Abstract: Scholars have drawn attention to the prevalence of antizionist campaigning on campus, but previous studies have found lower levels of antisemitism among graduates. In this cross-sectional study, levels of antisemitism were measured among members of a large, demographically representative sample of UK residents (N = 1725), using the Generalised Antisemitism (GeAs) scale. Overall scores, as well as scores for the two subscales of this scale (that is, Judeophobic Antisemitism, JpAs, and Antizionist Antisemitism, AzAs) were measured, with comparisons being made according to educational level (degree-educated vs non-degree educated) and subject area (among degree holders only, classified using the JACS 3.0 principal subject area codes). Degree holders were found to have significantly lower scores than non-degree holders for Generalised Antisemitism and Judeophobic Antisemitism, while scores for Antizionist Antisemitism were effectively identical. Among degree holders, graduates from subjects under the JACS 3.0 umbrella category of Historical and Philosophical Studies exhibited significantly lower scores for Generalised Antisemitism and Judeophobic Antisemitism, and lower scores for Antizionist Antisemitism, although the latter association fell short of significance following application of the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (unsurprisingly, given the large number of hypotheses and the small absolute number of respondents in this category, N = 65). Exploratory analysis of the dataset suggests possible further negative associations with antisemitism for graduates of economics, psychology, and counselling, which may have been concealed by the system of categories employed. These associations may have intuitive theoretical explanations. However, further research will be necessary to test whether they are statistically robust. The article concludes with a discussion of possible theoretical explanations for observed patterns, and some suggestions for further research.
Abstract: Scholars have drawn attention to the prevalence of antizionist campaigning on campus, but previous studies have found lower levels of antisemitism among graduates. In this cross-sectional study, levels of antisemitism were measured among members of a large, demographically representative sample of UK residents (N = 1725), using the Generalised Antisemitism (GeAs) scale. Overall scores, as well as scores for the two subscales of this scale (that is, Judeophobic Antisemitism, JpAs, and Antizionist Antisemitism, AzAs) were measured, with comparisons being made according to educational level (degree-educated vs non-degree educated) and subject area (among degree holders only, classified using the JACS 3.0 principal subject area codes). Degree holders were found to have significantly lower scores than non-degree holders for Generalised Antisemitism and Judeophobic Antisemitism, while scores for Antizionist Antisemitism were effectively identical. Among degree holders, graduates from subjects under the JACS 3.0 umbrella category of Historical and Philosophical Studies exhibited significantly lower scores for Generalised Antisemitism and Judeophobic Antisemitism, and lower scores for Antizionist Antisemitism, although the latter association fell short of significance following application of the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (unsurprisingly, given the large number of hypotheses and the small absolute number of respondents in this category, N = 65). Exploratory analysis of the dataset suggests possible further negative associations with antisemitism for graduates of economics, psychology, and counselling, which may have been concealed by the system of categories employed. These associations may have intuitive theoretical explanations. However, further research will be necessary to test whether they are statistically robust. The article concludes with a discussion of possible theoretical explanations for observed patterns, and some suggestions for further research
Abstract: This cross-sectional study follows Open Science principles in estimating relationships between antisemitism, i.e. anti-Jewish bigotry, and conspiracy belief, i.e. endorsement of conspiracy theories, through analysis of data collected from a representative sample of UK adults (n=1722). Antisemitism was measured using the Generalized Antisemitism scale, and conspiracy belief was measured using the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale. Positive relationships were found to exist between all forms of antisemitism and all types of conspiracy belief, and an average across all items of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale was found to predict Generalized Antisemitism at least as well as any individual type of conspiracy belief. On a more detailed level, antisemitic attitudes relating to British Jews were found to be most strongly associated with belief in conspiracies relating to personal well-being, while antisemitic attitudes relating to the State of Israel and its supporters were found to be most strongly associated with belief in conspiracies relating to government malfeasance. Generalized Antisemitism itself was found to be most strongly associated with belief in malevolent global conspiracies. Exploratory analysis additionally examined the effect of standard demographic variables that had been introduced into the main analysis as controls. Through this means, it was found that antisemitic attitudes relating both to Jews qua Jews and to Israel and its supporters are more prevalent among less highly educated people and members of other-than-white ethnic groups, while antisemitic attitudes relating to Israel and its supporters are more common among younger people. In addition, it was found that female gender is associated with reduced antisemitic attitudes relating to Jews qua Jews and also with increased antisemitic attitudes relating to Israel and its supporters. However, the addition of demographic controls did not explain any additional variance in Generalized Antisemitism beyond that which was already explained by conspiracy belief – perhaps suggesting that demographic characteristics are more strongly associated with the inclination towards particular expressions of antisemitism than with antisemitism itself.
Abstract: Two cross-sectional studies were carried out in order to identify predictors of antisemitism, measured using the Generalised Antisemitism or GeAs scale. In the first, which used a self-selecting sample of UK-resident adults (n = 809), age, gender, ethnicity, and educational level as well as a wide range of ideological predictors were analysed as bivariate predictors of antisemitism. In the second, which used a representative sample of UK-resident adults (n = 1853), the same demographic predictors plus the non-demographic predictors found to have the strongest bivariate relationships with Generalised Antisemitism in the previous study were used to construct a linear model with multiple predictors. Ethnicity, support for totalitarian government, belief in malevolent global conspiracies, and anti-hierarchical aggression were identified as the strongest predictors of Generalised Antisemitism. However, support for totalitarian government was only found to predict ‘old’ antisemitic attitudes (measured using the Judeophobic Antisemitism or JpAs subscale) and not ‘new’ antisemitic attitudes (measured using the Antizionist Antisemitism or AzAs subscale), whereas ethnicity, anti-hierarchical aggression, and belief in malevolent global conspiracies were found to predict both ‘old’ and ‘new’ antisemitic attitudes. This finding adds nuance to ongoing debates about whether antisemitism is more prevalent on the political right or left, by suggesting that (at least in the UK) it is instead associated with a conspiracist view of the world, a desire to overturn the social order, and a preference for authoritarian forms of government—all of which may exist on the right, the left, and elsewhere. Data from both samples are open, as is the code used in order to carry out the analyses presented here.
Abstract: This article validates the Generalised Antisemitism (GeAs) scale, which provides a measure of antisemitism consistent with the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of Antisemitism (generally known as the IHRA Definition). The GeAs scale is comprised of two 6-item subscales, each containing a balance of reverse-coded items: the Judeophobic Antisemitism (JpAs) subscale, comprised of antisemitic statements about Jews as Jews, and the Antizionist Antisemitism (AzAs) subscale, comprised of antisemitic statements about Israel and its supporters. Pre-registered tests of convergent-discriminant validity are carried out using a quota sample (n= 602), which is also used to test the pre-registered hypothesis of positive correlation between subscales. The latter is supported and shown to be robust to outliers, as well as to hold both among male and female respondents and among younger and older respondents. Test-retest reliability is measured using re-invitees from the first sample (n= 428). Data from larger samples of UK-resident adults (a quota sample balanced for age and gender, n= 809, and a representative random sample from a recruited panel, n= 1853) are used in a confirmatory factor analysis and in tests of measurement invariance. The findings provide further evidence that the GeAs scale is reliable and valid. The finding that improved fit is achieved by bifactor models featuring two group factors and a general factor is consistent with the view that statements characteristic of ‘old’ and ‘new’ antisemitism express a single underlying trait.
Abstract: The 3-year pilot project presented here aims at analyzing antisemitic hate speech and imagery on mainstream news websites and social media platforms in different European contexts. Current forms of antisemitism will be examined in various ways by three international research teams from Germany, France, and the UK.
First, the datasets will be studied in detail (qualitative analysis based on pragmalinguistic, image analytical and historical approaches), taking into account explicit as well as implicit forms of communication (TU Berlin).
The resulting annotated datasets will provide training, validation, and test data for supervised machine learning techniques (King’s College London).
Eventually, all studied phenomena will be measured over time through statistical/quantitative analysis (TU Berlin and King’s College London).
The project stands in contrast to previous quantitative research on antisemitism online due to a) its awareness of verbal and visual complexity in the respective cultural and situational contexts, and b) its detailed, multimodal approach. Thus, it will provide the most accurate picture yet of the full extent of Jew-hatred on the interactive web.
The focus of the pilot project will be on German, English and French websites and their respective social media platforms. After the initial three year period, the focus will broaden out to investigate other European language communities.
The project will make a major contribution to the study of viral hate in different cultural contexts. Moreover, the researchers will engage in an ongoing dialogue not only with academia, but also with political, media and pedagogical institutions. An additional output will be an open source tool that will help to identify the full extent of antisemitism in various web milieus.
The half-yearly discourse reports share central insights of the ongoing research outcomes of the project "Decoding Antisemitism" and review unfolding trends.
The second discourse report presents the definitional basis of our analyses and for the first time provides comprehensive insights into our corpus analyses relating to Great Britain, France and Germany.
Abstract: The 3-year pilot project presented here aims at analyzing antisemitic hate speech and imagery on mainstream news websites and social media platforms in different European contexts. Current forms of antisemitism will be examined in various ways by three international research teams from Germany, France, and the UK.
First, the datasets will be studied in detail (qualitative analysis based on pragmalinguistic, image analytical and historical approaches), taking into account explicit as well as implicit forms of communication (TU Berlin).
The resulting annotated datasets will provide training, validation, and test data for supervised machine learning techniques (King’s College London).
Eventually, all studied phenomena will be measured over time through statistical/quantitative analysis (TU Berlin and King’s College London).
The project stands in contrast to previous quantitative research on antisemitism online due to a) its awareness of verbal and visual complexity in the respective cultural and situational contexts, and b) its detailed, multimodal approach. Thus, it will provide the most accurate picture yet of the full extent of Jew-hatred on the interactive web.
The focus of the pilot project will be on German, English and French websites and their respective social media platforms. After the initial three year period, the focus will broaden out to investigate other European language communities.
The project will make a major contribution to the study of viral hate in different cultural contexts. Moreover, the researchers will engage in an ongoing dialogue not only with academia, but also with political, media and pedagogical institutions. An additional output will be an open source tool that will help to identify the full extent of antisemitism in various web milieus.
The half-yearly discourse reports share central insights of the ongoing research outcomes of the project "Decoding Antisemitism" and review unfolding trends.
The first discourse report provides insight into the methodological approaches and the nature of antisemitic hate speech in selected discourse spaces.
Abstract: Executive summary
• Three of the four ‘alternative media’ platforms analysed were found to promote a
negative view of Jews
• The fourth was found to promote a negative view of Muslims, but not of Jews
(although it sometimes made use of arguments and images that are in other
contexts used to stigmatise Jews)
• A significant relationship was found between holding antisemitic views and having a
positive opinion of each of the three platforms that were found to promote a
negative view of Jews
• A significant relationship was also found between holding antisemitic views and
having a positive opinion of the Russian state-owned propaganda broadcaster, RT
(formerly Russia Today)
• By contrast, there was no relationship, or a substantially weaker and more conflicted
relationship, between antisemitism and evaluation of named ‘mainstream media’
sources
• Moreover, drawing on the ‘mainstream media’ in general for political information
was associated with lower levels of antisemitism
• In the interests of reducing prejudice, it would appear desirable to encourage use of
high quality, reputable sources of information at the expense of low quality fringe
sources
• Partial solutions to the problem could include:
- Demonetisation of problematic websites (for example, through withdrawal of
advertising)
- De-prioritisation of content from such websites in social media news feeds
and search algorithms
- Guidelines for members or employees of organisations such as political
parties, voluntary sector organisations, trade unions, and media companies,
both against sharing content or repeating claims from such websites and
against providing them with content in the form of interviews, quotations, or
stories
- In extreme cases, legal or regulatory sanctions against the owners of the
websites themselves
• However, it is at least as important for government, individual consumers, and other
stakeholders (including social media companies) to play their part in ensuring that
reputable media-producing organisations are able to remain viable as businesses
that can both invest in and promote high-quality content within a democratic
regulatory framework
Abstract: Through secondary analysis of survey data collected by YouGov for Campaign Against Antisemitism, this research note provides a longitudinal account of changes in Judeophobic antisemitism (that is, antisemitism articulated in relation to Jews identified as Jews) in mainland Britain from 2016-2020. Because survey responses are aggregated by most recent general election vote, the dataset facilitates comparison between those who voted for each of Britain’s three main parties in the 2015, 2017, and 2019 UK general elections. (Those who voted for other parties, as well as those who did not vote and those for whom voting data are missing, are aggregated as a fourth category.) Amongst those who voted for the centrist Liberal Democrat party, levels of Judeophobic antisemitism declined throughout the period. Amongst those who voted for the left-wing Labour Party, levels of Judeophobic antisemitism began at a low level, rose to a peak in 2018, and then declined, returning to something close to their 2016 level by 2020. Changes amongst other voter groups were less clear-cut, although all voter groups saw a decline in Judeophobic antisemitism from 2019 to 2020. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze trends in antizionist antisemitism (that is, antisemitism articulated in relation to Israel and its supporters), comparative figures for that form of antisemitism are provided for the years 2019–2020.
Abstract: Existing research suggests that, in contemporary liberal democracies, complaints of racism are routinely rejected and prejudice may be both expressed and disavowed in the same breath. Surveys and historical research have established that – both in democratic states and in those of the Soviet Bloc (while it existed) – antisemitism has long been related to or expressed in the form of statements about Israel or ‘Zionist’, permitting anti-Jewish attitudes to circulate under cover of political critique. This article looks at how the findings of a survey of anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli attitudes were rejected by users of three Facebook pages associated with the British Left. Through thematic discourse analysis, three recurrent repertoires are identified: firstly, what David Hirsh calls the ‘Livingstone Formulation’ (i.e. the argument that complaints of antisemitism are made in bad faith to protect Israel and/or attack the Left), secondly, accusations of flawed methodology similar to those with which UK Labour Party supporters routinely dismiss the findings of unfavourable opinion polls, and thirdly, the argument that, because certain classically antisemitic beliefs pertain to a supposed Jewish or ‘Zionist’ elite and not to Jews in general, they are not antisemitic. In one case, the latter repertoire facilitates virtually unopposed apologism for Adolf Hitler. Contextual evidence suggests that the dominance of such repertoires within one very large UK Labour Party-aligned group may be the result of action on the part of certain ‘admins’ or moderators. It is argued that awareness of the repertoires used to express and defend antisemitic attitudes should inform the design of quantitative research into the latter, and be taken account of in the formulation of policy measures aiming to restrict or counter hate speech (in social media and elsewhere).
