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Author(s): Kuperberg, Rebecca
Date: 2021
Date: 2021
Abstract: Executive summary
• Three of the four ‘alternative media’ platforms analysed were found to promote a
negative view of Jews
• The fourth was found to promote a negative view of Muslims, but not of Jews
(although it sometimes made use of arguments and images that are in other
contexts used to stigmatise Jews)
• A significant relationship was found between holding antisemitic views and having a
positive opinion of each of the three platforms that were found to promote a
negative view of Jews
• A significant relationship was also found between holding antisemitic views and
having a positive opinion of the Russian state-owned propaganda broadcaster, RT
(formerly Russia Today)
• By contrast, there was no relationship, or a substantially weaker and more conflicted
relationship, between antisemitism and evaluation of named ‘mainstream media’
sources
• Moreover, drawing on the ‘mainstream media’ in general for political information
was associated with lower levels of antisemitism
• In the interests of reducing prejudice, it would appear desirable to encourage use of
high quality, reputable sources of information at the expense of low quality fringe
sources
• Partial solutions to the problem could include:
- Demonetisation of problematic websites (for example, through withdrawal of
advertising)
- De-prioritisation of content from such websites in social media news feeds
and search algorithms
- Guidelines for members or employees of organisations such as political
parties, voluntary sector organisations, trade unions, and media companies,
both against sharing content or repeating claims from such websites and
against providing them with content in the form of interviews, quotations, or
stories
- In extreme cases, legal or regulatory sanctions against the owners of the
websites themselves
• However, it is at least as important for government, individual consumers, and other
stakeholders (including social media companies) to play their part in ensuring that
reputable media-producing organisations are able to remain viable as businesses
that can both invest in and promote high-quality content within a democratic
regulatory framework
Date: 2021
Abstract: „Zionisten“, „Satanisten“, „Transhumanisten“ und die „Pharmamafia“ würden durch „Sterilisation und Mord per Todesspritze“ […] „die absolute Kontrolle jedes Einzelnen und die Auslöschung weiterer Teile der Bevölkerung“ herbeiführen. Denn hinter Corona stecke „der feuchte Traum von einer kommunistischen Weltmacht“, nämlich der Zweck der „Umstrukturierung der Welt in eine neue Ordnung, kurz NWO (New World Order, Anm. RIAS Bayern. Vgl. Glossar, → NWO)“.

Dies sagte eine Rednerin auf einer Kundgebung sogenannter Coronarebellen in Nürnberg am 27. Juni 2020. Der Frau zufolge sollen durch Impfungen Menschen weltweit mit Nanochips überwacht, sterilisiert und getötet werden. Abschließend befand sie: „Ja, das muss man auch mal ganz klar benennen dürfen, oder?“

Zwar mögen solche Erzählungen meist abstrus und verrückt wirken, sie sind jedoch in ihren potentiellen Konsequenzen ernst zu nehmen. Selbstverständlich existierten auch vor der Coronapandemie Verschwörungserzählungen. Jedoch haben sie sich auch in Bayern verstärkt verbreitet, nachdem im Frühjahr 2020 Menschen, die sich als Coronarebellen oder Querdenker bezeichnen, begannen, gegen tatsächliche und imaginierte
staatliche Maßnahmen im Zuge der Coronakrise zu protestieren.

Nicht zuletzt in den sozialen Medien verbreiten sich Verschwörungserzählungen in Wort und Bild zunehmend rasanter und erreichen im Zuge der „Corona-Proteste” auch immer mehr Menschen, die vor der Pandemie wenig verschwörungsideologisch geprägt waren. Laut einer repräsentativen Umfrage der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung vom Juli 2020 glauben 16 Prozent der Einwohner:innen in Deutschland, dass Bill Gates allen Menschen Mikrochips einpflanzen wollen würde. Antisemitische Einstellungen sind in Deutschland weit verbreitet. Laut einer repräsentativen Umfrage des Jüdischen Weltkongresses (WJC) von 2019 behaupten 28 Prozent
der sogenannten Elite (laut Studie Hochschulabsolvent:innen mit einem Jahreseinkommen von mindestens 100.000 Euro), Juden hätten zu viel Macht in der Wirtschaft. 26 Prozent attestieren Juden „zu viel Macht in der Weltpolitik“. Fast die Hälfte von ihnen (48 Prozent) behauptet, Juden verhielten sich loyaler zu Israel als zu Deutschland. Der
WJC ließ dafür zweieinhalb Monate vor dem Anschlag auf die Synagoge in Halle an Yom Kippur 2019 1300 Menschen befragen.

Diese Broschüre der Recherche- und Informationsstelle Antisemitismus (RIAS) Bayern soll über Verschwörungserzählungen im Zusammenhang mit Antisemitismus aufklären. Was sind Verschwörungserzählungen und was haben sie mit Antisemitismus zu tun? Warum sind sie für bestimmte Menschen attraktiv? Wie kann man ihnen begegnen? Ab Seite 18 findet sich ein ausführliches Glossar zu gängigen Verschwörungserzählungen mit von
RIAS Bayern dokumentierten Beispielen.
Date: 2021
Abstract: Since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, the economic uncertainties and anxieties around the virus have been weaponised by a broad range of extremists, conspiracy theorists and disinformation actors, who have sought to propagandise, radicalise and mobilise captive online audiences during global lockdowns. Antisemitic hate speech is often a common feature of these diverse threats, with dangerous implications for public safety, social cohesion and democracy. But the Covid-19 crisis has only served to exacerbate a worrying trend in terms of online antisemitism. A 2018 Fundamental Rights Agency survey on Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism among Jews in the EU found nearly nine in ten respondents considered online antisemitism a problem. Eight in ten encountered antisemitic abuse online. This report, conducted by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), presents a data-driven snapshot of the proliferation of Covid-19 related online antisemitic content in French and German on Twitter, Facebook and Telegram. The study provides insight into the nature and volume of antisemitic content across selected accounts in France and Germany, analysing the platforms where such content is found, as well as the most prominent antisemitic narratives – comparing key similarities and differences between these different language contexts. The findings of this report draw on data analysis using social listening tools and natural language processing software, combined with qualitative analysis. Covering the period from January 2020 until March 2021 to build insights around the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on online antisemitism, the Executive Summary International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism was used to identify channels containing antisemitic content, before developing keyword lists to identify antisemitic expressions widely used on these channels.
Date: 2021
Abstract: CST’s Antisemitic Incidents Report 2020 shows that last year CST recorded 1,668 antisemitic incidents across the UK. This is an 8% fall from the 1,813 incidents recorded in 2019 but is still the third-highest number of incidents CST has ever recorded in a calendar year. There were 1,690 antisemitic incidents recorded in 2018, 1,420 in June 2017 and 1,275 antisemitic incidents in 2016.

A further 402 reports of potential incidents were received by CST in 2020 but were not deemed to be antisemitic and are not included in this total of 1,668 antisemitic incidents. Many of these 402 potential incidents involved suspicious activity or possible hostile reconnaissance at Jewish locations; criminal activity affecting Jewish people and buildings; and anti-Israel activity that did not include antisemitic language, motivation or targeting.

The 1,668 antisemitic incidents CST recorded last year were clearly influenced by the pandemic. There were 41 incidents that referenced the pandemic alongside antisemitic language, and 19 cases of Jewish religious, educational or social events being ‘zoombombed’ by antisemites who accessed the events to express antisemitic abuse. There was a reduction in the number of incidents affecting Jewish schools, teachers and school students, but an increase in the number of incidents at people’s homes. The highest monthly totals came in January, February and June, when the pandemic either had not yet fully struck or when restrictions had been eased. In contrast, the lowest monthly incident totals came in March, April and December, when lockdown measures were at their strictest. Nevertheless, CST still recorded over 100 incidents in all but one month in 2020, which continues the pattern of historically high antisemitic incident figures in recent years: December 2020 was the first month for three years in which CST recorded fewer than 100 antisemitic incidents.

Forty-one incidents in 2020 involved references to the pandemic alongside antisemitic rhetoric. This ranged from conspiracy theories alleging Jewish involvement in creating and spreading Covid-19 (or creating the so-called ‘myth’ of Covid-19), to simply wishing that Jewish people catch the virus and die from it. Overall, 332 incidents, or almost one in five of all antisemitic incidents reported to CST in 2020, involved the expression of antisemitic conspiracy theories (compared to 370 incidents in 2019).
Date: 2019
Abstract: Wie denken, fühlen und kommunizieren Antisemiten im digitalen Zeitalter? Welche Rolle spielt das Internet bei der Verbreitung und Radikalisierung von Judenhass? Diese Fragen werden anhand von Beispielen aus dem Web 2.0 und auf der Basis einer umfassenden Studie im Buch anschaulich sowie präzise erläutert.


Weltweit nimmt die öffentliche Verbreitung von Antisemitismen über das Internet drastisch zu. Dabei zeigt sich, dass uralte judenfeindliche Stereotype sich mit aktuellen Konzeptualisierungen verbinden. Die Basis von Judenhass zeigt sich unabhängig von politischen, sozialen, ideologischen und ökonomischen Faktoren als ein kultureller Gefühlswert, der auf der Wahnvorstellung fußt, Juden seien das Übel in der Welt. Anhand zahlreicher Beispiele aus der Internet-Kommunikation erörtert Monika Schwarz-Friesel, dass sich zwar oberflächliche Formen und kommunikative Prozesse im digitalen Zeitalter verändern, der alte kollektive Hass gegenüber Juden jedoch ungebrochen die semantische Grundlage ist.

Dabei zeigt sich, dass Antisemitismus nicht bloß ein Vorurteilssystem ist, sondern ein auf Phantasmen basierendes Weltdeutungssystem, das über Sprachgebrauchsmuster ständig reproduziert wird und im kollektiven Bewusstsein lebendig bleibt. Auch die Erfahrung des Holocaust hat diese Tradition nicht gebrochen. Den aktuellen Antisemitismus und seine derzeit dominanten Manifestationen des Anti-Zionismus und Anti-Israelismus kann man daher nicht ohne seine kulturhistorische Dimension verstehen.
Date: 2020
Abstract: Antisemitismus ist ein umfassendes Phänomen der Ausgrenzung, das unabhängig von Alter, Religion, Herkunft, Bildungsabschluss, Geschlecht oder Hautfarbe auftritt. Somit liegt es im gesamtgesellschaftlichen Interesse, seine Ausdrucksformen und die ihm zugrunde liegenden Ursachen zu erkennen, zu begreifen und – aus der Geschichte lernend – wiederkehrende antisemitisch motivierte, eskalierende Bedrohungen rechtzeitig wahrzunehmen und zu unterbinden. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit antisemitischen Haltungen, Denkfiguren und Handlungen sowie ein faktenbasiertes Wissen gehören daher in den Kanon politischer Bildung.
Dieses Buch erscheint in einem historischen Kontext, in dem Risse in der Fassade des gemeinsamen deutsch-jüdischen Gebäudes erkennbar geworden sind. Mit dem zunehmenden zeitlichen Abstand zum Nationalsozialismus und dem Verblassen der Erinnerung nehmen Geschichtskonstruktionen, Verzerrungen oder Leugnungen der historischen Geschehnisse zu. Subtile antisemitische Einstellungen werden immer häufiger durch offen vorgetragene juden- und israelfeindliche Positionen überlagert.
Der Band diskutiert aktuelle Antisemitismus-Studien in Hinblick auf ihre pädagogischen Konsequenzen aus wissenschaftlichen, politischen und bildungspolitischen Perspektiven.

Mit Beiträgen von Matthias J. Becker | Uwe Becker | Julia Bernstein | Michael Blume | Micha Brumlik | Marina Chernivsky | Florian Diddens | Andreas Eberhardt | Thomas Eppenstein | Matthias Heyl | Dervis Hizarci | Doron Kiesel | Felix Klein | Salomon Korn | Deborah Krieg | Thomas Krüger | Yael Kupferberg | Beate Küpper | Simon Lengemann | Friederike Lorenz | Harry Schnabel | Stefanie Schüler-Springorum | Monika Schwarz-Friesel | Luisa Maria Schweizer | Christian Staffa | Natan Sznaider | Christiane Thompson | Martin Vahrenhorst | Greta Zelener | Andreas Zick

Konzept und Redaktion: Doron Kiesel, Thomas Eppenstein

Inhalt

Doron Kiesel & Thomas Eppenstein: Einleitung
Salomon Korn: „Die Erforschung des Antisemitismus in all seinen chamäleonhaften, gefährlichen Erscheinungsformen bleibt unverzichtbar.“
Harry Schnabel: „Antisemitische Attacken sind schlimm genug, aber noch schlimmer ist es, diese zu ertragen, wenn alle wegschauen.“
Felix Klein: „Wir brauchen neue und bessere Instrumente im Kampf gegen den
Antisemitismus.“
Uwe Becker: „Es ist nicht hinnehmbar, dass das Wort ,Jude‘ heute wieder als
Schimpfwort auf Schulhöfen gebraucht wird.“
Greta Zelener: „Nie wieder“? – Es war nie weg. Pädagogische Ansätze zur
Antisemitismusbekämpfung
Yael Kupferberg: Antisemitismus in Deutschland – Kontinuität oder Zeitenwende?
Natan Sznaider: Antisemitismus zwischen Schwertern und Pflugscharen
Christian Staffa: Von der gesellschaftlichen Notwendigkeit christlicher Antisemitismuskritik
Micha Brumlik: Erziehung zur Mündigkeit und Kritik des Autoritären
Christiane Thompson: Erziehung nach Auschwitz – Erziehung nach den Antisemitismus-Studien?
Stefanie Schüler-Springorum: Antisemitismus-Studien – ein Überblick
Andreas Eberhardt & Luisa Maria Schweizer: Antisemitismus-Studien und ihre Folgen für die historisch-politische Bildungsarbeit
Beate Küpper & Andreas Zick: Antisemitische Einstellungen in Deutschland – Befunde aus Bevölkerungsumfragen und Ableitungen für die politische Bildung
Julia Bernstein & Florian Diddens: Antisemitismus an Schulen
Marina Chernivsky & Friederike Lorenz: „Das ist überhaupt nicht greifbar, und deswegen ist es so schwer, dagegen auch was zu machen“ – Eine Studie zu Antisemitismus im Bildungswesen
Monika Schwarz-Friesel: Antisemitismus im Web 2.0 – Judenhass zwischen Kontinuität und digitaler Adaption
Matthias J. Becker: Antisemitismus im Internet – eine unterschätzte Herausforderung mit wissenschaftlichem Handlungsbedarf
Thomas Krüger & Simon Lengemann: Antisemitismus und „Volksgemeinschaft“. Notwendige Impulse für historisch-politische Bildung in identitären Zeiten
Thomas Eppenstein: Grenzen und Spannungsfelder antisemitismuskritischer Bildung
Deborah Krieg: Bildungsarbeit gegen Antisemitismus – Perspektiven für die Praxis
Derviş Hızarcı: „Du Jude“ – Wie man mit Diskriminierung im Unterricht umgeht
Michael Blume: Welche Bildung hilft gegen Antisemitismus?
Martin Vahrenhorst: Der Umgang mit Antisemitismus im christlichen Religionsunterricht
Matthias Heyl: Was können bundesdeutsche KZ-Gedenkstätten zu einer
antisemitismuskritischen Bildungsarbeit beitragen?
Date: 2004
Date: 2009
Abstract: Placards carrying images of swastikas superimposed on the Star of David and the Israeli flag were commonplace in street-level protests about the recent Israeli military actions and the conflict in Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009. Allusions between Nazi genocidal practices and the activities of the Israeli state were also drawn in some of the speeches at protest meetings and press commentary on the conflict. Although this was not the first occasion that the ‘Nazi card’ had been played against Israel and Jews, the prevalence of the phenomenon appears to indicate its growing normalisation. Playing the ‘Nazi card’ is a discursive act involving the use of Nazi or related terms or symbols (Nazism, Hitler, swastikas, etc.) in reference to Jews, Israel, Zionism or aspects of the Jewish experience. It manifests in words uttered in speech or in writing, or in visual representations such as artwork, drawings, caricatures, cartoons, graffiti, daubings and scratchings, or visual expressions such as a Nazi salute or the clicking of heels. In many instances, the playing of the Nazi card is unquestionably antisemitic. However, the inclusion of particular modes of criticism of Israel in definitions of antisemitism has provoked controversy. The result has been a war of words which has stagnated into an intellectual and discursive cul-de-sac of claim and counter-claim about what does and does not qualify as antisemitism. Because of this, in focusing on discourse, this report attempts to shift the focus of analysis of contemporary antisemitism onto new ground: away from labelling and defining the problem, to an understanding of the consequences of particular discourse. By unravelling and dissecting various manifestations of the phenomenon, the report reveals how the playing of the Nazi card scratches deep wounds by invoking painful collective memory of the Holocaust. It also offers some recommendations as to how the problem might be addressed.
Date: 2020
Abstract: In this article, we conduct a comprehensive study of online antagonistic content related to Jewish identity posted on Twitter between October 2015 and October 2016 by UK-based users. We trained a scalable supervised machine learning classifier to identify antisemitic content to reveal patterns of online antisemitism perpetration at the source. We built statistical models to analyze the inhibiting and enabling factors of the size (number of retweets) and survival (duration of retweets) of information flows in addition to the production of online antagonistic content. Despite observing high temporal variability, we found that only a small proportion (0.7%) of the content was antagonistic. We also found that antagonistic content was less likely to disseminate in size or survive for a longer period. Information flows from antisemitic agents on Twitter gained less traction, while information flows emanating from capable and willing counter-speech actors—that is, Jewish organizations—had a significantly higher size and survival rates. This study is the first to demonstrate that Sampson’s classic sociological concept of collective efficacy can be observed on social media (SM). Our findings suggest that when organizations aiming to counter harmful narratives become active on SM platforms, their messages propagate further and achieve greater longevity than antagonistic messages. On SM, counter-speech posted by credible, capable and willing actors can be an effective measure to prevent harmful narratives. Based on our findings, we underline the value of the work by community organizations in reducing the propagation of cyberhate and increasing trust in SM platforms.
Date: 2020
Author(s): Elman, R Amy
Date: 2015
Date: 2015
Date: 2002
Abstract: The article presents the results of surveys done on anti-Semitism in Poland in 1992, which in part were compared to results from a 1996 survey. The group, under the author's direction researched anti-Semitism in the context of Poles' attitudes towards other nations, as well as in terms of their own national identity. Two types of anti-Semitic attitudes were observed: traditional, religiously grounded anti-Semitism, and anti-Semitism rooted in anti-Semitic political ideology, of the type that has developed since in the French Revolution. Traditional anti-Semitism occurs only among older people who are not well educated and live in rural areas; increased education results in the disappearance of this type of anti-Semitism. Modern anti-Semitism, on the other hand occurs among both the lowest and most highly educated groups in society. Moreover, from 1992 to 1996, the percentage of the respondents declaring anti-Semitic views increased. At the same time, however, there was also a larger increase in the number of respondents declaring anti-anti-Semitic views, which has meant that there has been a clear polarization of attitudes. Having a university education makes a person more likely to be ill-disposed toward anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, the attitude of Poles toward Jews cannot be described simply on the basis of anti-Semitic attitudes. The researchers noted that there was also an attitude of "not liking Jews", which was less engaged than the anti-Semitic views, and to a large extent a result of the content comprising Polish national identity. The model of Polishness assumes a Romantic-Messianic image of the Polish nation. According to this model, Poles see themselves as being distinguished by their noble fulfillment of obligations, even when it is to their own detriment, particularly with respect to symbolic Jews and Germans. Researchers also assumed that there was a particular kind of competition between Poles and Jews with respect to the moral superiority of their respective nations. The results from 1992 in part confirmed this hypothesis.
Author(s): Allington, Daniel
Date: 2018
Abstract: Existing research suggests that, in contemporary liberal democracies, complaints of racism are routinely rejected and prejudice may be both expressed and disavowed in the same breath. Surveys and historical research have established that – both in democratic states and in those of the Soviet Bloc (while it existed) – antisemitism has long been related to or expressed in the form of statements about Israel or ‘Zionist’, permitting anti-Jewish attitudes to circulate under cover of political critique. This article looks at how the findings of a survey of anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli attitudes were rejected by users of three Facebook pages associated with the British Left. Through thematic discourse analysis, three recurrent repertoires are identified: firstly, what David Hirsh calls the ‘Livingstone Formulation’ (i.e. the argument that complaints of antisemitism are made in bad faith to protect Israel and/or attack the Left), secondly, accusations of flawed methodology similar to those with which UK Labour Party supporters routinely dismiss the findings of unfavourable opinion polls, and thirdly, the argument that, because certain classically antisemitic beliefs pertain to a supposed Jewish or ‘Zionist’ elite and not to Jews in general, they are not antisemitic. In one case, the latter repertoire facilitates virtually unopposed apologism for Adolf Hitler. Contextual evidence suggests that the dominance of such repertoires within one very large UK Labour Party-aligned group may be the result of action on the part of certain ‘admins’ or moderators. It is argued that awareness of the repertoires used to express and defend antisemitic attitudes should inform the design of quantitative research into the latter, and be taken account of in the formulation of policy measures aiming to restrict or counter hate speech (in social media and elsewhere).
Author(s): Partington, Alan
Date: 2012