen des Antisemitismus und insbesondere israelbezogener Antisemitismus unter Muslim:innen besonders akzentuiert ausfällt. Der Antisemitismus, in muslimischen Submilieus, stellt neben dem ethnonationalen, rechtsextremen Antisemitismus eine Bedrohung für Jud:innen in Deutschland dar. Der Antisemitismus unter Muslim:innen stützt sich sowohl auf Narrative, die aus ihren Herkunftsländern stammen, sowie auf religiöse Quellen. Allerdings ist der Antisemitismus unter Muslim:innen in Deutschland geringer ausgeprägt als in den meisten Gesellschaften der islamischen Welt. Darüber hinaus sind schuldverleugnende Artikulationen von Antisemitismus nach wie vor ein Markenzeichen der autochthonen Bevölkerung und rechter politischer Milieus. Antisemitismus in Deutschland bedarf daher eines differenzierteren Verständnisses, als es noch vor wenigen Jahren notwendig erschien.
Abstract: he Government needs to step up efforts to address attempts by the far-right to blame the COVID-19 pandemic on Jews, according to a think tank report.
The conspiracies are said to have permeated every corner of the internet, including encrypted apps like Telegram and everyday digital tools like podcasts. Despite much of the recent political and media focus being on mainstream platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, the report finds the most ardent forms of hatred circulate on peripheral so-called ‘alt-tech’ platforms.
The study — by the Henry Jackson Society — comes as it was revealed that Facebook has taken robust action in banning adverts by extremist group, which have attempted to sow the seeds of division amidst the COVID-19 crisis.
Among the online messages spread by the far-right identified within the report, are that:
Jews are using global lockdowns to “steal everything”.
“Satan in human form”, or Jewish people, are throwing dance parties to celebrate the spread of the coronavirus.
Jewish public leaders are using the COVID-19 crisis to “test the populations [sic] willingness to comply” with authoritarian restrictions on their civil liberties.
COVID-19 is being used as part of a plot to replace the ‘white’ population of Europe.
Those infected with the coronavirus should visit their local synagogue and mosque, and more broadly ethnically-diverse neighbourhoods, in order to spread the disease.
Jews spread the bubonic plague through Europe in the Middle Ages and demonstrate an inherent tendency for killing large numbers of non-Jews through efficient methods.
In response, the author recommends the introduction of stronger forms of internet regulation for alt-tech social media platforms, including a review by the Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE) and extensive training for law enforcement officers on the full scope of alt-tech platforms. The report also recommends that the Home Office establish a new counter-disinformation unit to tackle online conspiracy theories head-on by “exposing their fundamental lack of credibility, through well-organised social media campaigns”.
This material is said to be circulating on both sides of the Atlantic with extremist messaging from the British National Socialist Movement in the UK and the National Socialist Movement in the United States. The similarities between the content across the Atlantic is identified by the author as an area of particular concern
Abstract: As pandemic restrictions intensified in Western Europe, so too did a wave of COVID-related
antisemitism and Islamophobia, proliferating on social media. Considering antisemitism and
Islamophobia as joint and intersecting phenomena, this report investigates the ways in which,
eighteen months after the start of the pandemic, anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim narratives continue to be created, spread and accessed on social media. Through interviews with thirteen Jewish
and Muslim community leaders, subject-area experts and representatives of inter-governmental
organisations, this report presents not only the key trends both on and offline, but they ways in
which they have impacted the targeted communities, and the ability of Jews and Muslims in
Western Europe to live and practice their religion threat-free. This research makes ten key recommendations for social media companies, governments and civil societies, in order to urgently
address the spiralling radicalisation which is evidenced throughout this report.
Abstract: n 2016 I published the results of three surveys, two on antisemitism and xenophobia in Poland and one on antisemitism and xenophobia in Ukraine, in Polin 29. The first of these was conducted in 1992, at the very start of Poland’s turn to democracy. The second, conducted ten years later in 2002, coincided with the end of the transition to democracy and just before Poland’s acceptance into the European Union. Shortly afterwards, in 2003, thanks to a grant from the Polish Committee of Scientific Research, we conducted a comparative study in Ukraine.¹
I now present the conclusions of a fourth survey, conducted in Poland a decade later in 2012 and representing a time when democracy was supposedly being consolidated.2 This survey reveals some optimistic changes in Poles' behaviour and attitudes towards Jews and 'Others' in general. It shows, however, some very disturbing features. These would be felt some years later when the right-wing, nationalist-Catholic Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość; PiS) won the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015. This new material adds to the picture that emerged from the previous surveys, but other features are evident as well. We were unable to repeat the survey in Ukraine because of the outbreak of social protest and the occupation of Maidan in Kiev in 2013.
Abstract: Aim: What was the attitude of the first Croatian president Franjo Tuđman and the Croatian leadership towards the Holocaust and the Jewish community in Croatia in the 1990s? Some considered Tuđman a Holocaust denier because of the purportedly controversial parts of his 1989 book Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti (Wastelands of Historical Reality). The Croatian leadership was accused of minimizing World War II crimes of the Ustasha regime and rehabilitating the World War II Independent State of Croatia.
Methods: We analyzed archival documents, Tuđman’s published correspondence, controversial parts of his Wastelands of Historical Reality, his public statements, biographical writings of contemporary Croatian leaders, and newspaper articles. We scrutinized the Serbian propaganda against Croatia in the 1990s, the position and role of the Jewish community and prominent Jews in Croatian public life as well as the relations between Croatia and Israel.
Findings: The Croatian leadership and the Jewish community maintained good relations in the 1990s. Some prominent Croatian Jews actively advocated for Croatia’s international recognition and refuted certain authors’ and some Jewish international circles’ accusations of antisemitism among Croatian leadership. Jews participated at the highest levels of Croatian government. Democratic changes at the beginning of the 1990s enabled national, religious, political and other freedoms for minorities in Croatia, including the Jewish community. Still, some authors considered Tuđman an anti-Semite and a Holocaust denier. These opinions were partly shaped by quotes from the Wastelands of Historical Reality taken out of context and published by Serbian propagandists. This propaganda successfully shaped the false perception of official antisemitism in Croatia and has contributed to the delay in the establishment of the diplomatic relations between Croatia and Israel for more than five years after Israel had recognized Croatia.
Conclusion: There is no evidence for claims of political antisemitism in Croatia in the 1990s. This article sheds light on this widely manipulated topic and provides a basis for further researchs.
Abstract: This paper examines the discourse around anti-Semitism in Germany since 2000. The discourse makes use of the figure of the Jew for national security purposes (i.e. via the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the trope of the “dangerous Muslim”) and the politics of national identity. The article introduces the concept of the “War on Anti-Semitism”, an assemblage of policies about national belonging and security that are propelled primarily by white racial anxieties. While the War on Terror is fought against the Muslim Other, or the War on Drugs is fought against predominantly Latinx and Black communities, the War on Anti-Semitism is ostensibly fought on behalf of the racialized Jewish Other. The War on Anti-Semitism serves as a pretext justifying Germany's internal and external security measures by providing a logic for the management of non-white migration in an ethnically diverse yet white supremacist Europe.
In 2000, a new citizenship law fundamentally changed the architecture of belonging and im/migration by replacing the old Wilhelminian jus sanguinis (principle of blood) with a jus soli (principle of residency). In the wake of these changes and the resulting racial anxiety about Germanness, state sponsored civil-society educational programs to fight anti-Semitism emerged, targeting predominantly Muslim non-/citizens. These education programs were developed alongside international debates around the War on Terror and what came to be called “Israel-oriented anti-Semitism” in Germany (more commonly known as “Muslim anti-Semitism”).
Triangulated through the enduring legacy of colonial racialization, the Jew and the Muslim are con/figured as enemies in socio-political German discourses. This analysis of the War on Anti-Semitism has serious implications for our understanding of “New Europe”. By focusing on the figure of the Jew and the Muslim, the implications of this work transcend national borders and stress the important connection between fantasy, power, and racialization in Germany and beyond.
Abstract: Executive summary
• Three of the four ‘alternative media’ platforms analysed were found to promote a
negative view of Jews
• The fourth was found to promote a negative view of Muslims, but not of Jews
(although it sometimes made use of arguments and images that are in other
contexts used to stigmatise Jews)
• A significant relationship was found between holding antisemitic views and having a
positive opinion of each of the three platforms that were found to promote a
negative view of Jews
• A significant relationship was also found between holding antisemitic views and
having a positive opinion of the Russian state-owned propaganda broadcaster, RT
(formerly Russia Today)
• By contrast, there was no relationship, or a substantially weaker and more conflicted
relationship, between antisemitism and evaluation of named ‘mainstream media’
sources
• Moreover, drawing on the ‘mainstream media’ in general for political information
was associated with lower levels of antisemitism
• In the interests of reducing prejudice, it would appear desirable to encourage use of
high quality, reputable sources of information at the expense of low quality fringe
sources
• Partial solutions to the problem could include:
- Demonetisation of problematic websites (for example, through withdrawal of
advertising)
- De-prioritisation of content from such websites in social media news feeds
and search algorithms
- Guidelines for members or employees of organisations such as political
parties, voluntary sector organisations, trade unions, and media companies,
both against sharing content or repeating claims from such websites and
against providing them with content in the form of interviews, quotations, or
stories
- In extreme cases, legal or regulatory sanctions against the owners of the
websites themselves
• However, it is at least as important for government, individual consumers, and other
stakeholders (including social media companies) to play their part in ensuring that
reputable media-producing organisations are able to remain viable as businesses
that can both invest in and promote high-quality content within a democratic
regulatory framework
Abstract: „Zionisten“, „Satanisten“, „Transhumanisten“ und die „Pharmamafia“ würden durch „Sterilisation und Mord per Todesspritze“ […] „die absolute Kontrolle jedes Einzelnen und die Auslöschung weiterer Teile der Bevölkerung“ herbeiführen. Denn hinter Corona stecke „der feuchte Traum von einer kommunistischen Weltmacht“, nämlich der Zweck der „Umstrukturierung der Welt in eine neue Ordnung, kurz NWO (New World Order, Anm. RIAS Bayern. Vgl. Glossar, → NWO)“.
Dies sagte eine Rednerin auf einer Kundgebung sogenannter Coronarebellen in Nürnberg am 27. Juni 2020. Der Frau zufolge sollen durch Impfungen Menschen weltweit mit Nanochips überwacht, sterilisiert und getötet werden. Abschließend befand sie: „Ja, das muss man auch mal ganz klar benennen dürfen, oder?“
Zwar mögen solche Erzählungen meist abstrus und verrückt wirken, sie sind jedoch in ihren potentiellen Konsequenzen ernst zu nehmen. Selbstverständlich existierten auch vor der Coronapandemie Verschwörungserzählungen. Jedoch haben sie sich auch in Bayern verstärkt verbreitet, nachdem im Frühjahr 2020 Menschen, die sich als Coronarebellen oder Querdenker bezeichnen, begannen, gegen tatsächliche und imaginierte
staatliche Maßnahmen im Zuge der Coronakrise zu protestieren.
Nicht zuletzt in den sozialen Medien verbreiten sich Verschwörungserzählungen in Wort und Bild zunehmend rasanter und erreichen im Zuge der „Corona-Proteste” auch immer mehr Menschen, die vor der Pandemie wenig verschwörungsideologisch geprägt waren. Laut einer repräsentativen Umfrage der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung vom Juli 2020 glauben 16 Prozent der Einwohner:innen in Deutschland, dass Bill Gates allen Menschen Mikrochips einpflanzen wollen würde. Antisemitische Einstellungen sind in Deutschland weit verbreitet. Laut einer repräsentativen Umfrage des Jüdischen Weltkongresses (WJC) von 2019 behaupten 28 Prozent
der sogenannten Elite (laut Studie Hochschulabsolvent:innen mit einem Jahreseinkommen von mindestens 100.000 Euro), Juden hätten zu viel Macht in der Wirtschaft. 26 Prozent attestieren Juden „zu viel Macht in der Weltpolitik“. Fast die Hälfte von ihnen (48 Prozent) behauptet, Juden verhielten sich loyaler zu Israel als zu Deutschland. Der
WJC ließ dafür zweieinhalb Monate vor dem Anschlag auf die Synagoge in Halle an Yom Kippur 2019 1300 Menschen befragen.
Diese Broschüre der Recherche- und Informationsstelle Antisemitismus (RIAS) Bayern soll über Verschwörungserzählungen im Zusammenhang mit Antisemitismus aufklären. Was sind Verschwörungserzählungen und was haben sie mit Antisemitismus zu tun? Warum sind sie für bestimmte Menschen attraktiv? Wie kann man ihnen begegnen? Ab Seite 18 findet sich ein ausführliches Glossar zu gängigen Verschwörungserzählungen mit von
RIAS Bayern dokumentierten Beispielen.
