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Author(s): Lapeyronnie, Didier
Date: 2012
Abstract: Ces dernières années, on croyait ne jamais plus voir ces images de synagogues brûlées. On pensait qu'un Juif pratiquant, portant kippa, ne pourrait pas être insulté dans une rue ou dans le métro, pas plus qu'un enfant dans une école ne pourrait être inquiété.

On se disait que les morts dormiraient en paix, sans que des tombes ne soient profanées. Mais voilà, les injures et les agressions se sont multipliées. Et ces derniers temps, les Juifs de France ont éprouvé comme un malaise, un sentiment d'abandon. Le texte que nous publions pour ce neuvième numéro des Études du CRIF est d'une grande richesse et d'une grande érudition.

Didier Lapeyronnie connaît bien le sujet et les questions qu'il pose nous interpellent gravement. Y a-t-il généralisation d'un sentiment antisémite dans les quartiers populaires ? Pourquoi certains jeunes, premiers touchés par une discrimination dirigée vers les populations arabes ou d'origine immigrée, sont-ils à l'origine d'incidents et de violences antisémites ? Comment l'antisémitisme s'explique-t-il alors et est-il une revendication d'ordre social et d'intégration ? Se donne-t-il à voir sous plusieurs formes ? Est-il présent dans le vocabulaire et les expressions quotidiennes ? S'exprime-t-il hors de toute idéologie constituée, comme s'il s'inscrivait régulièrement dans le vocabulaire et les expressions quotidiennes ?

Le sociologue pense que l'antisémitisme finit par structurer une représentation du monde dans laquelle il va chercher confirmation et renforcement.

Il ajoute ensuite cette réflexion saisissante : « Les Juifs sont tout, si je suis exclu, les Juifs sont intégrés, si je suis pauvre, ils sont riches, si je suis méconnu, ils sont reconnus, si je suis méchant, ils sont gentils, si je suis dépourvu de communauté, ils en ont une, si je suis impuissant, ils sont puissants... Au fond ils concentrent tout le sens et assèchent toutes les possibilités de donner une signification à la situation vécue. Si « je ne suis nulle part », «les Juifs, il y en a partout et c'est bien le problème !» Il devient donc inutile de chercher à se transformer ou à changer la société, il devient inutile de revendiquer ou d'agir. Il devient inutile de penser.

L'antisémitisme résout tous les problèmes : il suffit d'inverser les polarités. S'ils n'étaient pas « partout », je ne serais pas nulle part.»

Tout comme le racisme, il est évident que l'antisémitisme secoue notre société. Il met bien à mal les valeurs de la République et il est une tâche indélébile et crasse. Mais il est surtout l'affaire de tous. Ce ne sont pas aux seuls Juifs de France de combattre l'antisémitisme, mais à la société entière de combattre les racines du mal.

Marc Knobel
Date: 2016
Abstract: Le dispositif d’enquête dont les principaux enseignements sont présentés ci-après a été conduit par l’Institut Ipsos à la demande de la Fondation du Judaïsme Français. Ce dispositif d’études s’articule autour de trois volets.

Le premier volet concerne l’ensemble de la population française : nous avons interrogé 1005 personnes constituant un échantillon représentatif de la population française âgée de 18 ans et plus (méthode des quotas). L’enquête a été réalisée par internet du 15 au 24 juillet 2014.

Le second concerne les personnes se considérant comme juives : après avoir réalisé 45 entretiens qualitatifs d’environ 2h auprès de juifs (45) dont des responsables communautaires (15) en région parisienne, à Toulouse et Strasbourg, Ipsos a réalisé une étude quantitative auprès de 313 personnes.
Il n’existe pas de définition satisfaisante de qui est juif et qui ne l’est pas. Il n’existe pas non plus de statistiques permettant d’appliquer des quotas. La méthode utilisée a été celle de l’autodéfinition par les personnes elles-mêmes. Est juif celui ou celle qui se considère comme tel. A partir de plusieurs dizaines de milliers de panélistes interrogés, on a ainsi pu extraire un échantillon de 313 personnes se déclarant comme juif ou juive, auquel le questionnaire a été administré du 24 février au 8 juin 2015. Cette méthode a l’avantage de limiter les biais que l’on rencontre lors de recrutement « dans la rue » ou à proximité de lieux de culte

Le troisième concerne les personnes se considérant comme musulmanes. Pour les mêmes raisons, il a été procédé exactement de la même façon que pour les répondants juifs. Un échantillon de 500 personnes se déclarant musulman/musulmane extrait de notre Acces Panel a ainsi été interrogé du 24 février au 9 mars 2015.
Author(s): Kovács, András
Date: 2006
Abstract: [From the introduction to the article]
Between March and November 1999, under the auspices of the Minority Research Institute of the Department of Sociology, Eötvös Loránd University, I conducted a sociological survey of the current situation of the Jewish community in Hungary. In the course of the survey, 2015 respondents were interviewed. The most important demographic and social data were collected for four generations – from respondents’ grandparents to their children. Participants in the survey were asked to respond to questions concerning their relationship towards Jewish traditions and their acceptance or rejection of various forms of Jewish identity. They were also asked for their opinions on assimilation, integration and dissimilation, on Israel, and on the current significance of the Holocaust. Finally, an attempt was made to gauge the opinions of Hungarian Jews on the state of their own community, on their relationships with non-Jews, and on antisemitism in postcommunist Hungary.
My purpose in this article shall be to analyse the data that we collected in this latter area. Firstly, I shall reveal how Jews living in Hungary define antisemitism, and whether – when it comes to classifying particular statements as antisemitic – there are any significant differences between younger and older groups of Jews, between those who are better educated and those with less education, and between those with a stronger and those with a weaker sense of Jewish identity. I shall then explore how the various respondent groups judge the extent, intensity and gravity of anti-Jewish sentiment in the country, examining in particular whether respondents themselves have experienced such sentiment or have been subjected to discrimination. I shall reveal whether respondents think that antisemitism will increase or decrease in the coming years. Finally, I shall touch upon the policies that respondents consider desirable when it comes to tackling antisemitic phenomena. Evidently, the images formed by Jews and non-Jews shall determine in large part the relations between the two groups of one other.
Author(s): Kovács, András
Date: 2012
Abstract: The article analyzes the newest survey results on antisemitic prejudices, antisemitic political discourses, and political antisemitism in present-day Hungary. According to the research findings, during the first decade and a half after the fall of communism, 10%-15% of the Hungarian adult population held a strong antisemitic prejudice. Surveys conducted after 2006 show not only an increase in the absolute percentage of antisemites, but also an increase in the proportion of antisemites who embed their antisemitism in the political context. This phenomenon is linked with the appearance on the political scene of Jobbik, a more or less openly antisemitic party. When examining the causes of antisemitism, the most interesting finding was that the strength of antisemitic feelings is regionally different and that these differences correlate with the strength of Jobbik’s support in the various regions. Accordingly, we hypothesized that support for a far-right party is not a consequence of antisemitism, but conversely should be regarded as a factor that mobilizes attitudes leading to antisemitism. Thus, antisemitism is—at least in large part—a consequence of an attraction to the far right rather than an explanation for it. While analyzing antisemitic discourse, we found that the primary function of the discourse is not to formulate anti-Jewish political demands but
to establish a common identity for groups that, for various reasons and motives, have turned against the liberal parliamentary system that replaced communism.
Date: 2019
Abstract: De groei van antisemitisme in Nederland komt overeen met de trends in andere landen: ook in het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Frankrijk en Duitsland kwamen het afgelopen jaar vaker anti-Joodse incidenten voor.

Met name in de directe omgeving steeg het aantal antisemitische incidenten sterk. De stijging in deze categorie was 67 procent. Het gaat hier om voorvallen op school, op het werk of tussen buren. Juist deze incidenten hebben doorgaans een grote impact en zijn daardoor extra schrijnend. Zo registreerde CIDI een melding van een Joodse scholier, die in de klas en in groepsapps opmerkingen te horen krijgt als “alle Joden moeten dood” en “ga terug naar de gaskamer”. De school neemt pas na veel aandringen maatregelen en het pesten neemt pas af wanneer de leerling (op eigen verzoek) wordt overgeplaatst naar een andere klas.

De door CIDI geregistreerde incidenten vormen hoogstwaarschijnlijk het topje van de antisemitische ijsberg in Nederland. Onderzoek door het Fundamentele Rechtenagentschap van de EU geeft aan dat slechts 25 procent van de Joodse Nederlanders, die de afgelopen vijf jaar slachtoffer werden van antisemitisme, hun ervaring meldde bij een instantie (zoals CIDI) of aangifte deed bij de politie. Veel antisemitisme speelt zich dus af onder de radar.

CIDI maakt zich zorgen over de toename van antisemitisme en wil een duidelijk actieplan van de overheid om dit probleem te bestrijden. Het is hoog tijd dat politie en justitie specifiek aandacht besteden aan antisemitisme en het probleem goed in kaart brengen. Ook moet worden geïnvesteerd in opsporing en vervolging van daders – nu is het zo dat slachtoffers na een aangifte soms jaren wachten voordat er vervolging plaatsvindt. Steeds meer mensen denken dat melden of aangifte doen geen zin heeft. Antisemitisme dreigt hierdoor steeds verder onder de radar te verdwijnen. Deze zorgwekkende trend kan alleen worden gekeerd wanneer de overheid met een serieuze, transparante en krachtdadige aanpak van het probleem komt.

De aanpak van antisemitisme kan echter niet beperkt blijven tot politie en justitie. CIDI wil dat docenten ondersteuning krijgen bij het bestrijden van antisemitische vooroordelen en complottheorieën in de klas. Inburgeringstrajecten voor nieuwe Nederlanders moeten aandacht besteden aan antisemitisme en benadrukken dat rechten van minderheden in Nederland worden gerespecteerd. En wanneer antisemitisme zich voordoet – op straat, op school, op internet – is het belangrijk dat men zich er duidelijk tegen uitspreekt. We mogen antisemitisme niet normaal gaan vinden.
Date: 2011
Abstract: Democratic polities continue to be faced with politics of resentment. Along with resurgent counter-cosmopolitanism and anti-immigrant prejudice, various political agents have mobilized old and modernized antisemitism in European democracies. The first comparative study of its kind, this book rigorously examines the contemporary relevance of antisemitism and other politicized resentments in the context of the European Union and beyond. Presenting new approaches and state-of-the-art research by leading authorities in the field, the volume combines comparative work and political theorizing with ten single country studies using qualitative and quantitative data from Eastern and Western Europe. The result is a new and sober set of arguments and findings, demonstrating that antisemitism and counter-cosmopolitan resentment are still all too present human rights challenges in today’s cosmopolitan Europe.

Contents:

I. Foundations
Politics and Resentment: Examining Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitanism in the European Union and Beyond
Lars Rensmann & Julius H. Schoeps
II. European Comparisons
Is There a New “European Antisemitism”? Public Opinion and Comparative Empirical Research in Europe
Werner Bergmann
“Against Globalism”: Counter-Cosmopolitan Discontent and Antisemitism in Mobilizations of European Extreme Right Parties
Lars Rensmann
Antisemitism and Anti-Americanism: Comparative European Perspectives
Andrei S. Markovits
Playing the Nazi-Card: Israel, Jews, and Antisemitism
Paul Iganski & Abe Sweiry
III. Eastern Europe
The Empire Strikes Back: Antisemitism in Russia
Stella Rock & Alexander Verkhovsky
Hatred Towards Jews as a Political Code? Antisemitism in Hungary
András Kovács
The Resilience of Legacies: Antisemitism in Poland and the Ukraine
Ireneusz Krzemiński
IV. Western Europe
Beyond the Republican Model: Antisemitism in France
Jean-Yves Camus
The Liberal Tradition and Unholy Alliances of the Present: Antisemitism in the United Kingdom
Michael Whine
Political Cultures of Denial? Antisemitism in Sweden and Scandinavia
Henrik Bachner
Erosion of a Taboo: Antisemitism in Switzerland
Christina Späti
Anti-Jewish Guilt Deflection and National Self-Victimization: Antisemitism in Germany
Samuel Salzborn
V. Epilogue
Theorizing Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitanism in the Global Age: A Political Crisis of Postmodernity?
Lars Rensmann
Author(s): Samardžić, Nikola
Date: 2015
Abstract: Following on the overview presented at the first annual Holocaust and Restitution Conference concerning what is known about the expropriation of cultural property in Serbia during World War II and where that cultural property is presently located, ways in which restitution of art, Judaica, and other cultural property might best be implemented are discussed.

Serbia is encouraged to do historical research on the history of cultural plunder during World War II and on what was restituted to Serbia and within Serbia after the War, and to create a listing or database on the internet of what was taken in Serbia, noting what was subsequently returned and what is still missing. An entity should be responsible for provenance research in the country, either one that actually does the research as in Austria or one that oversees the research carried out by museums, libraries, and archives as in the Netherlands. Information should be made public over the internet of the results of such provenance research. A separate entity, as neutral and independent as possible, should be responsible for restitution decisions based on the provenance research. Serbia should pass legislation covering the return of private movable cultural property that is applicable to both Serbian and foreign citizens. Preferably there should be no deadline for claims for cultural property, whether individual or communal, since such cultural property is often not immediately identifiable. A non-bureaucratic process for filing claims should be established. Cultural property for which original owners and heirs are not identified (heirless property) should be listed on an internet site so that potential claimants can come forward. Such
items should not necessarily move from their current location, but their provenance history should be publicly noted.
Date: 2014
Date: 2015
Date: 2019
Abstract: CST recorded a record high total of 1,652 antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2018. 2018 was the third year in a row that CST has recorded a record high incident total and means the problem of rising antisemitism in our country continues to grow.

The 1,652 antisemitic incidents CST recorded in 2018 represent a 16 per cent rise from the 1,420 incidents recorded in 2017. These 1,652 incidents were spread throughout the year, with over 100 incidents recorded in every month for the first time in any calendar year; indicating that a general atmosphere of intolerance and prejudice is sustaining the high incident totals, rather than a one-off specific ‘trigger’ event. In addition to more general background factors, the highest monthly totals in 2018 came when the problem of antisemitism in the Labour Party was the subject of intense discussion and activity, or when violence surged temporarily on the border between Israel and Gaza; suggesting that these events, and reactions to them, also played a role in 2018’s record total.

The highest monthly totals in 2018 came in May, with 182 incidents; April, with 151 incidents; August, with 150 incidents; and September, with 148 incidents. It is likely that these higher monthly totals were partly caused by reactions to political events in the UK and overseas, involving the Labour Party and violence on the border of Israel and Gaza, during those months.

CST recorded 148 antisemitic incidents in 2018 that were examples of, or took place in the immediate context of, arguments over alleged antisemitism in the Labour Party. Of these 148 incidents, 49 occurred in August, 16 in September and 15 in April. These were all months in which allegations of antisemitism in the Labour Party attracted significant media and political attention. Also in April and May, several Palestinians were killed and many injured in violence connected to protests at the border between Israel and Gaza. CST recorded 173 antisemitic incidents in 2018 that showed anti-Israel motivation alongside antisemitism, of which 47 incidents – over a quarter – occurred in April and May. In 2018 as a whole, CST recorded 84 antisemitic incidents that showed far right motivation, and 13 that showed Islamist motivation.

The 182 incidents recorded by CST in May is the highest monthly total CST has recorded since August 2014, when Israel and Hamas last fought a sustained conflict over Gaza, and is the fourth-highest monthly total CST has ever recorded.

2018 saw an increase in the number and proportion of antisemitic incidents that used political or extremist language and imagery. Forty-five per cent of the incidents recorded by CST in 2018 involved the use of extremist language or imagery alongside antisemitism, compared to 30 per cent of incidents recorded in 2017. Not all of these incidents revealed a clear, single ideological motivation: many involved the varied and confused use of different extremist motifs, drawn from a broad reservoir of antisemitic sources. Of the 1,652 antisemitic incidents recorded during 2018, 456 involved language or imagery relating to the far right or the Nazi period; 254 involved references to Israel and the Palestinians, alongside antisemitism; and 29 involved references to Islam and Muslims. In 285 incidents, more than one type of extremist discourse was used.
Date: 2015
Author(s): Echikson, William
Date: 2019
Date: 2019
Abstract: In late 2017, JPR published a major study of attitudes towards Jews and Israel among the population of Great Britain, a project supported by the Community Security Trust and the Department for Communities and Local Government. We regard it as a groundbreaking piece of work - the first study conducted anywhere that empirically demonstrates a clear connection between extreme hostility towards Israel and more traditional forms of antipathy towards Jews.

This report explores this connection yet further, focusing specifically on two particularly prevalent ideas that are often experienced by Jews as antisemitic: the contention that Israel is 'an apartheid state' and that it should be subjected to a boycott.

In the first instance, the study finds that large proportions of people actually have no view at all on these ideas, either because they do not know anything about the issues, or because they are simply unsure of where they stand on them. This is particularly the case for young people and women - knowledge levels improve and opinions sharpen the older people are, and, as has been found in numerous other studies, women tend to be less opinionated than men on these types of political issues.

However, among those who do have a view, 21% agree with the contention that 'Israel is an apartheid state,' 5% strongly so, and 10% endorse the argument that 'people should boycott Israeli goods and products (3% strongly so). About the same proportion (18%) disagrees with the apartheid contention as agree with it, but a much higher proportion disagrees with the boycott one (47%) than agrees with it.

Disagreement with the boycott idea is higher in older age bands than in younger ones, increasingly so among those aged 40-plus, a phenomenon that is not found in relation to the apartheid contention. But the ideas are not particularly sensitive to educational level - both agreement and disagreement with both contentions increase the higher the educational qualification achieved.

However, clear distinctions can be found when looking at the data through the lens of religion, with Muslims much more likely than other groups to support both contentions.

The report goes on to explore the correlations between these views and more traditional anti-Jewish ones, and finds clear links between the two, although this is more the case with the boycott idea than the apartheid one. However, it also notes that the correlation is stronger with other anti-Israel beliefs, particularly those arguing that Israel exploits the Holocaust for its own purposes, and those claiming that Israel is excessively powerful or the primary cause of troubles in the Middle East.
Date: 2019
Abstract: What can the internet tell us about antisemitism in the United Kingdom? It has been shown that people are remarkably honest when they search for information online. Their Google searches and queries reveal interests, prejudices and hatreds that they might keep hidden from friends, family members, neighbours, surveys and even from themselves. They have been shown to share their health secrets, sexual preferences, and hostility towards other groups.

We decided to put this to the test to see what the Google searches made by people in the United Kingdom could tell us about attitudes
towards Jewish people in this country and in general towards Jews. Unsurprisingly perhaps, we found that, every year, people in this
country express antisemitic thoughts through their internet searches. People make some Google searches that are disturbing, including searches such as “I hate Jews,” and “Why are Jews evil?”, along with other searches expressing violent intentions towards Jews. Others post on anonymous hate sites such as the far right Stormfront website, expressing their antisemitic feelings about various Jewish Members of Parliament and celebrities.

By analysing this data, we can get a better sense of the where, when, who and what of antisemitism in Britain today. For example,we looked at whether the voting patterns of towns and cities affect the number of antisemitic searches in those places. We found that searches looking for information on the Holocaust being a hoax rise about 30 per cent every year on Holocaust Memorial Day. We learnt that Jewish women in public life or positions of power are the subject of more antisemitic searches than Jewish men in similar positions. We found evidence of the rise in popularity of antisemitic conspiracy theories, such as the discredited myth relating to the role of the Rothschild family in running the world. And we found that sometimes heightened media focus on Jews or Israel, even if it is positive, can still lead to an increase in online searches for antisemitic content.

We also found strategies that technology companies and civil society organisations can use to fight hatred. For example, our research shows that, when Google changed its autocomplete formula to eliminate antisemitic search suggestions, this lowered the number of people searching for antisemitic material (which also means that, before removing those antisemitic search prompts, Google was directing people to make antisemitic searches
who might otherwise not have done so).

This is the story of the hidden hate that our report reveals.
Author(s): Katz, Ethan B.
Date: 2018
Abstract: To date, scholars have rarely talked about contemporary antisemitism and Islamophobia in France as part of a single story. When they have, it has typically been as part of a framework for analyzing racism that is essentially competitive: some depict Islamophobia as less a real problem than a frequent excuse to ignore antisemitism; others minimize antisemitism as an unfortunate but marginal phenomenon by comparison with the pervasive nature of anti-Muslim racism in French society. This article argues that the two are inseparable, and it focuses on a hitherto overlooked set of connections: in the era since the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher in January 2015, at key flash points that question Muslim belonging in France, the position of Jews has repeatedly been invoked in ambiguous, contradictory ways. Participants in these public debates have sometimes forcefully maintained that Jews are unlike Muslims, since they have long been fully integrated French citizens. At other moments, these discussions have raised the specter of Jewish ethnic and religious difference. By emphasizing Jewish particularity, such debates evoke, perforce, the past twenty-five years of controversies about the allegedly problematic attire, food, and beliefs of France’s Muslims. The article focuses on several key moments, from the speech of Prime Minister Manuel Valls before the French parliament in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks, to the kippah and burkini affairs of 2016, to the provocative comments of candidates in the 2017 presidential elections concerning Muslim and Jewish religious and ethnic markers of difference.
Author(s): Arkin, Kimberly A.
Date: 2018
Author(s): Bell, Dorian
Date: 2018
Abstract: Are Muslims the “new Jews” of Europe? The spectacle of Middle Eastern and African refugees shuttled by train from camp to squalid camp has understandably drawn parallels to the darkest pages in twentieth-century continental history. Such a historical comparison between Islamophobia and antisemitism, however, risks missing their ongoing interrelation. This article examines that interrelation, arguing that Islamophobia and antisemitism now most resemble each other as complementary mechanisms for diverting the anxieties bred by the global economic order. Antisemitism has long scapegoated the Jews for capitalism’s tendency to produce outsized winners. But there has been no comparably global shorthand for the anxiety prompted by capitalism’s losers—until now. Muslim refugees help give a name, Islam, to the masses seemingly encroaching from the margins of the world system. The result, I argue, is the hardening of Islamophobia and antisemitism into the inextricable poles of a reactionary worldview. Taking France as a case study, the article reads the burkini bans prompted by the July 2016 terror attack in Nice as an expression of middle-class fear about downward mobility. Targeted at both internal Muslim leisure and external Muslim encroachment, the bans evoke how European unease about globalization increasingly takes Islamophobic form. Such intolerance threatens not only to lodge Islamophobia at the heart of a reconstituted Europe but also to erode the vigilance against antisemitism once characteristic of the postwar European project.