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Date: 2020
Abstract: Aim: What was the attitude of the first Croatian president Franjo Tuđman and the Croatian leadership towards the Holocaust and the Jewish community in Croatia in the 1990s? Some considered Tuđman a Holocaust denier because of the purportedly controversial parts of his 1989 book Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti (Wastelands of Historical Reality). The Croatian leadership was accused of minimizing World War II crimes of the Ustasha regime and rehabilitating the World War II Independent State of Croatia.

Methods: We analyzed archival documents, Tuđman’s published correspondence, controversial parts of his Wastelands of Historical Reality, his public statements, biographical writings of contemporary Croatian leaders, and newspaper articles. We scrutinized the Serbian propaganda against Croatia in the 1990s, the position and role of the Jewish community and prominent Jews in Croatian public life as well as the relations between Croatia and Israel.

Findings: The Croatian leadership and the Jewish community maintained good relations in the 1990s. Some prominent Croatian Jews actively advocated for Croatia’s international recognition and refuted certain authors’ and some Jewish international circles’ accusations of antisemitism among Croatian leadership. Jews participated at the highest levels of Croatian government. Democratic changes at the beginning of the 1990s enabled national, religious, political and other freedoms for minorities in Croatia, including the Jewish community. Still, some authors considered Tuđman an anti-Semite and a Holocaust denier. These opinions were partly shaped by quotes from the Wastelands of Historical Reality taken out of context and published by Serbian propagandists. This propaganda successfully shaped the false perception of official antisemitism in Croatia and has contributed to the delay in the establishment of the diplomatic relations between Croatia and Israel for more than five years after Israel had recognized Croatia.

Conclusion: There is no evidence for claims of political antisemitism in Croatia in the 1990s. This article sheds light on this widely manipulated topic and provides a basis for further researchs.
Author(s): Younes, Anne-Esther
Date: 2020
Abstract: This paper examines the discourse around anti-Semitism in Germany since 2000. The discourse makes use of the figure of the Jew for national security purposes (i.e. via the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the trope of the “dangerous Muslim”) and the politics of national identity. The article introduces the concept of the “War on Anti-Semitism”, an assemblage of policies about national belonging and security that are propelled primarily by white racial anxieties. While the War on Terror is fought against the Muslim Other, or the War on Drugs is fought against predominantly Latinx and Black communities, the War on Anti-Semitism is ostensibly fought on behalf of the racialized Jewish Other. The War on Anti-Semitism serves as a pretext justifying Germany's internal and external security measures by providing a logic for the management of non-white migration in an ethnically diverse yet white supremacist Europe.

In 2000, a new citizenship law fundamentally changed the architecture of belonging and im/migration by replacing the old Wilhelminian jus sanguinis (principle of blood) with a jus soli (principle of residency). In the wake of these changes and the resulting racial anxiety about Germanness, state sponsored civil-society educational programs to fight anti-Semitism emerged, targeting predominantly Muslim non-/citizens. These education programs were developed alongside international debates around the War on Terror and what came to be called “Israel-oriented anti-Semitism” in Germany (more commonly known as “Muslim anti-Semitism”).

Triangulated through the enduring legacy of colonial racialization, the Jew and the Muslim are con/figured as enemies in socio-political German discourses. This analysis of the War on Anti-Semitism has serious implications for our understanding of “New Europe”. By focusing on the figure of the Jew and the Muslim, the implications of this work transcend national borders and stress the important connection between fantasy, power, and racialization in Germany and beyond.
Date: 1994
Abstract: With the rise of ultranationalist organizations throughout Europe, the issue of attitudes and orientations held toward designated "out-groups" has become a critical concern of anxious observers. In Russia the strength registered by Vladimir Zhirinovskii's ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party during the parliamentary elections of 1993 has been interpreted as a sign of intolerance among the Russian populace. In fact, the success of candidates associated with the Liberal Democratic Party was not only based upon appeals to strengthen the Russian nation against perceived enemies, but also upon promises of a return to price stability and upon Zhirinovskii's anti-establishment, populist program. Nonetheless, Zhirinovskii's success in the 1991 presidential elections (he attracted 7.8% of the electorate) does serve to reaffirm the importance of tracking how attitudes toward groups that have often been targeted as scapegoats in times of social or economic upheaval have evolved in the late Soviet and immediate post-Soviet period. Two major questions concern us here: first, how pervasive among Russians and Ukrainians are perceptions of significant "social distance" between themselves and designated out-groups, most notably the Jewish population; and second, to what extent do these perceptions of distance form part of a cohesive ideology of ultranationalism? Understanding the basis of sentiments toward Jewish populations is particularly important for interpreting the workings of the complex mosaic of the post-Soviet political culture.
Date: 2021
Abstract: Executive summary
• Three of the four ‘alternative media’ platforms analysed were found to promote a
negative view of Jews
• The fourth was found to promote a negative view of Muslims, but not of Jews
(although it sometimes made use of arguments and images that are in other
contexts used to stigmatise Jews)
• A significant relationship was found between holding antisemitic views and having a
positive opinion of each of the three platforms that were found to promote a
negative view of Jews
• A significant relationship was also found between holding antisemitic views and
having a positive opinion of the Russian state-owned propaganda broadcaster, RT
(formerly Russia Today)
• By contrast, there was no relationship, or a substantially weaker and more conflicted
relationship, between antisemitism and evaluation of named ‘mainstream media’
sources
• Moreover, drawing on the ‘mainstream media’ in general for political information
was associated with lower levels of antisemitism
• In the interests of reducing prejudice, it would appear desirable to encourage use of
high quality, reputable sources of information at the expense of low quality fringe
sources
• Partial solutions to the problem could include:
- Demonetisation of problematic websites (for example, through withdrawal of
advertising)
- De-prioritisation of content from such websites in social media news feeds
and search algorithms
- Guidelines for members or employees of organisations such as political
parties, voluntary sector organisations, trade unions, and media companies,
both against sharing content or repeating claims from such websites and
against providing them with content in the form of interviews, quotations, or
stories
- In extreme cases, legal or regulatory sanctions against the owners of the
websites themselves
• However, it is at least as important for government, individual consumers, and other
stakeholders (including social media companies) to play their part in ensuring that
reputable media-producing organisations are able to remain viable as businesses
that can both invest in and promote high-quality content within a democratic
regulatory framework
Author(s): Baer, Marc David
Date: 2013
Author(s): Baugut, Philip
Date: 2021
Abstract: Rund 75 Jahre nach dem Holocaust verzeichnet die Polizei einen An-stieg antisemitischer Straftaten in Deutschland; als bedrohte Minderheit sorgen sich jüdi-sche Menschen um das gesellschaftliche Meinungsklima, das auch die etablierten Massen-medien prägen. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht der vorliegende Beitrag mit Hilfe des normativen Konzepts der „interkulturellen medialen Integration“ die medienjournalisti-sche Berichterstattung der Wochenzeitung Jüdische Allgemeine. Die Befunde der qualitati-ven Inhaltsanalyse von 168 Beiträgen zeigen, dass die vom Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland herausgegebene Publikation in verschiedener Hinsicht heftige Kritik an etab-lierten Medien übt. So hätten einzelne Medien antisemitische Stereotype verbreitet, Perso-nen, die sich antisemitisch äußern, eine Plattform geboten und Antisemitismus als solchen nicht erkannt, relativiert oder negiert. Im Sinne einer differenzierten Medienkritik macht die Jüdische Allgemeine aber auch deutlich, welche Merkmale von Medieninhalten sie für wünschenswert hält, darunter Berichte über alltägliches jüdisches Leben in Deutschland, aber auch authentische Beiträge über Antisemitismus, in denen Betroffene zu Wort kom-men. Die Befunde können zum einen verstehen helfen, warum viele Jüd*innen in Europa Antisemitismus in den Medien als Problem sehen. Zum anderen liefern sie Produzierenden von Medienangeboten Hinweise darauf, welche Resonanz ihre Inhalte innerhalb der jüdi-schen Gemeinschaft finden.
Author(s): Baugut, Philip
Date: 2021
Date: 2021
Abstract: „Zionisten“, „Satanisten“, „Transhumanisten“ und die „Pharmamafia“ würden durch „Sterilisation und Mord per Todesspritze“ […] „die absolute Kontrolle jedes Einzelnen und die Auslöschung weiterer Teile der Bevölkerung“ herbeiführen. Denn hinter Corona stecke „der feuchte Traum von einer kommunistischen Weltmacht“, nämlich der Zweck der „Umstrukturierung der Welt in eine neue Ordnung, kurz NWO (New World Order, Anm. RIAS Bayern. Vgl. Glossar, → NWO)“.

Dies sagte eine Rednerin auf einer Kundgebung sogenannter Coronarebellen in Nürnberg am 27. Juni 2020. Der Frau zufolge sollen durch Impfungen Menschen weltweit mit Nanochips überwacht, sterilisiert und getötet werden. Abschließend befand sie: „Ja, das muss man auch mal ganz klar benennen dürfen, oder?“

Zwar mögen solche Erzählungen meist abstrus und verrückt wirken, sie sind jedoch in ihren potentiellen Konsequenzen ernst zu nehmen. Selbstverständlich existierten auch vor der Coronapandemie Verschwörungserzählungen. Jedoch haben sie sich auch in Bayern verstärkt verbreitet, nachdem im Frühjahr 2020 Menschen, die sich als Coronarebellen oder Querdenker bezeichnen, begannen, gegen tatsächliche und imaginierte
staatliche Maßnahmen im Zuge der Coronakrise zu protestieren.

Nicht zuletzt in den sozialen Medien verbreiten sich Verschwörungserzählungen in Wort und Bild zunehmend rasanter und erreichen im Zuge der „Corona-Proteste” auch immer mehr Menschen, die vor der Pandemie wenig verschwörungsideologisch geprägt waren. Laut einer repräsentativen Umfrage der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung vom Juli 2020 glauben 16 Prozent der Einwohner:innen in Deutschland, dass Bill Gates allen Menschen Mikrochips einpflanzen wollen würde. Antisemitische Einstellungen sind in Deutschland weit verbreitet. Laut einer repräsentativen Umfrage des Jüdischen Weltkongresses (WJC) von 2019 behaupten 28 Prozent
der sogenannten Elite (laut Studie Hochschulabsolvent:innen mit einem Jahreseinkommen von mindestens 100.000 Euro), Juden hätten zu viel Macht in der Wirtschaft. 26 Prozent attestieren Juden „zu viel Macht in der Weltpolitik“. Fast die Hälfte von ihnen (48 Prozent) behauptet, Juden verhielten sich loyaler zu Israel als zu Deutschland. Der
WJC ließ dafür zweieinhalb Monate vor dem Anschlag auf die Synagoge in Halle an Yom Kippur 2019 1300 Menschen befragen.

Diese Broschüre der Recherche- und Informationsstelle Antisemitismus (RIAS) Bayern soll über Verschwörungserzählungen im Zusammenhang mit Antisemitismus aufklären. Was sind Verschwörungserzählungen und was haben sie mit Antisemitismus zu tun? Warum sind sie für bestimmte Menschen attraktiv? Wie kann man ihnen begegnen? Ab Seite 18 findet sich ein ausführliches Glossar zu gängigen Verschwörungserzählungen mit von
RIAS Bayern dokumentierten Beispielen.
Author(s): Bharat, Adi Saleem
Date: 2021
Author(s): Katzin, Mirjam
Date: 2021
Abstract: Malmö stad har under hösten 2020 undersökt förekomsten av antisemitism och förutsättningarna för judiskt liv i Malmös förskolor, skolor, gymnasier och vuxenutbildning. Resultatet presenteras nu i en rapport tillsammans med en forskningsöversikt och förslag på åtgärder framåt. Undersökningen och rapporten är en del av Malmö stad och Judiska Församlingen Malmös samverkansöverenskommelse.

Rapporten handlar om att motarbeta antisemitism och stärka förutsättningarna för judiskt liv i Malmös förskolor, skolor, gymnasier och vuxenutbildning. Studien består av intervjuer med skolpersonal och judiska barn och unga i Malmö, vilket kompletteras med en skolpersonalenkät utförd i några av Malmös grundskolor och gymnasier, samt en forskningsöversikt.

- Antisemitismen i Malmö är ett verkligt problem med tydliga offer, men frågan är mer mångbottnad än vad den ibland beskrivs som. Målsättningen med det här arbetet är att, utifrån kunskap och forskning, identifiera problem och behov i Malmös skolor för att skapa förutsättningar för att arbeta systematiskt med dessa frågor i utbildningen, säger Mirjam Katzin, samordnare för arbetet mot antisemitism och författare till rapporten.

Resultatet visar att det ofta saknas tillräckliga förutsättningar och förkunskaper hos skolpersonal för att arbeta mot antisemitism. För att förebygga rasism och antisemitism är en ökad kunskapsnivå central. Detta gäller i första hand lärare och annan skolpersonal och i andra hand eleverna. Slutsatsen är att det behövs kunskap och utbildning i demokrati, rättigheter, antirasism och specifikt frågor om antisemitism, konspirationsteorier, Israel/Palestina och de nationella minoriteterna.
Date: 2021
Abstract: Since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, the economic uncertainties and anxieties around the virus have been weaponised by a broad range of extremists, conspiracy theorists and disinformation actors, who have sought to propagandise, radicalise and mobilise captive online audiences during global lockdowns. Antisemitic hate speech is often a common feature of these diverse threats, with dangerous implications for public safety, social cohesion and democracy. But the Covid-19 crisis has only served to exacerbate a worrying trend in terms of online antisemitism. A 2018 Fundamental Rights Agency survey on Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism among Jews in the EU found nearly nine in ten respondents considered online antisemitism a problem. Eight in ten encountered antisemitic abuse online. This report, conducted by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), presents a data-driven snapshot of the proliferation of Covid-19 related online antisemitic content in French and German on Twitter, Facebook and Telegram. The study provides insight into the nature and volume of antisemitic content across selected accounts in France and Germany, analysing the platforms where such content is found, as well as the most prominent antisemitic narratives – comparing key similarities and differences between these different language contexts. The findings of this report draw on data analysis using social listening tools and natural language processing software, combined with qualitative analysis. Covering the period from January 2020 until March 2021 to build insights around the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on online antisemitism, the Executive Summary International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism was used to identify channels containing antisemitic content, before developing keyword lists to identify antisemitic expressions widely used on these channels.
Date: 2021