Abstract: Scholars have drawn attention to the prevalence of antizionist campaigning on campus, but previous studies have found lower levels of antisemitism among graduates. In this cross-sectional study, levels of antisemitism were measured among members of a large, demographically representative sample of UK residents (N = 1725), using the Generalised Antisemitism (GeAs) scale. Overall scores, as well as scores for the two subscales of this scale (that is, Judeophobic Antisemitism, JpAs, and Antizionist Antisemitism, AzAs) were measured, with comparisons being made according to educational level (degree-educated vs non-degree educated) and subject area (among degree holders only, classified using the JACS 3.0 principal subject area codes). Degree holders were found to have significantly lower scores than non-degree holders for Generalised Antisemitism and Judeophobic Antisemitism, while scores for Antizionist Antisemitism were effectively identical. Among degree holders, graduates from subjects under the JACS 3.0 umbrella category of Historical and Philosophical Studies exhibited significantly lower scores for Generalised Antisemitism and Judeophobic Antisemitism, and lower scores for Antizionist Antisemitism, although the latter association fell short of significance following application of the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (unsurprisingly, given the large number of hypotheses and the small absolute number of respondents in this category, N = 65). Exploratory analysis of the dataset suggests possible further negative associations with antisemitism for graduates of economics, psychology, and counselling, which may have been concealed by the system of categories employed. These associations may have intuitive theoretical explanations. However, further research will be necessary to test whether they are statistically robust. The article concludes with a discussion of possible theoretical explanations for observed patterns, and some suggestions for further research.
Abstract: Scholars have drawn attention to the prevalence of antizionist campaigning on campus, but previous studies have found lower levels of antisemitism among graduates. In this cross-sectional study, levels of antisemitism were measured among members of a large, demographically representative sample of UK residents (N = 1725), using the Generalised Antisemitism (GeAs) scale. Overall scores, as well as scores for the two subscales of this scale (that is, Judeophobic Antisemitism, JpAs, and Antizionist Antisemitism, AzAs) were measured, with comparisons being made according to educational level (degree-educated vs non-degree educated) and subject area (among degree holders only, classified using the JACS 3.0 principal subject area codes). Degree holders were found to have significantly lower scores than non-degree holders for Generalised Antisemitism and Judeophobic Antisemitism, while scores for Antizionist Antisemitism were effectively identical. Among degree holders, graduates from subjects under the JACS 3.0 umbrella category of Historical and Philosophical Studies exhibited significantly lower scores for Generalised Antisemitism and Judeophobic Antisemitism, and lower scores for Antizionist Antisemitism, although the latter association fell short of significance following application of the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (unsurprisingly, given the large number of hypotheses and the small absolute number of respondents in this category, N = 65). Exploratory analysis of the dataset suggests possible further negative associations with antisemitism for graduates of economics, psychology, and counselling, which may have been concealed by the system of categories employed. These associations may have intuitive theoretical explanations. However, further research will be necessary to test whether they are statistically robust. The article concludes with a discussion of possible theoretical explanations for observed patterns, and some suggestions for further research
Abstract: This cross-sectional study follows Open Science principles in estimating relationships between antisemitism, i.e. anti-Jewish bigotry, and conspiracy belief, i.e. endorsement of conspiracy theories, through analysis of data collected from a representative sample of UK adults (n=1722). Antisemitism was measured using the Generalized Antisemitism scale, and conspiracy belief was measured using the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale. Positive relationships were found to exist between all forms of antisemitism and all types of conspiracy belief, and an average across all items of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale was found to predict Generalized Antisemitism at least as well as any individual type of conspiracy belief. On a more detailed level, antisemitic attitudes relating to British Jews were found to be most strongly associated with belief in conspiracies relating to personal well-being, while antisemitic attitudes relating to the State of Israel and its supporters were found to be most strongly associated with belief in conspiracies relating to government malfeasance. Generalized Antisemitism itself was found to be most strongly associated with belief in malevolent global conspiracies. Exploratory analysis additionally examined the effect of standard demographic variables that had been introduced into the main analysis as controls. Through this means, it was found that antisemitic attitudes relating both to Jews qua Jews and to Israel and its supporters are more prevalent among less highly educated people and members of other-than-white ethnic groups, while antisemitic attitudes relating to Israel and its supporters are more common among younger people. In addition, it was found that female gender is associated with reduced antisemitic attitudes relating to Jews qua Jews and also with increased antisemitic attitudes relating to Israel and its supporters. However, the addition of demographic controls did not explain any additional variance in Generalized Antisemitism beyond that which was already explained by conspiracy belief – perhaps suggesting that demographic characteristics are more strongly associated with the inclination towards particular expressions of antisemitism than with antisemitism itself.
Abstract: Two cross-sectional studies were carried out in order to identify predictors of antisemitism, measured using the Generalised Antisemitism or GeAs scale. In the first, which used a self-selecting sample of UK-resident adults (n = 809), age, gender, ethnicity, and educational level as well as a wide range of ideological predictors were analysed as bivariate predictors of antisemitism. In the second, which used a representative sample of UK-resident adults (n = 1853), the same demographic predictors plus the non-demographic predictors found to have the strongest bivariate relationships with Generalised Antisemitism in the previous study were used to construct a linear model with multiple predictors. Ethnicity, support for totalitarian government, belief in malevolent global conspiracies, and anti-hierarchical aggression were identified as the strongest predictors of Generalised Antisemitism. However, support for totalitarian government was only found to predict ‘old’ antisemitic attitudes (measured using the Judeophobic Antisemitism or JpAs subscale) and not ‘new’ antisemitic attitudes (measured using the Antizionist Antisemitism or AzAs subscale), whereas ethnicity, anti-hierarchical aggression, and belief in malevolent global conspiracies were found to predict both ‘old’ and ‘new’ antisemitic attitudes. This finding adds nuance to ongoing debates about whether antisemitism is more prevalent on the political right or left, by suggesting that (at least in the UK) it is instead associated with a conspiracist view of the world, a desire to overturn the social order, and a preference for authoritarian forms of government—all of which may exist on the right, the left, and elsewhere. Data from both samples are open, as is the code used in order to carry out the analyses presented here.
Abstract: This paper focuses on struggles over how antisemitism is defined. Struggles over definition are themselves part of the wider struggle between those who say that hostility to Israel is important in understanding contemporary antisemitism and those who say that these two phenomena are quite separate. A key question, therefore, is what kinds of hostility to Israel may be understood as, or may lead to, or may be caused by, antisemitism?
In this paper I analyse three case studies of struggles over how antisemitism is defined. First, I trace a genealogy of the EUMC (European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, now the Agency For Fundamental Rights, FRA) Working Definition of Antisemitism. I show how this definition emerged out of a process of splitting between the global antiracist movement on the one hand and Jewish-led opposition to antisemitism on the other. At the Durban ‘World Conference against Racism’ in September 2001, there was a largely successful attempt to construct Zionism as the key form of racism on the planet; this would encourage people to relate to the overwhelming majority of Jews, who refuse to disavow Zionism, as if they were racists. In response, some Jewish NGOs found that they could get a hearing for their concerns within the structures of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union. If Durban is thought of as a non-white global forum and if the OSCE and the European Union are thought of as networks of white states, then the antagonism between non-white antiracism and white anxiety about antisemitism becomes visible and concerning. The clash between anti-Zionism on the one hand and the claim that antizionism is related to antisemitism on the other plays out within the realm of discourse and then it is also mirrored institutionally in these global struggles over the definition of antisemitism.
Second, I go on to look at a case study of alleged antisemitism within the University and College Union (UCU) which was related to the partial success within the union of the campaign to boycott Israel. The explicit disavowal of the EUMC definition during the 2011 UCU Congress can be understood as the climax of a process of struggle within the union over the recognition of a relationship between hostility to Israel and antisemitism.
The third case study is an analysis of two formal processes which were asked to adjudicate whether hostility to Israel had become antisemitic: the UCU v Fraser case at the Employment Tribunal in 2012 and the Shami Chakrabarti Inquiry into Antisemitism and Other Racisms in the Labour Party in 2016. The EUMC definition of antisemitism offers a framework for understanding the potential of certain kinds of hostility to Israel to be antisemitic. The further argument was made within the UCU, as well as to the Employment Tribunal and to the Chakrabarti Inquiry, that cultures of hostility to Israel and of support for boycotts tend to bring with them, into institutions which harbour them, cultures of antisemitism. The structures of the Union, as well as the two inquiries, wholeheartedly rejected both the claims: first, that a politics of hostility to Israel manifests itself in antisemitism in these cases; and second, that a cultural or institutional antisemitism, analogous to institutional racism, could be identified in the UCU or the Labour Party.
This paper asks whether these wholehearted rejections of claims about antisemitism are themselves implicated in the functioning of contemporary antisemitism. Denial of racism is a necessary element of those kinds of racism which do not see themselves as racist. Perhaps the hostility to the EUMC definition and to arguments about cultural or institutional antisemitism is a necessary component of the anti-Zionist discourses and cultures themselves which arguably relate in complex ways to antisemitism.
Abstract: This article validates the Generalised Antisemitism (GeAs) scale, which provides a measure of antisemitism consistent with the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of Antisemitism (generally known as the IHRA Definition). The GeAs scale is comprised of two 6-item subscales, each containing a balance of reverse-coded items: the Judeophobic Antisemitism (JpAs) subscale, comprised of antisemitic statements about Jews as Jews, and the Antizionist Antisemitism (AzAs) subscale, comprised of antisemitic statements about Israel and its supporters. Pre-registered tests of convergent-discriminant validity are carried out using a quota sample (n= 602), which is also used to test the pre-registered hypothesis of positive correlation between subscales. The latter is supported and shown to be robust to outliers, as well as to hold both among male and female respondents and among younger and older respondents. Test-retest reliability is measured using re-invitees from the first sample (n= 428). Data from larger samples of UK-resident adults (a quota sample balanced for age and gender, n= 809, and a representative random sample from a recruited panel, n= 1853) are used in a confirmatory factor analysis and in tests of measurement invariance. The findings provide further evidence that the GeAs scale is reliable and valid. The finding that improved fit is achieved by bifactor models featuring two group factors and a general factor is consistent with the view that statements characteristic of ‘old’ and ‘new’ antisemitism express a single underlying trait.
