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Author(s): Partington, Alan
Date: 2012
Date: 2011
Date: 2017
Date: 2018
Date: 2019
Abstract: CST recorded a record high total of 1,652 antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2018. 2018 was the third year in a row that CST has recorded a record high incident total and means the problem of rising antisemitism in our country continues to grow.

The 1,652 antisemitic incidents CST recorded in 2018 represent a 16 per cent rise from the 1,420 incidents recorded in 2017. These 1,652 incidents were spread throughout the year, with over 100 incidents recorded in every month for the first time in any calendar year; indicating that a general atmosphere of intolerance and prejudice is sustaining the high incident totals, rather than a one-off specific ‘trigger’ event. In addition to more general background factors, the highest monthly totals in 2018 came when the problem of antisemitism in the Labour Party was the subject of intense discussion and activity, or when violence surged temporarily on the border between Israel and Gaza; suggesting that these events, and reactions to them, also played a role in 2018’s record total.

The highest monthly totals in 2018 came in May, with 182 incidents; April, with 151 incidents; August, with 150 incidents; and September, with 148 incidents. It is likely that these higher monthly totals were partly caused by reactions to political events in the UK and overseas, involving the Labour Party and violence on the border of Israel and Gaza, during those months.

CST recorded 148 antisemitic incidents in 2018 that were examples of, or took place in the immediate context of, arguments over alleged antisemitism in the Labour Party. Of these 148 incidents, 49 occurred in August, 16 in September and 15 in April. These were all months in which allegations of antisemitism in the Labour Party attracted significant media and political attention. Also in April and May, several Palestinians were killed and many injured in violence connected to protests at the border between Israel and Gaza. CST recorded 173 antisemitic incidents in 2018 that showed anti-Israel motivation alongside antisemitism, of which 47 incidents – over a quarter – occurred in April and May. In 2018 as a whole, CST recorded 84 antisemitic incidents that showed far right motivation, and 13 that showed Islamist motivation.

The 182 incidents recorded by CST in May is the highest monthly total CST has recorded since August 2014, when Israel and Hamas last fought a sustained conflict over Gaza, and is the fourth-highest monthly total CST has ever recorded.

2018 saw an increase in the number and proportion of antisemitic incidents that used political or extremist language and imagery. Forty-five per cent of the incidents recorded by CST in 2018 involved the use of extremist language or imagery alongside antisemitism, compared to 30 per cent of incidents recorded in 2017. Not all of these incidents revealed a clear, single ideological motivation: many involved the varied and confused use of different extremist motifs, drawn from a broad reservoir of antisemitic sources. Of the 1,652 antisemitic incidents recorded during 2018, 456 involved language or imagery relating to the far right or the Nazi period; 254 involved references to Israel and the Palestinians, alongside antisemitism; and 29 involved references to Islam and Muslims. In 285 incidents, more than one type of extremist discourse was used.
Date: 2019
Abstract: What can the internet tell us about antisemitism in the United Kingdom? It has been shown that people are remarkably honest when they search for information online. Their Google searches and queries reveal interests, prejudices and hatreds that they might keep hidden from friends, family members, neighbours, surveys and even from themselves. They have been shown to share their health secrets, sexual preferences, and hostility towards other groups.

We decided to put this to the test to see what the Google searches made by people in the United Kingdom could tell us about attitudes
towards Jewish people in this country and in general towards Jews. Unsurprisingly perhaps, we found that, every year, people in this
country express antisemitic thoughts through their internet searches. People make some Google searches that are disturbing, including searches such as “I hate Jews,” and “Why are Jews evil?”, along with other searches expressing violent intentions towards Jews. Others post on anonymous hate sites such as the far right Stormfront website, expressing their antisemitic feelings about various Jewish Members of Parliament and celebrities.

By analysing this data, we can get a better sense of the where, when, who and what of antisemitism in Britain today. For example,we looked at whether the voting patterns of towns and cities affect the number of antisemitic searches in those places. We found that searches looking for information on the Holocaust being a hoax rise about 30 per cent every year on Holocaust Memorial Day. We learnt that Jewish women in public life or positions of power are the subject of more antisemitic searches than Jewish men in similar positions. We found evidence of the rise in popularity of antisemitic conspiracy theories, such as the discredited myth relating to the role of the Rothschild family in running the world. And we found that sometimes heightened media focus on Jews or Israel, even if it is positive, can still lead to an increase in online searches for antisemitic content.

We also found strategies that technology companies and civil society organisations can use to fight hatred. For example, our research shows that, when Google changed its autocomplete formula to eliminate antisemitic search suggestions, this lowered the number of people searching for antisemitic material (which also means that, before removing those antisemitic search prompts, Google was directing people to make antisemitic searches
who might otherwise not have done so).

This is the story of the hidden hate that our report reveals.
Date: 2018
Abstract: In welchen Manifestationen tritt Antisemitismus im digitalen Zeitalter in Erscheinung? Wie, wo und von wem werden judenfeindliche Inhalte artikuliert und verbreitet?Welche Stereotype werden kodiert, welche Argumente benutzt? Welche Rolle spielen Emotionen und irrationale Affektlogik beim aktuellen Einstellungs- und Verbalantisemitismus? Inwiefern hat das Internet die Verbreitung und Intensivierung von Antisemitismen akzeleriert und forciert? Wie lassen sich die modernen Ausprägungen
des Judenhasses wissenschaftlich beschreiben, einordnen und erklären?

Die von der DFG vier Jahre lang geförderte Langzeitstudie zur Artikulation, Tradierung, Verbreitung und Manifestation von Judenhass im World Wide Web1 hat diese Fragen im Rahmen der empirischen Antisemitismusforschung systematisch und datenreich
untersucht.

Weltweit, so scheint es seit Jahren, nimmt die Artikulation und Verbreitung von Antisemitismen, insbesondere über das Web 2.0, stark zu. Diese Entwicklung in der virtuellen Welt korreliert in der realen Welt mit judenfeindlichen Übergriffen und Attacken, Drohungen und Beleidigungen sowie dem „neuen Unbehagen d.h. Furcht und Sorge in den jüdischen Gemeinden Deutschlands und Europas.

Dieser Eindruck, der sich bislang nur durch Einzelfälle dokumentiert sah (und deshalb zum Teil bezweifelt oder als subjektives „Gefühl“ in Frage gestellt wurde), wird nun durch die empirischen Daten der vorliegenden Langzeitstudie wissenschaftlich bestätigt.

Durch die Spezifika der Internetkommunikation (Reziprozität, aktive Netzpartizipation, Schnelligkeit, freie Zugänglichkeit, Multimodalität, Anonymität, globale Verknüpfung) und die steigende Relevanz der Sozialen Medien als meinungsbildende Informationsquelle in der Gesamtgesellschaft hat die schnelle, ungefilterte und nahezu grenzenlose Verbreitung judenfeindlichen Gedankengutes allein rein quantitativ ein Ausmaß erreicht, das es nie zuvor in der Geschichte gab. Die Digitalisierung der Informations-und Kommunikationstechnologie hat „Antisemitismus 2.0“ online schnell, multipel, textsortenspezifisch diffus und multimodal multiplizierbar gemacht. Jeden Tag werden Tausende neue Antisemitismen gepostet und ergänzen die seit Jahren im
Netz gespeicherten und einsehbaren judenfeindlichen Texte, Bilder und Videos. Im 10-Jahres-Vergleich hat sich die Anzahl der antisemitischen Online-Kommentare zwischen 2007 und 2018 z.T. verdreifacht. Es gibt zudem kaum noch einen Diskursbereich
im Netz 2.0, in dem Nutzer_innen nicht Gefahr laufen, auf antisemitische Texte zu stoßen, auch wenn sie nicht aktiv danach suchen.
Date: 2016
Abstract: Denne rapporten presenterer HL-senterets undersøkelse av hvorvidt og hvordan antisemittisme kommer til uttrykk i et utvalg
norske medier. Undersøkelsen har tatt utgangspunkt i et begrenset og strategisk utvalg saker fra redigerte nyhetsmedier og
kommentarfelt fra nettaviser og én av de utvalgte nyhetsmedienes Facebook-sider. Det er gjort kvantitative innholdsanalyser
av totalt 824 artikler og 2689 kommentarer. Det er også gjort en rent kvalitativ gjennomgang av cirka 250 Twitter-meldinger tilknyttet
emneknaggen «jøde», fra perioden 14. juli 2010 – 28. mai 2016.

Undersøkelsen viser at negative og problematiske utsagn og ytringer om jøder eksisterer i både de redigerte nyhetsmediene
og kommentarfeltene. Samlet sett er likevel slike ytringer, og spesielt eksplisitte antisemittiske utsagn, relativt lite utbredt i
det undersøkte materialet. Fremstillinger av jødene som en kollektiv størrelse og ansvarliggjøring av jøder for staten Israels politikk
er de problematiske uttrykksformene som har høyest forekomst i det undersøkte materialet. Den vanligste formen for
slike ytringer er generaliserende sammenblandinger av jøder som gruppe og staten Israel, og oppfordringer om at jøder som
gruppe skal ta tydelig avstand fra israelske handlinger. I blant refereres det også til «amerikanske jøder» eller «norske jøder»
som en enhet med felles meninger, interesser og mål. Det er videre en viss forekomst av ytringer som sammenlikner Israels
politikk overfor palestinerne med den nazistiske jødeforfølgelsen og negative utsagn som spiller på forestilte negative trekk ved
jødisk religion. I enkelte av kommentarfeltene forekommer tradisjonelle konspiratoriske antisemittiske forestillinger.

De problematiske enkeltutsagnene i redigerte nyhetsmedier er mest utbredt i leserbrev, kronikker og debattinnlegg som er
skrevet av eksterne bidragsytere, mens de kommer sjeldnere til uttrykk i redaksjonelle kronikker, ledere og nyhetsartikler tilknyttet
medienes egne medarbeidere. Slike ytringer utløser imidlertid i de fleste tilfeller konkrete tilsvar og reaksjoner, og blir dermed sjeldent
stående uimotsagt. Problematiske og til dels jødefiendtlige ytringer er noe mer utbredt i artikler som også inneholder uttalte
Israel-kritiske standpunkter. Samtidig har et tydelig flertall av de Israel-kritiske artiklene overhodet ikke forekomst av problematiske/
negative utsagn om jøder. Mange av de problematiske ytringene i de redigerte mediene er utslag av upresis og ubevisst språkbruk,
og sjeldent et uttrykk for antisemittiske intensjoner. Eksplisitte antisemittiske ytringer forekommer i svært liten grad i denne delen
av mediene.

Enkelte av de jødefiendtlige ytringene tenderer til å være mer eksplisitt uttrykt i kommentarfeltene.På samme måte som i de redigerte
nyhetsmediene har negative/problematiske ytringer om jøder i kommentarfeltene noe høyere forekomst i sammenheng med Israel-kritiske standpunkter. Det er imidlertid kommentarfeltene under saker om antisemittisme og Holocaust som utmerker seg ved å ha
høyest forekomst av problematiske og jødefiendtlige ytringer. Slike saker aktiverer også et klart flertall av de groveste konspiratoriske
antisemittiske ytringene. Selv om denne type ytringer er relativt lite utbredt også i de undersøkte kommentarfeltene, viser mangfoldet
blant de groveste antisemittiske uttrykkene en bemerkelsesverdig kontinuitet i det antisemittiske tankegodset.
Twitter-meldingene tilknyttet emneknaggen «jøde» skiller seg fra det øvrige undersøkte materialet. Selv om et mindretall
av meldingene spiller på antisemittiske klisjeer, er koplingen av denne emneknaggen til penger og moralske avvik innenfor
økonomi og profitt et gjennomgående trekk.Slike meldinger refererer ikke til faktiske eller forestilte jøder, men viser bl.a. til venners
gjerrighet, overdreven sparsomhet og kollegers lave arbeidsmoral. #jøde blir altså brukt som en metafor for slette karaktertrekk,som uvilje mot å betale gjeld, uærlig profittog latskap. Slike ytringer refererer til klassiske forestillinger i den moderne antisemittismen,og inngår i en historisk norsk satirisk tradisjon.

Date: 2015
Abstract: A magyar lakosság több, mint egyharmada vall antiszemita előítéleteket – ez az egyik megállapítása annak a tanulmánynak, amit a mai napon mutatott be a nyilvánosságnak Tett és Védelem Alapítvány központjában. A Tett és Védelem Alapítvány megbízásából a Medián Közvéleménykutató Intézet készített átfogó felmérést az antiszemita előítéletek mértékéről, a zsidósággal kapcsolatos beállítódás jellemzőiről, valamint a zsidó szervezetek aktív közéleti szerepvállalásának megítéléséről.

Az 1200 fő megkérdezésével készült reprezentatív kutatás főbb megállapításai:

• Az elmúlt időszakban kis mértékben nőtt az antiszemita előítéleteket vallók aránya,

• A magyar közvéleményt csak igen mérsékelten foglalkoztatják a zsidó közélet kérdései.

• A Jobbik szavazói az átlagnál jóval nagyobb arányban vallanak zsidóellenes nézeteket,

• Szintén növeli a zsidóellenesség valószínűségét a nacionalista, rendpárti, tekintélyelvű társadalmi attitűd, és a másság különböző formáinak (homoszexualitás, kábítószer-fogyasztás, bevándorlás) elutasítása.

• A vészkorszak emlékezete mélyen megosztja a magyar társadalmat: a magyar felelősség kérdéséről éppúgy megoszlanak a vélemények, mint arról, hogy a jelenlegi közbeszédben napirenden kell-e tartani a kérdést. A nyílt holokauszt-tagadó és -relativizáló kijelentések támogatottsága a 2006-os 6-8 százalékról 2014-re fokozatosan 12-15 százalékra emelkedett.

• A magyar lakosság véleménye megoszlik abban a kérdésben, hogy a zsidóság második világháború alatti tragédiájáért ki a felelős: 51 százalék szerint Magyarország is felelős, 40 százalék szerint viszont kizárólag a németek. A válaszadók 52 százaléka nem támogatja a Szabadság téri emlékmű felépítését, 34 százalék igen.

• A kormány és a zsidó közösségek közötti párbeszédről megoszlanak a vélemények, abban is, hogy a kormánynak mikor kellene kikérni a zsidó szervezetek véleményét, és abban is, hogy a zsidó szervezeteknek milyen esetekben kellene nyilvános állásfoglalást tenniük.
Date: 2018
Abstract: CST recorded 1,382 antisemitic incidents in 2017, the highest annual total CST has ever recorded. The total of 1,382 incidents is an increase of three per cent from the 2016 total of 1,346 antisemitic incidents, which was itself a record annual total. The third highest annual total recorded by CST was 1,182 antisemitic incidents in 2014.

There has been a 34 per cent increase in the number of antisemitic incidents recorded in the category of Assaults in 2017: 145 incidents in 2017, compared to 108 in 2016. As in 2016, CST did not classify any of the assaults as Extreme Violence, meaning an attack potentially causing loss of life or grievous bodily harm. This is the highest annual total of Assaults recorded by CST, surpassing the 121 incidents recorded in 2009.

Antisemitic incidents recorded by CST occurred more in the first six months of 2017 than in the second half of the year. The highest monthly total in 2017 came in January with 155 incidents; the second highest was in April with 142 incidents; and the third highest was in February with 134 incidents reported. Every month from January to October, CST recorded a monthly incident total above 100 incidents. This continued an utterly unprecedented sequence of monthly totals exceeding 100 antisemitic incidents since April 2016, a run of 19 consecutive months. There were 89 incidents recorded in November and 78 in December. There is no obvious reason why November and December 2017 saw an end to this sequence, although historically CST has usually recorded fewer antisemitic incidents in December in comparison to other months. It is too soon to predict whether this decline in monthly incident totals towards the end of 2017 marks the beginning of a downward trend from the sustained highs of the past two years.

Previous record high annual totals in 2014 and 2009 occurred when conflicts in Israel and Gaza acted as sudden trigger events that caused steep, identifiable ‘spikes’ in antisemitic incidents recorded by CST. In contrast, in 2017 (as in 2016) there was not a sudden, statistically outlying large spike in incidents to cause and explain the overall record high.
Date: 2015
Abstract: EXPLICIT antisemitism against Jews per se, simply for their being Jewish, remains rare in British public life and within mainstream political media discourse.
In 2014, CST received an unprecedented number of reports of antisemitic incidents. This was due to levels of antisemitism during the relatively lengthy conflict in July and August, between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and southern Israel.
Levels of antisemitic discourse are far harder to consistently observe and measure, than quantitative antisemitic incidents and hate crimes. Nevertheless, many people contacted CST (and other Jewish organisations), expressing their feelings that the conflict was creating a climate of unusually heightened antipathy and hostility to British Jews. Numerous newspaper columnists and other public commentators voiced the same concerns, stating that the public mood against Jews had never before felt as it did.
This was the first conflict involving Israel at a time when social media is all pervading, more so (especially Twitter) than during the last major conflict between Israel and Hamas in 2009. This resulted in a quicker spread of antisemitic discourse, threats and themes than previously seen during any such conflict: visible to witnesses, perpetrators and victims. For example, the hashtag #Hitlerwasright trended on Twitter, was portrayed on placards and was shouted in verbal abuse against Jews.
In Britain, the use of Nazism to attack Israel, Zionists and Jews was the dominant antisemitic theme during the conflict, in both discourse and incidents reported to CST. Calling British Jews child or baby killers was the second most common theme in antisemitic incidents. It is impossible to prove what role - if any - this old antisemitic theme of Jews as child killers played in mainstream media coverage of the conflict, or in widespread political activism during it.

Numerous leading politicians strongly condemned the antisemitism of July and August 2014.
Two opinion polls in May 2014 (before the summer conflict) found that 8% and 7% of British people are unfavourable towards Jews. Findings about Jews having power or control suggest this core feature of antisemitism still resonates with millions of British people.
2014 reinforced the importance of social media to the spread and visibility of antisemitism today. The concerted hatred directed via Twitter at Luciana Berger, a Jewish Labour MP, was an extreme example of how one person can suffer repeated and targeted abuse: facilitated by the instantaneous public free speech nature of social media.
The Parliamentary vote for Palestinian statehood in October 2014 sparked reactions that explicitly or implicitly evoked antisemitic conspiracy charges, against either British or American Jewish and pro-Israel lobbies. This echoed accusations commonly heard during the July-August conflict, that some form of conspiracy or fear was determining Government and mainstream media reactions to the conflict.
There were five cases concerning antisemitism at the highest levels of English football (not including the ongoing use of “Yid” around Tottenham Hotspur FC). These were: the disciplining of player Nicolas Anelka for his “quenelle” salute; linked controversies involving manager Malky Mackay and chairman Dave Whelan; the disciplining of player Mario Balotelli, for unwittingly posting an antisemitic cartoon; and Liverpool FC removing a Jewish New Year message from social media due to the level of antisemitic abuse it attracted.
The British National Party returned to being openly antisemitic, evoking Nazi antisemitic charges within contemporary anti-globalisation and anti-capitalist rhetoric.